



BESIDE THEMSELVES:  




















A thesis submitted to  
Royal Holloway, University of London 
for the degree of  





















This thesis would not be what it is were it not for the guidance and friendship of Eric 
Langley, who believed in me, and in this thesis, before I did. More than words can wield 
the matter, I feel privileged to have had seven years discussing all of this with him.  
 
I am incredibly grateful to Deana Rankin for her advice and insight on this project. 
Thanks also to Kiernan Ryan for supervising the first year of my doctoral research, and 
to Harry Newman for notes on several of the chapters that follow. To go back to the 
beginning, I would also like to thank Clare Keen and Maureen Lenehan for setting me 
on this path in the first place.  
 
This project has received generous support from TECHNE, and benefited greatly from 
a short-term fellowship at the Huntington Library in California. I am grateful to these 
bodies, and in particular to Carol Hughes and Jane Gawthrope who have always been 
willing to help. 
   
Thank you to my wonderful colleagues in Globe Education who have kept me going 
week on week, and especially to Will Tosh and Farah Karim-Cooper for their advice, 
support, and friendship. They inspire me more than I can say.   
 
I’ve been fortunate in sharing this journey with a number of friends and peers. In 
particular, I would like to thank Ursula Clayton, Richard Ashby, Jamie Birkett, Lucy 
Brown, and Emma Hayes, who have been real stars, and great drinking partners, 
throughout.  
 
Thank you to my family of Edwardses, Kendalls, and Garrods for their love and support, 
and especially to my Mum, sisters, and Sally and Toby. Special thanks to my late 
Grandmother, whose support made my MA studies possible.  
 
Finally, thank you to Josh Garrod. Without his love, support, and patience, this work 














‘Ecstasy’: the term’s usage spans the timeline of Shakespeare’s canon, registering for the 
first time in The Comedy of Errors (1589) and last in The Tempest (1611), a temporal range 
that suggests Shakespeare’s sustained interest in the word and the state it denotes. 
Derived from the Greek ek-stasis—ek (out of, away from, beyond) and histanai (to place, 
to stand)—the term translates as a flight of the soul from the body. Taking this as its 
working definition, but complicating the word’s valence by examining it in a number of 
literary and non-literary contexts, ‘Beside Themselves: Shakespeare’s Ecstatic Subjects’ 
examines characters made abject and alienated from their normal states, thrown beside 
or outside of themselves by love, grief, anger, rapture, trance, and intoxication. This 
thesis therefore explores artistic, religious, and philosophical conceptions and 
representations of  ecstasy in works of  the early modern period. More specifically, it 
considers how depictions of  the ecstatic condition in Renaissance literature are informed 
by their classical, medical, theological, and intellectual contexts, to demonstrate how 
moments of  profound selflessness—of  self-loss or self-division—are, paradoxically, 
symptomatic of  and central to an early modern conception of  interiority. In doing so, it 
illustrates that, for the Renaissance writer, ecstasy was not only a term denoting religious 
rapture, but rather had the capacity to be more broadly employed as an umbrella term 
denoting a range of  subjective experiences. To consider ecstasis—a moment of  extreme 
elation or radical desertion—is to consider the Renaissance subject in extremis, caught in 
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CRESSIDA  I have a kind of  self  resides with you,  
But an unkind self  that itself  will leave.1 
 
Troth I not know, nor whither, nor bout what;  
I am so utterly beside my selfe.2  
      
 
This thesis explores artistic, religious, and philosophical conceptions and representations 
of  ecstasy in works of  the early modern period. More specifically, it considers how 
depictions of  the ecstatic condition in Renaissance literature are informed by their 
philosophical, theological, and medical contexts, in order to demonstrate that these 
moments of  profound selflessness—of  self-loss or self-division—are, paradoxically, 
symptomatic of  and central to an early modern conception of  interiority and subjective 
experience. ‘I am … beside my selfe’: as the title of  this thesis suggests, this will be a 
recurring statement in what follows, for it is a recurring sentiment in early modern 
literature, where subjects compulsively find and assert themselves as being beside or 
outside of  themselves. ‘Besyde them selves and clene out of  their wyttes’; ‘sometime 
transported, and beside them selves’: these are the subjects of  this study.3  
‘With how many different pleasures, and all perfectly extreme, art thou ravished 
now, my soule? With what ravishments of  joy art thou transported beside thy selfe? In 
what sweet extasies art thou no[w] wandering?’:4 it is the ‘ability to goe out of  [the] selfe’,
                                                             
1 William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, III.ii.135-6. All subsequent references to Shakespeare’s 
works will be given in parenthesis within the text.  
2 Terence, ‘The Eunuch’, in The Two First Comedies of Terence called Andria, and the Eunuch, trans. 
Thomas Newman (London: by G. Miller, 1627), pp. 50-109 (71). 
3 Thomas Becon, A New Postil Conteinyng Most Godly and Learned Sermons vpon all the Sonday Gospelles 
(London: by Thomas Marshe and John Kingston, 1566), p. 172; Pierre de la Place, Politique 
Discourses, trans. Aegremont Ratcliffe (London: for Edward Aggas, 1578), p. 45. 
4 Terence, p. 71. 
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to borrow Anglican theologian Richard Sibbes’ formulation (1629), that is captured by 
the etymological construction of  ‘ecstasy’—derived from the Greek ek- (out of, away from, 
beyond) and histanai (to place, to stand).5 Central to the ecstatic experience is this sense of  
departure and displacement. As Judith Butler has it: ‘to be ec-static means, literally, to be 
outside oneself ’.6 Taking as its working definition this notion of  ecstasy as the experience 
of  standing outside or beside oneself, this thesis seeks to illuminate an early modern 
interest in models of  subjectivity that are defined by a painful yet productive displacement 
from the norm. To consider ecstasis—a moment of  extreme elation or radical 
desertion—is to consider the Renaissance subject in extremis, caught in what I will 








‘Paule thou art beside thy selfe’: in early modern England, ecstasy was a term deeply 
rooted in Christian thought, one that the Church had inherited from its classical 
counterparts.7 ‘For centuries before Erasmus’, M. A. Screech observes in his study of  
ecstasy in The Praise of  Folly, ‘ecstasy had come to mean the state of  a Christian who had 
been raptured outside of  [themselves]’, a state in which the subject would abandon their 
body in order to allow their spirit to connect with the divine: ‘I was in the spirit, that is, I 
was in a trance or ecstasie, and there received a vision, a revelation from God’.8 As 
                                                             
5 Richard Sibbes, The Saint’s Cordials (London: by Miles Flesher, 1629), p. 124. 
6 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), p. 24. 
7 Augustin Marlorat, A Catholike and Ecclesiasticall Exposition of the Holy Gospell after S. Marke and Luke, 
trans. Thomas Timme (London: by Thomas Marsh, 1583), p. 308. 
8 Michael Andrew Screech, Ecstasy and the Praise of Folly (London: Penguin, 1980), p. 49; Henry 
Hammond, A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Testament (London: by James 
Flesher, 1659), p. 591. 
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Catholic theologian St. François de Sales notes: 
Ecstasy is called rapture … because through it God draws us and raises us up to 
him; and rapture is called ecstasy in that, by it, we come out of  ourselves, remain 
out of  ourselves and above ourselves, in order to unite ourselves with God.9  
 
By this logic, all raptures are ecstasies, and vice versa. But for the early modern subject, 
‘ecstasy’ no longer simply connoted a rapturous, self-fulfilling encounter with the divine. 
Instead, it became a term that encompassed a variety of  more prosaic experiences, from 
falling in love to drunken or medical madness.  
Looking to the period’s most famous playwright, we find that the term ‘ecstasy’ 
spans the entire timeline of  Shakespeare’s canon, registering first in The Comedy of  Errors 
(1589) and last in The Tempest (1611): a temporal range that suggests a sustained interest 
in the word and the state it denotes. Yet, as a quick survey of  Shakespeare’s usage of  the 
term demonstrates, the state described is a varied and complex one. Take Ross in Macbeth, 
for example, for whom ‘a modern ecstasy’ is a ‘violent sorrow’ (IV.iii.170-1), just as the 
woman in ‘A Lover’s Complaint’, beside herself  with misery, is described as ‘suffering 
ecstasy’ (l. 69). In both cases, ‘ecstasy’ is at odds not only with the Christian model 
articulated above, but also with our ‘modern’ understanding of  the term as meaning 
‘intense delight’.10 More puzzling still are moments where Shakespeare’s uses of  the term 
seem to be at odds with each other. When, for instance, Shakespeare describes Venus as 
‘stand[ing] in trembling ecstasy’ (Ven., 895) in Venus and Adonis, he is marking out an 
experience quite different from that of  Antipholus of  Ephesus who also ‘trembles in his 
ecstasy’ in The Comedy of  Errors (IV.iv.46). At first glance, it seems that these instances refer 
to the same kind of  ecstatic experience, one that manifests itself  in the same way upon 
                                                             
9 François de Sales, Oeuvres, cit. Screech, Ecstasy and the Praise of Folly, p. 57. 
10 In The Shakespeare Miscellany, David and Ben Crystal consider ‘ecstasy’ to be a ‘false friend’, 
contrasting the ‘modern sense’ of the word as ‘intense delight, rapture’, and the ‘obsolete sense’ 
as ‘any point on a scale of emotional intensity’ (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 60. For a 
consideration of ecstasy from a modern philosophical perspective, see Jules Evans, The Art of Losing 
Control: A Philosopher’s Search for the Ecstatic Experience (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2017). 
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the body, with both cases depicting an intensity of  emotion that leaves these subjects with 
‘senses all dismayed’ (Ven., 896) and needing to ‘establish … true sense again’ (Err., 
IV.iv.43).11 But these emotions, and the ecstasies these characters suffer as a result, are 
notably different. For Venus, the term signals momentary, fear-induced paralysis; she 
‘stands in trembling ecstasy’ because, as the term etymologically suggests, her mind or 
spirit stands forth from her body, leaving her in a state of  suspension. But when the 
Courtesan ‘marks how [Antipholus] trembles in his ecstasy’ as he beats his servant 
Dromio, she observes an ecstasy brought about by anger, not fear. Rather than leaving 
Antipholus paralysed, this flurry of  emotion throws Antipholus into a frenzy: ‘is not your 
husband mad?’ (Err., IV.iv.40). As one subject experiences an angered fit, the other is 
thrown into momentary pause: as fear or anger, ecstasy here demonstrates its capacity to 
span an emotional scale, implicating characters as being ‘beside themselves’ to quite 
different measures, and to quite different dramatic effect.  
This thesis, therefore, explores ‘ecstasy’ as a word and state that encompasses a 
wide range of  senses. It is at once something to be feared—‘hinder them from what this 
ecstasy | May now provoke them to’ (Tmp., III.iii.108-9) —and something to be wary of: 
‘this is the very ecstasy of  love’ (Ham., II.i.103). It can be tortuous—‘better be with the 
dead … | Than on the torture of  the mind to lie | in restless ecstasy’ (Mac., III.ii.21-
24)—and threateningly impassioned: ‘O love, be moderate! Allay thy ecstasy … I feel too 
much thy blessing! Make it less ...’ (MV, III.ii.111-113). Most commonly, however, as we 
glimpsed in Antipholus’ ecstasy, it is a state associated with frenzied madness: 
 
GERTRUDE This is the very coinage of  the brain. 
  This bodiless creation ecstasy 
  Is very cunning in. 
HAMLET         Ecstasy? 
  My pulse as yours doth temperately keep time, 
                                                             
11 This dichotomy between sense and ecstasy is illustrated again by Hamlet’s assertion that ‘sense 
to ecstasy was ne’er so thralled’ (III.vi.72), as he tries to convince his mother that he is not mad. 
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And makes as healthful music. It is not madness  
That I have uttered.     
(Ham., III.iv.128-133) 
 
To gloss ‘ecstasy’ simply as ‘madness’ is, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, necessarily 
reductive.12 We saw above just how varied the ecstatic experience could be, and Hamlet 
alone unshackles it from a stable meaning: here we hear of  ‘the very ecstasy of  love’, but 
also discover what it means to be ‘blasted with ecstasy’.13 In a play that resists reductive 
diagnosis and privileges semantic and ontological uncertainty, it is apt that ecstasy defies 
neat categorisation and instead represents a state that effaces clear distinction. 
Furthermore, as Hamlet rejects an ecstatic diagnosis by evidencing his pulse, he invites 
us to consider ecstasy as not merely a ‘coinage of  the brain’ as Gertrude has it, but as an 
experience that registers itself  on the body. Indeed, when Doctor Pinch is urged by 
Adriana to assess Antipholus—to ‘attend him in his ecstasy’ (Tit., IV.i.124)—he similarly 
suggests a link between ecstasy and heart-rate: ‘Give me your hand, and let me feel your 
pulse’ (Err., IV.iv.47). For Shakespeare, very simply, ecstasy was an experience that affected 
both mind and body, the consequences of  which become graphically dramatized in 
Othello:   
OTHELLO  Lie with her? Lie on her? We say ‘lie on her’ when they belie her. 
Lie with her? ’Swounds, that’s fulsome! Handkerchief-confessions-
handkerchief ? To confess, and be hanged for his labour? First to 
be hanged and then to confess. I tremble at it … It is not words that 
shakes me thus …  
[He] falls in a trance  
     (IV.i.34-40, emphasis added) 
                                                             
12 Ecstasy is most frequently glossed as ‘madness’ by modern editors—in The Norton Shakespeare, 
‘madness’ and ‘frenzy’ are the most common glosses, as seen in The Tempest, Macbeth, The Comedy 
of Errors, Hamlet, and Titus Andronicus. The exceptions to this are Hamlet II.i (‘insanity’), Venus and 
Adonis (‘stupor’), Macbeth (where ‘modern ecstasy’ is described as a ‘commonplace emotion’), and 
Othello, where the term is clarified as meaning ‘for your fit’.  
13 A further sense of ecstasy as extremity or extremis is hinted at by the textual variations between 
different versions of Hamlet. In Q1 and F1, Polonius’ revelation here that in his youth he ‘suffered 
much extremity for love, very near this’, is for Corambis in Q2 an assertion of ‘the vehemency of 
love, and when I was young I was very idle and suffered much ecstasy in love’ (II.ii.224-5). See 
Hamlet: The Texts of 1603 and 1623, ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor (London: Bloomsbury 
Arden Shakespeare, 2006). 
 
13 
What for Venus and Antipholus was a ‘trembling ecstasy’ is experienced with increased 
intensity in Othello, as the Moor collapses and ‘fall[s] into an epilepsy’ (47) or ecstatic 
trance. ‘I … laid good ’scuse upon your ecstasy’ (77), Iago tells Othello as he recovers, 
conflating ecstatic and epileptic fits. Ecstasy, then, is not just an intense emotional state 
which describes subjects as being beside themselves in anger, fear, passion, or anxiety, but 
is also presented as having physiological consequences. Informed and intrigued by these 
various experiences, this thesis explores what it means to ‘suffer ecstasy’, and what is at 
stake for those Shakespearean subjects who encounter this altered state.  
 
 




In order to situate Shakespeare’s ecstatic subjects in context, this study offers sustained 
analysis of  how early modern writers—both literary and non-literary—conceived of  and 
represented the ecstatic experience. As for Shakespeare, ecstasy captured the 
imaginations of  early modern literary writers as a state that denoted ‘fantastick Dotage, 
Madnesse, Phrenzy, Rupture of  mere imagination’, as Corax observes in John Ford’s The 
Lover’s Melancholy (first published 1629).14 It also provided a metaphorical framework 
through which to articulate a range of  experiences from kissing and sexual encounter, to 
the sending of  letters; ‘I make account that this writing of  letters’, asserts John Donne, 
whose sustained interest in the ecstatic experience is given due consideration below, ‘is a 
kind of  extasie, and a departure and secession and suspension of  the soul, which doth 
then communicate itself  to two bodies’. ‘So for these extasies in letters’, Donne continues, 
pushing his analogy further, ‘I oftentimes deliver myself  over in writing’.15 Lady Macbeth, 
                                                             
14 John Ford, The Lover’s Melancholy, ed. R. F. Hill (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1985), III.i.110-2. 
15 John Donne, ‘To my honoured friend S. T. Lucey’, Letters to Severall Persons of Honour (London: 
by James Flesher, 1651), pp. 11-9 (11). 
 
14 
too, will consider the potential of  letters in these ecstatically affective terms: ‘Thy letters 
have transported me beyond | This ignorant present, and I feel now | The future in the 
instant’ (Mac., I.v.54-6). Ecstasy, considered in these terms, can transport subjects through 
time and space. Elsewhere, in The View of  France (1604), travel writer Robert Dallington 
similarly employs the dynamics of  ecstasy, but to articulate the state of  France during its 
recent civil wars: ‘See here a Country in an extacie, distracted in her selfe, and 
transported out of  herselfe, ready to fall into a falling sicknesse, like the soule of  a 
distempered man’.16 This notion of  collective, political ecstasis is similar to the malady—
‘a modern ecstasy’—which Ross observes as afflicting Scotland in Macbeth: ‘Alas, poor 
country! | Almost afraid to know itself ’ (IV.iii.164-5; 170).17 With these metaphorical 
applications comes a hint of  the violent displacement that ecstasy can enact. This was an 
experience, in short, that provided a way of  thinking not only about the relationship 
between soul and body, but also about interpersonal relationships, about issues of  
movement, and about the mutability of  self: ‘Ecstasy utterly alters me’, as Homer’s 
translator has it.18 As well as considering the word and state itself, therefore, this study 
explores ecstasy’s metaphorical potential. 
Another writer whose voice is heard alongside these period poets, dramatists, 
essayists, and theologians, is Helkiah Crooke, physician to King James I and author of  
the highly influential anatomical treatise Microcosmographia: A Description of  the Body of  Man 
(1615).19 This extensive work proved popular in the marketplace, reprinted in 1616 and 
1618 before going to a second edition in 1631 and third edition in 1651. Representing 
and reconsidering the established work and thought of  key medical figures such as Galen, 
                                                             
16 Robert Dallington, The View of France (London: by Simon Stafford, 1604), sig. F4r.  
17 See Bryan Lowrance’s reading of the political implications of Macbeth’s ecstasies in ‘“Modern 
Ecstasy”: Macbeth and the Meaning of the Political’, ELH, 79.4 (2010), 823-49. 
18 Homer, The Iliads of Homer, trans. George Chapman (London: by Richard Field, 1611), p. 307. 
19 Helkiah Crooke, Microcosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man (London: by William Jaggard, 
1615). Further editions of Crooke’s treatise were printed in 1616, 1618, and 1631.  
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as Eve Keller describes, Crooke rewrites these works ‘to support a notion of  subjectivity 
more neatly aligned with ... humanist ideals’: an ontology predicated upon analysis, 
confession, self-scrutiny, and rational understanding.20 We saw above how the bodies of  
Shakespeare’s ecstatic subjects are often implicated in their experiences—variously 
trembling, shaking, and having their pulse felt—and what Crooke’s study provides is a 
guide through which to consider the role of  and implications for the bodies of  those who 
‘suffer ecstasy’. While ecstasy is primarily understood to be a mental, emotional state, this 
thesis also demonstrates the extent to which that experience was bound up with the body. 
My approach, therefore, is one that brings together a variety of  early modern voices, 
voices which contribute to our understanding of  Shakespeare’s engagement with the 
ecstatic.  
This thesis also brings an historical context into dialogue with modern theoretical 
perspectives on the ecstatic experience, an approach which offers a unique consideration 
of  the virtues and dangers of  ecstatic subjectivity. In The Five Senses: A Philosophy of  Mingled 
Bodies, for instance, philosopher Michel Serres pauses over what it means to stand outside: 
By extending myself  precariously I exist. … Existence, or ecstasy, throws itself  
outwards, projects itself  unsure-footed. … First security, then abandon. The I only 
exists outside of  the I. The I only thinks when outside of  the I. It really feels when 
outside of  itself. … I only really live outside of  myself; outside of  myself  I think, 
meditate, know; outside of  myself  I receive what is given, enduringly; I invent 
outside of  myself. Outside of  myself, I exist, as does the world.21  
 
For Serres’ sensitive subject, this is an experience worth celebrating, one that ecstatically 
immerses the subject in the world. He, in other words, welcomes influence, and advocates 
connectivity: 
Lost, dissolved in the transparent air, flowing with its every variation, sensitive to 
its shallowest comas, shivering at the slightest breeze, given over to the world 
                                                             
20 Eve Keller, Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves: The Rhetoric of Reproduction in Early Modern England 
(Washington: University of Washington Press, 2007), p. 48. 
21 Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter 
Cowley (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 94. 
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and mingling with its outburst, thus do I exist.22  
 
Existence, in these terms, is in some crucial sense ecstatic: to step out of  oneself  (ex) and 
to open oneself  up to the influence of  the world is a paradoxical part of, to adopt Stephen 
Greenblatt’s famous term, self-fashioning: existence involves acts of  self-extension, 
however precarious they may be. For the early modern subjects of  this study who 
variously desire to be ‘dissolved into ecstasies’, to experience the ecstasy of  divine 
influence, or to mingle with the beloved in erotic union, Serres’ model of  ecstatic 
openness feels not at an anachronistic remove, but rather distinctly familiar. 
In what follows, then, I incorporate these theoretical voices into the texture of  this 
study, for they offer models through which to explore the constitution and dissolution of  
identity in terms that not only prove germane to the present discussion of  ecstasy, but are 
often compatible with early modern thought. It is in these circumstances that Donne’s 
consideration of  the dynamics of  ecstasy in terms of  letter exchange finds its modern 
correlative in Jacques Derrida’s claim that ‘I address myself  to you, somewhat as if  I were 
sending myself ’. In a similar manner, French physician Marin Cureau de la Chambre’s 
study of  the ‘Syncopes and Extasies which sometimes happen to Lovers’ is complemented 
by Catherine Clément’s interest in the syncopic subject and the philosophy of  rapture: 
‘when the subject melts into syncope, into ecstasy, into jouissance, it crosses with a leap, the 
limits of  its own sex, and finds itself  in the other’.23 At times, therefore, this study allows 
the early modern ecstatic subject to be placed in dialogue with these modern subjects, as 
well as Julia Kristeva’s abject subject, Georges Bataille’s erotic subject, or the jouissant 
subject of  Roland Barthes. Additionally, other contemporary theorists such as Jean 
                                                             
22 Serres, The Five Senses, p. 56. 
23 Jacques Derrida, The Post-Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), p. 45; Marin Cureau de la Chambre, A Discourse upon the Passions in Two Parts, trans. 
R. W. (London: by Thomas Newcomb, 1661), p. 102; Catherine Clément, Syncope: The Philosophy 
of Rapture, trans. Sally O’Driscoll and Deirdre M. Mahoney (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 220. 
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Baudrillard, Judith Butler, Luce Irigary, and Jean-Luc Nancy reflect on the ecstatic 
experience itself.24 Their work suggests the value of  welcoming the ecstatic risk, of  
recognising and embracing human existence as, in Butler’s terms, ‘precarious life’.25 
Owing to this strong theoretical influence, this study asks, as Butler does, ‘what claims us 
… such that we are not the masters of  ourselves? To what are we tied? And by what are 
we seized?’26 Following these lines of  enquiry, this thesis will consider the role of  the 
ecstatic experience in the fashioning of  both early modern and modern identities. For 
these theorists, the passage from and distance between self  and other or, indeed, self  and 
self, remains an expanse to be mapped and measured: ‘an expanse that seems to 
transgress all boundaries’.27 Such is the quest for the self, a kind of  subjective geography 
that this thesis embraces in its exploration of  those boundaries.  
Identifying ecstasy as a state that brings the subject towards and beyond its 
boundaries, this thesis contributes to the burgeoning body of  scholarship considering 
emotional and subjective experience in early modern studies. Indeed, in the introduction 
to their recent collection of  essays on The Renaissance of  Emotion, Erin Sullivan and Richard 
Meek identify a ‘“Renaissance of  emotion” in the field, with scholars across various 
disciplines turning their attention to the centrality of  emotion (or passion, or affect … ) 
in all aspects of  early modern literary, dramatic, cultural and political life’.28 
                                                             
24 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982); Georges Bataille, Eroticism: Death and Sensuality, trans. Mary 
Dalwood (New York: Walker, 1962); Roland Barthes, The Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. 
Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978) and The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard 
Miller (London: Cape, 1976); Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstacy of Communication, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, 
trans. Bernard and Caroline Schutze (New York: Semiotext(e), 1987); Judith Butler, Precarious 
Life; Luce Irigary, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger, trans. Mary Beth Mader (London: 
Athlone, 1999); Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008).  
25 This notion, as its title suggests, is central to Butler’s Precarious Life. 
26 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 21. 
27 Irigaray, p. 24. 
28 Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in 
Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), p. 3. Tracing 
through the lines of enquiry put forth in highly influential studies such as Michael Schoenfeldt’s 
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Furthermore, this study uses the ecstatic experience as a means to thinking about 
Renaissance subjectivity more broadly. Like Erin Sullivan’s Beyond Melancholy and Carol 
Thomas Neely’s Distracted Subjects, this thesis explores early modern conceptions of  
subjectivity through a particular word or state.29 While it observes subjects in states of  
ecstasy, it also gestures further as to how we might identify an ecstatic state of  being: one 
whereby the act of  standing outside and projecting the self  beyond its own borders, 
renders the subject simultaneously open to and at risk from that which lies beyond it. 
What the ecstatic model offers, I suggest, is a means of  exploring the subject’s two-way 
negotiation of  that which is pleasurable, and that which can cause it pain. Ecstasy, as we 
will see in what follows, is an experience that blurs such distinctions. As such, in addition 
to the theoretical perspectives identified above, the ‘ecstatic subject’ of  this study 
necessarily engages with and shares in the experiences of  James Kuzner’s ‘open subject’, 
Eric Langley’s ‘sympathetic subject’, Timothy Reiss’ ‘passible subject’, and Nancy 
Selleck’s ‘interpersonal’ subject.30 Like Rodolphe Gasché’s subject, the ecstatic subject is 
‘outgoing’; like Cynthia Marshall’s ‘dispersive self ’, it risks ‘self-shattering’.31 What unites 
                                                             
Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and 
Inwardness in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
and Gail Kern Pastor’s Humoring the Body: Emotions on the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004), recent years have seen a wealth of scholarship considering the early 
modern subject in light of its emotions. See esp. Bridget Escolme, Emotional Excess on the 
Shakespearean Stage: Passions Slaves (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2013); Gail Kern 
Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in 
the Cultural History of Emotion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Brian 
Cummings (ed.), Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013); and R. S. 
White, Mark Houlahan, and Katrina O’Loughlin (eds.), Shakespeare and Emotions: Inheritances, 
Enactments, Legacies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
29 Erin Sullivan, Beyond Melancholy: Sadness and Selfhood in Renaissance England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016); Carol Thomas Neely, Distracted Subjects: Madness and Gender in Shakespeare 
and Early Modern Culture (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
30 James Kuzner, Open Subjects: English Renaissance Republicans, Modern Selfhoods and the Virtue of 
Vulnerability (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Eric Langley, Shakespeare’s Contagious 
Sympathies: Ill Communications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Timothy J. Reiss,  Mirages 
of the Self: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003); Nancy Selleck, The Interpersonal Idiom in Shakespeare, Donne, and Early Modern Culture 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
31 Cynthia Marshall, The Shattering of the Self: Violence, Subjectivity and Early Modern Texts (Baltimore: 
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these subjects is an awareness of  their own boundaries, and of  how self  is constituted by 
those boundaries.  
What an examination of  the ecstatic experience provides, I will demonstrate, is a 
model through which to re-examine Renaissance ‘Ipseity, or Selfness’.32 If  ecstasy enables 
the subject to unite with the divine or the beloved—to glimpse heaven or to become ‘one’ 
with another more completely—that experience necessarily requires a going out of  the 
self. ‘Indeed’, as Sibbes has it, ‘wee are never our selves perfectly, till we have wholly put 
off  our selves’.33 Identifying the ecstatic experience as one that ‘pulled toward opposite 
extremes of  dissolution and coherence’—where, in Sibbes terms, the claim to self  occurs 
through the experience of  having put it off—this study understands ecstasy in the terms 
which, as Marshall has suggested, ‘defined the emerging subject’.34 Acknowledging that 
with ecstatic self-division comes the risk of  irrecoverable fracture, I share Marshall’s 
interest in the ways that the subject might be constituted by such experiences of  painful 
subjection. Such shattering of  the self, this thesis agrees, can be a crucial stage in the 
formation of  the subject. Observing both the Renaissance impulse to negate selfhood—
to ‘put it off ’ in Sibbes’ terms—and the subsequent impulse towards self-destruction and 
annihilation in Renaissance literature, Marshall’s The Shattering of  the Self demonstrates the 
central role of  violence in early modern conceptions of  subjectivity. Advocating ‘the 
instability of  the emergent subject’, Marshall observes in the early modern period ‘a 
selfhood fundamentally challenged by the call to autonomy and by the terms that 
necessarily structure the autonomy in social interactions’.35  
                                                             
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Rodolphe Gasché, Of Minimal Things: Studies on the 
Notion of Relation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
32 The term ‘ipseity’, from the latin ipse (self), will be used throughout the following discussion of 
Renaissance senses of selfhood. Walter Charleton, The Darknes of Atheism (London: by J. F., 1652), 
p. 171. 
33 Sibbes, The Soule’s Conflict with It Selfe (London: by M. F., 1635), p. 111. 
34 Marshall, p. 14. 
35 Marshall, p. 54. 
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For Kuzner, as for historians of  selfhood such as Charles Taylor, Jerrold Seigel, 
and Timothy Reiss, the emergent, modern self  is one ‘whose boundaries become 
increasingly well fortified’: it is in becoming bounded that the subject becomes more 
modern.36 Understood in these terms, Kuzner argues, the early modern subject has 
limited options: wound or be wounded, maintain control over oneself  or be controlled, 
obliterated, by the other.37 In his study of  Open Subjects, Kuzner reconsiders this dichotomy 
by situating the vulnerable, unbounded subject in opposition to its violent, bounded 
counterpart. While Marshall’s modern subject is constituted through violence, 
increasingly aware of, and anxious about, its own borders, Kuzner’s open subject is, like 
Selleck’s, ‘plunged into intersubjectivity’.38 For these subjects, ‘violence [is] implausible, 
maybe even unthinkable, since the elements that often precede violence—for example 
the inflexible boundaries between self  and other that permit self-hardening and 
aggression—are no longer in place’.39 Kuzner thus contrasts the dangers of  bounded 
existence with the virtues of  vulnerability, charting the capacity for openness in the 
formation of  the social self. What these studies bring into focus, then, are two models of  
early modern subjectivity: one that is constituted through the experience of  self-
shattering, the other constituted through the experience of  self-opening. As one shatters, 
the other flexes.  
Like the open individual, an ecstatic subject moves beyond the rigid divisions 
between bodies demarcated by the notion of  a bounded, autonomous existence. I 
approach terms like ‘individual’ with caution, since this thesis repeatedly demonstrates 
that the subject is not in-divisible (un-dividable), but instead highlights experiences that 
suggest the contrary: that individuals could be divisible, and that such an experience 
                                                             
36 Kuzner, p. 4. 
37 Kuzner, p. 2. 
38 Kuzner, p. 108. 
39 Kuzner, p. 108. 
 
21 
could be as blissful as it could be agonising. While ecstasy can be profoundly pleasurable 
and rewarding, to risk the danger of  ecstasy is to risk the irrecoverable fracture and 
dissolution of  the self. ‘Beside Themselves’ thus situates itself  between these explorations 
of  Renaissance subjectivity, considering ipseic structures through a term that 
encompasses simultaneous loss and gain, violence and vulnerability, observing the tender 
subject in sufferance but also in bliss. Ecstasy, in other words, cuts both ways. 
This thesis also shares Selleck’s interest in the ways in which we are, to borrow a 
phrase from Donne, ‘involved in’ others.40 Selleck’s choice and use of  the term 
‘interpersonal’, as opposed to ‘relational’ or ‘intersubjective’, reflects her study’s focus on 
the recognition of  ‘the plurality of  persons involved’ in the formation of  the Renaissance 
‘self ’.41 Yet while ‘a great deal of  … criticism addresses the alienated “other” in early 
modern culture’, Selleck notes that the ways in which this otherness structures 
Renaissance selfhood have been largely ignored.42 She thus establishes a relational model 
of  the self  that builds upon Stephen Greenblatt’s seminal Renaissance Self-Fashioning, in 
that it seeks to blur sharp distinctions between self  and other. This thesis participates in 
that endeavour insofar as it understands self-fashioning as ‘achieved in relation to 
something perceived as alien, strange, or hostile’, as Greenblatt has it.43 Where this study 
augments these discussions, however, is in its consideration of  what is at stake when this 
‘alien’ is oneself; it considers not only the alien other, but also self-alienation. 
Characterized as ‘a true alienation’—‘soe strange an … alienation of  the mind’, as priest 
and author Henry Hawkins  (1577-1646) notes—ecstasy involved for the early modern 
subject a radical departure from self. As French clergyman David Blondel (1591-1665) 
                                                             
40 ‘I am involved in mankind’—John Donne, ‘Meditation XVII’, in Devotions Upon Emergent 
Occasions (New York: Cosimo, 2010), pp. 107-9 (109). 
41 Selleck, p. 11. 
42 Selleck, p. 2. 
43 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), p. 9. 
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articulates, and as this study will demonstrate in due course, such loss of  self  was deeply 
ingrained in notions of  religious identity: ‘Neither Peter, nor John, nor James were sensible of  
the Vision of  God without a denial of Reason, and alienation of  spirit; for which we maintain … that 
Ecstasie, that is, alienation of  spirit, is consistent with Grace’.44 The experience of  ecstasy was 
one of  deliberate alienation.   
While I join the above critics as they assert the primacy of  interactions with the 
other as prerequisite encounters for knowing the self, I narrow my focus to explore the 
ways in which the subject knows itself  by becoming other to itself. Ecstasy, as this thesis 
demonstrates, figures itself  as both a public and intensely private experience. While 
Selleck takes Cressida’s line ‘I have a kind of  self  resides with you’ (Tro., III.ii.143) as her 
point of  departure—a line exemplifying an interpersonal ‘kind of  self ’ predicated upon 
one’s relationship with another—it is Cressida’s further assertion of  ‘an unkind self  that 
itself  will leave’ (144) that is also of  interest to me here, because it hints at the subject’s 
capacity to depart and stand outside of  itself. ‘We are’, as Montaigne puts it, ‘never in 
ourselves, but beyond’.45 It is around these statements, and their various manifestations 
and implications within early modern literature, that the study rotates, charting and 
exploring the ecstatic experience as a crucial stage in the formation of  the subject. While 
Claude Lévi-Strauss might argue that ‘the ultimate goal of  the human sciences is not to 
constitute but to dissolve man’, this thesis argues that constitution and dissolution ought 
not to be seen as opposing forces.46 This study therefore investigates Renaissance self-
fashioning, but it also recognises that such a venture necessitates an exploration of  the 
undoing of  the Renaissance self.  
                                                             
44 John Smith, Select Discourses (London: by James Flesher, 1660), p. 198; Henry Hawkins, A History 
of S. Elizabeth Daughter (Rouen: by J. Cousturier, 1632), p. 203; David Blondel, A Treatise of the Sibyls 
So Highly Celebrated, trans. J. D. (London: by T. R., 1661), p. 64. 
45 Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. John Florio (London: by Melchior Bradwood, 1613), I.3.5. 
I refer to Montaigne’s works by book, chapter, and page number. 
46 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 274. 
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This thesis encounters ecstasy in myriad forms, for the significance of  ‘ecstasy’ is that it 
serves as an umbrella term for a number of  lived and felt experiences: from divine 
inspiration, to sexual union, to violent medical seizure. Broadly speaking, these various 
kinds of  ecstatic experience govern the chapters of  this thesis. That said, these chapters 
ought not to be taken simply as discrete examinations of  what it meant to experience 
ecstasy, but rather as an attempt to develop a more comprehensive understanding of  the 
ecstatic state more broadly: what an ecstatic subject might gain from taking such a step 
outside of  themselves, and what is at stake in that endeavour. Accordingly, this study first 
charts the ecstatic experience from its earliest conceptions, exploring its roots in classical 
Greek and early Christian thought. My first chapter introduces notions of  mania, furor, 
and frenzy through key works such as the Pythagorean doctrine on the transmigration of  
the soul, Plato’s Phaedrus, and Longinus’ On the Sublime. These are works and concepts 
which heavily informed early modern conceptions of  the ecstatic experience, and 
therefore establish some of  the key philosophical motivations for taking a step outside of  
oneself. This prehistory identifies different types of  ecstatic experience (from the violent 
to the blissful), and broadens the ecstatic lexicon to include a range of  words, states, and 
properties that will resonate throughout this thesis more broadly.     
Chapter Two explores early modern narratives of  religious ecstasy from St. 
Augustine and St. Teresa of  Avila, to John Donne, George Herbert, and Richard 
Crawshaw. Here we encounter subjects who share a desire to journey outside of  
themselves in order to enter into union with the divine: to surrender and lose themselves 
in hopes of  returning ‘home’ to God. Establishing the period’s commonplace religious 
narratives of  ecstasy, this chapter considers the ways in which Shakespeare, whose work 
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seldom engages explicitly with religious texts, can be seen to inherit the contemporary 
language of  ecstatic aspiration. Taking Hamlet’s Claudius and A Midsummer Night’s Dream’s 
Bottom as test-cases, the final section of  this chapter explores ecstasy in spatial terms in 
order to demonstrate how the dynamics of  faith in these works are symptomatic of  the 
force dynamics at play in these texts more broadly, where pathways of  devotion are 
literalized in the movements of  the Shakespearean subject.   
Having established Shakespeare’s interest in the ecstatic experience to be at one 
remove from its divine context, Chapters Three and Four provide extended readings of  
what it means to ‘suffer ecstasy’ in the early modern period. Chapter Three identifies the 
similarities between how the period articulated ecstasy and sexual experience, exploring 
moments of  ‘little death’ in Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis and Romeo and Juliet. Reading 
these texts alongside contemporary medical discourses of  erotic and amorous experience, 
this chapter demonstrates ecstasy to be an intensely physical experience: capable of  
leaving the amorous subject quaking with orgasmic pleasure, or trembling with fear; one 
which could have the pulse racing, or stop it altogether. In other words, this chapter 
observes subjects who do not, in Hamlet’s terms, ‘temperately keep time’ (Ham., 
III.iv.142). Chapter Four explores more fully what it means to ‘suffer ecstasy’ through a 
consideration of  how the etymological sense of  ‘ecstasy’ as displacement (of  standing or 
being placed outside) contributes to the fractured models of  subjectivity that are 
presented in The Comedy of  Errors and Othello. In so doing, this chapter carries previous 
discussions of  embodiment through to a consideration of  ecstasy as a medical state, 
moving from a consideration of  ecstasy as an experience of  petite mort, to a kind of  le petit 
mal: from subjects who are ‘distempered’ because they fail to keep time, to those who 
suffer a ‘distemperature’ of  the brain. What elsewhere are the trembling pleasures of  
divine and erotic rapture, here become translated into the convulsive tremors of  medical 
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seizure. More specifically, this discussion situates Othello’s trance alongside period 
discourses of  ecstasy and epilepsy in order to both demonstrate the previously unexplored 
similarity between these states, and to suggest how this ecstatic experience reflects the 
play’s depiction of  models of  self-fracturing. Having established in Chapters Two and 
Three ecstasy as an experience that unites two subjects into one, Chapter Four considers 
the virtues and dangers of  ecstatic subjectivity, when those dynamics of  union and 
division are played out in a ‘dialogue of  one’ (Donne, ‘The Extasie’, 74).  
This thesis, the first full-length study of  the ecstatic experience in Shakespeare’s 
works, demonstrates how ecstasy could be experienced in different ways, for different 
lengths of  time, through different parts of  the body, and in different directions. Indeed, 
as we will see in the chapters that follow, this is an experience that can be read along both 
a vertical and horizontal axis (be it an aspirational journey towards heavenly bliss, the 
movement to and from a lover, or a path that leads from the city to a world outside its 
gates). The subjects of  this study therefore reveal what it really means to be beside oneself. 
‘I am ... beside myself ’, this study contends, is not simply the statement of  a character in 






Ecstatic Subjects: A Prehistory 
 
  
 Lovers and madmen have such seething brains, 
 Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend 
 More than cool reason ever comprehends. 
 The lunatic, the lover and the poet 
 Are of  imagination all compact: 
 One sees more devils than vast hell can hold, 
 That is, the madman: the lover, all as frantic, 
 Sees Helen’s beauty in a brow of  Egypt: 
 The poet’s eye, in fine frenzy rolling, 
 Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven; 
 And as imagination bodies forth 
 The forms of  things unknown, the poet’s pen 
 Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
 A local habitation and a name. 
           (MND, V.i.4-17) 
 
Theseus’ famous speech in the closing stages of  A Midsummer Night’s Dream brings together 
three distracted subjects: ‘[t]he lunatic, the lover, and the poet’. For Theseus, what unites 
the first two is their ‘seething brains’, agitated minds that are boiling hot (OED, ‘seething’, 
adj., 1a.) and as such are likely to spill over, to seethe out and away from the body. In stark 
contrast to ‘cool reason’, it is this distempered mind that gives way to ‘shaping fantasies’. 
As the poet joins their ranks, the pair become a trio who are able to see things differently: 
who ‘apprehend more’. What these subjects share, in other words, is an over-active 
imagination, minds that wander too freely, such that elsewhere in the canon will leave 
characters ‘wax[ing] desperate’ (Ham., I.iv.87), ‘trembl[ling]’ (Ven., 668), or at risk of  
‘los[ing] | The knowledge of  themselves’ (Lr., IV.vi.276-7). Accordingly, there lies in these 
depictions of  ‘frantic’ madness a sense that ‘the heightened imagination fuelled by 
passion’ was one that was, as Margaret Healy observes, associated ‘with considerable 
danger’.1 These are minds that are unnaturally heightened, restless, agitated. And yet to 
                                                             
1 Margaret Healy, ‘Poetic ‘‘making’’ and the moving of the soul’, in Shakespearean Sensations, ed. 
Katherine Craik and Tanya Pollard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 173-
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be ‘frantic’, in the terms that Theseus describes it, is not necessarily a negative experience: 
to have a wandering mind, or to have a roaming soul, could be to experience a ‘fine 
frenzy’. In these altered states, the subject might well ‘see … devils’, but they might also 
see ‘Helen’s beauty’, ‘glance heaven’, and discover ‘the forms of  things unknown’. What 
unites ‘the lunatic, the lover, and the poet’, is that their minds are able to transport them 
beside themselves, for better or for worse. What follows is an exploration of  what it means 
to be drawn beyond these confines.  
‘The lunatic, the lover and the poet’: borrowing Theseus’ categories, this chapter 
provides a broadly chronological prehistory of  the early modern ecstatic subject in order 
to demonstrate how early modern writers—from theologians and philosophers to 
physicians, playwrights, and poets—inherited from classical philosophy a sense of  what 
it meant to ‘suffer ecstasy’ (LC, 64). Moving from conceptions of  divine and loving ecstasy, 
to a consideration of  ecstasy as an intensely physiological experience, the sections of  this 
chapter reflect the various kinds of  ecstasy explored in each of  the chapters that follow. 
As we shall see, the subjects that Theseus draws together were not only ‘compact’ in their 
imaginative capacities—able to ‘apprehend’ and ‘see more’—but were frequently bound 
together in classical and early modern discourses as subjects whose souls could freely 
depart their bodies in search of  something beyond. These are the ecstatic subjects of  this 
study.   




I. UNDER THE INFLUENCE; OR, ‘THE LUNATIC’ 
 
 
Let us be driven by the Socratic frenzies, which so may place us outside of  our 
minds, that they will place our minds and ourselves in God …2  
 
     
Our history of  ecstasy begins in ancient Greece with those who worshipped Dionysus, or 
‘the grapegod Bacchus’ as Ovid’s Pythagoras calls him; ‘hee was’, as English poet and 
translator Richard Linche tells us, ‘knowne and called by diverse and severall names, as 
sometimes Bacchus, sometimes Dionisius’.3 This ‘monarch of  the vine’ (Ant., II.vii.108) 
introduced his subjects—most commonly referred to as Bacchanals or Maenads—to 
divine intoxication and madness, ‘discouer[ing] vnto men… the manner of  gathering 
grapes from the vinetree, and to presse and bruse them together’, and inspiring them 
towards a divine intoxication brought about by the resultant ‘juice and licour’.4 ‘The 
Bacchinalls’, writes Thomas Heywood, ‘were women that were usually drunke in the 
celebrations of  the feasts of  Bacchus … extasied in their devine furor’.5 A product of  both 
liquid and spiritual intoxication, the ‘divine furor’ of  ecstasy is prevalent in Bacchic 
worship. As Linche notes: 
Those great feasts, which were called Bacchanalia, were solemnised and kept, at 
which almost all the women thereabout would meet, drinking and carousing in that 
abundance and immoderate excesse, as they would become with the force thereof  
even furiously mad, brainesicke, and wild, with dauncing and leaping, singing loud 
canticles, beating one another, running among the woods, vallies, and mountaines, 
and vsing all strange and rude gestures, and behauiours, worse than people 
extreamely mad and lunatike.6 
 
                                                             
2 Pico, De Hominus Dignitate, cit. Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance (New York: Norton, 
1968), p. 175. 
3 Ovid, Shakespeare’s Ovid; being Arthur Golding’s Translation of the Metamorphoses, ed. W. H. D. Rouse 
(London: Centaur Press, 1961), XV.455. Subsequent parenthetical references are to this edition; 
Richard Linche, The Fountaine of Ancient Fiction (London: by Adam Islip, 1599), sig. Xiii. 
4 Linche, sig. Xiiiv. ‘These mynysters of Bacchus’, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa notes, were also 
known ‘as Tyades, Menades, Bacche, Eliades, Mimallonides, Eonides, Eubiades, Bassarides, 
Triaterides’—A Treatise of the Nobilitie and Excellencye of Woman Kynde, trans. David Clapam (London: 
by Thomae Bertheleti, 1542), sig. Ev. 
5 Thomas Heywood, Gynaikeion: Or, Nine Bookes of Various History (London: by Adam Islip, 1624), 
pp. 148-9. 
6 Linche, sig. Yiiir. 
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In these terms, to be ‘extasied in … devine furor’ is to be ‘furiously mad’: to be both 
‘inspired [with] frenzy’ (OED, ‘furor’, n. 2, ‘fury’, n. 4), but also to be in a ‘frenzied rage’ 
(OED, ‘fury’, n. 1a). ‘Loving to be inspired with such divine madnes & fury’, as Plutarch 
has it, these ‘furious women, who served in the sacrifices of  Bacchus’ are open to and 
under the influence of  both vine and ‘grapegod’.7 Under the influence, very simply, 
because Dionysus ‘was not just the god of  wine; he was wine itself ’; ‘when we pour 
libations to the gods’, Tiresias tells us in Euripides’ The Bacchae, ‘we pour the god of  wine 
himself ’.8  
It seems apt in these intoxicating circumstances to consider this divine influence 
in light of  critic George Cave’s assertion that ‘drunkenness is the only realm of  human 
experience which can be used to describe the ecstasy of  union with God’.9 For what these 
accounts of  the Bacchanals demonstrate is that drunkenness is more than a metaphor for 
ecstatic union: it is also the catalyst. If  ‘the mysterious god [is] hidden within the fibres 
of  the vine’, as Charles Baudelaire suggests in his Paradis artificiels, then this god 
influences—that is, flows into—his followers; they are inspired (OED, adj. 3: animated by 
a divine or supernatural influence) for they are ‘spirited with wine’ (H5, III.v.21).10 Put 
simply, divine inspiration and furor are products of  spiritual influence—or inflowance—
which in the Bacchic tradition encompassed not only the ‘spirit of  Bacchus’, but also 
‘spiritts’ which are ‘wine, double distilled’.11 Inspired or in-spirited by an ‘invisible spirit 
of  wine’ (Oth., II.iii.216), Bacchus’ followers have the god flowing within; to be infused 
                                                             
7 Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians, trans. Thomas North (London: by Thomas Vautroullier 
and John Wight, 1579), p. 723; Thorius, p. 15, n. 
8 John Maxwell O’Brien, Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy: A Biography (London: Routledge, 
1992), p. 1. 
9 George Cave, Sufi Poetry (Rawalpindi: R. C. D. Cultural Association, 1972), p. 20. 
10 Charles Baudelaire, cit. Marty Roth, Drunk the Night Before: An Anatomy of Intoxication 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 40. 
11 Francis Bacon, The Wisedome of the Ancients, trans. Sir Arthur Gorges (London: by Iohn Bill, 
1619), p. 56; Randle Holme, The Academy of Armory; Or, A Storehouse of Armory and Blazon (Chester: 
for the author, 1688), III.xx.250. 
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with spirits is to be enthused—en (in), theos (god)—by the divine.   
Such enthusiastic intoxication played a central role in the worship of  Bacchus. 
When, for instance, French writer Honoré d’Urfé (1568-1625) describes ‘Bacchanals 
run[ning] thorow the streets raging and storming, full of  Enthusiasme of  their god’, he 
describes worshippers at one with the divine.12 To have enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιασμός; 
enthūsiasmus; enthousiasme), to be enthusiastic, is to have god within: ‘a certaine 
ἐνθουσιασμός and celestiall inspiration … poured into the witte’ of  man, as Edmund 
Spenser has it.13 Such is the desire of  an ecstatic subject, who abandons their body so 
that their spirit might connect with the divine; as Anglican theologian Richard Sibbes 
advises, rehearsing this enthusiastic model through a Christian framework, ‘you must be 
lost in your selfe that you may be found in [Christ]’.14 The benefit of  being beside oneself, 
in these terms, is that is creates a space for the divine to enter into, and so an ecstatic 
subject necessarily negotiates this two-way exchange. As Michael Rinella observes, ‘extasis 
and enthousiasmos … refer to kindred states [and are] often indistinguishable’, with both 
signalling states of  divinely inspired fury.15 These ‘kindred states’ seemingly pull the 
subject in opposite directions. While ecstasy transports the subject outside of  themselves 
and beyond their confines, the experience of  being in-spired or en-thused signals a counter 
movement into the self: ecstasy extends the subject outwards; enthusiasm allows for 
another to enter in. In order to receive the divine, the individual needs to be porous. 
Crucially for my study, these narratives emphasize the extent to which ecstasy and 
enthusiasm require that the subject’s borders be permeable, and that the subject be open 
to influence.  
                                                             
12 Honoré d’Urfé, The History of Astrea: The First Part. In Twelue Bookes, trans. n.k. (London: by 
Nicholas Oakes and Thomas Creede, 1620), p. 146. 
13 Edmund Spenser, The Shepheardes Calender (London: by Hugh Singleton, 1579), fol. 39. 
14 Sibbes, The Soule’s Conflict, p. 47. 
15 Michael A. Rinella, Pharmakon: Plato, Drug Culture and Identity in Ancient Athens (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2010), p. 36. 
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As we will see in Chapter Two, for the early modern religious subject, ecstasy 
offered a rapturous encounter with the divine. But in its early Bacchanalian form, such 
an encounter was one that was capable of  throwing the subject into violent madness. 
Shakespeare’s ‘Egyptian Bacchanals’ in Antony and Cleopatra demonstrate how this 
intoxicated ecstasy could cut either way: 
Come, thou monarch of  the vine,  
 Plumpy Bacchus with pine eyne! 
 In thy fats our cares be drowned, 
 With grapes our hairs be crown’d. 
  Cup us til the world go round 
  Cup us til the world go round.  
       (II.vii.111-6) 
 
Temporarily setting their grievances to one side, these ‘sacred rytes’ provide a moment 
of  suspension, bringing Rome and Egypt into a single state of  harmonious concord: ‘all 
take hands’, suggests Antony, ‘Till that the conquering wine hath steeped our sense | In 
soft and delicate Lethe’ (109-110). And yet to drink and dance in such excess also has the 
capacity to bring about self-oblivion; ‘strong Enobarb | Is weaker than wine’, complains 
Caesar, ‘and mine own tongue | splits what it speaks’ (124-6). ‘This wild disguise’, he 
asserts, ‘hath almost | Antick’d us all’ (122-3); like Hamlet’s ‘antic disposition’ (Ham., 
I.v.172), alcohol causes them to dispossess themselves. In a play where the stoic confines 
of  the subject are forever at risk of  erosion from the liquid influence of  Egyptian 
epicureanism, the literal fumes of  wine become metaphorically felt in moments where 
‘surfeits’ and ‘lascivious wassails’ (Ant., I.iv.27; 56) gradually erode the defined structures 
of  a ‘firm Roman’ (I.v.45), and melt the ‘man of  steel’ (IV.iv.33) into an increasingly fluid 
subject.    
The Bacchanals are most commonly described as being inspired with a divine 
fury that makes them ‘brainsicke, and wild … extremely mad and lunaticke’; ‘insanire’, 
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adds writer John Thorius to his definition of  these ‘furious women’.16 ‘Insanire’, ‘furious’, 
‘lunaticke’: these epithets dominate early modern accounts of  these ‘women-priests of  
Bacchus’. If  we have thus far understood ecstasy as demanding that the subject be porous, 
it follows that it is the female subject that is most commonly depicted as being under the 
influence. For the female body—in Greek thought as in early modern—was understood 
as being more permeable than its male counterpart: women were understood, as Gail 
Kern Paster observes in her highly influential study The Body Embarrassed, as a ‘leaky 
vessel’ and therefore more ‘open, permeable, effluent’ than the ‘closed, opaque, self-
contained’ male.17 As Cleora has it in dramatist Richard Flecknoe’s Erminia: ‘All women 
are leaking vessels, and can hold nothing, God help them’.18 This medically informed but 
ideologically fraught conception of  openness was considered all the more true of  ‘virginal 
and maternal bodies’; bodies that, as Tanya Pollard notes in her recent study of  Greek 
tragic women on the early modern stage, ‘suggest a privileged capacity to absorb and 
transmit; one not yet entered, the other emptied after inhabitation by another body, both 
serve as conductors for a kind of  affective electricity’.19 More susceptible to divine 
influence, the female subject demonstrates itself  as a more enthusiastic worshipper.  
‘Rapt with fury’, writes St. Augustine, these ‘Bacchae’, these ‘raging … women’, 
committed ‘such fooleries, filthynesse and butcheries; for many slaughters were 
committed in [their] sacrifices’.20 The savage nature of  the cult is depicted in Book III of  
                                                             
16 Raphael Thorius, Hymnus Tabaci: A Poem in Honour of Tabaco, trans. Peter Hausted (London: by 
T. N., for Humphrey Moseley, 1651), p. 15, n. 
17 Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 25; 92. 
18 Richard Flecknoe, Erminia; Or, The Fair and Virtuous Lady (London: sn., 1661), p. 88. 
19 Tanya Pollard, Greek Tragic Women on Shakespearean Stages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), p. 7. Pollard later cites a moment from Longinus’ On the Sublime, where inspired and 
enthusiastic worship and the maternal body come together: ‘by divine power set down in this 
way, [the Pythia (a Delphic Oracle)] is impregnated, and delivers oracles through this inspiration’, 
p. 10. 
20 Saint Augustine, Of the Citie of God, trans. I. H. (London: by George Eld, 1610), p. 251. 
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Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a book which is itself, in Philip Hardie’s terms, ‘very much under 
the influence of  Bacchus, the god who by its end will have won universal recognition in 
Thebes’.21 As ‘the wise Tyresias’ (404) prophesies, King Pentheus’ refusal to worship 
Bacchus will bring about his violent end:  
Another Bacchus Semeles sonne, whom if  thou not support 
With pomp and honour like a God, thy carcasse shall be tattered, 
And in a thousand places eke about the Woods be scattered. 
And for to reade thee what they are that shall perfourme the deede,  
It is thy mother and thine Auntie that thus shall make thee bleede. 
I know it shall come to passé, for why thou shalt disdaine,  
To honour Bacchus as a God: and then thou shalt with paine 
Feele how that blinded I am, I sawe for thee too much.   
          (654-661) 
 
‘Tattered … scattered; deede … bleede; disdaine … paine’: these unusually insistent 
rhymes, where words are often nearly identical, mimetically catch the sense that these 
violent, drunken Bacchic rites could cause individual entities to lose their sense of  
containment and control. As these semantic units bleed into one another, Ovid’s 
translator Arthur Golding maps in poetry the extent to which distinctions are lost and 
edges blur. Paradoxically seeing all too well what Pentheus is too blind to see, Tyresias’ 
‘words prove true in deede’ as a ‘newfound Bacchus comes’ and brings with him what is 
by now a familiar scene: 
… the woods and fieldes rebound, 
With noyse of  shouts and howling out, and such confused sound. 
The folke runne flocking out by heapes, men, Mayds, and wives togither 
The noble men and rascall soret ran gadding also thither, 
The Orgies of  this unknowne God full fondley to performe. 
(663; 665-9) 
 
This ‘confused sound’ captures a sense of  a sonic barrage which blurs distinct noises, like 
individual subjects, ‘togither’ into one (OED, ‘confused’, adj. to mingle; not clearly 
distinguished). In ecstasy, edges are blurred, identities mingle, distinction is lost. Indeed, 
it is no longer only women who find themselves under the influence of  Bacchus, but the 
                                                             
21 Philip Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 167. 
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populace of  Thebes at large: his influence is widespread. The ‘noyse of  shouts’ and ‘such 
confused sound’ echo throughout the book; from the ‘noyse of  crooked horne’ (673) to 
the ‘sheepish shrieks of  simple women’, to the ‘sound of  toying timpanes’ (678), these 
noises create a soundscape associated with these Bacchic rites, one that will underscore 
Pentheus’ struggle.22 Such noise was understood as a defining feature of  a certain kind of  
Bacchic worship known as ‘Corybantism’, the rituals of  which Euripides outlines in The 
Bacchae: 
In your caves the triple- 
Crested corybantes 
Made the rounded timbrel 
Tight with hide and beat its 
Tense ecstatic jangle 
Into the sweetened airs 
Breathed by Phrygian-flutes.  
They gave it in the hand of    
Mother Rhea to drum-beat 
Shouting bacchants raving.23 
 
Once again, the poetry used to describe these moments neatly encapsulates the state it 
describes, as the ‘[t]ense ecstatic jangle’ of  this musical ritual is articulated through ‘tense’ 
and compressed line of  poetry that is itself  ‘jangl[ing]’ and ‘tight’. Inducing a rhythmic 
‘compulsion’ in its hearers—‘mov[ing] the hearers to collection’ (Ham. IV.v.8-9)—the 
‘ecstatic jangle’ that accompanies the wild, enthusiastic rites could render the subject, as 
Longinus asserts, from whom we shall hear more later, ‘out of  their mind … and full of  
Corybantic frenzy’.24 Music is after all, as Robert Burton would later write in his Anatomy 
of  Melancholy, ‘so powerful a thing that it ravisheth the soul … and carries it beyond itself ’, 
and for Ovid these disorderly, ‘confused’ sounds are able to at once both reflect and 
                                                             
22 Ovid will also employ this soundscape to evoke memories the cult in Book VI, where the 
‘tinking sound of pots and pans’ (III.673) is echoed in the ‘tincling pannes and pots’ (VI.750). 
23 Bacchae, ll. 124-29, cit. Roslyn Weiss, Socrates Dissatisfied: An Analysis of Plato’s Crito (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 135. 
24 Longinus, cit. and trans. Stephen Halliwell, Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics 
from Homer to Longinus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 337-8. In Plato’s Phaedrus, 
Socrates describes himself as both a Corybant (228b-c) and a Bacchant (234d). 
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enhance the distempered interior states of  these Bacchanals.25 This ‘ecstatic jangle’ thus 
presents a negative forerunner to theologian Richard Hooker’s assertion that using music 
with psalms might ‘carrieth as it were into extasies, filling the minde with an heavenly joy, 
and for the time, in a manner, severing it from the body’.26 While it would later be 
described as a pleasant severance between body and soul, there is considerable violence 
in ecstasy’s Bacchic origins.  
Such noises are a defining feature of  these Bacchic rites.27 Like the alcohol that 
inspired them, dissonant sound flows into the ear and moves Bacchanals to distraction. 
As Ovid’s Pentheus advances towards these Bacchic ‘holie rites’ (Metamorphoses, III.896), 
the soundscape is filled with ‘loud confused sounds of  Bacchus drunken throngs’ (887), 
‘bloudie Trumpe’ (888) and ‘noyse of  howling loud’ (891); frantic sounds which reach a 
crescendo as the frantic deeds of  these ‘frenticke folke’ (892) intensify:  
 
And like a Bedlem first of  all she doth upon him runne,  
And with hir Javeling furiously she first doth wound hir sonne. 
Come hither sisters come she cries, he is that mighty Bore, 
Here is the Bore that stroyes our fields, him will I strike therefore. 
With that they fall upon him all as though they had bene mad, 
And clustring all upon a heape fast after him they gad. 
He quakes and shakes…       
       (III.898-904) 
 
                                                             
25 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Holbrook Jackson (New York: The New York 
Review of Books, 2011), II.116. John Milton would also later highlight the noise of these Bacchic 
rituals in Book VII of Paradise Lost (London: by Peter Parker, 1667): 
 But drive farr off the barbarous dissonance 
 Of Bacchus and his Revellers, the Race 
 Of that wilde Rout that tore the Thracian Bard 
 In Rhodope, where Woods and Rocks had Eares 
 To rapture, till the savage clamor dround 
 Both Harp and Voice …   (VII, 32-8) 
26 Richard Hooker, The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (London: by Thomas Newcomb, 1666), p. 
184. 
27 In addition to discordant music, the exclamation ‘Evoe!’ is also understood as a Bacchanalian 
exclamation, ‘a noise which Bacchus his Priests did use: because it is reported that Bacchus and 
those women that followed him did use this acclamation or cry’—Gerhard Mercator, Historia 
Mundi (London: by T. Coles, 1635), p. 808. ‘My soule doth Eboe utter’, writes Horace in his ‘Ode 
to Bacchus’, ‘and my brest | Fall gorg’d with Wine, doth rumblingly egest | Evoe’—Odes and 
Epodes of Horace, trans. Henry Rider (London: by John Haviland, 1638), p. 55. 
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With bloody hands these ‘wicked women’ (918) tear their ‘newfound sacrifice’ (920) limb 
from limb, head from torso, inaugurating the worship of  Bacchus in Thebes. Here we see 
the dangers of  ecstasy, of  becoming one with god, especially when that god is Bacchus; 
intoxication, both physical and spiritual, is presented as a state which, as Marty Roth 
writes in his study of  drunkenness, ‘either enables man to outdo himself  or turns him into 
a brute, that introduces him to ecstasy or plunges him into bestiality’.28 In ecstasy, one 
can either enthusiastically find oneself  through divine inspiration, or lose oneself  
completely.  
But the line that separates ecstasy from bestiality, as Roth writes, is a fine one, and 
for those who worshipped the god of  ecstasy himself, it could all too easily be dissolved. 
Such is the case for Orpheus, a priest and philosopher whose violent fate resonates 
throughout the classical canon and into medieval and Renaissance literature. It is this 
Bacchic unruliness that Shakespeare’s Theseus is unwilling to admit to his wedding 
ritual—indeed the play has by now begun to silence the ‘ecstatic jangle’ and ‘musical 
confusion’ (MND, IV.i.109) that echoed through the forest—turning down a 
redramatisation of  the story for his nuptial evening’s entertainment:  
‘The riot of  the tipsy Bacchanals  
Tearing the Thracian singer in their rage.’  
That is an old device; and it was play’d  
When I from Thebes came last a conqueror.  
       (V.i.48-51)  
 
Suffering a fate akin to Pentheus, Ovid’s Orpheus meets his end against a similar acoustic 
backdrop, as the ‘sweete | And most melodious harmonye’ of  ‘Orpheys harp’ is beset by 
barbaric ‘noyse … growing strong with blowing shalmes, and beating drummes, and 
bedlem howling out, | And clapping hands on every syde by Bacchus drunken rout’ 
(XI.11-12; 16-19). Ovid depicts the savage nature of  the ‘flocke of  Bacchic froes’ (22) by 
                                                             
28 Roth, p. 3. 
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contrasting their behaviour to the ‘savage beasts’ who now look on as the violence ensues, 
and by degrading the women themselves to ‘witlesse beastes’ (44): 
 They flockt about him like as when a sort of  birds have found 
An Owle a daytymes in a tod: and hem him in full round, 
As when a Stag by hungrye hownds is in a morning found, 
The which forestall him round about and pull him to the ground.  
        (24-27)  
 
What becomes increasingly clear in this text about transformation is the transfiguring 
effects of  extasis—that ecstasy is a form of  metamorphosis. It is this ecstatic frenzy that 
will bring about the metamorphoses of  these Bacchanalian women. Discovering the 
extent to which his followers ‘wreake[d] theyr woodness’ (32), Bacchus grieves the 
‘murther of  the Chaplaine of  his Orgies’ (77) and inflicts an apt punishment:  
 She sawe her leggs growe round in one, and turning into woode 
 … 
 Shee felt them [her thyghes] tree: her brest was tree: her shoulders eeke were tree. 
 Her arms long boughs yee might have thought, and not deceyved bee.   
(91-5)  
 
While we see throughout the Metamorphoses a number of  figures transformed into trees, 
this metamorphosis, one that sees Bacchus ‘envyrond … about’ by ‘woodwards and … 
franticke froes’ (99), seems particularly apt.29 As Richard Verstegran notes in his Restitution 
of  Decayed Intelligence (1605), ‘wee yet retaine in some partes of  England, the word for 
wodnes for furiousnes or madnes’; to be ‘wood’ is to be ‘out of  ones mind, insane, lunatic’ 
(OED, adj. 1.a).30 Turned into trees for having too much endured a ‘dronken woodnesse 
wrought by wine’ (III.677), the metamorphosis of  Bacchus’ worshippers literalizes 
Demetrius’ assertion in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: ‘I am … wood within this wood’ 
(II.i.92). Divine influence transforms these Bacchanals into ‘woodwards’: theirs is a 
                                                             
29 Elsewhere in the Metamorphoses, numerous other characters are transformed into trees as follows: 
Daphne (laurel tree); Phaethon’s sisters (amber trees); Baucis/Philemon (trees); Dryope (lotus 
tree); Cyparrissus (tree); Myrrha (tree); and, finally the Thracian women (trees).  




‘dronken woodnesse’ that goes too far.  
For the ecstatic worshipper of  Bacchus, then, metamorphosis was more than a 
metaphorical concept: the divine influence of  this ‘god of  wine’ could truly transform a 
subject from ‘man to beast’. What are in the Metamorphoses merely metaphors ‘of  shapes 
transformde into bodies strange’ (I.i) held, for these early ecstatic subjects, some element 
of  truth. Tracing ecstasy from its Bacchic roots and through to the ‘Chaplaine of  … 
Orgies’, Orpheus, this chapter reveals the ecstatic experience to be a kind of  madness 
experienced by the subject in quest of  divine union. Centred on the belief  that man was 
part earth, part heaven, Orphics believed that leading a pure life enabled the heavenly 
part to develop. If  successful, the Orphics believed, the soul could become one with 
Bacchus and experience the ecstasy of  divine union. What are in Ovid’s Metamorphoses 
metaphorical transformations were therefore for the Orphics necessary spiritual 
transformations, reincarnations of  the soul, that proffered an ecstatic end: only once the 
soul has purified itself  through a series of  physical transformations—known as 
transmigrations—may it be united with the divine. To be under the influence, these early 
ecstatic subjects demonstrate, is a dangerous endeavour: by sending oneself  out and 
allowing the divine to flow in, the subject risks losing themselves completely.  
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II.  ‘THINGS EB AND FLOW’; OR, ‘THE LOVER’  
 
 
Love is a true and sensible Transmigration of  the Soul, or as some define it … It 
is an Extasie by which the Soul ceaseth to live in the Body, which she animates, to 
live in that which she Loves.31 
 
 
The ‘perpetuall revolution and transmigration of  soules through bodies’, asserts John 
Donne in a sermon on 12 December 1626, ‘hath been the giddinesse of  some 
Philosophers to think’.32 Describing the soul’s capacity to depart and enter bodies of  its 
own accord, ‘transmigration’ or ‘metempsychosis’—which etymologically means to put 
the soul into (empsychoun) the beyond (meta)—exhibits a movement that is central to the 
ecstatic experience. The notion of  being beside oneself  as the soul departs the body was, 
therefore, by no means a new one for the Renaissance subject, but was indebted to 
classical thought, stemming from Pythagoras (c. 580 BCE) and Plato (c. 427-347 BCE). 
As Siobhán Collins notes in her close analysis of  Donne’s satirical poem Metempsycosis 
(1601), ‘with the revival of  Classical philosophy and literature the doctrine of  
metempsychosis was popularised in the Renaissance’.33 The poem—where the ‘loose 
soul’ (125) is ceaselessly ‘throwne’ into one body and ‘throwne out again’ (301-2)—coopts 
this sense of  transference in order to capture some of  the kinetic potential of  New 
Scientific thought. For clergymen and author Francis Meres, writing in 1598, poetic 
influence might itself  be articulated in these transmigratory terms: ‘As the soule of  
Auphorbus was thought to live in Pythagoras: so the sweete wittie soule of  Ovid lives in 
mellifluous and hony-tongued Shakespeare’.34 After all, as Ovid’s Pythagoras has it:   
                                                             
31 Pierre le Moyne, The Gallery of Heroick Women, trans. the Marquesse of Winchester [John Paulet] 
(London: by R. Norton, 1652), p. 112. 
32 John Donne, LXXX Sermons Preached by that Learned and Reverend Divine, John Donne, Dr in Divinity 
(London: by Miles Flesher, 1640), p. 816. 
33 Siobhán Collins, Bodies, Politics and Transformations: John Donne’s Metempsychosis (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013), p. 60. 
34 Francis Meres, Palladis Tamia (London: by P. Short, 1598), p. 281. Richard Bellings makes a 
contrary assertion in his note ‘To the Reader[s]’ of his sequal to Philip Sidney’s Arcadia: ‘No no, 
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All things doo chaunge. But nothing sure dooth perish. This same spright 
Doth fleete, and frisking heere and there dooth swiftly take his flight 
From one place too another place, and entreth every wyght, 
Removing out of  man too beast, and out of  beast too man.  
But yit it never perrisheth nor never perrish can.     
            (Metamorphoses, XV.183-7) 
 
By Book XV of  this narratologically mutative narrative—where one story transforms and 
bleeds into the next, as one figure picks up the concerns and symbolic resonances of  their 
predecessors—the reader is accustomed to the unstable propensity of  all Ovidian matter 
to mutate. ‘Removing out of  man to beast’, the soul exists in a state of  perpetual motion, 
ceaselessly moving and re-moving itself  from one body to another. As the soul migrates 
from body to body, it sets upon a pathway toward the All which was, for the Pythagoreans, 
a pre-requisite for union with the divine. In this model, the soul wanders between bodies 
as though on an aspirational ladder, oriented towards an immanent understanding of  
and attainment with the All. Not quite at home in the body, the soul aspires to stand 
outside.  
While these ideas were in circulation and captured the early modern imagination, 
many early modern detractors ridiculed any real belief  in the literal transmigration of  
souls. As English clergyman John Brinsley (1600-1665) writes, ‘[Thomas] Aquinas … tells 
us of  certain Hereticks’ who dream ‘of  a Pythagorical Metempsychosis, a transmigration, a 
flitting of  Souls out of  one body into another’.35 Dressed as a priest, Feste interrogates 
the ‘mad’ Malvolio on these matters in Twelfth Night: 
FESTE  What is the opinion of  Pythagoras concerning wild-fowl? 
MALVOLIO That the soul of  our grandam might happily inhabit a bird.  
FESTE  What think’st thou of  his opinion? 
MALVOLIO I think nobly of  the soul, and no way approve his opinion. 
FESTE Fare thee well. Remain thou still in darkness. Thou shalt hold 
theopinion of  Pythagoras ere I will allow of  thy wits, and fear to 
kill a woodcock lest thou dispossess the soul of  thy grandam. Fare 
                                                             
I doe not follow Pythagoras his opinion of transmigrations: I am well assur’d divine Sidney’s soule is 
not infus’d into me’—A Sixth Booke to the Countess of Pembrokes Arcadia (Dublin: by the Societie of 
Stationers, 1624), sig. A3r.  
35 John Brinsley, The Christians Cabala (London: for George Sawbridge, 1662), p. 53. 
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thee well.       
     (IV.ii.50-60) 
 
At issue here are notions that the soul precedes the existence of  the body; belief  that ‘the 
soul of  our grandam might happily inhabit a bird’ not only undermines man’s privileged 
position, but also threatens the key Christian concepts of  sin and divine retribution.36 ‘In 
a Christian climate’ (R2, IV.i.131), the soul was believed to be created ex nihilio, not 
continually reborn. And so when Gratiano uses this narrative to articulate Shylock’s 
‘currish spirit’ in The Merchant of  Venice, he necessarily acknowledges its heretical potential:  
O, be thou damned, inexorable dog, 
And for thy life let justice be accused! 
Thou almost mak’st me waver in my faith 
To hold opinion with Pythagoras, 
That souls of  animals infuse themselves  
Into the trunks of  men. Thy currish spirit 
Governed a wolf  who, hanged for human slaughter, 
Even from the gallows did his fell soul fleet, 
And whilst thou layest in thy unhallowed dam 
Infused itself  in thee; for thy desires  
Are wolvish, bloody, starved, and ravenous.  
       (IV.i.127-37) 
 
To ‘hold opinion with Pythagoras’, therefore, provokes a ‘waver[ing of] faith’, for while 
‘fifteenth-century intellectuals invited Pythagoras to the status of  prophet of  
Christianity’—owing primarily to his ‘revelations about the immortality of  the soul’ 
which ‘conferred on him the status of  a pre-Christian Christian’—notions of  the soul’s 
pre-existence situated Pythagorean thought in opposition to Christian teaching. As 
French historian Michel Baudier (1589-1645) asserts—noting in a prefatory letter how 
easily he might suggest the addressee to be ‘animated with the Souls of  the greatest 
                                                             
36 ‘The notion that a man could be transformed into a beast’, writes Siobhan Collins, ‘threatens 
the Christian concept of sin and divine retribution. Material continuity, from a Christian 
perspective, is necessary to justice. Soul and body sin together and therefore must be punished 
together’, p. 66. See also Jonathan Gil Harris reading ‘transmigration’ in geopolitical terms in 
Sick Economies: Drama, Mercantilism, and Disease in Shakespeare’s England (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 108-35. 
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Heroes’—‘the Principles of  Christianity forbid me to believe a Pythagorean Metempsychosis’.37  
‘These fictions’, writes Michel Jeanneret,  
feed the worst superstitions and are in patent contradiction with the lessons of  the 
bible. … How can a species that God distinguishes once and for all transform into 
another? Such metamorphoses are scandalous because they upset the order of  
creation.38  
 
‘Scandalous’ as they were, ‘these fictions’ of  metamorphosis and metempsychosis held 
significant appeal for a number of  early modern writers. For what they offer are narratives 
of  transformation and change: models which suggest that the self  might be best 
understood as being, like the soul, in continual progress; death in this model is not an 
end, but could instead be read in terms of  movement and transformation. Indeed, 
Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), a key figure in bringing the ideas of  
both Plato and Pythagoras into circulation in the Renaissance, read Pythagoras’ notion 
of  metempsychosis in precisely these terms: ‘the hidden truth to be drawn out by the 
exegete is the marvellous capacity of  the soul to effect change in itself, to re-form itself ’.39 
Key to the soul’s metempsychotic departure from the body is this sense of  change and 
transformation, and to think about the relationship between soul and body in this way 
provided a model for thinking about the inherent changeability of  self. 
Yet with each temporary severance of  the tether between body and soul, with 
each reincarnation, the soul risks losing its way and falling into forgetfulness: a facet of  
the divine All is disclosed only to be forgotten. As James Luchte observes, ‘the silent 
aspiration of  a return to the divine remains harboured in the heart which sets above the 
                                                             
37 Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier, Pythagoras and Renaissance Europe: Finding Heaven (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 35; Michel Baudier, The History of the Court of the King of 
China (London: by H. B., 1682), p. 6. 
38 Michel Jeanneret, Perpetual Motion: Transforming Shapes in the Renaissance from da Vinci to Montaigne, 
trans. Nidra Poller (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 165. 
39 Christopher S. Celenza, ‘Pythagoras in the Renaissance: The Case of Marsilio Ficino’, RQ, 
52.3 (1999), 666-711 (685). 
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static din of  forgetfulness’.40 It is this forgetfulness that informs what Juliet Dusinberre 
considers to be ‘one of  Rosalind’s most obscure jokes’ in As You Like It, as Rosalind 
happens upon Orlando’s romantic verse in the forest of  Arden: ‘I was never so berhymed 
since Pythagoras’ time that I was an Irish rat, which I can hardly remember’ (III.ii.172-
3).41 The joke, however, would likely have been less obscure for an early modern audience, 
for whom, as Christiane L. Joost-Gaugier notes, ‘familiarity with Pythagoras was so 
widespread … that authors … could even make light-hearted fun of  him’, but that 
‘occasions for this were … restricted to the subject of  transmigration’.42 In these 
circumstances, Rosalind’s ‘obscure joke’ rests upon the same tenants as Donne’s Poêma 
Satyricon, which recalls not only the doctrine of  transmigration but furthermore that 
Pythagoras himself  is said to have been able to recount his previous lives: ‘[he] himselfe 
said, that he remembered to have been Aethaledes then Euphorbus, afterward Hermotimus, at 
last from Pyrrhus to have passed into Pythagoras: having memorie of  himselfe the space of  
two hundred and six yeares’.43 Echoing the contemporary belief  that Irish rats could be 
rhymed to death, Rosalind seemingly remembers not only a past life, but also the violent 
acoustic backdrop of  ‘drumming tunes’, as Jonson has it elsewhere, that accompanied 
and brought about death.44 Though Rosalind can ‘hardly remember’, she has not 
forgotten altogether: to transmigrate is not necessarily to forget.  
In Donne’s variation on this Pythagorean doctrine, the soul similarly ‘can 
remember’ its accumulative experiences: ‘however the bodies have dul’d her other 
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faculties her memorie hath ever bene her owne’.45 Foregrounding the soul’s capacity to 
remember in the poem’s ‘Epistle’, Donne sets up his poem not as a series of  discontinuous 
narratives, but as a model of  narrative continuity: one of  memory and nostalgia, of  
outgoing and homecoming, of  ebb and flow. It is this emphasis on fluidity, as opposed to 
fixity and closure, that captured the Renaissance mindset. Able to ‘infuse’ itself  into 
bodies, the fluid, metempsychotic soul permeates its hosts in much the same way that 
spirits influenced and inspired the Bacchanals. These liquid properties of  the soul 
remained, for a number of  early modern writers, key features of  the ecstatic condition, 
where ‘soule into the soule may flow’, as Donne has it in ‘The Extasie’, and where the 
self  might, in John Milton’s terms, ‘dissolve … into extasies’.46 In ecstasy, as in 
metempsychosis, the soul’s fluidity reflects the changeable nature of  self: ‘in all the world 
there is not that that standeth and stay’, asserts Ovid’s Pythagoras. Central to our 
understanding of  the ecstatic experience, then, is this sense that ‘things eb and flow’ 
(Metamorphoses, XV.189-9). Liquid, fluid, permeable, dissolvable: these properties define 
the ecstatic subject.  
These notions of  transmigration and the immortality of  the soul were carried 
through to a number of  Platonic dialogues.47 ‘That Plato tells of  the transits of  souls into 
beasts is Pythagorean’, asserts Ficino, whose Latin translation of  a number of  Plato’s 
works ensured that, as Sarah Hutton observes, ‘the philosophy of  Plato was more widely 
known in the Renaissance than at any time since classical antiquity’.48 Indeed, for Ficino, 
                                                             
45 Donne, ‘Epistle’ to Metempsychosis, in The Complete English Poems, ed. C. A. Patrides (London: 
David Campbell Publishers, 1991), pp. 402-27 (404). Subsequent parenthetical references to 
Donne’s poetry are to this edition. 
46 Donne, ‘The Extasie’, 59; John Milton, ‘Il Penroso’, in Poems of Mr. John Milton (London: by 
Ruth Raworth, 1645), pp. 37-44 (43) 
47 This sense of philosophical ideas a sequential, carried from one school of philosophy and 
developed by another, was frequent in the Renaissance. As Celenza notes, ‘most thinkers 
considered the history of philosophy as a linear progression within the context of developing, 
individually discrete schools’, p. 681. 
48 Marsilio Ficino, Opera Omnia (1576), cit. and trans. Celenza, p. 689; Sarah Hutton, ‘Platonism, 
 
45 
stressing the Pythagorean origins of  certain Platonic thought served to protect Plato in 
moments where his doctrine, especially with regards to metempsychosis, lay contrary to 
Christian thought—thought which Ficino, along with the Florentine academy, sought to 
harmonise with Platonic philosophy.49 While tweaking elements of  the narrative 
accordingly, Ficino nonetheless demonstrates Plato’s emphasis on an immortal soul that 
is fluid and mobile, driven by a desire to ascend to the divine. Central to these narratives 
is a trajectory of  heavenly ascent, and thus notions of  outgoing and homecoming remain: 
‘Plato willed his soule to returne home to her kindred’, writes theologian Thomas Hayne, 
‘and to her first originall, that is, saith he, to the wise and immortall godhead the fountaine 
of  all goodnesse, as called from banishment into our owne native countrey’.50 As 
philosopher Jean Guillemard notes, encouraging his reader not to fear death, but, 
following Plato, to recognise instead that the body itself  is a ‘sepulchre’: ‘the soule is a 
plant transported from heaven into a strange soyle, into the body of  earth, where it sighs, 
pines away, and desires to depart’.51 The soul, in short, is never at home in the body.  
‘The very nerves and sinews of  Religion is hope of  immortality’, asserts 
Neoplatonist Henry More—whose work often seeks to bring classical thought into 
dialogue with Renaissance religious belief—in a prefatory note to his Psychodia Platonica; 
Or, A Platonicall Song of  the Soul.52 ‘Sing[ing]’ of  ‘the immortalitie | of  Souls’, More’s poem 
explores the central tenants of  ‘Plato’s philosophie’, setting about the task of  proving ‘that 
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when the soul by death’s cut off  from all, | Yet she within her self  might live and move’; 
it is, he notes, ‘the purer flame of  [divine] love [that] unties’ the ‘chains’ which bind the 
soul to the body: once ‘unbound’ the soul ‘sores aloft’.53 But Plato also identifies instances 
where the soul departs the body not just at the moment of  death—‘when she this life hath 
lost … she doth ascend … lifted aloft, not again to descend’, as More puts it—but also in 
life:  
Few men but will confesse that prophesie 
Proceeds from God, when as our soul’s possest 
By his all-seeing spright; als ecstasie 
Wherein the soul snatch’d by the Deity, 
And for a time into high heaven hent 
Doth contemplate that blest Divinity.54  
 
It was possible, in other words, for the soul to be temporarily ‘wrapt into highest heavens’: 
in these moments, ‘our soul hangs twixt’ God and the ‘world we know’, and goes ‘where 
either spright doth snatch her’.55 ‘Soul and body severing’ (H8, II.iv.16) was not just 
something that occurred at the moment of  death, but was a kind temporary departure 
that could be enjoyed by those ‘loose of  soul’ (Oth., III.iii.418): 
Though the union between the Body and the Soul be so strict … it is not so strong 
but that sometimes it admits of  a dissolution, which the Philosophers conceiv’d 
possible, both the parts continuing entire. This separation is call’d an Ecstasy, 
wherein the Platonists, who first brought it into Vogue, plac’d the Summun Bonum, or 
greatest Felicity, inasmuch as they pretended, that mens minds were thereby 
disengag’d from all material things.56  
 
Figured as a temporary ‘separation’ or ‘dissolution’ of  the union between body and soul, 
ecstasy, brought ‘into Vogue’ by the Platonists, here offers a ‘disengag[ment] from all 
material things’, one that could yield ‘the Summun Bonum’, the greatest happiness. Where 
Bacchic ecstasy was violent, Platonic ecstasy is joyously blissful. As stated at the outset of  
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this thesis, ecstasy can cut both ways.  
Replying to a letter from theologian Maarten van Dorp, Dutch humanist 
Desiderius Erasmus reiterates his argument in the final pages of  his Praise of  Folly (1511): 
In showing a folly which is wise, I also showed an insanity which is sane and a 
madness which retains its senses. To soften what follows about the hapinnes of  
the blessed, I first cited the three forms of  madness prescribed by Plato, where the 
happiest is that of  lovers, for it takes them out of  themselves. In the case of  the 
pious, this ecstasy is only a foretaste of  the happiness to come, in which we shall 
be wholly absorbed into God and be more in him than in ourselves. Now Plato 
calls it a madness when anyone is carried out of  himself  and exists in the object 
of  his love where he finds his happiness.57  
 
In a text that describes the importance and utility of  such ‘folly’, Erasmus here sketches 
out what M. A. Screech has termed Plato’s ‘soul-departing philosophy’: the motion, in 
Erasmus’ terms, of  being ‘carried out’ of  oneself.58 Here, ‘the lover’ shares something 
with ‘the lunatic’: both have souls that strive to leave their bodies and, as a result, both 
are ‘mad’. But, according to Plato, there are different kinds of  madness. As Socrates 
teaches in Plato’s Phaedrus, there are four kinds of  divine ‘mania’: prophesy, revelation, 
poetic inspiration, and, most privileged of  all, the ‘madness’ of  mutual love.59 Each 
experience is characterized by ecstasy as we have understood it thus far: a moment where 
the soul is temporarily absent from the body, where the mind is thrown from its normal 
state, and where the spirit of  the divine, or soul of  the beloved, enters the body. To be 
‘beside oneself ’ in this way is to experience a privileged kind of  frenzy, one that offers a 
glimpse at the divine, even if  only temporarily. ‘The ecstasy of  godly men, which Plato 
calls a holy madness’, Erasmus reiterates in another letter on 7 May 1518, ‘is a kind of  
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foretaste of  future blessedness, by which we shall be absorbed into God and live in future 
more in him than in ourselves’.60 In the ecstasy and madness of  love, we catch a fleeting 
glimpse at that which lies beyond. As Socrates asserts, ‘the greatest goods come to us 
through madness, provided that it is bestowed by divine gift’: ‘god-sent madness is a finer 
thing than man-made sanity’ (Phaedrus, 244-45). In these frenzied wanderings, the soul 
frees itself  from the earthly prison which prevents its return to its heavenly home. As 
Montaigne observes: 
Plato disputeth thus; that the facultie of  prophesiyng and divination is far above-
us, and that when wee treate it, we must be besides our selves: our wisdome must 
be darkened and over shadowed by sleepe, by sickenesse, or by drowzinesse; or by 
some celestiall fury, ravished from hir owne seat.61 
 
For the notoriously errant and wandering philosopher, an ecstatic subject is one whose 
soul is bound to the body less tightly.  
At the centre of  these Pythagorean and Platonic narratives, then, is a mobile, 
immortal soul which has the capacity to flow beyond its bodily borders. Love—an 
experience which is, as we have heard, itself  ‘merely a [kind of] madness’ (AYLI, 
III.ii.384)—motivates this movement, one of  ‘ebb and flow’ (LLL, IV.iii.207) as the soul 
is temporarily called out towards the beloved and returns to the body, or, in the broader 
narrative, tethered to an earthly body and aspiring to return to the divine home from 
whence it fell: ‘as it is with the sea and the thames, there is ebbing and flowing’, writes 
Puritan theologian Thomas Hooker, it is ‘the power of  his Spirit … that makes the soule 
flowe … so it now flowes and comes to God again’.62 Drawn out beyond its confines, and 
allowing the other to flow within, an ecstatic subject distinguishes itself  from those who 
are ‘hard-hearted’ (MND, II.i.195); those who, in the words of  Saint Francis de Sales 
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(1567-1622), ‘doe not easily receive the divine impressions’.63 ‘Contrariwise’, those who 
are open to ecstasy possess ‘a suple, pliable … and liquifying heart’ which, in turn, 
‘liquifie[s] and melt[s] the Spouse his soule’: 
She [the soul] is melted with love … going out of  herself, and passing the limits 
of  her naturall beeing … She permits herself  to slide and runne into the thing 
beloved … lets her selfe gently glide, as a liquide and fluent thing, into the Divinite 
which she loves …  So the soule which, though otherwise in love, remained before 
in her selfe, goes out by this sacred liquification, and saintly flowing, and foresakes 
her selfe, not onely to be united to the well-beloved, but to be entirely mingled 
and moistened with him.64  
 
Ecstasy is here presented as a fluid movement: one of  ‘going out’ and ‘runn[ing] into the 
… beloved’, of  ‘go[ing] out’ in order ‘to be entirely mingled’. Such ‘liquefaction of  a 
soule into her God’, de Sales continues, ‘is a true extasie’, an experience through which 
the soule ‘transcends’ her limits in order to attain ‘these holy excesses of  heavenly love’.65   
But it is also necessary to acknowledge the dangerous inverse of  a claim like 
French lawyer and bishop Guillaume Du Vair’s that ‘the springhead of  all goodness which 
is the love of  God, floweth over soules, and spreddeth it selfe throughout all parts of  their 
bodies’.66 For while these subjects might be persuaded to willingly announce themselves 
to ‘hense forth be fully molton: and relent in to the flowe of  thy love’, French physician 
Jacques Ferrand appropriates this Platonic model in order to assert that ‘love is a kind of  
poison … which flows and glides into our bowels’, where ‘the animal spirits radiate from 
the lover towards the beloved’ and spread ‘throughout the body’, ‘thereby bringing on 
this disease’.67 In these circumstances, and as we will see in the subsequent chapters of  
this thesis, the early modern subject might think twice before opening themselves up to 
such affective experience, to having one’s ‘soul so enfettered’ (Oth., II.iii) to the beloved. 
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After all, as we have heard, ecstasy is only a temporary experience—‘only a foretaste of  
happiness to come’ as Erasmus explained—and thus any celebration of  fluency is to be 
followed by the inevitable ebb of  this ‘liquide and fluent thing’: ‘hence it happens’, de 
Sales concludes, ‘that such as attaine to these holy excesses of  heavenly love, afterward 
being come to themselves, can find nothing in the earth that can content them, and living 
in extreame annihilation of  themselves remaine much weakned’.68 While ‘the very ecstasy 
of  love’ (Ham., II.i.102) might well allow the soule to ‘go… out by this sacred liquefaction, 
and saintly flowing’, to give oneself  over to the ‘ebb’ and flow of  such an experience is to 
risk being carried along ‘like to a vagabond flag upon the stream’ which ‘goes to, and 
back’, and ‘rot[s] itself  with [that] motion’ (Ant., I.iv.42-6). Like ‘the lunatic’ whose 
enthusiasm blurred the distinction between divine union and intoxicated violence, the 
lover—who, as Theseus reminds us, is ‘just as frantic’—discovers that ecstasy can be 
agonising. 
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III.  ALLOWING THE INFLUENCE; OR, ‘THE POET’ 
 
   
‘To say it was “electrifying” does not capture the effect’, writes American Journalist Ron 
Rosenbaum recalling Peter Brook’s 1970 production of  A Midsummer Night’s Dream: ‘It was 
more like being struck by lightning. I felt “transported” in the literal sense of  being 
physically as well as metaphysically lifted from the muddy vesture of  earth to some higher 
realm’.69 Something about Brook’s production moved—‘struck … transported … 
lifted’—Rosenbaum, and for critics such as G. K. Chesterton, ‘in pure poetry and the 
intoxication of  words, Shakespeare never rose higher than he rises in [A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream]’.70 By these accounts, Shakespeare’s poetry has the potential to both move and 
intoxicate us: to watch or read the play might be to find oneself, in some crucial sense, 
under its influence. Indeed, Rosenbaum’s description of  feeling as though he was ‘struck 
by lightning’ finds its classical correlative in Cassius Longinus’ account of  the ecstasy of  
the sublime—the greatness of  thought and intensity of  feeling, brought about by the 
affective experience of  reading and listening—the effects of  which he variously likens to 
a ‘flash of  lightning’ or the sudden impact of  a ‘thunderbolt’:  
The effect of  genius is not to persuade the audience but rather to transport them 
out of  themselves. Invariably, what inspires wonder, with its power of  amazing us, 
always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing. For our persuasions 
are usually under our own control, while these things exercise an irresistible power 
and mastery, and get the better of  every listener.71  
 
In terms that have punctuated this classical pre-history of  ecstasy, Greek scholar and 
statesman Longinus asserts that great writing ‘inspires wonder’ and ‘transport[s]’ listeners 
‘out of  themselves’. Furthermore, it is an experience that again denotes movement: both 
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upwards towards the divine—as the title of  Longinus’ treatise Peri hypsous (peri: on, about; 
hypso: height, aloft) or On the Sublime suggests—but also outwards towards an audience, 
who are in turn thrown beside themselves in sublime rapture. As poet George Wither 
describes in his fourth eclogue: 
 The kinde flames of  Poesy 
 Have now borne thy thoughts so high,  
 That they up in Heaven be 
 And have quite forgotten mee.72 
 
The power of  poetry, often described in Wither’s works, is such that it carries us away: ‘A 
fit, that some will call poetick-madness, | Hath now surprized me’, writes Wither elsewhere 
in the opening to his Furor-Poeticus.73 In these circumstances, we see how comfortably the 
‘poet’ sits in the company of  the ‘lunatic’ and the ‘lover’. What makes these ecstatic 
subjects ‘all compact’, as Theseus had it, is their enthusiastic fluidity: their capacity to 
move and be moved. 
Indeed, as we have seen, Plato placed such ‘poetic inspiration’ alongside the 
madness of  mutual love as a kind of  divine ‘mania’ or ‘furor’. As Ficino considers in a 
published letter from 4 March 1474: 
Plato was right in his view that poetry springs not from technique but from a kind 
of  frenzy. … In Phaedrus and Ion, he discusses divine frenzy, of  which he claims 
there are three principle signs. Firstly, without God, one can scarcely master a 
single art, even after a long time. Secondly, those who are in a frenzy may utter 
many wonderful things [as] … God had sounded in through them, as though 
through trumpets. Thirdly, neither prudent men nor those learned from their 
youth have proved to be the best poets. … Plato adds that some very unskilled 
men are thus possessed by Muses, because divine providence wants to show 
mankind that the great poems are not the invention of  men but gifts from Heaven. 
He indicates this in Phaedrus when he says that no one, however diligent and 
learned in all the arts, has ever excelled in poetry unless to these other qualities 
he has been added a fiery quickness of  the soul. We experience this when we are 
inflamed by God’s presence working in us. Such force carries the seed of  the 
divine mind.74  
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Good poetry is here not simply a work of  art, but comes of  being inspired or possessed, 
of  having ‘a fiery quickness of  the soul’. Once again, ‘divine frenzy’ is articulated in terms 
of  the soul’s movement, and the ability for the divine to inspire and flow through the 
subject, ‘as though through trumpets’. This movement is crucial, for if  a speaker is truly 
moved, they can move others in turn; as French poet and priest Pontus de Tyard notes, 
following Ficino, ‘the divine furor not only makes a good poet, but also drenches with its 
liquor … those who listen to these verses’.75 Ecstasy, therefore, could be a highly affective 
experience. This potential of  words to ‘move’ the soul, Katherine Craik has observed, 
signalled both a ‘writer’s superlative achievement’ and ‘the matching commitment of  the 
reader’ who was enthralled and elevated by these sublimely affecting passages: ‘uplifted 
with a sense of  proud exaltation, we are filled with joy and pride, as if  we had ourselves 
produced the very thing we heard’.76 In this affective model, authors were inspired, and 
audiences were enthusiastically involved: poetic excellence is both a product of  and a 
catalyst for ecstatic rapture, as one soul moved out of  place moved others in turn.   
But what we might now celebrate, like Rosenbaum, as the capacity for a 
production or speech to ‘move’ us, was, for the early modern anti-theatricalist, also a 
cause for concern. As Bridget Escolme has shown, the sense of  ‘motion’ in ‘emotion’ 
would not only have been familiar to an early modern audience, but was also understood 
quite literally. ‘Emotion’, Escolme notes, involves this sense of  ‘somatic turbulence and 
movement’, with many ‘early modern treatises on the passions figur[ing] them as 
turbulent movements it is impossible to control’.77 Such movements were consistently 
understood as ‘motions of  the soule’: as, in Thomas Wright’s terms, ‘certain internall 
actes or operations of  the soule bordering upon reason and sense, prosecuting some good 
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thing, or flying some ill thing, causing therewithal some alteration in the body’.78 A claim 
such as ‘my lord, I see you are moved’ (Oth., III.iii.226) is therefore, as we shall see in 
Chapter Four, one laden with dangerous potential: one that could have profound physical 
and psychological consequences. ‘Comedies so tickle our senses with a pleasenter vein’, 
asserts anti-theatricalist Stephen Gosson, ‘that they make us lovers of  laughter and 
pleasure without any mean, both foes of  temperance; what schooling is this?’79 Pollard 
describes how ‘Gosson worrie[d] particularly that plays’ powerful effects on the senses 
gave them a dangerous power to invade audiences’ hearts, minds, and souls’.80 In these 
circumstances, one could be ‘moved’ to laugh, cry, or, as Thomas Heywood describes in 
his Apology for Actors (1616), compelled to confess to their crimes.81 Theatregoing, in other 
words, was understood as having the potential to bring about dangerous transformations, 
and in his Th’overthrow of  Stage-Playes, John Rainolds—a reader in Greek at Corpus Christi 
in Oxford—shows just how dangerous these transformations could be, citing an event 
‘recorded [by Lucian] to have come to pass in the Cite of  Abdêra’:  
At misdummer, in very hott weather, Andromeda (a Tragedie of  Euripedes) being 
played, manie [audience members] brought home a burning ague from the 
theater: about the seventh day folowing, they were riddle thereof, some by much 
bleeding, some by sweating, but all, as soon as they were abroad their beddes, did 
fall into a strange distemper and passion of  a light phrensie. The which exciting 
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them to say & cry aloude such things as were sticking freshly in their memorie, 
and had affected most their minde.82 
 
That these Thracian theatregoers could be thrown into such ‘franticke follie’ functions, 
for Rainolds, as support for his claim that ‘the seeing wherof  played but an hower, or two, 
might taint spectators’: that drama could transform playgoers completely.83 ‘Bleeding’, 
‘sweating’, falling into ‘strange distemper’ and ‘light phrensie’, these subjects are not only 
‘moved’ by what they see and hear, but are violently and physically affected. Indeed, as 
plague caused London’s theatres to close, these fears were not too distant.84 
Observing the subject moved out of  and beside itself, this chapter has 
demonstrated the extent to which, for the early modern subject, ecstasy, like the sublime, 
could be an affectively e-motional experience: one that moved the soul, one capable of  
altering the body, one that could move others in turn. As we have seen, ecstasy holds this 
dangerous potential. But, as Allison Hobgood demonstrates, these affective encounters 
also provided a catalyst for ‘precariously pleasurable transformations in theatregoers’ 
whose identification with ‘characters on stage brought about a temporary realignment of  
their ego boundaries, and their familiar selves disappeared in a pleasurable diffusion of  
subjectivity’.85 In these terms, as Jean Starobinski asserts in his study of  Montaigne, 
relation to others ‘is no longer a peril, a loss of  oneself, a superfluity, but an obligatory 
passage without which identity can never be sure of  itself ’.86 The individual who is open 
to ecstatically affective encounter—to the influence of  the divine, the beloved, or swept 
                                                             
82 John Rainolds, Th’overthrow of Stage-playes (Middleburg: by Richard Schilders, 1599), p. 118. 
83 Rainolds, p. 119. Allison Hobgood persuasively considers how playgoers could also have 
reciprocally transformed drama in Passionate Playgoing in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
84 See esp. Nichole DeWall, ‘“Sweet Recreation Barred’: The Case for Playgoing in Plague-
Time’, in Representing the Plague in Early Modern Europe, ed. Rebecca Totaro and Ernest B. Gilman 
(London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 133-149.  
85 Hobgood, Passionate Playgoing, pp. 192-3. 
86 Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985), p. 29. 
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along by narrative pleasure—demonstrates the capacity for such an experience to both 
inform and transform. What this prehistory of  the ecstatic experience reveals is that, for 
the early modern subject, there is something beyond the confines of  the self—union with 
the divine, the attainment of  knowledge, a prospect of  a greater sense of  connection to 
others and the world around you—that makes taking a step outside an enticing prospect. 
At the heart of  this study, as indeed at the heart of  early modern conceptions of  ecstatic 
experience, lies an acknowledgement that ecstasy is at once both a risk and an 
opportunity.  
For the subjects of  this chapter and those that follow, the ecstatic experience is 
one that brings about an awareness of  the boundaries that constitute the self. While we 
must necessarily acknowledge the dangers of  ‘open[ing] the door’ (Err., III.i.38), the 
ecstatic subjects of  this study will encourage that we not ‘keep the gate’ and ‘let no 
creature enter’ (II.ii.206-10), but that we allow ourselves to venture outside the confines 
of  the ‘city … state, [or] self ’. This thesis, in other words, celebrates the risk that ecstasy 
demands of  its subjects; while we necessarily recognise the dangers of  ecstasy as we 
progress through this study, we also recognise that getting ‘carried away’ might not be 
such a bad thing. Ficino may well be right that ‘bodies are most eagerly attached to their 
souls, and are separated from them with the greatest reluctance’ but, as Michel Serres has 
it, ‘no one who has not experienced ecstasy can know what being together means’.87   
 
                                                             






Early Modern Narratives of  Religious Ecstasy  
 
 
 Paul, thou art besyde thyself.1 
  
It is one thing, from the wilde top of  a Mountaine to see the Land of  Peace, and 
not to find the way thither; and in vaine to travell through wayes unpassable, 
round about beset with these fugitive Spirits, forsakers of  their God, lying in 
ambush with that Ring-leader of  theirs … and another thing to keep on the way 
that leades thither, which is guarded by the care of  our heavenly Generall.2 
 
 
Informed by the Platonic model outlined in the previous chapter, St. Augustine figures 
the soul’s return to God as a journey upwards. While some have failed ‘to find their way 
thither’ up the mountain, others manage to ‘keep on the way’ home toward ‘the Land of  
Peace’. Augustine’s Confessions are, from the very outset, driven by this compulsion to go 
beyond—‘thou hast made us for thy self  and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee’ 
(I.i.2)—and as a result, as Andrew Louth notes, ‘the sense of  not being at home in the 
world is fundamental to Augustine’s mystical thought’.3 This restless sense of  not feeling 
at home is one shared by each of  the travelling subjects of  this chapter, for whom ‘to lie 
| In restless ecstasy’ (Mac., III.ii.23-24) is to find oneself  relentlessly caught between and 
motivated by the experiences of  outgoing and homecoming; of  throwing oneself  beside 
oneself  in order to return to what Platonists considered the home of  bliss from whence 
the soul once fell. But here, in Augustine’s narrative of  religious travails and later in 
                                                             
1 The Holie Bible, trans. Matthew Parker (London: by Richard Jugge, 1568), lxxxvii. Replacing the 
Calvinist Geneva Bible, the Bishop’s Bible is generally acknowledged as the Bible with which 
Shakespeare was most familiar. As Rudolph Chris Hassel Jr. notes, ‘Shakespeare (or his 
characters) … cites the Bible so precisely that scholars have shown him alternating between the 
Bishops’ and the Genevan versions’—Shakespeare’s Religious Language: A Dictionary (London: 
Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2015), p. xx.  
2 Saint Augustine, Saint Augustine’s Confessions, trans. William Watts (London: by John Norton, 
1631), VII.xxi.27. Subsequent parenthetical references are to this edition unless otherwise stated. 
I refer to Augustine’s works by book, chapter, and page numbers.   
3 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Experience: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981) p. 134. 
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Renaissance religious writing, we also encounter subjects who are made restless by ecstasy: 
subjects who, familiar with the narratives of  religious ecstasy set forth and cultivated by 
key figures such as Plato, St. Paul, St. Augustine, and St. Teresa, find themselves restlessly 
longing to situate themselves within those ecstatic narratives, looking to these ecstatic 
frameworks to provide structure for otherwise inchoate experience.4 The following 
discussion considers what is at stake in that endeavour, outlining the established model of  
religious ecstasy to which the devout early modern subject might aspire, before then 
bringing into focus the implications of  this narrative for subjects who are not at home in 
themselves, and for whom residence with the divine is not guaranteed. Exploring these 
dynamics of  faith and aspiration in the poetry of  George Herbert, John Donne, and 
Richard Crawshaw, this chapter will then situate these narratives of  ecstasis alongside 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet and A Midsummer Night’s Dream in order to suggest the extent to 
which the playwright—whose work rarely engages directly or explicitly with religious 
texts—can be seen to inherit this language of  ecstatic aspiration and vulnerability. In 
what ways, I will ask, is Shakespeare’s drama informed by narratives of  religious ecstasy?  
                                                             
4 It is not my intention in what follows to suggest the extent to which ecstasy could be classified 
as either a Catholic or Protestant experience. Indeed, many of the figures at the centre of this 
chapter cannot be classified so neatly, with poets such as John Donne and Richard Crawshaw 
converting between faiths (from Catholicism to Anglicanism and from Anglicanism to 
Catholicism respectively). Furthermore, St. Teresa’s experience was not authenticated by the 
Catholic Church until 1622. The extent to which ecstatic experiences complicate such clear-cut 
classification is neatly summarized by a debate played out in the marginalia of Teresa's 
autobiography The Flaming Hart: ‘This Saint you see, was certainly no Protestant’, reads a printed note, 
to which an anonymous seventeenth-century reader retorts: ‘I say that she was a Protestant, tho 
[n]ominally Rom[an] Catholic’—Folger shelfmark: 157-787, cit. N. K. Sugimura, ‘“Divine 
annihilations”: Richard Crawshaw’s Religious Politics and the Poetics of Ecstasy’, Modern 
Philology, 112 (2015), 615-642 (641). This was a hotly contested subject. This is not to ignore 
terminological complications endemic to religious history of the period, which variously labels 
subjects as Catholic, Protestant, Puritan, Anglican, Laudian, and so on. Rather, it is to bring into 
focus a vocabulary of ecstasy which is shared by a range of authors. Put simply, this chapter does 
not consider how far ecstasy belongs to a Catholic or Protestant lexicon, but rather identifies the 
ecstatic lexion that resists such neat categorisation.   
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I. ST. AUGUSTINE AND THE NARRATIVE OF ECSTATIC ASCENSION 
 
 
‘Persistent toil overcomes all things’, writes Petrarch in a letter to Dionigi de Borgo San 
Sepolcro on 26 April 1336, detailing his recent ascent of  Mont Ventoux.5 Here Petrarch 
describes wandering around the valleys, seeking alternative routes towards the summit to 
the short-cuts taken by his brother who accompanied him, but instead finding himself  
veering downwards and losing his way: ‘I hoped to find an easier passage on the other 
side of  the mountain and that I would not be afraid of  a longer road if  I could advance 
more easily’ (174). But Petrarch’s journey is a difficult one, and his account is punctuated 
throughout with references to his ‘burden’, ‘weariness’, ‘distress’, ‘serious trouble’, and 
‘delu[sion]’ (174). When he finally reaches the summit, he finds himself  ‘moved by a 
certain unaccustomed quality of  the air and by the unrestricted spectacle’, and stands 
quite still ‘as in a trance’, admiring the views and ‘thinking about earthly things’ before 
then ‘raising [his] mind to loftier things’ (175-6). It is at this moment that Petrarch turns 
to the book he has with him, a copy of  Augustine’s Confessions; ‘I opened it and started to 
read at random’, he writes:  
By chance it was the tenth book of  that work to which I opened … [and] my eyes 
happened to light where it was written: ‘And they do to admire the summits of  
mountains and the vast billows of  the sea and the broadest rivers and the expanses 
of  the ocean and the revolutions of  the stars and they overlook themselves’. I 
confess that I was astonished. I closed the book enraged with myself  because I 
was even then admiring earthly things after having been long taught by pagan 
philosophers that I ought to consider nothing wonderful except the human mind 
compared to whose greatness nothing is great. … Then indeed having seen 
enough of  the mountain I turned my inner eyes within, and from that moment 
there was no one who heard me speak until we arrived back at the foot of  the 
mountain.  
             (178) 
 
Similarly turning to the Confessions—a seminal text for figures such as Thomas Aquinas 
                                                             
5 Francesco Petrarca, ‘To Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro’, in Rerum Familiarum Libri I-VIII, trans. 
Aldo S. Bernardo (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 172-80 (173). 
Subsequent parenthetical references are to this edition. 
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and John Donne, first translated into English by Tobie Matthew in 1620—the ensuing 
discussion will demonstrate the frequency with which these narratives of  ascension so 
often find themselves in dialogue with one another. Allowing Petrarch and other 
Renaissance writers to remain in conversation with the fourth-century theologian’s 
journey towards spiritual ascent, this section establishes the rhetoric and narrative 
framework of  religious ecstasy, as it will later appear in the work of  Donne, Herbert, and 
Shakespeare. Here we see a model of  the subject-in-pilgrimage, where the spatial 
dynamics of  ecstatic faith are mapped onto a literal landscape.   
 
i) AUGUSTINE, PLATO, AND THE DESIRE TO RETURN HOME 
 
The Seventh Book of  Augustine’s Confessions is, in many ways, an admission of  a lack of  
knowledge about the true nature of  God. He begins by articulating the internal 
struggle—‘My heart passionately cryed out upon all my former phantasmes; and with 
one blow I laid about mee, to beat away all that stuttering troope of  uncleane fancies, 
from the eye of  my mind’ (i.340)—which he faces as he becomes disillusioned with ‘those 
dumbe praters’ of  Manicheism (ii.345), ‘the sort of  esoteric Christianity that he had 
adopted in late adolescence’ but which he now comes to reject.6 Similarly ‘reject[ing] 
those deceitfull Divinations, and impious dotages of  the Astrologers’ (vi.360), Augustine 
instead turns to ‘certaine Bookes of  the Platonists’ (ix.375) in his quest to better understand 
the divine. While there is, as John Peter Keeley notes, ‘uncertainty regarding Augustine’s 
Platonic syllabus’, what Augustine does make clear is that these are works through which 
he becomes ‘more and more puffed up with … knowledge’ (xx.405), and that these books 
                                                             
6 John Peter Keeley, The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions (London: Routledge, 
2005), p. 3. 
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mark a crucial stage in the advancement of  his philosophical reflections.7 Augustine, 
whose conception of  faith is predicated upon the notion of  journeying and return, 
therefore inherited two compatible traditions. For it is in being ‘perswaded’ and 
‘admonished’ by these Platonic texts that Augustine begins to turn his attention inwards 
and ‘returne[s] to my selfe’ (375; 382):  
 I entred even into mine one inwards, thou being my leader. … Into my self  I went, 
 and with the eye of  my soule (such as it was) I discovered over the same eye of  my 
 soule, over my  minde, the unchangeable light of  the Lord.  
         (x.381)  
 
While this thesis has previously understood the ecstatic model as one which necessitates 
a journey out of  the self, Augustine, informed by Platonic doctrine that stressed the 
immortal soul’s desire to return home to the divine All, makes it clear that the path 
upwards towards God first requires retraction and introspection. Just as Petrarch turned 
his ‘inner eyes within’, one must journey into and through oneself  before being drawn 
upwards.  
 This notion of  indwelling as a precondition for outgoing—of  introspective 
ascent—is integral to Augustine’s contemplative vision, and this movement from outside, 
to inside and upwards, becomes his characteristic mode of  religious travel and discovery. 
For such spiritual introspection brings into focus the extent to which the self  is dependent 
on another source: ‘I am aware of  my own sensing and thinking’ writes Charles Taylor 
in his articulation of  Augustinian inwardness: 
… and in reflecting on this, I am made aware of  its dependence on something 
beyond it, something common. … I recognize that this activity which is mine is 
grounded on and presupposes something higher than I, something which I should 
look up to and revere.  By going inward, I am drawn upward.8  
 
Or, to recall Augustine himself: ‘I entered into mine owne inwards … and with the eye 
                                                             
7 Keeley, p. 15. 
8 Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 134. 
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of  my soule … I discovered … the unchangable light of  the Lord’ (381). As much as ‘the 
Confessions is, in the end, about God and the soul’, as Keeley notes, it is also a journey 
towards self-discovery: what this Platonic narrative offers Augustine is a model through 
which he might better understand and define himself. But that is, in many ways, precisely 
the problem. While it is in turning inwards that Augustine catches a glimpse of  divine 
light, one ‘superiour to my soule, because it made me’ (382), this glimpse as yet remains 
only temporary. ‘[T]hou liftedst me up, that I might see there was something which I 
might see’, recounts Augustine, ‘and yet it was not what I did see’ (382); Augustine knows 
that there is something to be seen, yet divine (in)sight lies out of  view. ‘I trembled both 
with love and horror: and I perceived my selfe to be far off  from thee’: left without the 
union and clarification he seeks, Augustine instead comes to realise his ‘utter Unlikeness’ 
(382) to the divine. In a moment of  ecstatic contemplation that promised ‘self-
sameness’—‘the classical epithet for the Platonic forms’—Augustine rather finds himself  
cast back into radical unlikeness and instability, where God’s ultimate articulation of  
divine agency ‘I AM THAT I AM’ can be heard, but only ‘from afarre off ’ (383).9 This 
is a text which tries continually to narrow gaps and spaces, to propel towards a teleological 
goal, but yet is beset by way-laying and unexpected distances which repeatedly prevent 
Augustine’s return home to God. Instead, Augustine remains in travel, at a spectator’s 
distance.  
 Augustine’s conception of  the ecstatic experience is marked by its fleeting nature, 
one that is unable to last because the soul’s moral weakness precludes contact and 
therefore total union with the divine: ‘And now came I to have a sight of  those invisible 
things of  thee … But I was not able to fixe mine eye long upon them: … my infirmity 
being beaten backe againe’ (xvii.397). Such descriptions are not unique to the Confessions; 
                                                             
9 Keeley, p. 77. 
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in Sermon 52, Augustine discusses the temporary nature of  ecstasy in relation to Psalm 
31:22 (‘I said in my ecstasy, I am cut off  before your eyes’). Much like his account in Book 
VII, the narrative follows a ‘soul lifted up to God, [who] poured out his soul above [it]self  
… reach[ing] that unchangable light by a form of  spiritual contact’.10 After ‘a while in 
ecstasy, having been separated from bodily experience and snatched up to God’, the soul 
returns to its corporeal, human condition: just as much as the soul is a gift, it is also a 
‘burden’.11 But Augustine’s account of  his experience in the Confessions is much more 
violent and painful: ‘thou diddest beat backe the infirmity of  my owne sight’; ‘I was ravisht 
to thee by thine owne beauty; and yet by and by I violently fell off  againe … the body 
which is corrupted, presseth down the soule … my infirmity being beaten backe againe’ (382; 
394-397, emphasis added). With the knowledge that ‘by this very soule, I will ascend up 
unto him’ (588), comes the painful recognition that the soul, chained to and infected by 
its corporeal, earthly prison, is similarly disposed towards descent:   
Sometymes thou doest admit me, to most unusual inward, strange affects; and the 
feeling  of  I know not what delight; which if  once it were perfected in me, I know 
not what joy that is, which would not be felt, in such a life as this. But againe, I 
fall backe, as being drawne downe by certain said and heavy weights; yea I am 
swallowed up with my ill customes. … I bewayle my selfe with many tears; but 
still I find my selfe held fast. Heere below I have the power to remaine, but I have 
no mind to it; there above I have a will to be, but I want the power; and miserable 
I am, in both conditions.12 
 
Subject to these ‘strange affects’, Augustine articulates himself  as being in a state of  
constant motion. Indeed, infused with intense delight before being weighed back down, 
desiring to ascend yet habitually caught below, Augustine’s narratives of  ascension are 
punctuated by this sense of  suffering from which he is never quite freed. As Keely writes: 
‘nothing is ever easy for the Augustinian soul’.13 Ecstasy can be agonising.   
                                                             
10 Cit. Keeley, p. 135. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Due to an illegible manuscript, this citation is to Augustine’s Confessions, trans Sir Tobie 
Matthew (Saint-Omer: English College Press, 1620), X.XL.568-9. 
13 Keeley, p. 71. 
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The optimism and spiritual confidence of  Plato and Plotinus is therefore 
understandably absent in Augustine’s Confessions; while contemplative souls elsewhere find 
salvation, the moral weight of  Augustine’s soul is always a hindrance to flight: ‘onely an 
infirmity of  the soule it is, that it … cannot entirely rise up together’ (464). Where the 
Platonist texts offered Augustine hope, then, they also presented a danger; ‘they describe 
a vain path to salvation, which can tempt the soul to spiritual pride, and thereby ironically 
and tragically exacerbate its fallen state’, notes Keeley.14 Aware that ‘I can find no safe 
place for my soul except in you’ (X.xi.65), Augustine is thrown into a world of  radical 
instability, for while that ‘safe place’ is ever present, it is always just out of  reach. ‘I set my 
self  to seeke a meanes of  recovering so much strength, as should bee sufficient to enjoy 
thee; but I could not finde it …’ (VII.xviii.398): it is claims such as this that lead a number 
of  critics to read Book VII as ‘a series of  attempts at Plotinian ecstasy’ or, more 
specifically, as Brian Dobell puts it, ‘failed attempts at ecstasy’.15 Similarly, for Susan M. 
Felch, Book VII offers a description of  Augustine’s ‘younger self  Platonically striving in 
solitude to scale the heights of  divine knowledge. And failing’.16 Understood in these 
terms, Augustine fails to achieve in Book VII the ecstasy that he eventually experiences 
in Book X, following his conversion to Christianity. Before turning to Augustine’s famous 
Ostian narrative, however, I wish to consider the inverse of  these claims: not that 
Augustine fails to achieve Platonic ecstasy, but rather that the narrative of  Platonic ecstasy 
fails him. 
 Indeed, as the previous chapter highlighted, the ecstatic experience was for Plato 
                                                             
14 Keeley, p. 71. 
15 Keeley, p. 5; Brian Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 135 (n.144). See also pp. 213-27 for a 
comparison between the Platonic ascent of Book VII and the ‘Ostia experience [which] is’, for 
Dobell, ‘clearly presented by the narrator of the Confessions as a model of successful ascent of the 
soul, in contradistinction to the failed attempts of book 7’, p. 213. 
16 Susan M. Felch, The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), p. 219. 
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a requisite stage of  enlightenment, whereby, according to Marsilio Ficino, ‘after the soul 
has fallen from higher things to lower, God draws it back from lower to higher’.17 Indeed, 
for Augustine, the spiritual element in man is a painful reminder not of  the potential for 
salvation, but of  his fallen state. As Keeley observes: 
Unlike the compatibalism of  divine production and fall in Plotinus, the creation 
and fall are distinct events for Augustine, the latter exacerbating the former. 
Hence these texts from Book VII exhibit a greater sense of  loss, a greater need 
for salvific restitution, and a profound need for the soul to be submissive to God.18  
 
As Protestant divine William Watts’ translation and subheadings suggest—outlining an 
exploration ‘Of  the divers Bookes of  the Platonists’ followed by ‘What he found in the holy 
Scriptures, which was not in the Platonists’—the latter stages of  Book VII exhibit not only 
Augustine’s struggle to achieve ecstasy, but rather suggest the extent to which the Platonic 
narrative of  ecstatic union with the divine fails him. For him, the state is not sustainable 
and not available in the way he had come to expect. In his identification of  the 
inadequacies of  the Libri Platonici, Augustine therefore finds not salvation, but limitation: 
There again did I read, that God the Word was not borne of  flesh nor of  blood, nor of  the 
will of  man, nor of  the will of  the flesh, but of  God. But that the Word was made flesh, and 
dwelt among us, did I not there reade.  
         (376)   
 
‘All this did I not read there’; ‘those Bookes have not’; ‘[it] is not there’; ‘none of  all this 
doe these Platonic writings containe’; ‘No man in those Bookes heares him calling’ (376; 
377; 378; 409; 410): these claims punctuate Augustine’s account of  the Platonist books. 
While his contemplative experience makes him sure of  God’s existence—‘O eternall 
Truth!’ (xx.382)—Augustine grows increasingly aware of  his abject distance from the 
divine. Despite his assertion that he is ‘puffed up with knowledge’ through these Platonist 
works, that knowledge ultimately leads, as Dobell observes, ‘to “destruction” rather than 
                                                             
17 Ficino, Sopra lo Amore ovvero Convito di Platone, cit. and trans. E. H. Gombrich, Symbolic Images: 
Studies in the Art of the Renaissance (London: Phaidon Press, 1975), p. 169.  
18 Keeley, p. 71. 
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to the blessed life’.19  
This failure is significant for Augustine, for it is one that will lead him to redirect 
his focus to Scripture and set him upon a path that will eventually lead him to salvation: 
‘upon these [books] I beleeve it was, thy pleasure that I should first fall, before. I took thy 
Scriptures into my consideration’ (405). It is this fortunate ‘fall’ or felix culpa, Augustine 
asserts, that enables him to come to a more comprehensive understanding of  his 
relationship with the divine. It is therefore crucial for him to remember ‘how far those 
[Platonic] Bookes wrought upon [his] affections’—for him to ‘print in memory’ the 
impression they made—in order for him to be ‘made tractable by thy [God’s] Bookes’ (405; 
406); it is through encountering the shortcomings of  Platonic doctrine that Augustine 
becomes tractable (OED, adj. 1.a: ‘docile, compliant, manageable’) to divine tract (OED, 
n. 2: ‘an anthem consisting of  verses of  Scripture’). Thus, at the close of  Book VII, 
Augustine sets himself  upon a different track altogether, adopting the narrative of  
pilgrimage and highlighting the vertical geography of  ecstasy: 
For it is one thing, from the wilde top of  a Mountaine to see the Land of  Peace, 
and not to find the way thither; and in vaine to travell through wayes unpassable 
… and another thing to keep on the way that leades thither, which is guarded by 
the care of  our heavenly Generall.  
(xxi.410)  
 
While Platonism offered Augustine the capacity to ‘see the Land of  Peace’—or, at least, 
a glimpse at what might have been seen—it did not show him the way. Instead, to 
appropriate from the speaker of  Shakespeare’s ‘Sonnet 7’, Augustine’s ‘eyes … now 
converted are | from his low tract and [now he] look[s] another way’ (11-2), turning from 
Plato to St. Paul and so beginning his conversion to Christianity: ‘these things did by 
wonderfull meanes sinke into my very bowels, when as I read that least of  thy Apostles, 
and had considered upon thy workes, and trembled (1 Cor, 15.9)’ (vii.410-11). Having 
                                                             
19 Dobell, p. 209. 
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redirected his focus from secular to sacred reading, Augustine comes to ‘discerne at last 
and distinguish’ between ‘those who saw whither they were to goe, but knew nothing of  
the way’, and those that took ‘that path which leades unto that blessed Countrey, not to 
be lookt upon onely, but dwelt in’ (406). Access to the latter, he now recognizes, would 
not have been possible through ‘these Platonike bookes … onely’ (407). Here we find 
ecstasy appropriated into new hands.  
  




This rhetoric of  the soul’s tractability and divine traction—of  finding and keeping 
oneself  on the path towards union with the divine—would continue to find articulation 
in discussions of  the soul’s quest for union with God. ‘Watch the way of  the Spirit of  
God, into thee’, advises Donne, who, as Katrin Ettenhuber has observed, turned to 
Augustine’s work ‘throughout his career with almost obsessive frequency’:20  
That way which he makes his path, in which he comes oftnest to thee, and by 
which thou findest thy self  most affected, and best disposed towards him, and 
pervert not that path. … Make streight his paths, that is, keepe them streight; and 
when thou observest, which is his path in thee, (by what means especially he 
workes upon thee) meet him in that path, embrace him in those meanes, and 
alwayes bring a facile, a fusil, a ductile, a tractable soule, to the offers of  his grace, 
in his way.21    
 
Adopting Augustine’s travel dynamic, Donne asserts that the subject must ‘make streight 
his paths’ towards the divine because it is not only the route ‘best disposed towards him’, 
but also the way ‘in which [God] comes ofnest to thee’; the track is not just one-way but 
runs in both directions, allowing the subject to journey out towards the other in search of  
union. An exploration of  these dynamics, therefore, suggests that ecstasy includes 
                                                             
20 Katrin Ettenhuber, Donne’s Augustine: Renaissance Cultures of Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 3. 
21 Donne, ‘Sermon XXXVIII’, in Fifty Sermons (London: by James Flesher, 1649), p. 351. 
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additional directions and movements. Again, in his sermon on Judges 5.20 (September 
15, 1622), Donne advocates ‘a good, tractable, and ductile disposition’, promoting a soul 
that is disposed towards dis-position, towards being drawn out—‘ductile, easy to be 
drawne’, as Thomas Elyot’s Dictionary has it.22 What these narratives of  ‘ductile and 
tractable soules’ repeatedly drive towards is an ipseic flexibility and malleability, for this 
is, as Rector Peter Watkinson notes, ‘the Fire and Hammer, wherewith God breaks the 
Rocks (the stoniest hearts) in pieces’:  
It makes the flintyest heart contrite and humble, and to tremble at the Hearing 
of  it: whereby it becomes tractable, and ductile, apt to receive divine impressions. 
Hence the Apostle praiseth God, who had so moulded the Romans, that they were 
delivered into that form or type of  Doctrine (for so it is in the Greek) they were 
cast into that mould, or received that stamp.23 
  
To be tractable and ductile is to be ‘apt to receive divine impressions’, because a ‘ductile 
disposition’ is one that allows the soul to be drawn out towards the divine and reformed. 
Echoing period coining metaphors that articulated the subject in terms of  its wax-like 
impressionability, Donne here articulates the ductile subject as one that could be 
‘moulded’ by being placed into a ‘form or type’, and there be ‘stamp[ed]’ by God. As 
Donne declares elsewhere in a sermon at the Earl of  Exeter’s chapter at St. John’s, 
Clerkenwell, in 1624: ‘God sealed us, in imprinting his Image in our souls … every man 
hath this seale, and he hath it, as soone as he hath a soule’.24 Just as seal-impressions were 
used to authenticate documents, and coin-impressions validated the fineness and weight 
of  a coins’ metal, so ‘divine impressions’ here authenticate the devout subject with the 
                                                             
22 Donne, Five Sermons upon Speciall Occasions (London: for Thomas Jones, 1626), p. 21; Thomas 
Elyot, The Dictionary of Syr Thomas Elyot (London: by Thomae Bertheleti, 1538), xxxvii. 
23 John Tombes, Antipaedobaptism (London: by H. Hils, 1652), p. 228; Peter Watkinson, Mary’s 
Choice Declared in a Sermon Preached at the Funeral of the Right Honourable Lady Mary Wharton (London: 
by Robert White, 1674), p. 22. 
24 Donne, ‘Sermon XXXII’, in Fifty Sermons, pp. 279-287 (283). On the enduring idea that the 
soul was imprinted with God’s image, see G. W. H. Lampe, The Seal of the Spirit (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1951). See also Harry Newman’s consideration of the formation of 
identity and various impressing technologies in Impressive Shakespeare: Identity: Authority and the Imprint 
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imprint of  God’s image: religious identity could be stamped upon the subject.25 Only 
those with a ‘ductile disposition’ can be so impressionable, for good or ill. As Theseus 
warns Hermia in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, employing a commonplace metaphor of  
biological generation to impression, and simultaneously aligning a father-figure with 
‘god’, the Father: 
To you your father should be as a god, 
One that composed your beauties, yea, and one 
To whom you are but as a form in wax, 
By him imprinted, and within his power 
To leave the figure, or disfigure it. 
(I.i.47-51)  
 
To be ‘a form in wax’, ‘imprinted’ by the ‘father’, is to recognise the extent to which such 
impressions can both ‘compose’ and ‘disfigure’; allowing divine influence and impression, 
the pliable, ductile subject opens itself  to an experience that can either ‘figure, or disfigure 
it’. 
 As we have seen, this is a narrative that Augustine, with his ‘infirmity being beaten 
back againe’, knew all too well. As a number of  Renaissance texts make clear, such a 
beating is part of  the process: a ‘ductile disposition’ is only available to the subject who 
can withstand the stroke of  the hammer, the receipt of  the stamp: ‘send a thunderbolt of  
grace from heaven’, pleads clerk Thomas Warmstry, ‘and dash my heart to pieces … that 
I may be undone in my self, so that I may be made up again in thee’.26 It is in this context 
that we hear Donne’s plea not only to ‘batter my heart’ but also to ‘knocke, breathe, shine, 
and seeke to mend’ as he calls to a ‘force’ that lies beyond to ‘o’erthrow me’ and ‘to 
breake, blowe, burn, and make me new’.27 As Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen has noted in his 
                                                             
25 Kimberley Ann Coles notes that Donne employs this rhetoric of divine impression to articulate 
his changable faith: ‘You shall seldome see a Coyne, upon which the stamp were removed, 
though to imprint it better, but it looks awry and squint … And so, for the most part, do mindes 
which have received divers impressions’—‘The Matter of Belief in John Donne’s Holy Sonnets’, 
RQ, 68 (2015), 899-931 (920). 
26 Thomas Warmstry (1610-1665), A Box of Spikenard (London: by T. Mabb, 1660), p. 36. 
27 Donne, ‘Holy Sonnet X’, in Poems (London: for John Marriot, 1633), F3r. 
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Pain and Compassion in Early Modern Literature and Culture, Donne here ‘evokes late medieval 
and post-Tridentine Catholic attitudes towards pain, in which physical suffering is seen 
as a key to salvation’.28 Donne welcomes, even craves, ‘the workman’s hammer’, is 
prepared to be hammered out thin, because he knows that the ductile, tractable subject 
is defined by its pliancy—‘I come into the hands of  my God… pliably… ductily…’—a 
condition which will in turn make it not only compliant with but also ‘led and conducted 
by the spirit of  God’: ‘O make us so Tractable to his holy Motions, that we may experience 
his Heavenly Consolations’.29 A ductile disposition is desirable for the subject who seeks to 
position itself  closer to God: tractability is attractive. ‘Batter my heart’: this is a subject 
who craves the agony of  ecstasy.  
 We might consider Augustine’s Confessions, particularly its latter stages (from Book 
VII onwards), as a narrative of  ecstasy, that is, a narrative that is driven by the desire for 
ecstatic union with and return to the divine. ‘Desire’ is, after all, as Peter Brooks suggests 
in his Reading for the Plot, a ‘narrative motor’: ‘[it] is always there at the start of  a narrative 
… [and] reache[s] a state of  intensity such that movement must be created, motion 
undertaken, change begun’.30 Such desire—such change, such motion—is instilled in 
Augustine’s narrative from the moment he encounters Plotinus:  
One who has seen the good, the desire of  every soul, knows what I mean when I 
say it is beautiful.31  
 
‘The person who knows the truth knows it, and he who knows it knows eternity’, echoes 
Augustine (VII.x.122-3). What drives Augustine, to continue Brooks’ narrative metaphor, 
                                                             
28 Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen, Pain and Compassion in Early Modern Literature and Culture (Cambridge: 
D. S. Brewer, 2012), p. 108. 
29 Donne, ‘Sermon XVI’ (1629), in XXVI Sermons (London: by Thomas Newcomb, 1661), pp. 
220-232 (223); George Chapelin, A Familiar and Christian Instruction (London: by Thomas 
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30 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Desire and Intention in Narrative (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1984), p. 39. 
31 Plotinus, p. 320. 
 
71 
is the hope of  things to come: ‘a motion towards the end as yet unobtained’, as English 
priest and theologian Richard Hooker puts it.32 For, as Phillip Cary describes, channelling 
Augustine: 
A lasting vision of  God, when it comes, will metaphorically change us into God 
in the sense of  causing us to participate in the incorruptibility of  the divine nature. 
We shall be kept safe from all changes for the worse by our union with him. This 
is ultimate happiness and eternal rest, for once found it can never be lost.33  
 
Or, as Robert Crofts has it, exploring how the mind works on the body in his Paradise 
Within Us (1640), ‘that our fraile bodies shall be changed and made spirituall bodies like the glorious 
body of  the Sonne of  God, (Phil. 3, 21) With whom we shall enjoy infinite happinesse for 
ever’.34 And, in what Kim Paffenroth considers ‘the true intellectual and spiritual climax 
of  the book’, Augustine does finally attain this ‘ultimate happiness’ in a vision shared with 
his mother at Ostia:35  
Our discourse was once come unto that poynt, that the highest pleasure of  the 
carnall sences, and that in the brightest beame of  corporall lightsomenesse, was, 
in respect of  the sweetenesse of  that life, not onely not worthy of  comparison, but 
not so much as of  mention; wee chering up our selves with a more burning 
affection towards that, did by degrees course over all these corporeals: that is to 
say, the heaven it selfe, from whence both Sunne, and Moone, and starres doe 
shine upon this earth: yea wee soared higher yet, by inward musing, and discourse 
upon Thee, and by admyring of  thy workes. And last of  all, wee came to our 
owne soules which wee presently went beyond, that wee might aduance as high 
as that Region of  never-wasting plenty.  
(X.i.538-9) 
 
Travelling ‘up[wards]’ and ‘beyond’ by ‘inward musing’, ‘soar[ing] higher’ by journeying 
in, Augustine articulates the spatial dynamics of  faith that he has learned on his 
confessional journey, one which, as Leo C. Ferrari has noted, the narrative structure of  
                                                             
32 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie in Eight Bookes (London: by John Windet, 
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33 Phillip Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, in A Reader’s Companion 
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the Confessions places between two trees: the pear tree in Book II from which a sixteen 
year old Augustine steals fruit, and the fig tree under which he pauses just before his 
conversion in Book VIII.36 And now, at the close of  his journey, Augustine finally achieves 
that ‘infinite happinesse forever’: that ‘never-ceasing ecstasy of  joy and delight [which is] 
to find our selves united to him, the Almighty Lord’.37    
Or, so he had hoped. This is not the ‘lasting vision of  God’ for which he longed, 
and once again Augustine returns to his body in anguish:  
Should this exaltation of  spirite have ever continued, and all Other visions of  a 
[f]arre inferior alloy beene quite taken away, and that this one exaltation should 
ravish us, and swallow us up, and so wrappe up their beholder among these more 
inward ioyes, as that his life might bee for ever like to this very moment of  
understanding which wee now sighed after.  
        (x.542-3)  
 
At Ostia, Augustine seemingly achieves the ecstatic experience that he sought in Book 
VII, but this ‘one exaltation’ is not enough to contain—to ‘ravish … swallow … wrappe 
up’—its beholder ‘for euer’, but instead leaves its subjects sighing after its return, lost in 
nostalgia. Ecstasy can only ever be fleeting; ‘this [pious] ecstasy’, as Erasmus observes in 
a letter to theologian Maarten van Dorp, ‘is only a foretaste of  the happiness to come, in 
which we shall be wholly absorbed into God and more in him than in ourselves’.38   
While this fleeting glimpse is, for Augustine, a cause of  frustration and anguish, 
Donne would come to recognise this as a defining factor of  the ecstatic experience; 
acknowledging the fleeting nature of  ecstasy in his 1629 Easter Sermon, he recalls ‘that 
S. Paul in his extasie, in his rapture into the third heaven, did see that very light of  glory, 
which constitutes the Beautificall vision, and yet did lose that sight again’.39 As Michael 
                                                             
36 ‘Basic to the intrinsic dramatic structure of the Confessions is the fact that like the Bible it is 
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Martin notes, ‘Paul’s ecstasy is Donne’s exemplum of  Christian religious experience, 
precisely in the fact that ecstasy does not last this side of  death’. ‘If  there is to be an 
ecstasy’, he continues, ‘for Donne, there must be a thorn in the flesh’, and this is precisely 
what Augustine and his mother Monica discover:40 
Then sayd my Mother: Sonne, for mine owne part I have delight in nothing in 
this life, what I should here doe any longer, and to what end I am here, I know 
not, now that my hopes in this world are vanished.  
        (x.543-4)  
 
The pain of  ecstasy here is twofold. Having glimpsed the wonders that lie beyond and 
therefore ‘delight[ing] nothing in this life’, Monica departs this world for the next. But 
having ‘beene made one, out of  hers and mine together’, having shared in a moment of  
ecstatic union not only with the divine but also with his mother, Augustine finds himself  
‘destitute of  so great a comfort’, his ‘very soule wounded’, his ‘life torne in pieces’ 
(xii.ii.552); ‘I cloased her eyes’, he recounts, ‘and there flowed withall an unspeakeable 
sorrow into my heart … mine eyes at the same time by the violent command of  my mind, 
pumpt their Well drie, and wo was me in that same agony’ (i.549).41 What is perhaps most 
agonising about ecstasy here is that it reveals its inability fully to access the divine; this 
side of  death ecstasy must come to an end, and pain is thus necessarily encountered in 
the return to a world where hopes ‘are vanished’. Religious ecstasy is, in other words, a 
promissory note of  the eternal union that lies beyond, at a distance which death will 
eventually overcome.  
For now, Augustine’s reconciliation with the divine remains, as Richard Kearney 
observes, in the future, and can therefore be ‘expressed only in narratives of  hope, desire, 
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faith, which point forward to a promised land that is not yet, a messianic era that 
transcends the here and now’.42 Because of  this, we might be inclined to revise Phillip 
Cary’s assertion that ‘the Confessions is not an autobiography, but an account of  how the 
soul wanders from God and returns to him’ in order to acknowledge more fully 
Augustine’s account of  what happens in the interim: the Confessions is simultaneously 
driven and frustrated by the narrative that the soul wanders from God and returns to 
him.43 While Augustine desires to return home, the journey is not so straightforward; 
‘were not this as much, as Enter into thy Masters joy? (Mat. 25.21), he cites, before turning 
to question: ‘But when shall that bee?’ (x.543). Complete ecstatic union with the divine 
is, for Augustine, always deferred. But through Augustine’s keynote experiences in quest 
of  that ultimate happiness, what Cary terms his ‘pilgrim journey’ through Books One to 
Nine, the Confessions present a narrative of  transformation via the dispersal and recovery 
of  the self.44 This is a subject willing to be thrown beside himself, prepared to send himself  
out despite being repeatedly beaten back. It is in these acts of  faith, and in the certainty 
of  potential denial, that the ecstatic subject takes shape. 
While Augustine might not get the homecoming he had hoped for when he set 
upon his ‘pilgrim journey’, he has nonetheless come a long way: ‘Thou shalt increase, O 
Lord, thy graces more and more upon mee, that my soule may follow my selfe home to 
thee’ (659). Having by now journeyed through the Confessions to the moment that Petrarch 
read at the top of  Mount Ventoux, we come to recognise the extent to which Augustine’s 
journey towards God has required steps towards himself: 
A wonderfull admiration surprizes me, and an astonishment seazes me vpon this: 
that men go abroad to admire the heights of  mountaines, the lofty billowes of  the 
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sea, the long courses of  riuers, the vast compasse of  the Ocean, and the circular 
motions of  the starres, and yet leaue them selues vnadmired.  
          (viii.vi.597)  
 
‘This is’, Augustine states in Book X, ‘the fruit of  my Confessions; not of  what I have 
beene, but of  what I am’ (v.577, emphasis added): just as Augustine’s pilgrimage journeys 
between two trees, it also charts the expanse between those pronouns. But ‘I am whatever 
I am’ is still some way from ‘I AM THAT I AM’ (x.383), and while Augustine’s narrative 
shifts into the present as it catches up with its narrator, there is still an anxiety surrounding 
the idea of  being present: ‘so long therefore as I bee absent from thee, I am neerer vnto 
my selfe then vnto thee’ (v.580). Self  can be too present, for such presence is marked by, 
and predicated upon, absence: self-presence only through divine absence; divine presence 
only through self-absence. This narrative becomes, as this chapter will now explore in 
more detail, entrenched in early modern religious discourse; ‘I am resolved’, asserts 
seventeenth-century clergyman and religious writer Edward Kellett, echoing Philippeans 
1.23, ‘to lose my selfe in holy devotion … that I may find my Christ’.45 What is clear 
throughout Augustine’s articulations of  his desire to ‘lose my selfe in holy devotion’, is 
that the first step towards the divine is to deny self: one cannot ‘Know thy selfe’ without 
first knowing God; one cannot find God without first losing oneself. As Calvin would 
suggest, this was a dynamic that cut both ways: ‘it is evident that man doth never come 
to the perfect knowledge of  him selfe, unlesse hee have first beheld the face of  God’.46 
Thus when Augustine questions earlier in the Confessions ‘whereabouts was I, when I 
sought after thee?’ and comes to realise that ‘Thou wert directly before mee, but I had 
gone backe from thee; nor did I then finde my selfe, much lesse thee’ (V.iii.211), he 
articulates precisely this dynamic of  the fractured self  that must recover and find itself  
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before it can hope to find God. Five books later, and Augustine is prepared to lend his 
recovered self  to further discovery: ‘to such therefore will I discouer my selfe, whom thou 
commandest mee to serue: not discouering what I haue beene, but what I now am, and 
what I am yet’ (iv.iii.579). This is the journey of  a subject that finds autonomy via 
abjection; a subject that, through out-going, journeys home to self.   
What these early, foundational narratives of  religious ecstasy bring into focus is 
the extent to which the subject must be willing to suffer the pain of  self-departure, willing 
to endure dispersal, if  it is to come back together reformed; that one must be willing to 
go outside if  one is ever truly to ‘come home’. In the second section of  this chapter, I will 
explore the religious poetry of  George Herbert and John Donne—the latter a ‘second St 
Austine’ according to seventeenth-century divine Izaak Walton—as exemplars of  subjects 
desiring to be ecstatically ‘loosed asunder’ and united with God.47 In so doing, I explore 
further the dynamics of  faith that will inform Shakespeare’s conception of  the ecstatic 
experience as one of  movement: of  out-going and homecoming. As Sir Richard Tempest 
has it (1649): 
Here, in devout extasies, my soule loses it selfe, in those ravishments of  divine 
love: I goe out of  my selfe, in wonderment, not able to comprehend it; but joyfully 
throw myself  into those depths, desiring to be comprehended by it.48   
 
Here, in devout ecstasies, we will encounter the language of  frustrated selflessness, 
informed by an impulse towards self-sacrifice, that is central to this study’s exploration of  
the ecstatic subject.  
                                                             
47 Cit. Martin, p. 49. 
48 Sir Richard Tempest, An Entertainment of Solitariness: Or, the Melting of the Soule (London: s.n., 
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II. MINDING THE GAP: AGONISING ECSTASY 
 
Our Soule, whose country is heaven, and God her father,  
Into this world, corruptions sinke, is sent, 
Yet, so much in her travaile she doth gather, 




As Reformation Christianity shifted the responsibility for the quality of  the relationship 
between God and his people from church to individual, from mediated to immediate, 
gaining God’s favour became an intensely personal experience and, accordingly, a 
personal problem. ‘No man’, asserts Martin Luther, ‘can be thoroughly humbled until he 
knows that his salvation is utterly beyond his powers, devices, endeavours, will, and works, 
and depends entirely on the choice, will, and work of  another, namely, of  God alone’.50 
The devout subject must submit itself  to God’s Will: divine grace cannot be merited, only 
given. If, as Alan Sinfield suggests, articulating this Protestant model, ‘we cannot ascend, 
only be lifted up’, then what we repeatedly find in the period’s devotional poetry are calls 
to the divine to raise the subject into ecstatic union: to take them home.51 Herbert’s 
refrain in ‘Home’ is one such plea for divine transportation: 
 Oh loose this frame, this knot of  man untie! 
 That my free soul may use her wing, 
 Which now is pinion’d with mortalitie, 
         As an intangled, hamper’d thing. 
         O show thy self  to me,  
         And take me up to thee!52  
 
Overcome with the desire to overcome himself, Herbert invokes the Platonic notion of  
the winged soul and contrasts it with the ‘knots’ and ‘ties’ of  ‘mortalitie’ in which he finds 
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himself  ‘intangled’, lamenting that he should ‘stay and grone’ while ‘most of  me to heav’n 
is fled’; his ‘thoughts and jokes are all packt up and gone’ while his ‘flesh and bones and 
joynts’ are left to ‘pray’ below. Herbert’s current ‘Home’ is not where his heart is, and 
thus he is unwilling to accept John Donne’s advice to ‘be … thine owne home, and in thy 
selfe dwell’.53 Instead he desires to go out and seek residence elsewhere: 
 If  thou stayest still, why must I stay? 
        My God, what is this world to me, 
 This world of  wo? Hence all ye clouds, away, 
        Away; I must get up and see. 
  O show thy self  to me,  
  And take me up to thee!  
            (‘Home’, 101) 
 
Because, for Herbert, the body is not ‘Home’ to the soul but rather the location of  its 
exile: a home from home. And yet this desire to return home, to ‘get up and see’, is 
restricted by the ‘knot of  man’ that perpetually holds these subjects back, the anchor that 
keeps the soul within the body. As we have seen, calls to loosen such knots and ties are 
similarly central to Donne’s conception of  the ecstatic experience, as he too calls 
upwards—‘batter my heart’—and pleads to the divine to ‘Divorce mee, untie, or breake 
that knot againe, | Take mee to you, imprison mee’.54 These are subjects that are 
painfully aware that ecstatic union requires loosening the knot, being untied and thrown 
beyond themselves. Surrender is a necessary and inevitable part of  ecstasy. As Puritan 
Jacobite Henry Jessey confirms ‘you must be lost in your selfe that you may be found in 
him’.55 No union with God without first losing yourself, no homecoming for those who 
are not first willing to risk going outside.  
 But untying that knot, taking that step outside, can be painful, as The Flaming Heart, 
the autobiography of  Spanish mystic and nun Saint Teresa of  Avila (1515-1582), makes 
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all too clear: 
That, which afflicted me, was the sharp, and bitter paine, which never gave me 
over, bu[t] vexed me, even all alike, from head to foot. For, the torment of  the 
sinnewes, is a kinde of  intollerable thing, as the Doctours affirme; and especially, 
when they all shrinke up, as mine did; and certainly, if  I had not lost the merit of  
it, through mine owne fault, the torment was strong enough, to have intitled me to 
it.56   
 
‘From head to foot’, Teresa’s body is painfully bound up with this spiritual experience. 
This language of  ‘bitter paine’ provides for Teresa, as Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen notes, ‘a 
vocabulary for addressing the sense of  alienation from the world, and the disintegration 
of  self, which turning towards God brings with it’.57 For, as Jessey has advocated, self-loss 
must precede divine discovery; to turn towards God requires to some extent a turn away 
from or step outside of  self. As van Dijkhuizen observes: 
Teresa’s soul is ‘alienated even from her self ’ and it seems that ‘she, and [God], 
were one, and the self-same thing, without division, or distinction’. This sense of  
becoming dead to the world is also painful in that it intensifies Teresa’s desire for a 
full mystical union with Christ that is as yet beyond her reach—she is in an 
inbetween state, both cut loose from the world and not yet one with Christ.58  
 
Cut loose from Herbert’s ‘knot of  man’—enduring what is, in her own words, ‘a kind of  
total untying, and loos[e]ning … from all things’—but not yet ‘one with Christ’, Teresa 
suffers the pain of  liminal existence: suspended outside of  herself  she is, like so many 
others we are encountering in this study, caught in the between. But this agonising interim 
of  ecstatic liminality is, for Teresa, a crucial stage in her spiritual process: ‘the Soule was 
purifyed by this paine; and for that it was burnished, & refined heer, as gold might be in 
the Chrysuble’.59 Teresa’s pain here might be understood, as Ariel Glucklich considers it 
in her study of  Sacred Pain, as ‘an alchemical force, like the folger’s fire, which magically 
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transforms its victim from one state of  existence to a higher, purer state’.60 After all, as 
Spenser notes, only the ‘refynd mind’ can ‘dwell | in His high thought’ and admire 
‘heavenly light’.61 This ‘paine, and glorie together’, Teresa notes, ‘did carrie my 
understanding into such distraction, and disorder, that I knew not, how they both, could 
possibly consist together’. ‘O what it is to see the Soule so wounded!’: pliably, ductily, 
Teresa welcomes ‘the Fire and Hammer’, the alchemy of  ecstasy.62  
 What Teresa therefore shares with Donne, and inherits from Augustine, is an 
awareness that agonising ecstasy, the anguish of  self-loss, brings with it the potential for 
transformation. ‘This pain is presented’, as van Dijkhuizen has it, ‘as a way of  bringing 
about an inner transformation in the speaker: a method of  dissolving, even destroying 
the speaker’s self, so that God can forge a new identity for him’.63 As Teresa notes, it is 
only divine love that allows the subject to follow its requisite trajectory, and to locate itself  
beyond itself:  
The effects of  this divine love, are many, but those principally, an extasy, by which 
the soul seemeth to goe out of  her self  with a servour of  spirit, to be transformed 
into her beloved; then liquification, which is a kind of  tendernesse, or melting of  
the soul, that the pores all open, she might draw the beloved into herself  as a 
spunge doth water. Union by which they are united, and doe touch each other, 
mutuall inhesion by which [t]hey now united …64 
 
With ecstasy comes the potential for tender liquefaction, and with such melting of  the 
soul comes union, tactility, mutual inhesion. Divine love—self-consciously borrowing the 
                                                             
60 Ariel Glucklich, Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), p. 207. 
61 Edmund Spenser, Foure Hymnes (London: by Richard Field, 1596), p. 8. 
62 St. Teresa, The Flaming Heart, p. 417. 
63 van Dijkhuizen, ‘Pain and Protestantism: From Lucas Cranach to John Donne’ in Living in 
Posterity: Essays in Honour of Bart Westerweel, ed. Jan Frans Van Dijkhuizen, Paul Hoftijzer, Juliette 
Roding, and Paul Smith (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Veloren, 2004), pp. 75-86 (83). Dijkhuizen is 
careful to point out that remaining aware of the meaning of pain would take a deliberate effort, 
‘since it can easily slide into its opposite. Pain could also be inflicted by the devil in an attempt to 
lead her into religious despair’, pp. 46-7. Problematically, Teresa is not always able to make 
distinctions between the paradoxical joy of mystical pain and pain which is demonically inflicted.  
64 St. Teresa, The Third Part of the Soule’s Delight (Antwerp: by William Lesteens, 1654), p. 105. 
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rhetoric of  the ‘beloved’, whereby ‘mutuall inhesion’ refers not to divine union but rather 
to the ‘melt[ing] … pleasure [experienced] in carnal copulation’—encourages the subject 
to be open to vulnerable experience.65 Highlighting the devout subject’s liquidity and its 
porous bodily borders, Teresa identifies what James Kuzner has termed ‘open’ 
subjectivity, an experience of  living in a world ‘where what is inside and what is outside 
individual boundaries become inseparably, dynamically and sometimes indistinguishably 
tied to each other, where individuals do not make connections, so much as they become 
those connections’.66 For Teresa, divine love enables such a transformation of  self  into 
Other, a ‘transformation by which she [is] to be changed’ into the object of  her affections: 
not only to be connected, but, in Kuzner’s terms, to become that connection.67  
These metaphors of  transformation via dissolution, melting, and liquefaction are 
a frequent feature of  ecstatic devotion, with Paul’s ‘desire to be loosed, and to be with 
Christ’ (Phil. 1:23) figuring as a keynote claim of  those who acknowledge that being 
‘employ’d on High’ will see the ‘ravish’d Soul dissolve[d] in Ecstasie’: those who desire to 
know ‘what extasies, meltings, [and] transports … gratious souls meet’ when they are 
‘ravished with the discoveries of  Christ in the Gospel’.68 This image of  the subject 
‘ravished’ by the divine—from the French ravir: to seize or snatch, and etymologically 
implying a (typically female) subject carried away with some force—is perhaps most 
famously captured by Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s white marble sculpture (figure 1), the 
‘Ecstasy of  St. Teresa’ (c.1647-52), which emphasizes the erotic overtones of  an ecstasy-
inducing ‘dart’. This moment, also referred to as ‘The Transverberation of  St Teresa’—
                                                             
65 Giovanni Torriano, The Second Alphabet (London: by A. Warren, 1662), p. 201. This rhetoric of 
melting and dissolving into ecstasy is similarly a large feature of sexual and romantic poetry, and 
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67 St. Teresa, The Third Part of the Soul’s Delight, p. 105. 
68 Edmund Arwaker, Fons Perennis (London: for Henry Bonwicke, 1686), p. 13; John Flavel, The 
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a word which Henry Cockeram defines as meaning ‘to strike thorow’—represents the 
capacity for the heavenly to pierce through all things.69 ‘I saw an Angell very neer me, 
towards my left side’, recounts Teresa: 
I saw, that he has a long Dart of  gold in his hand; and at the end of  the iron below, 
me thought, there was a little fire; and I conceaved, that he thrust it, some severall 
times, through my verie Hart, after such a manner, as that it passed the verie 
inwards, of  my Bowells; and when he drew it back, me thought, it carried away, 
as much, as it had touched within me; and left all that, which remained, wholy 
inflamed with a great loue of  Almightie God. The paine of  it, was so excessiue, 
that it forced me to vtter those groanes; and the suauitie, which that extremitie of  
paine gaue, was also so very excessiue, that there was no desiring at all, to be ridd 
of  it; nor can the Soule then, receaue anie contentment at all, in lesse, then God 
Almightie himself. This is no Corporall, but a Spirituall paine; though yet the 
Bodie doe not faile, to participate some part thereof; yea and that, not a little. And 
it is such a deare, delightfull kind of  entercourse, which passes heer, between the 
Soule, and Almightie God, as I beseech him of  his infinit goodnes, that he will 
giue some touch, or tast of  it, to whosoeuer shall beleiue, that I lye. During the 
time, when I was in this state, I went, up, and downe that world, like an odd kind 
of  transported Foole; neither cared I, either to see anie thing, or to speake; but 
contented my self  to consume, with burning-up in my paine, which was to be the 
greatest glorie for me, that this whole world could affoard.70 
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83 
   
Figure 1. Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Ecstasy of  St. Teresa, marble and bronze, c.1647-52, 
Cornaro Chapel, Santa Maria della Vittoria, Rome. 
 
Teresa here describes an experience of  ecstatic jouissance, a ‘delightfull kind of  
entercourse’, that blurs the boundary between divine and erotic rapture. As much as this 
is a spiritual experience, Bernini’s sculpture reflects Teresa’s assertion that ‘the Bodie did 
not faile, to participate some part thereof ’. Framed by luminous golden rays, Teresa 
reclines gently, her body engulfed by a volume of  folds that give way only to reveal bare 
feet, gently postured hands whose fingers, in their slight tension, convey an occasion of  
trembling momentariness, and a face absorbed in ecstasy.71 As Teresa articulated, this is 
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an experience that involves the entire body, ‘from head to foot’. As the angel in Bernini’s 
sculpture lifts Teresa’s robes to reveal flesh that is held just out of  view, we are both invited 
to witness and held at a distance from this moment of  religious sublimity and sexual bliss: 
Teresa’s body simultaneously renders the moment legible, visable, but Bernini also keeps 
something withheld, unknowable. The sculpture is, for Victoria Turvey Sauron, 
‘spectacularly transgressive of  the traditionally-conceived boundaries between the sacred 
and the erotic, body and soul, but also inside and outside’.72 Or, as Amy Hollywood notes, 
channelling Luce Irigary, ‘only this divine being understands the radicality of  a desire 
whose violence, experiences as ec-static jouissance, generates the shattering of  boundaries 
between inside and outside, subject and other’.73 The ecstatic experience, very simply, 
undermines and subverts these boundaries.   
Indeed, while we saw in the previous chapter how the porous female body lent 
itself  more readily to divine influence, moments of  eroticised religious ecstasy were not 
unavailable to men. As well as figuring the ecstasy of  St. Teresa in orgasmic terms, for 
instance, metaphysical poet Richard Crawshaw (1613-1649) also depicts the ecstasy of  a 
male body: 
O how oft shalt thou complain 
Of  a sweet and subtle paine? 
Of  intolerable joyes? 
Of  a death in which who dyes 
Loves his death, and dyes again, 
And would for ever be so slain!74 
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Just as the critics above observed in depictions of  Teresa’s ecstasy a blurring of  
boundaries, Crawshaw’s sequence of  poems on Teresa adopts notions of  corporeal 
permeability and interpenetration in order to unsettle the conventionally gendered 
subject positions of  ravisher and ravished, penetrator and penetrated. As Richard 
Rambuss has considered, these positions ‘can variously and successively be taken on by 
male, female, and undecidably gendered devotional bodies as they are rendered 
ecstatically expressive, devotionally stimulated’.75 Indeed, in Crawshaw’s ‘The Flaming 
Heart’, ‘a well-plac’d and wise mistake’ (8) means that readers must ‘read HIM for her, 
and her for him’ (11); the dichotomies of  gender and sexuality are manipulated and so 
present an experience not of  ‘gender trouble’, in Judith Butler’s terms, but rather, as 
Rambuss has it, ‘a kind of  gender ecstasy’: an experience in which the subject dissolves 
the binaries of  gender and moves fluidly between the two.76 As ecstasy renders fluid the 
traditional boundaries of  self, Teresa wields ‘love’s manly flame’ (24), and it is instead the 
speaker of  the poem who desires the ecstasy-inducing dart:  
By all of  HIM we have in THEE 
Leave nothing of  my SELF in me. 
Let me so read thy life, that I 
Unto all life of  mine may dy. 
 (‘The Flaming Heart’, 105-8)  
 
Informed by Teresa’s ecstasy, and using poetry to share in that experience, Crawshaw’s 
poetic subject desires to be dissolved and absorbed into the divine, desiring to achieve 
self-trancendance and reformation via self-annhilation. Articulating the paradoxical 
experience ‘of  living DEATH and dying LIFE’, whereby the subject can only announce 
‘I live in thee’ after a claim of  being ‘dead to my selfe’ (‘A Song’, 14; 16), Crawshaw 
inherits a sense of  ecstasy as an experience that pushes the subject to its limits. A 
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promissory note of  the divine union to come, only ecstasy can balance this sensation of  
‘living DEATH and dying LIFE’.  
 This characteristic disposition towards self-evacuation and self-dissolution is 
shared by Catherine Clément’s syncopic subject, which receives sustained attention in the 
following chapter’s exploration of  loving and sexual ecstasy: ‘I want to displace self, I 
wanted to dissolve self ’.77 As Clément observes and Teresa might agree, ‘when the[se] 
subjective frontiers dissolve, when the subject melts into syncope, into ecstasy … [it] finds 
itself  in the other’.78 This desire to dissolve self  is rather a desire to dissolve the boundary 
between self  and other: dissolution facilitates union. Thus, Herbert pleads not only for 
‘this knot of  man’ to be ‘untie[d]’, but for the divine to ‘dissolve the knot’ altogether 
(‘Affliction IV’, 22) as he desires for the dissolution, tactility, and union outlined by Teresa. 
Lamenting the ‘strange distance’ between himself  and the divine, Herbert tries to enact 
union first by improving proximity: 
Since my grief  must be as large,  
As is thy space, 
Thy distance from me; see my charge,  
Lord, see my case.  
 
O take these bars, these lengths away; 
Turn, and restore me.  
          (‘The Search’, 45-50)  
 
Agonised by an ‘absence [which] doth excel | All distance’, and with grief  a corollary of  
space, Herbert urges the divine to ‘turn’ and approach, to shorten ‘lengths’ and ‘be near’ 
enough that no ‘point’ will be ‘piercing’ enough ‘to come between’ them (53-6). Just as 
God’s absence exceeds all distance, Herbert imagines divine presence in terms of  a 
radical ‘nearness’ that is capable of  expelling distance altogether, ‘making two one’ (60). 
Very simply, with ‘distance’ comes the desire for ‘no space’ (PhT, 30).  
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 Aware that indwelling presupposes outgoing, that the devotional subject must 
reflect inwardly before they can ultimately ascend and attain divine union, Herbert moves 
to explore the internal recesses of  the self. Indeed, as the structure of  ‘The Temple’ 
suggests in its movement from ‘Church Porch’, through the ‘Superliminare’ (which self-
consciously signals a transgression of  the limin), and into ‘The Church’, architectural 
space and the dialectics between inside and outside are central to Herbert’s conception 
of  both faith and selfhood. Such a move inward, he notes, demands that certain things 
be left at the door: ‘Avoid, Profaneness; come not here: | Nothing but holy, pure, and 
clear’ (‘Superliminare’, 5-6). This journey inwards demands purification—‘acquit thee 
bravely’ (‘The Church Porch’, 457)—and so the subject must empty itself  of  that which 
‘doth pollute and foul’ (7) body and soul—‘spit out thy phlegm’ (91)—in order to be 
‘fill[ed] … with glory’ (91). The ‘radical reflexivity’ that is, for Charles Taylor, a hallmark 
of  Augustinian inwardness is, therefore, similarly identifiable in Herbert’s insistence that 
his subject take this moment on the Church Porch to ‘salute thyself ’ and ‘see what thy 
soul doth wear’:79  
Dare to look in thy chest; for ‘tis thine own: 
And tumble up and down what thou find’st there.  
 Who cannot rest till he good fellows find,  
 He breaks up house, turns out of  doors his mind.  
        (145-50) 
 
Self-reflexivity demands that we be prepared to ‘break up house’ and turn ourselves (or, 
more specifically, our sinful selves) out of  doors.80 And yet Herbert is clear that the subject 
must remain in control at all times, must ‘keep … guard upon himself ’ (139), must be 
careful not to ‘lose thy hold’ (41). ‘Man is a shop of  rules’ (141): Herbert’s stoic position 
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here is not incidental, but is reflective of  architectural positioning—his ‘Church-Porch’ 
recalling the ‘painted Stoa’, to borrow Milton’s phrase, from which Stoicism owes its 
name.81 This emptying of  the sinful self  is in turn crucial to the subject’s moral 
restructuring, itself  an architectural endeavour that will ultimately provide space for the 
divine to enter, for He knows the way:   
Only thy grace, which with these elements comes,  
Knoweth the ready way,  
And hath the privie key,  
Op’ning the souls most subtile rooms; 
While those to spirits refin’d, at doore attend 
Dispatches from their friend.   
      (‘The Holy Communion’, 19-24)  
 
Adopting the model that Teresa advocated, Herbert’s subject renders itself  porous and 
open, making available even the ‘soul’s … most subtile rooms’ in the hope of  drawing in 
divine grace. The self, in this, is an empty space eagerly awaiting ‘the inhabitation of  
Gods holy spirit’.82 
 In ‘Holy Communion’, Herbert invites us to think more specifically about the 
ways in which the devout subject is nourished by God’s presence, and the modes of  
presence that quite literally provide nourishment. ‘He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh 
my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him’ (John, 6.56): correlating devotion with digestion, 
Michael Schoenfelt has discussed Herbert’s consuming subject as one for whom food 
provided ‘a primal occasion and an apt medium for exploring … inwardness’; ‘as food 
progresses from the external liturgies of  sacred and secular consumption to the internal 
labyrinths of  digestion,’ Schoenfeldt asserts, ‘it traces for Herbert the inner contours of  
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the devotional subject’.83 Studies of  food in The Temple have questioned how far Herbert 
subscribes to contemporary English Protestant views on the relationship between the 
Eucharist and ‘real presence’.84 For R. V. Young, Herbert’s discussion of  wine in ‘The 
Invitation’—‘which before ye drink is bloud’ (l.12)—demonstrates ‘a belief  in the real 
presence in some substantial mode’, and Herbert’s interest in what it means to experience 
and receive communion is one that, for Sophie Read, is at times ‘tantamount to 
subscribing to the Catholic doctrine of  transubstantiation’.85 To re-direct slightly this 
focus on Herbert’s Eucharistic beliefs to consider depictions of  the spiritual nature of  that 
experience, I will suggest, is to foreground Herbert’s interest in an experience that is able 
to remove the distance between devout subject and the divine. What has previously been 
understood as an experience of  ‘having some little fore-taste of  him … in an holy extasy’, 
where a subject might ‘on a sudden fall into an Ecstasy, as if  he had then tasted of  the 
Joys of  Paradise’, now, like the divinely intoxicated subjects of  the previous chapter, 
literally involves tasting: devout tractability now crucially involves digestive traction—‘O 
what alterations, what alienation, what extasies do they feel in and after Communion!’86 
‘When Christians participate in the Eucharist’, notes David Steinmetz:  
They ascend in the ecstasy of  faith to the right hand of  God, where they 
contemplate the risen Christ, seated at the right hand of  God the Father. This 
spiritual experience of  believers, the sursum corda of  their faith, is one … ladder 
linking heaven and earth.87  
 
                                                             
83 Schoenfeldt, p. 96. 
84 Herbert’s complicated stance on the Eucharist has generated a wealth of critical response. 
Sophie Read outlines in detail the difficulty in placing Herbert ‘within the broad spectrum of 
post-Reformation thought on the subject’ of the Eucharist, identifying the conflicting stances in 
Herbert’s poetry and in subsequent critical interpretation—Eucharist and the Poetic Imagination in 
Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 98-126. See also, 
Donald R. Dickson, ‘Between Transubstantiation and Memorialism: Herbert’s Eucharistic 
Celebration’, George Herbert Journal, 11 (1987), 1-14. 
85 R. V. Young, Doctrine and Devotion in Seventeenth-Century Poetry: Studies in Donne, Herbert, Crawshaw 
and Vaughn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 115; Read, p. 119. 
86 John Rawlinson, Quadriga Salutis. Foure Quadragesimal, or Lent-sermons (Oxford: by John Litchfield 
and William Turner, 1625), p. 4; François Rabelais, The Works (London: for Richard Baldwin, 
1694), p. 25; Thomas Vincent, A Dayly Exercise of the Devout Christian (London: s.n., 1673), p. 327. 
87 David Steinmetz, Calvin in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 176. 
 
90 
Ecstasy is here once again articulated along a vertical axis, with participation in the 
Eucharist designating a two-way motion: the sacred meal brings the divine into the body, 
and the soul in turn ascends to heaven in ecstatic and contemplative union. This 
connection between Eucharist and ecstasy has been identified as stretching back to the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with German beguine Mechtild of  Magdeburg (d. 
c.1282) describing both experiences as ‘eating God’.88 As critics such as Caroline Walker 
Bynum have demonstrated, Eucharistic piety and miracle is predominantly associated 
with women, whose accounts of  Eucharistic devotion are often articulated as intensely 
erotic experiences.89 As thirteenth-century Flemish mystic Hadewich recounts:  
He gave himself  to me in the shape of  the Sacrament, in its outward form … and 
then he gave me to drink from the chalice. … After that he came himself  to me, 
took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to him. … So I was outwardly 
satisfied and fully transported. Also, then, for a short while, I had the strength to 
bear this; but soon, after a short time, I lost that manly beauty outwardly in the 
sight of  his form. I saw him completely come to nought and so fade and all at 
once dissolve that I could no longer distinguish him within me. Then it was to me 
as if  we were one without difference.90 
 
The orgasmic union of  this vision—where lover is so completely dissolved into beloved 
that difference is abolished—enacts the ‘mutuall inhesion’ and subjective dissolution that 
Herbert’s consuming subject aspires to. In ‘The Holy Communion’, Herbert welcomes 
the divine into the labyrinthine passageways of  his body: ‘by the way of  nourishment and 
strength | Thou creep’st into my breast’ (7-8). As the divine ‘creep[s]’ through the 
digestive tract, Herbert again articulates faith in agonisingly spatial terms. For while the 
internal spaces of  Herbert’s physiological self  might represent and map on to the 
psychological, spiritual self—‘thy small qualities … spread their forces into every part’ 
(10-11)—these metaphors of  devotional interiority can seemingly only stretch so far:  
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Yet can these not get over to my soul, 
Leaping the wall that parts 
Our souls and fleshly hearts; 
But as th’outworks, they may control 
My rebel-flesh, and carrying thy name, 
Affright both sin and shame.   
            (13-18) 
 
God’s ‘small qualities’ are, it seems, unable to traverse the ‘wall that parts’ soul from flesh: 
total union is obstructed by the body’s internal architecture. This concern is, however, 
fleeting, for the Eucharistic feast is ultimately able to overcome the distance, to ‘control’ 
the body’s ‘rebel flesh’ that threatened impediment: ‘And as the worde was made fleshe 
by an unspeakable union, so wee by eating that fleshe, are ioyned to him, by an 
unspeakable union’.91 But the return to these anxieties in ‘The Holy Communion’ of  the 
William’s manuscript, not included in The Temple, reveals Herbert’s doubts as to whether 
communion can, at least for him, truly offer total incorporation:  
 Into my soul this cannot pass; 
 Flesh (though exalted) keeps his grass 
 And cannot turn to soul.  
   (37-39) 
  
‘Bodies and Minds’, he continues, ‘are different Spheres’, and are thus destined to ‘keep 
a constant pole’ (40-42). Frustrated by an unbridgeable distance, Herbert’s quest to 
‘mak[e] two one’ seems unattainable, and thus the subject is left without contact: no 
‘mouth in mouth, heart in heart, body in body, soul in soul’.92 Divine love can be 
overwhelming; Herbert’s desire for union is all consuming.  
 We feel in Herbert’s poetry, then, an intensely spatial conception of  faith and 
selfhood that is accordingly motivated by the desire to achieve presence through the 
annihilation of  distance, to dissolve self  into other and vice versa. This chiasmic effect is 
one enacted in Herbert’s ‘Clasping of  Hands’, signalling a movement that for Maurice 
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Merleau-Ponty ‘encodes mutuality’, an action that ‘initiates a kind of  reflection’ as one 
hand takes another—be it the imagined hand of  God, or one hand meeting another in 
prayer.93 It is with this action that Herbert reflects, and seeks reflection: 
 Lord, thou art mine, and I am thine, 
 If  mine I am: and thine much more,  
 Than I or ought, or can be mine.  
        (1-3) 
 
In terms that Nancy Selleck’s study of  sixteenth and seventeenth century notions of  
interpersonal subjectivity would find appropriate, ‘identity’ here quite literally ‘starts with 
the other’, as Herbert’s subject acknowledges and negotiates a reflexive two-way 
exchange of  identity.94 This transacted self  comes dizzyingly close to being emptied of  
self  altogether; Herbert asserts that ‘I am thine,’ but takes pause at the end of  the line to 
recognise that in these circumstances such a claim needs qualification: ‘if  mine I am’. For 
the subject at once resides both at home and beside himself  in the divine, and is thus left 
negotiating the interim: to collapse either way would be to lose ‘thee’ or ‘me’, and both 
are crucial to who ‘I’ am: ‘I without thee would [just] be mine’ (l.10). Or, as Augustine 
would have it, ‘if  I remaine not in him, I shall never bee able to doe it in my selfe’ 
(Confessions, XII.xi.384). The poem thus carefully keeps the two in balance: in, to recall 
Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, ‘a kind of  reflection’. For as the poem’s opening line—‘Lord, 
thou art mine, and I am thine’—reverses itself  in the second stanza—‘Lord, I am thine, 
and thou art mine’ (11)—the verse recalibrates itself  accordingly: 
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 first stanza   second stanza 
 
 ______ thine   ______ mine 
______ more    ______ more 
______ mine   ______ thine 
______ restore  ______ restore 
______ mine   ______ mine 
______ more     ______ more 
______ thine    ______ thine 
______ restore  ______ restore 
______ mine   ______ thine 
______ thine   ______ Mine 
 
 
Such excessive interplay of  possessive pronouns puts Herbert’s ‘I’ at risk of  being 
‘mine[d]’, plundered and prevented from making of  any claim to self  altogether. But this 
is precisely the point, for as is ultimately encapsulated in the poem’s final couplet, Herbert 
longs to move beyond these pronouns: to eliminate the distance that they represent by 
eliminating the very words themselves:   
 O be mine still! still make me thine! 
 Or rather make no Thine and Mine!  
          (19-20) 
 
Frustrated by the distance between these two distinct words and the selves that they 
represent—‘Thine’ and ‘Mine’ here graphically obstructed from one another by the ‘and’ 
that stands between them—Herbert emphatically calls for their annihilation. Like 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet who long to throw off  the linguistic designations that 
threaten to keep them apart—‘Romeo, doff  thy name, | And … take all myself ’—
Herbert seeks to ‘tear the word’ (Rom., II.ii.49-51; 57). Just as Romeo and Juliet merge 
into one as they meet ‘palm to palm’ (I.v.99) and experience what Farah Karim-Cooper 
considers in her study of  early modern gesture to be ‘love at first touch’, the clasping of  
hands in Herbert’s poem becomes, in Stephen B. Dobranski’s terms, ‘a symbol of  
rapturous dissolution as the speaker urgently strives for a complete identification with his 
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beloved God’.95 ‘[M]ake no Thine and Mine!’: though this is something not yet arrived 
at, Herbert here calls, hands clasped, for no ‘Thine’, no ‘Mine’, but instead for something 
beyond language and beyond self: for that which is, very simply, ‘something understood’ 
(‘Prayer I’, 14).  
 But any such absolute union with the divine is, for John Donne, not something that 
can be attained this side of  death. ‘It may be fairly argued’, he asserts in a sermon 
preached at Saint Paul’s, for Easter-Day (1628): 
That neither Adam in his extasie in Paradise, nor Moses in his conversation in the 
Mount, nor the other Apostles in the Transfiguration of  Christ, nor S. Paul in his 
rapture to the third heavens, saw the Essence of  God, because he that is admitted 
to that sight of  God, can never look off, nor lose that sight againe. Only in heaven 
shall God proceed to this patefaction, this manifestation, this revelation of  himself; 
And that by the light of  glory.96 
 
Examining the visions of  God presented in the Bible, Donne objects to the idea that these 
ecstatic subjects can have truly been ‘admitted to that sight of  God’, for, as Paul tells us: 
‘now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face’ (I Corinthians, 14:12). 
Hadewich’s desire to be ‘mouth in mouth, heart in heart, body in body, soul in soul’ is, in 
other words, only available after death, for it is only then that the subject comes ‘face to 
face’ with God. The ecstatic narrative in this sense risks being agonisingly misleading, 
and thus Donne comes to reject the ‘medieval thought about the ways of  “The School” 
to “union with God”’: 
A great limbe of  the Schoole … [places] this union with God, In visione, in this, 
That in heaven I shall see God, see God essentially, God face to face, God as he is. We 
do not see one another so, in this world; In this world we see but outsaides; In 
heaven I shall see God, and God essentially. … In this world we enjoy nothing; 
enjoying presumes perpetuity; and here, all things are fluid, transitory: There I 
shall enjoy, and possesse for ever, God himself.97  
                                                             
95 Farah Karim-Cooper, The Hand on the Shakespearean Stage: Gesture, Touch and the Spectacle of 
Dismemberment (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016), p. 178; Stephen B. Dobranski, 
‘Transported Touch’, in Milton’s Visual Imagination: Imagery in Paradise Lost (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 135-52 (140-41). 
96 Donne, ‘Sermon XXIII’, in LXXX Sermons, pp. 224-233 (230). 
97 Merritt Y. Hughes, ‘Some of Donne’s “Ecstasies”, PMLA, 75:5 (1960), 509-518 (515); Donne, 




Carefully demarcating the experiences of  ‘this world’ with those that will be made 
available to us ‘in heaven’, Donne seemingly goes against figures such as Aquinas who 
maintained the view that ecstatic union with God was possible in this life; ‘The mind of  
one who sees God’, notes Aquinas, ‘is assimilated to what it sees in God by being joined 
to the divine essence, in which the likeness of  all things pre-exist’.98 As Merritt Y. Hughes 
has suggested, Donne began to write ‘for an audience which had rejected its faith in 
ecstasy as Aquinas understood it’.99  
Instead, the ecstatic experience provided Donne with a way of  thinking about the 
construction of  selfhood via the other in more metaphorical terms: where identity is 
constituted through the action of  sending oneself  out, and receiving oneself  back. Thus, 
as we heard in the Introduction to this thesis, Donne comes to consider the ‘writing of  
letters’ as ‘a kind of  extasie’—as ‘a departure and secession and suspension of  the soul, 
which doth then communicate itself  to two bodies’—and accordingly to ‘deliver [him]self  
over in writing’.100 Turning the pathways of  devotional correspondence into letter 
networks, Donne provides a metaphor that actualizes what this study considers to be the 
period’s conception of  ecstasy as an intensely spatial experience. And yet rather than 
seeking to overcome the space between self  and other, Donne is willing to occupy (even 
maintain) the liminal gap that such a departure from self  necessarily opens. Thus the 
‘Clasping of  Hands’ that was for Herbert an attempt to collapse the distance between 
self  and Other, is a gesture that for Donne’s ecstatic lovers simultaneously offers both 
                                                             
98 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Questions on God, ed. Brian Davies and Brian Leftow 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 130. 
99 Hughes, p. 513; Ecstasy as an experience that pertained to divine union seems to have been 
taken less and less seriously, with many readers in the sixteenth century beginning to regard such 
experiences as supernatural or diabolical. Hughes aligns this view with the presented by Jean 
Bodin in his chapter on ‘Du Ravissement ou Ecstase, des Sorciers, & des frequentations 
ordinaires, qu’ilz ont avec les Daemons’ in De la Demonamania des Sourciers (Paris: s.n., 1580)—see 
Hughes, p. 513. 
100 Donne, ‘To My Honored Friend S. T. Lucey’, in Letters to Severall Persons, p. 11.  
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mutual incorporation and extension:   
 Our hands were firmely cimented 
 With a fast balme, which thence did spring, 
 Our eye-beames twisted, and did thred 
 Our eyes, upon one double string, 
 So to’entergraft our hands, as yet,  
 Was all the means to make us one, 
 And pictures in our eyes to get 
 Was all our propagation.   
        (‘The Extasie’, 5-12) 
 
Donne’s ‘Extasie’—an experience of  union between lovers rather than devout subject 
and the divine—achieves in some crucial sense what Herbert could not. For here the ‘fast 
balme’ that ‘entergraft[s]’ hand with hand also manages to ‘firmely ciment’ ‘thine’ and 
‘mine’ into ‘Our … Our … Our … our … our … our’: such are ‘all the means to make 
us one’. With a ‘single violet transplant’ (37) these ‘severall’ (33) entities—the ‘[d]efects 
of  loneliness’ (44)—are ‘concot[ed]’ (27) and ‘interanimat[ed]’ (42) into a ‘mixt’ (35), 
‘abler soul’ (43), thus realising the alchemy of  ecstasy that the subjects of  this chapter 
have longed after. And yet, as Selleck has noted, ‘the interest here is not so much in oneness 
but in extension’; this is a celebration of  ‘souls … which advance their state’ (15), which ‘go 
… out’ and allow themselves to ‘h[a]ng’ (16) there, ‘suspend[ed]’ (14), ‘negotiat[ing]’ (17) 
the interim.101 In these circumstances, ‘distance’ is not agonisingly threatening, but is 
‘convenient’ (24), not ‘a breach, but an expansion’ (Donne, ‘Valediction Forbidding 
Mourning’, 23). Donne advocates ecstatic outgoing as an experience that leaves the 
subject ‘so much refin’d’ (‘Valediction Forbidding Mourning’, 17), from which the subject 
returns to itself  ‘farre purer than he came’ (‘The Extasie’, 28): ‘That she returns home, 
wiser than she went’. We must, he insists, be willing to be ‘throwne, | And in due time 
throwne out againe’ (Donne, ‘Metempsychosis’, 301-2) for, to recall Richard Sibbes, ‘we 
are never ourselves perfectly till we have wholly put off  our selves’.102    
                                                             
101 Selleck, p. 5. 
102 Sibbes, The Soule’s Conflict, p. 110.  
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Central to early modern narratives of  religious ecstasy, this chapter has shown, is 
a desire to journey out of  oneself  in order to achieve union with the divine. Informed by 
and drawing upon the works of  key religious figures such as St. Augustine and St. Teresa, 
the devotional work of  poets such as Donne, Herbert, and Crawshaw articulate this desire 
to travel beyond the self, to lose oneself  in order to locate identity with God. Having 
established how period writers articulated and explored religious ecstasy as an intensely 
spatial experience—as a journey out of  and departure from oneself—I now turn to 
consider the ways in which the Shakespearean subject is willing to oblige these dynamics 
of  faith. With the subjects of  this chapter having thus far advocated the necessity of  
outgoing and the value of  vulnerability, what follows sees those pathways of  devotional 
correspondence literalized in the movement of  the Shakespearean subject in Hamlet and 
A Midsummer Night’s Dream. What these texts offer, I will argue, are secular versions of  
inherited models of  religious ecstasis.  
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In Shakespeare’s Religious Language: A Dictionary, Rudolph Chris Hassel Jr. ‘attempt[s]… to 
include all of  the words in Shakespeare with any religious nuance’, the result being a 
‘dictionary [which] contains over 1000 keywords which have some religious denotation 
or connotation’.103 From this comprehensive catalogue, ‘ecstasy’ is absent. Indeed, the 
absence of  Shakespeare from the preceding discussion of  religious ecstasy in early 
modern culture and literature perhaps goes some way to support Hassel’s decision, for 
while this thesis highlights his interest in and use of  the term, Shakespeare’s exploration 
of  ‘ecstasy’ and the ecstatic experience are seemingly at a remove from this divine context. 
There are, however, a number of  characters who echo the discussions of  an ecstatic 
separation of  body and soul heard in this study so far; from Anne Boleyn’s anxiety about 
the ‘panging | Of  soul and body’s severing’ (H8, II.iii.16) after death, to Count Mulen’s 
desire to be borne from the battle field so that his ‘body and soul’ might be ‘part[ed] … 
with contemplation and devout desires’ (Jn., V.iv.47-8), notions of  the dislocation of  body 
and soul are given voice in recognisably sacred terms. And yet while a character like 
Catherine of  Aragon describes ‘meditating | On that celestial harmony I go to’ (H8, 
IV.ii.79-80), such moments of  devout meditation are seldom presented as temporary 
moments of  divine inspiration, but are rather meditations on, or preparations for, that 
ultimate union with God that comes only once life has ended. If  ‘death and ecstasy are 
both seen as a matter of  the soul’s “emigrating” to another place’, as M. A. Screech puts 
it, Shakespeare’s characters are, at least ostensibly, only ever interested in the former, with 
the soul’s journey towards and union with God taking place at the moment of  death 
                                                             
103 Shakespeare’s Religious Language: A Dictionary, xxii; xix. The absence of ecstasy in this dictionary is 
worth comparing to its presence in Shakespeare’s Medical Language: A Dictionary (London: 
Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2011), pp. 114-7. The fourth chapter of this thesis examines 
ecstasy in a medical context. 
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rather than seeking, as Erasmus had it in the previous chapter, an ecstatic ‘foretaste of  
the happiness to come’.104   
Put simply, the ‘heavenly bliss’ (3H6, III.iii.182) of  union with the divine is 
seemingly not available to Shakespeare’s characters this side of  death, nor is it something 
that particularly motivates them. And yet while religious ecstasy is in this sense denied, 
Shakespeare, like Donne, can be seen as inheriting and appropriating the received 
language of  ecstatic aspiration and frustrated self-lessness. Informed by the previous 
sections of  this chapter which have explored the failure of  ecstatic narratives in 
Augustine’s Confessions, and the frustrated desire to achieve the ecstasy of  divine union in 
early modern devotional poetry, what follows first considers the ways in which escapist 
transcendence is unavailable and denied in Hamlet, before turning to explore the failure 
to appropriate religious ecstasy in A Midsummer Night’s Dream. While for Donne the ecstatic 
experience figures itself  spatially in terms of  devotional and literal correspondence, and 
for Herbert the transports of  spiritual encounter carry the aspirational subject up towards 
the divine, for Shakespeare, conversely, the ecstatic experience appears to remain the 
preserve of  the common man. At a time when ‘the Christian God could not be 
represented on stage without profanity’, I will demonstrate the extent to which 
Shakespeare explores secular alternatives to the models of  ecstasis seen elsewhere in this 
chapter.105  
 
i) ‘I STAND IN PAUSE’: DIS-TRACTION IN HAMLET 
 
 
Just as Augustine tested the limits of  the ecstatic narrative at the outset of  this chapter, a 
character such as Claudius is similarly tortured by his failure to achieve the ecstasy of  
ascension through prayer:  
                                                             
104 Michael Andrew Screech, Ecstasy and The Praise of Folly, p. 139. 




    Pray can I not: 
 Though inclination be as sharp as will, 
 My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent 
 And like a man to double business bound 
 I stand in pause where I shall first begin  
 And both neglect. … 
 And what’s in prayer but this twofold force 
 —To be forestalled ere we come to fall 
 Or pardoned, being down? Then I’ll look up: 
 My fault is past. But O, what form of  prayer 
 Can serve my turn? … 
 O wretched state, O bosom black as death, 
 O limed soul that struggling to be free 
 Art more engaged. Help, angels, make assay.   
          (Ham., III.iii.38-69)   
 
 
Knees bent, hands together, Claudius adopts the position that for Herbert’s subject had 
the potential to bring about rapturous union with the divine. According to Benedictine 
mystic Augustine Baker (1575-1641), whose writing on mystical experience emphasizes 
the individual’s journey and encourages spiritual freedom, ‘some are so wholly given up 
to this fashion of  Prayer, that they are allwaies in a kind of  Extasy’, for, as Thomas 
Burnford would later concur, ‘there is no Action whereby we approach nearer to God, 
no time wherin he communicate himself  more to us’.106 As we have seen, prayer provided 
the devotional subject with a medium of  divine correspondence: a notion of  facilitated 
transmission that continually motivated figures like St. Augustine, St. Teresa, and Herbert 
to ‘look up’ in the hope of  achieving identity with the divine. This is, after all, a model 
that seems to have been available elsewhere:   
In praying St Peter fell into an Extasie, Paul was ravisht to the third Heaven; 
Cornelius in his Prayers receiv’d the Vision of  an Angel: Monica St Austin’s 
Mother after her Prayers and Tears for the Salvation of  her Son, had in her dream 
that excellent Revelation of  his Conversion.107  
 
                                                             
106 Augustine Baker, Sancta Sophia (Doway: by John Patte and Thomas Fievet, 1657), p. 78; 
Thomas Burnford, The Christian’s Guide (London: for Henry Rodes, 1683), p. 212. See also Ramie 
Targoff, Common Prayer: The Language of Public Devotion in Early Modern England (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011). 
107 Burnford, p. 212. 
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Recounting these famous biblical ecstasies, Burnford emphasizes prayer as a catalyst for 
such experience. But Claudius’ prayer scene is not a moment of  ecstatic movement, but 
rather one of  ‘pause’: Claudius’ vocabulary, which informs my reading of  the play that 
follows, emphasizes not flight and departure, but rather enforced anchorage and a failure-
to-depart. ‘Pray can I not’: in a play that rings with claims of  ecstasy—indeed, it is in 
Hamlet that Shakespeare uses the word most frequently—the ecstatic experience is here 
paradoxically denied. As if  in answer to Francis de Sale’s discussion of  ‘a soule in Praier 
of  Union, even unto Extasie’, Claudius asks ‘what form of  prayer can serve my turn?’; to 
the question ‘who is more united, joined, and fastened to God … [than] the soule that 
praies?’, he replies ‘pray can I not’.108  
While elsewhere a claim like ‘I stand in pause’ might figure as a keynote claim of  
ecstatic liminality whereby the soul stands forth from the body—one heard for instance 
in Donne’s discussion of  souls which ‘advance their state’ and thus leave bodies ‘like 
sepulchral statues’ (‘The Extasie’, 18), and one which is explored in more detail in 
Chapter Three—it here only serves to intensify Claudius’ agonizing stasis. ‘I stand in 
pause’ is here not an assertion of  being thrown from or beside oneself, but quite the 
inverse: this is a soul that is kept down, kept bound, and denied the freedom it longs after. 
‘O limed soul that struggling to be free | Art more engaged’: with ‘stubborn knees’ that 
refuse to bend, a ‘heart with strings’ (70) that are ‘too, too solid’ (I.ii.129), and ‘thoughts’ 
that are unable to ‘fly up’ with ‘words’, Claudius grows painfully aware that his soul is 
stuck or, more properly, is ‘sticky’ (OED, ‘limed’, adj.1: smeared with birdlime or other 
similarly sticky substances). Just as ‘Lyme [could be used to] catche ye starlyngs in ye 
church’, Claudius’ ‘limed soul’ is denied ascension because it is caught ‘below’. As 
republican theorist and seventeenth-century commentator James Harrington articulates 
                                                             
108 de Sales, A Treatise on the Love of God, p. 405. 
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in his divine meditations on the Christian faith:  
Methinks the very Contemplation of  this life, should so ravish my Soul, and 
actuate these Wings, these Feet, that they should not only brake Prison, but carry 
her up in an holy extasie to these glorious Mansions. … But alass poor Soul, how 
are thy Wings limed, thy Feet lamed, thy Chariot-wheels clog'd, with Earth, and 
Sins?109 
 
Claudius’ ‘struggling’ soul is unable to ‘engage’ in union with the divine because the act 
of  struggling only intensifies its bond with the body: ‘like the foule which is once limed, 
the more she striueth, the faster she tieth her self ’.110 As English clergyman Thomas 
Adams writes of  St. Peter, ‘his feathers were limed, his soule so intangled with the world, that 
hee could not possibly mount up so high’:111 
 CLAUDIUS  My words fly up, my thoughts remain below.  
   Words without thoughts never to heaven go.   
                    (97-8) 
 
Unlike Herbert in ‘Prayer I’, here we will witness no ‘soul in paraphrase’, no ‘heart in 
pilgrimage’ (3). Nothing understood.  
 Claudius’ struggle here is symptomatic of  a play that is repeatedly subject to 
‘twofold force’, where every ‘exten[sion]’ is met with ‘contract[ion]’ (AW, V.iii.50). 
Indeed, to explore the play’s language of  flight and departure is to discover a concurrent 
impulse in the opposite direction. Thus, while an ecstatic subject is, as we have seen, one 
who journeys out and returns home, the inverse is true for Hamlet who, having come 
home to Elsinore, is denied outgoing: 
 CLAUDIUS    For your intent  
    In going back to school in Wittenberg 
    It is most retrograde to our desire, 
    And we beseech you bend you to remain 
    Here in the cheer and comfort of  our eye, 
    Our chiefest courtier, cousin, and our son. 
                                                             
109 James Harrington, The Holy Oyl (London: for the author, 1669), p. 164. 
110 Barnabe Rich, Riche His Farewell to Militarie Profession (London: by J. Kingston, 1585), D.iiiv. 
The connection between bird and soul is intensified by the early modern type which renders 
‘soule’ and ‘foule’ typographically identical. 
111 Thomas Adams, A Commentary or, Exposition upon the Divine Second Epistle (London: by Richard 




 GERTRUDE Let not thy mother lose her prayers, Hamlet.  
    I pray thee stay with us, go not to Wittenberg.  
 
 HAMLET  I shall in all my best obey you, madam.   
           (112-20) 
 
 
While Laertes’ ‘thoughts and wishes bend … toward France’ (55), Hamlet ‘bend[s] … to 
remain’ at home; one discussion of  departure is counteracted with another of  anchorage. 
This two-way tension of  movement, of  push and pull, of  upward and downward motion, 
can be identified throughout this play that is ‘to double business bound’ (III.iii.41). The 
spatial dynamics of  faith that were identifiable in Augustine’s Confessions and central to 
Herbert’s The Temple are in this sense problematized in Hamlet, where aspirations of  
outgoing and ascension are repeatedly tethered. What was earlier identified as the 
rhetoric of  ecstatic tractability is here replaced with the language of  ‘sore distraction’ 
(V.ii.207): tractable souls become a ‘distracted multitude’ (IV.iii.4) of  dis-tracted 
subjects.112 While the tractable soul pursued a path towards the divine, the distracted 
subject is one who is repeatedly ‘drawn away’ (OED, ‘distract’, adj. 2) or ‘drawn in different 
directions’ (OED, adj. 3). Thus Hamlet ‘confess[es] he feels himself  distracted’ (III.i.5) 
because Claudius has employed Rosencrantz and Guildenstern for precisely that 
purpose: ‘to draw [Hamlet] on to pleasures’; to ‘give him further edge | And drive his 
purpose into these delights’ or, as Hamlet sees it, to ‘drive [him] into a toil’ (II.ii.15; 
III.i.26-7; III.ii.339). ‘Importunate … distract’ Ophelia is similarly ‘driven into desperate 
terms’ by ‘the poison of  deep grief ’ (IV.v.2; IV.vii.27; IV.v.75). Subjected to forces beyond 
their control, these subjects are drawn to distraction, pulled in different directions and, 
ultimately, driven to fracture; ‘Poor Ophelia, divided from herself  and her fair 
                                                             
112 See Carol Thomas Neely’s Distracted Subjects for a more comprehensive discussion of the 




judgement’; ‘Hamlet from himself  ta’en away’ (IV.v.84; V.ii.212). 
 But it is not only the characters that suffer such ‘sore distraction’. Like its 
eponymous hero, Hamlet is deeply distracted. Indeed, Simon Critchley and Jameson 
Webster’s assertion that ‘thought and action seem to pull against each other’ in Hamlet’s 
lament that ‘currents turn awry | And lose the name of  action’ (III.i.86-87), is true of  the 
play’s action more broadly.113 Take, for instance, Hamlet’s fable in Act III, Scene iv: 
 In despite of  sense and secrecy 
 Unpeg the basket on the house’s top, 
 Let the birds fly and like the famous ape 
 To try conclusion in the basket creep 
 And break your own neck down.  
       (III.iv.190-4) 
 
Fictions of  flight—‘Let the birds fly up’—here come crashing back ‘down’ with ‘neck’ 
‘break[ing]’ momentum: movement is met with equal and opposite force; action with 
equal and opposite reaction. These distracted force dynamics are felt throughout Hamlet: 
Hamlet’s letters to Ophelia are sent out and ‘redelivere[ed]’ back to him (III.i.91); 
Polonius’ body is dragged ‘up the stairs into the lobby’ (IV.iii.35-6) before being ultimately 
buried in the ground; Ophelia falls into ‘the weeping brook’ and her ‘clothes … b[ea]r 
her up’ in the water before eventually ‘pull[ing] the poor wretch … to muddy death’ 
(IV.vii.173-181); the Gravedigger takes skeletons out of  a grave so that Ophelia’s body 
can be lowered in; Hamlet envisions ‘delv[ing] below’ the ‘mines’ of  Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern in order to ‘blow them to the moon’ (III.iv.205-206); Laertes ‘leap[s] in[to]’ 
his sister’s ‘grave’ (V.i.267) and then ‘leaps out’ (247) to grapple with Hamlet;114 Fortinbras 
arrives at port just as Hamlet leaves for England; and even that voyage, ‘’ere … two days 
old at sea’, is subject to the play’s compulsion to pull Hamlet back to Denmark with 
                                                             
113 Simon Critchley and Jameson Webster, The Hamlet Doctrine (London: Verso, 2013), p. 6. 
114 In this I follow the Arden Shakespeare edition, which has Laertes jump out of the grave rather 
than following Q1 which asserts that ‘Hamlet leapes in after Laertes’. Thompson and Taylor justify 
this decision by following a number of other editors ‘who argue that Hamlet cannot be the 
aggressor here’, pp. 428-9. 
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‘sudden return’ (IV.vi.15; IV.vii.46). Understood in these circumstances, Claudius’ 
frustrated ecstatic moment is not incidental, but is typical of  a play that is constantly 
being pulled in two directions. 
 ‘Like a man to double business bound’, the play’s moments of  pause and stasis are 
born out of  the tension between these competing forces: ‘I stand in pause’ is as a 
necessary, perhaps the only, response to this duel momentum. Hamlet’s suicidal 
contemplation ‘must give us pause’, for instance, because it pulls in opposite directions; 
one can either ‘suffer | The slings and arrows’ and ‘the sea of  troubles’—that is, remain 
at home and subject to agonising external force—or rather depart, ‘shuffle … off  this 
mortal coil’, and explore ‘that undiscovered country from whose bourne | No traveller 
returns’ (III.i.67; 57; 58; 66; 78-9). Ultimately, for Hamlet, it is ‘conscience’ that weighs 
him down, denies him flight, and ‘makes [him] rather bear those ills we have than fly to 
others we know not of ’ (80-1). Once again the fiction of  ascension is tethered, and the 
subject stands in pause. But moments of  pause can also catch characters off  guard. We 
hear, for instance, the ‘passionate speech’ of  ‘Pyrrhus [who] at Priam drives’, ‘his sword 
… declining on [his] milky head’, but whose action is momentarily suspended as his 
weapon ‘seemed i’th’ air to stick’ above his enemy’s head (II.ii.369; 410; 415-7). ‘Pyrrhus’ 
pause’ (425) is of  course later mirrored as Hamlet hesitantly stands, sword drawn, above 
Claudius seemingly ‘a-praying’ (III.iii.73):  
 Now might I do it. But now ’a is a-praying. 
 And now I’ll do it [Draws sword.]—and so ‘a goes to heaven, 
 And so am I revenged!  
 … And am I then revenged  
 To take him in the purging of  his soul 
 When he is fit and seasoned for his passage? 
 No.      [Sheathes sword.]      
         (73-87) 
 
‘Now … now … now … No’: as Hamlet fails to grasp the moment of  action, action is 
suspended and thought drawn out. For fourteen lines Hamlet ‘stand[s] in pause’ as his 
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conscience pulls him in opposite directions; to kill Claudius now ‘would be too kind, from 
one point of  view, and too cruel on the other’, as Lacan has it.115 Thought, in other words, 
distracts action and throws it off  course. If  Hamlet’s pause here echoes Pyrrhus’, then so 
too does it suffer from the play’s distracted force dynamics; the ‘twofold force’ operating 
here is not only a battle of  Hamlet’s conscience, but also reflects the play’s impulse to 
match fall with flight, aspiration with anchorage: Hamlet must raise his sword ‘up’ where 
Pyrrhus’ let his fall down. ‘[Draws sword.] … [Sheaths sword.]’: the interim, here as 
elsewhere, is Hamlet’s, because Hamlet is the ultimate interim; as Francis Barker has 
observed, Hamlet exists either in delay or in wait.116 Hamlet, in other words, exists in 
pause, in the interim, waiting for the right time to act or for action to find him instead. 
But Hamlet not only occupies the interim—from the Ghost’s urging him to ‘step between 
[Gertrude] and her fighting soul’ (III.iv.109) to Claudius’ attempt to ‘inter him’ 
(IV.v.84)—but embodies it: born on ‘that very day’ that ‘our last King Hamlet overcame 
Fortinbras’ (V.i.139; 135-6), and dying just three lines before young Fortinbras enters to 
‘embrace [his] fortune’ (V.ii.372), Hamlet’s life spans the interim between epochs, 
between one Fortinbras and another. The interim is his: he is the interim.  
Caught in the pause, these are subjects made restless by ecstasy. ‘My words fly up, 
my thoughts remain below’: familiar with the narrative of  ascension, Claudius desires to 
throw himself  out, to send his soul upwards, but is forced to ‘remain below’, to stay ‘a-
down a-down’, ‘never departed more’ (IV.v.165; 55). This is, as this study will explore in 
more detail, indicative of  Shakespeare’s interest in and frustrations with the ecstatic 
model more broadly: while early modern narratives of  ecstasy tend to ‘fly up’ into divine 
contemplation, representations of  ecstasy in Shakespeare stubbornly ‘remain below’. The 
                                                             
115 Jacques Lacan, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, trans. James Hulbert, ed. 
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tension that can be felt in Claudius’ moments of  stasis, where ecstatic ascension is 
unavailable, is therefore a tension of  movement that can be identified throughout the play 
at large. But it is also a tension reflective of  Shakespeare’s theological interim; just as 
Hamlet might be seen as occupying an interim between epochs, Hamlet can be read in 
light of  Shakespeare’s position between theological eras. In early modern England, the 
force dynamics of  faith were keenly felt; by 1601, the year Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, the 
country had experienced at least four changes of  state sanctioned religion in just over 
seventy years (since 1530), ‘from traditional Catholicism, to the various versions of  
Henrican reform, to Protestantism under Edward VI, back to Papalist Catholicism under 
Mary, and now back to Protestantism again’ under Elizabeth I.117 In this, Hamlet might 
be understood a product of  what Stephen Greenblatt terms ‘the fifty-year effect’:  
A time in the wake of  the great, charismatic ideological struggle in which the 
revolutionary generation that made the decisive break with the past is all dying 
out and the survivors hear only hypocrisy in the sermons and look back with 
longing on the world they have lost.118 
 
This is a (largely) Protestant England, in other words, haunted by its Catholic past, a push 
and pull between theologies that has been richly explored through examinations of  
Hamlet’s treatment of  purgatory.119 On this matter, Greenblatt is struck by ‘how much 
evidence on all sides there is in play’ as to whether the Ghost of  Hamlet Senior, occupying 
a terrifying interim between life and death, conforms to Protestant or Catholic models. 
The play, read in these terms, situates itself  very much between the two. But this ‘issue is 
not’, continues Greenblatt, ‘simply random inconsistency’: 
There is, rather, a pervasive pattern, a deliberate forcing together of  radically 
                                                             
117 Peter Lake, ‘Changing Attitudes towards Religion’, in Shakespeare: An Oxford Guide, ed. Stanley 
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incompatible accounts of  almost everything that matters in Hamlet. … The 
opposing positions challenge each other, clashing and sending shock waves 
through the play.120  
 
In other words, Hamlet is theologically ‘to double business bound’, caught between 
Catholic and Protestant models. In a play that, as we have seen, dramatizes the failure to 
ascend, to lift off, to break through, to move on, this is perhaps ultimately reflective of  a 
theological tension that, pulled in both directions, leaves Shakespeare standing in pause.   
 While the first section of  this chapter established the dynamics of  ecstasy through 
metaphors of  journey and pilgrimage, such journeys are postponed and denied in Hamlet. 
Indeed, the play is uninterested in the moment of  arrival: religious ascension is weighed 
down by heavy thoughts, letters are returned to sender, and journeys to ‘the undiscovered 
country’ (III.i.78), as to England, are suspended or cut short. Like the ghost of  his father, 
Hamlet is caught up in the play’s ‘corrupted currents’, denied peregrination and instead 
contained in Denmark. Instead, as I have suggested, Shakespeare situates his most famous 
ecstatic subject—variously diagnosed as experiencing the ‘very ecstasy of  love’ (II.i.99), 
being ‘blasted with ecstasy’ (III.i.161), or suffering the ‘coinage of  the brain’ that ‘ecstasy 
| Is very cunning in’ (III.iv.36-7)—firmly in the interim. It is here, I will demonstrate, that 
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ii)  BOTTOM’S DREAM: ‘MECHANICAL ENTHUSIASM’ AND THE MECHANICS OF 
ECSTASY IN A MIDSUMMER NIGHT’S DREAM 
 
 
The Apostle S. Paul in that great Extasy, which he suffred, when being rapt up into 
Paradise, did heare those secret words, which were not lawfull to speake to Man, 
was not as then Blessed, and yet he was so absorpt in God, as that be obserued 
not, whether he was in Body, or out of  Body. How great then shall that most 
happy Union of  a Soule with God be, & how shall that Soule (which shalbe one 




Rapt up to paradise in ‘that great Extasy’, St. Paul glimpses unspeakable wonders in his 
ascent to the third heaven: ‘The eye hath not seen, and the ear hath not heard, neither 
have entered into the heart of  man, the things which God hath prepared for them that 
love him’ (I Corinthians, 2:9). This is a keynote case of  the soul being caught outside of, 
and away from, the body: of  being, as English clergyman Martin Fotherby has it, 
‘ravished and transported with … heavenly contemplation’ and carried ‘cleane out of  
himself ’ in ‘spirituall extasie’.122 As Screech has observed, this Pauline verse was ‘a 
standard commonplace to cite in ecstatic contexts’: ‘merely to allude to it was enough to 
evoke association with ecstasies, visions and revelations’.123 It is with this in mind that the 
remainder of  this chapter turns to consider what is at stake in Shakespeare’s allusion to 
this ecstatic commonplace in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a play that is, as Alison Shell 
notes in her study of  Shakespeare and Religion, ‘on one level the most un-Christian of  
plays’.124 While Shakespeare’s writing does not concede to a Christian model of  ecstasy, 
I will consider the extent to which the play appropriates the narrative framework 
                                                             
121 Saint Bellarmino, Roberto Francesco Romolo, Of the Eternall Felicity of the Saints Fiue Bookes, 
trans. A. B. (Saint-Omer: s.n., 1638), pp. 370-1. 
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established throughout this chapter. This is not ecstasy denied, as it was in Hamlet: this is 
rather ecstasy reclaimed.   
‘I have had a most rare vision’, announces Bottom as he awakes from his dream: 
I have had a dream, past the wit of  man to say what dream it was. Man is but an 
ass if  he go about to expound this dream. Methought I was—there is no man can 
tell what. Methought I was, and methought I had—but man is a patched fool if  
he will offer to say what methought I had. The eye of  man hath not heard, the 
ear of  man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, nor his tongue conceive, 
nor his heart to report, what my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a 
ballad of  this dream. It shall be called ‘Bottom’s Dream’, because it hath no 
bottom…  
            (MND, IV.i.201-12) 
 
That Bottom’s failure to articulate his ‘bottomless’ dream echoes St. Paul’s account of  his 
ecstasy in I Corinthians 2:9 has not gone unnoticed in criticism of  the play. Attention to 
the passage highlights that in the Geneva Bible (1557)—the edition scholars tend to agree 
Shakespeare ‘refers most to’ and ‘may well have owned a copy’ of—the final phrase of  
Paul’s account reads ‘yea, the bottom of  Goddes secretes’: a phrase which is, for Thomas 
B. Stroup, the source for the name of  Shakespeare’s ‘Nick Bottom, the weaver’ (I.ii.16).125 
As Hassel notes, Shakespeare’s audience, ‘probably the best theologically trained 
audience in the history of  Christendom, would have heard the Pauline allusion, and most 
of  them would have grasped its crucial implications.’126 ‘Even Bottom’, Hassel continues, 
‘knew most of  the words’.127 Bottom is, after all, to borrow Puck’s epithet, one of  the 
play’s ‘rude mechanicals’ (III.ii.9), a term which, as Patricia Parker highlights, ‘designated 
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… the practical as opposed to the contemplative’.128 ‘The mechanical was’, she notes: 
a familiar term of  class distinction in the culture contemporary with Shakespeare, 
one used repeatedly as a term of  contempt. … As a term synonymous with the 
mean, vulgar, and unlettered, the mechanical … was associated with the material 
as something placed at the bottom of  a hierarchy, to be governed or ruled.129 
 
In Shakespeare’s work more specifically, Parker observes that references to the 
mechanicals are ‘most often the embodiment of  a distinct class voice, tied to the attempt 
to “singulate” or distinguish high from low’.130 Hassel’s note that even Bottom could recite 
scripture therefore seems to carry some weight, and Parker herself  considers 
Shakespeare’s decision to give Bottom these lines (rather than the play’s Athenian ruler) 
as indicative of  ‘this play’s preposterous unsettling of  hierarchy’; ‘if  the mechanical in the 
period was distinguished from the contemplative’, it is only fitting that ‘the mechanical 
Bottom (not the ruler Theseus)’ should recall ‘the scriptural instance par excellence of  
visionary experience’.131 In short, that the ‘unlettered’ Bottom—himself  at the bottom of  
the play’s social hierarchy—should recall a vision in (somewhat scrambled) Pauline terms 
is, for these critics, symptomatic of  the play’s subversive impulses.  
But to situate Shakespeare’s weaver alongside his mechanical contemporaries 
outside of  the play productively unsettles Parker’s assertion that the period distinguished 
‘the mechanical … from the contemplative’, for it suggests the extent to which such a 
blurring of  social distinctions extends beyond Shakespeare’s dramatic vision for Dream. 
In 1586, for instance, shoemaker John White claimed to be John the Baptist, and in 1636, 
two weavers, John Bull and Richard Farnham, claimed to be divine prophets. These 
individuals, often dismissed as ‘brainsick’ or ‘frantic’, offered a foretaste of  the 
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enthusiastic activities that would be more common in the Civil War period.132 Much later, 
in a pamphlet on The Sufficiencie of  the Spirits of  Teaching without Humane Learning (1640), 
Samuel How, cobbler and pastor of  a separatist church in pre-war London, condemns 
the notion that ‘knowledge of  arts, sciences, diverse tongues, [and] much reading’ 
enhances a person’s ability ‘to understand the mind of  God in his word’.133 For How, as 
for early Quakerist George Fox, ‘being bred at Oxford or Cambridge, was not enough to 
fit and qualifie Men to be Ministers of  Christ’.134 As Fox writes in his journal in early 
1646, this was a notion that ‘the Lord opened unto [him]’ while walking alone ‘in a field 
on a first-day morning’; one that he initially notes having ‘stranged at’ given that it went 
against the ‘common belief  of  the people’.135 Thus instead of  going ‘to hear the priest’, 
Fox began to instead ‘get into the orchard, or the fields, with [his] Bible, by [him]self ’: 
I saw that being bred at Oxford or Cambridge, did not qualify or fit a man to be 
a minister of  Christ; and what then should I follow such for? So neither of  them, 
nor any of  the Dissenting people, could I join with; but was a stranger to all, 
relying wholly upon the Lord Jesus Christ.136 
 
An Egalitarian notion that, at first, Fox ‘stranged at’, therefore, was one that would 
ultimately make him ‘a stranger to all’; this was a moment of  revelation that brought with 
it not only a move away from an established religious order and the practices he once 
upheld, but also from society. With ecstatic revelation it seems, comes social disruption. 
In this, How and Fox figure as later examples of  ‘Mechanick Enthusiasts’: subjects who 
challenged the notion that access to and understanding of  the word of  god belonged 
solely to the learned elite. While this stance was a radical one, How and Fox were by no 
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means alone in their outlooks. In his introduction to his Treatise on Enthusiasme, Anglican 
scholar and divine Meric Casaubon (1599-1671) promises (but would ultimately fail to 
write) a chapter on ‘Mechanical Enthusiasme’ as the ‘eighth and last species’ in his 
comprehensive study.137 While ‘neither Plato nor Plutarch mention any such’, Casaubon 
justifies this inclusion on the grounds that ‘others do expressly’, and that ‘there is ground 
enough in the nature of  the thing, to give it a particular head and consideration’.138 
Mechanical Enthusiasm was growing increasingly popular, and even a London goldsmith 
such as Thomas Tany (1608-1659) would come to observe how his profession became 
symbolic of  a prophetic status, adopting what ought to by now be the familiar language 
of  devout ductility: 
I was and am the Goldsmith, and God hath made me the Refiners fire, to refine 
Gold from the dross, which is but thus much, to separate ye Priests from your 
trade of  lies.139 
 
‘To see a godly Christian weaver, to pray, to read, to expound a chapter, repeat a Sermon, 
or Discourse of  the Scriptures privately in his owne house, to his owne family and his 
Christian Neighbours’ was, therefore, an increasingly common occurrence in early 
modern England.140 No longer was ‘Doctrine … knowne … onely of  them that are 
Doctors of  the Church, and the Maisters of  the people’, but now also ‘even of  the Tailors, 
and Smithes, and Weavers, and of  all Artificiers’.141 It is in this climate that figures such 
as Tom Snout, Robert Starveling, and Nick Bottom (a tinker, tailor, and weaver 
respectively) might be counted as early representations of  those ‘Poor sleight Fellows’ whose 
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spiritualist ideas and beliefs John Everand (1584-1641)—who held a doctorate in 
divinity—would explicitly seek to dismiss in his radical reformation against ‘Tinkers, 
Cobblers, Weavers’.142 This is a climate unwilling to tolerate the dreams and ecstatic 
aspirations of  mechanical enthusiasts. 
 Recounting his dream in Pauline terms, Bottom transgresses the socio-theological 
boundaries demarcating ‘mechanical’ and ‘contemplative’; boundaries which, as I have 
suggested, were to come under threat outside of  the play text as much as they do within 
it. That Bottom mangles ecstatic commonplace is, for a number of  critics, in keeping with 
Shakespeare’s comic vision for Dream; this is a moment that is for Screech ‘complex 
jesting’, and for Hassel one of  ‘unmistakable parody’.143 Bottom’s jumbled rhetoric is, in 
this, seen to be indicative of  the play’s wider concerns; ‘his malapropisms are’, as 
Marjorie Garber suggests, ‘related to the important theme of  transformation’.144 ‘The 
eye of  man hath not heard, the ear of  man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to taste, 
nor his tongue conceive, nor his heart to report, what my dream was’: this is the closest 
that any Shakespearean character—mechanical, contemplative, or otherwise—will come 
to articulating the theological ecstatic experience as it has been understood thus far in 
this study. Yet this is a speech that makes explicit its failure to articulate that experience: 
ecstasy, even in its most recognised and quoted form, is denied apt expression. It is here, 
in this inarticulate interim, that Shakespeare will exhibit what it means to be truly beside 
oneself; it is here that Shakespeare, who, as Philip Davis has observed ‘loves … working 
in those charged and saturated spaces in between’, will adopt an ecstatic interim to 
explore ‘the form of  things unknown’ (V.i.15).145   
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‘When my cue comes, call me, and I will answer. My next is “most fair Pyramus”’ 
(IV.i.198-199): waking from his ‘dream’, Bottom picks up precisely where he left off  prior 
to his ‘translat[ion]’ in III.i:  
 QUINCE Pryamus, enter! Your cue is past; it is ‘never tire’. 
 FLUTE  Oh, [as Thisbe] ‘As true as truest horse that yet would never tire’. 
          [Enter … Bottom with the ass head on.]     
       (III.i.89-90 s.d.)   
 
Since this moment in Act III, Scene i, Bottom has stood ‘in pause’, ‘entered in a br[e]ake’ 
(III.ii.15), and endured a dispersal of  self  that is recoverable only at the point of  his 
awakening; Bottom awakes in media res, as it were, to debate the cue he missed one act 
prior. In this Bottom seemingly succeeds where Claudius will fail, for Bottom’s narrative, 
to a large extent, takes place in an ecstatic interim where he ‘stand[s] in pause’; 
Shakespeare is willing to allow Bottom the ecstatic peregrination that he denies Claudius. 
Having been thrown out of  himself—made to be beside himself for an entire act of  the 
play—Bottom now returns home to self  with inexplicable ease, re-collects himself  with 
little recollection of  having lost himself  in the first place. All interactions in between, 
including those with his mechanical comrades, have seemingly fallen into the haze of  the 
somnambulant adventures of  ‘Bottom’s dream’ that reside beyond the capacity of  
utterance. And yet while Bottom may not be able to articulate ecstasy in the Pauline terms 
he grasps after, in his claims towards an experience ‘past the wit of  man to say’, that ‘no 
man can tell’, that he will not ‘offer to say’, he perhaps comes closer than it might first 
appear. For ‘it is’, as Puritan author Robert Crofts has it, ‘impossible to expresse the 
pleasures of  the heavenly soule’: ‘it’s Extasies and Ravishments cannot bee uttered’.146 
Translating Teresa’s Flaming Heart into English, Tobie Matthew similarly notes that ‘it is 
hard, for anie Penn, to express’ these experiences, an anxiety that repeatedly punctuates 
Teresa’s accounts of  rapture or vision of  the divine: ‘I know not, how to expresse it … I 
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neither can, nor know, how to expresse … I am not able, by anie means, to expresse’.147 
Indeed, early modern accounts of  Paul’s rapture to the third heaven are repeatedly 
punctuated by assertions of  ‘unspeakable mysteries’, ‘inexplicable sweetnesse’, and 
‘unexpressible words … which is was not possible for him to utter, and relate to others’.148 
Understood in these terms, Bottom’s ‘expound[ing]’ of  his dream is less a failed attempt 
at articulating the ecstatic experience than the keynote claim of  a subject who has suffered 
ecstasy: Bottom is symptomatic of  the ecstatic subject for whom words will always fail. ‘I 
have had a dream past the wit of  man to say what dream it was’: ecstasy, an experience 
that takes the subject to the limits of  self, can only ever seek expression at the limits of  
utterance.149  
‘I only have words to describe it;’ asserts Clément’s syncopic subject, ‘[and] I will 
tell you that they are inadequate’.150 Or, as Moria notes at the close to Erasmus’ Praise of  
Folly: 
when ravished so in the sprite, or being in a trance, they do speak certain things 
not hanging one with another, nor after any earthly facion, but rather do put forth 
a voice they wote never what, much less to be understood of  others … it is certain 
that they are wholly distraught and rapt out of  themselves. In sort that when a 
little after they come again to their former wits (Godly men in a kind of  trance) 
they deny plainly they wote where they became, or whether they were than in 
their bodies, or out of  their bodies, waking or sleeping: remembering also as little, 
either what they heard, saw, said, or did than, saying as it were through a cloud, 
or by a dream.151  
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‘Wholly distraught and rapt out of  them selves’, these are similarly the terms in which 
the lovers will express their ‘dream’ a ‘little after’ they have ‘come again to their former 
wits’:  
These things seems small and undistinguishable,  
 Like far-off  mountains turnèd into clouds.   
       (IV.i.186-7)  
 
‘Half  sleeping, half  waking’ (146), the lovers, now neatly coupled up, remember the 
events that have passed only ‘as it were through a cloud, or by a dream’; everything is, 
like the overgrown mazes of  the moonlit wood, ‘undistinguishable’ (II.i.100). Leaving the 
maze behind, the couples can do little else but speak ‘amazedly’ (145); as the lovers, to 
borrow Ruth Nevo’s term ‘recuperate, literally, from their “trip”’, they struggle to bring 
things into focus—‘me thinks I see … with parted eye, | When everything seems 
double’—and through to articulation: ‘I cannot truly say how I came here’ (IV.i.147).152 
This erotic revelry is something that Shakespeare’s characters cannot, or will not, 
articulate: as Jan Kott has it, ‘all are ashamed in the morning’.153 If  the move from city 
to forest is understood as one of  liberation, the return home is a return to constraint; 
while the moonlit wood facilitated erotic madness—an ecstasy that situates itself  
somewhere between the Bacchic ‘woodness’ and Platonic mania of  the previous 
chapter—the return of  daylight, to Athens, to Christian society, seems to bring with it 
some degree of  censorship.154 Lysander, for instance, ‘cannot truly say’ what happened 
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in the woods ‘as yet’; the lovers will ‘recount [their] dreams’ to one another, and will later 
tell ‘all the story of  the night’ to Theseus and Hippolyta with ‘great constancy’, but this 
cannot be given voice in the text. And even then, once all has been relayed, these tales 
remain beyond belief, ‘more strange than true’, as Theseus has it (V.i.2). Titania, too, is 
denied an answer as to ‘how came these things to pass’ (IV.i.77) until she and Oberon 
depart the stage ‘in … flight’ (98). Indeed, Bottom, though unable to fully recount his 
dream after he has woken, seemingly plans to eventually divulge all and ‘get Peter Quince 
to write a ballad of  this dream’ (IV.i.211): ‘I am to discourse wonders’, he announces to 
the company, but ‘if  I tell you, I am no true Athenian’ (IV.ii.26-7). Athens is seemingly no 
place for this kind of  ecstatic displacement, a society that is not willing to hear or give 
voice to these dreams.  
While Bottom’s dream highlights that the subject’s capacity to articulate ecstasy 
is limited, it also demonstrates the extent to which this commonplace ecstatic utterance 
is limiting in turn. After all, these carnal pleasures are precisely those that are inarticulable 
by St. Paul: ‘The body is not for fornication, but for the Lord’ (I Corinthians, 6:13). ‘Ever 
since St. Paul’, observe Anthony Kosnick et al. in their study of  sexuality in Catholic 
thought: 
Abstinence from sexual pleasure has been seen as an anticipation of  that future 
fulfilment, and passionate desire for pleasure as contrary to holiness. As a result, 
Christian tradition and spirituality have tended to see a certain incompatibility 
between sexual pleasure and sanctity. Living a sex life somehow does not seem to 
fit into living the divine life fully.155  
 
As Foucault writes, summarizing Saint Augustine’s experiences of  involuntary arousal: 
‘Sex in erection is the image of  man revolted against God’.156 Sexual desire should be 
controlled, fornication forbade. This is certainly contrary to what Titania has in mind for 
                                                             
155 Anthony Kosnik, William Carroll, Agnes Cunningham, Ronald Modras, and James Schulte, 
Human Sexuality: New Directions in American Catholic Thought (New York: Paulist Press, 1977), p. 29. 
156 Cit. Johnathan Goldberg, The Seeds of Things: Theorizing Sexuality and Materiality in Renaissance 
Representations (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), p. 75. 
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Bottom as she desires ‘to have my love to bed, and to arise’ (III.i.162).157 As Titania 
introduces Bottom to what Kott has considered ‘the dark sphere of  sex where … there is 
only infatuation and liberation’, the play displays the darker undercurrents of  the desire 
for union.158 For giving in to desire can, as Bottom and Titania will discover, force us 
beyond ourselves—‘thy fair virtue’s force perforce doth move me’ (133)—and quite 
literally throw us off  track. ‘Out of  this wood do not desire to go’, Titania instructs 
Bottom as he contemplates how ‘to get out of  this wood’. ‘Thou shalt remain here, 
whether thou wilt or no’; ‘lead him to my bower’ (142-4; 186)’: an obedient, tractable 
subject, Bottom is dis-tracted and thrown off  course by Titania’s desire.  
Thus if  Bottom fails to correctly appropriate a theological narrative of  ecstasy, it 
is because the narrative in turn fails him; Bottom’s malapropisms are less a failure to 
articulate his ecstatic experience than a struggle towards articulation that is hindered by 
the only available rhetoric. Bottom’s experience, in other words, eludes a Christian 
narrative, because this was not a Christian experience; his ‘vision has not been of  
Christian grace’, as Peter Holland notes, ‘but of  a night with an Ovidian fairy-queen’.159 
Bottom’s dream cannot be relayed in terms of  divine ecstasy, because the experience of  
divine union has been replaced with sexual rapture.160 Indeed, it is the prospect of  life-
long celibacy that sees ‘fair Hermia’s flight’ from Athens (I.i.246):  
Either to die the death, or to abjure 
 For ever the society of  men. 
 Therefore, fair Hermia, question your desires,  
 Know of  your youth, examine well your blood, 
                                                             
157 Critics and editors have highlighted the sexual connotations of ‘arise’ here. See, for instance, 
Holland, p. 187, n. l.162; James L. Calderwood (ed.), A Midsummer Night’s Dream (New York: 
Twayne, 1992), p. 63. 
158 Kott, p. 119. 
159 Peter Holland, p. 84. 
160 I use ‘rapture’ here to signal that Bottom’s encounter with Titania has been variously read as 
a scene of sexual bliss and of rape (which shares with rapture the latinate root raptura, to carry 
away by force). For discussions of the former, see Louis Adrian Montrose, ‘“Shaping Fantasies”: 
Figurations of Gender and Power in Elizabethan Culture’, Representations, 2 (1983), 61-94; for the 
latter, see Kott (1998). 
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 Whether, if  you yield not to your father’s choice, 
 You can endure the livery of  a nun, 
 For aye to be in shady cloister mewed, 
 To live a barren sister all your life, 
 Chanting faint hymns to the cold fruitless moon.  
          (65-73)  
 
On this fate ‘the law of  Athens’ (119) is, much like Hermia’s father, inflexible, ‘by no 
means … extenuate’ (120), and so the lovers must instead ‘steal forth’ the ‘father’s house’ 
(164), the city confines, ‘the sharp Athenian law’ (162), to a place where tenderness is 
allowed: where lovers are able to ‘tender … affection’ and discover what it means to have 
such affection tendered back: ‘I am such a tender ass’ (III.ii.230; IV.i.25).161 Refusing to 
retreat into ‘the austerity of  a single life’ (I.i.90), to ‘relent’ and ‘yield’ to a life of  ‘single 
blessedness’ (I.i.91; 78), Hermia realises that she must, quite literally, become more 
outgoing: ‘Lysander and myself  will fly this place’ (I.i.203).162 Because, as the subjects of  
this chapter would concur, union is only available to those willing to risk departure, willing 
to risk vulnerability; ‘one is’, in Judith Butler’s terms, ‘compelled and comported outside 
oneself ’ and ‘finds that the only way to know oneself  is through a mediation that takes 
place outside of  oneself, exterior to oneself.’163 Like its devout counterpart in the first 
section of  this chapter, the loving subject is attracted to this rhetoric of  tractability, willing 
to undo itself, to be undone by others, and to endure what Kuzner and Georges Bataille 
would agree as being ‘the experience of  ecstasy, of  being shattered through and 
through’.164 This is the kind of  vulnerable exposure that ecstasy demands.  
To deliver his characters from a world that is ‘by no means … extenuate[d]’, we 
                                                             
161 Eric Langley reminds us that ‘extenuate’ (from tenuis, thin) belongs to the tender lexicon; 
sharing the ‘Proto-Indo-European root ten- (to stretch) with tendere, to ‘extenuate’ means, amongst 
other related senses, to attenuate via elongation’, Shakespeare’s Contagious Sympathies, p. 232, n. 13. 
162 This is the kind of ‘outgoing subject’ that Rudolphe Gasché identifies in Of Minimal Things, p. 
8. 
163 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), p. 28. 
164 Kuzner, p. 116; Georges Bataille, ‘The Point of Ecstasy’, in Guilty, trans. Stuart Kendall 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), pp. 24-32. 
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have seen how Shakespeare necessarily provides extenuating circumstances.165 But while 
escaping Athens is the only way to step outside of  social identity, such radical action is 
not without cost. As they leave the city, the quartet of  lovers enter into a period of  strange 
amazement, wandering the ‘quaint mazes’ (II.i.99) of  a labyrinthine wood where they are 
estranged both from themselves—‘am not I Hermia?’—and from each other: ‘are you 
not Lysander?’ (III.ii.273). Indeed, this is a play that co-opts the Bacchic capacity for 
transformation in a localized space, for a confined period of  time, using its energies but 
keeping them in check. As we saw in Hamlet, characters in Dream repeatedly find 
themselves ‘distracted’ (31), ‘wood within this wood’ as Demetrius puts it (II.i.192), as 
they are drawn and diverted ‘through the forest’ (72) by powers beyond their control: be 
it overpowering affection—‘you draw me’, laments Helena to Demetrius, ‘[a]nd I … have 
no power [but] to follow you’ (195; 198)—or affected momentum: 
Up and down, up and down,  
I will lead them up and down.  
I am feared in field and town.  
Goblin, lead them up and down.  
        (III.ii.396-9)  
 
Here ‘nature shows art’ (II.ii.110), and the force dynamics that were identifiable in Hamlet 
are transparently stage managed. Titania ‘dote[s] on [Bottom] in extremity’ (III.ii.3), for 
example, because she is—like Bottom, like the lovers—put into extremis. ‘Steal me a while 
from mine own company’ (III.ii.436): lost in the maze, these characters learn what it truly 
means to be beside themselves. After all, as Kristeva notes, and Titania would perhaps 
attest, ‘being alienated from myself, as painful as that may be, provides me with that 
                                                             
165 Northrop Frye’s ‘green world’ theory of Shakespearean comedy similarly stresses the 
transformative potential of the journeying. As he writes of The Two Gentlemen of Verona, identifying 
an ‘embryonic form of the fairy world in’ of Dream: ‘the action of the comedy begins in a world 
represented as a normal world, moves into the green world, goes into a metamorphosis there in 
which the comic resolution is achieved, and returns to the normal world’—Northrope Frye’s Writings 
on Shakespeare and the Renaissance, ed. Troni Y. Grande and Garry Sherbert (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010), pp. 9-10 
 
122 
exquisite distance within which perverse pleasure begins’.166 
But this is, as Holland notes, ‘a maze which proves beneficial to the individuals 
who tread its paths’: ‘all shall be well’, as Puck tells us (III.ii.464).167 As they wake from 
their ‘long and tedious night’ (III.ii.431), the ‘fair lovers … are fortunately met’ (IV.i.176), 
leaving the ‘mazèd world’ (II.i.113) to find that discord has been translated into ‘gentle 
concord’ (IV.i.142), enmity into ‘new amity’ (86), and that, in these extenuating 
circumstances, the ‘law’ that previously could not be ‘extenuate[d]’ can now be ‘extremely 
stretchd’ (V.i.80):  
THESEUS  Egeus, I will overbear your will, 
For in the temple by and by with us 
These couples shall be eternally knit.  
     (178-80)  
 
Soon to be ‘eternally knit’ in marriage, these ‘fair lovers’ have risked self-loss and travelled 
through to a mutually incorporate identity; they have, to borrow Donne’s terms, ‘go[ne] 
out’, ‘advanced their state’, and returned home to reformed selves: ‘my heart’ declares 
Demetrius, is ‘home returned, there to remain’ (III.ii.171-3).168 In this Shakespeare’s 
characters enact a literal model of  the homecoming to which the ecstatic subject aspires; 
one where those who risk out-going are ‘fortunately met’ and welcomed home: ‘Away 
with us to Athens’ (IV.i.183). ‘I am amazed’ (III.ii.344): ecstasy is ‘amazing’, and, as those 
‘wand’ring in the wood’ (II.ii.41) variously demonstrate, as indeed Petrarch found on his 
ascent of  Mount Ventoux, that experience can be at once both dizzyingly agonising and 
joyously blissful.  
 
                                                             
166 Julia Kristeva, Stranger to Ourselves, trans. Leon R. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991), 13. 
167 Holland, p. 77. 
168 This is of course an overtly positive about Demetrius’ homecoming and return to his ‘natural 
taste’. For an alternative reading, see Alison Shell, ‘Delusion in A Midsummer Night’s Dream’, in 
Shakespeare and Early Modern Religion, ed. David Loewenstein and Michael Witmore (Cambridge: 






While Shakespeare might not be willing to engage fully with a theologically inflected 
narrative of  transcendence, of  aspirational ascension, of  outgoing and homecoming, he 
is willing to bring those issues in to play in a way that ‘remain[s] below’. While the 
‘corrupted currents’ (III.iii.57) of  Hamlet deny Claudius his wish to throw himself  out 
towards the divine, the characters in Dream are free to undergo a peregrination that will 
take them beside themselves and return them safely home. As the first two sections of  this 
chapter brought into focus, such metaphors of  movement and journeying were frequently 
used to articulate union with the divine in commonplace religious narratives of  ecstasy, 
and in the early modern devotional works of  poets such as Herbet, Donne, and 
Crawshaw. In these models, ecstasy is presented as an experience which could, 
temporarily, enable the devout subject both to transgress the boundaries and negotiate 
the distance between self  and the divine other. Yet, as we have seen, rather than engaging 
explicitly with narratives of  religious ecstasy, Shakespeare, like Donne, instead employs 
ecstasy as narrative, turning devotional pathways into the journeys of  the subject. What 
this chapter has established, therefore, is Shakespeare’s interest in secular alternatives to 
the commonplace models of  religious ecstasis. Likening the journey that was central to 
this chapter to the experience of  love that is central to the next, Clément captures this 
succinctly: ‘no one returns the same as when he left: he will not come back as he was at 
the beginning, he will never be the same’.169 Here we have observed subjects necessarily 
‘extended through and through … in the coming-and-going into the world’, subjects 
willing to ‘alienate [them]selves through desire’, for, as Jean Starobinski suggests, 
following Montaigne, ‘I have no identity unless I am willing to accept this alienation’.170 
                                                             
169 Clément, p. 128. 
170 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, p. 119; Starobinski, p. 128. 
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As it moves to consider the ecstasy of  desire, this study will now consider just how 





Shakespeare’s Little Deaths:  
The Erotic Ecstatic 
 
 
Great love is never without some kind of  extasie.1 
 
A little death it is, which up doth send  
Our soules to heaven, before we make our end.2 
 
 
‘Love’s not Time’s fool’, asserts the speaker of  Shakespeare’s ‘marriage sonnet’.3 Despite 
the risk of  being undermined by the sonnets which surround it—which James Schiffer 
recognises as ‘mak[ing] clear that … permanence cannot be long sustained in an ever-
changing relationship in a highly mutable world’—‘Sonnet 116’ seeks to carve out a 
moment of  surety and confidence ‘against time and alteration’.4 In this moment of  pause, 
the speaker no longer ‘fear[s] … Time’s tyranny’ that ‘creeps in ’twixt vows’ and is 
endlessly ‘alt’ring things’ (‘Sonnet 115’, 6; 8), but instead celebrates love’s triumph over 
time and, accordingly, its unalterable fixity: 
    Love is not love  
 Which alters when it alteration finds, 
 Or bends with the remover to remove. 
 O no, it is an ever-fixèd mark 
 That looks on tempests and is never shaken.  
       (‘Sonnet 116’, 2-6) 
 
Read optimistically, the sonnet shows Shakespeare at least acknowledging the ideal of  
love as stable, fixed, unmoving, and unchanging; enumerating its sublime qualities, love 
is here depicted as an emotion that ‘alters not’ with the passing of  time, that remains 
                                                             
1 Edward Hyde, Christ and his Church: Or, Christianity Explained, Under Seven Evangelical and Ecclesiastical 
Heads (London: by R. White, 1658), p. 37. 
2 Francis Rous, Thule (London: by Felix Kingston, 1598), sig. N3v. 
3 Jonathan F. S. Post, ‘Regifting Some Shakespeare Sonnets of Late’, in The Sonnets: The State of 
Play, ed. Hannah Crawforth, Elizabeth Scott-Baumann, and Clare Whitehead (London: 
Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2017), pp. 208-28 (222). 
4 James Schiffer, ‘The Incomplete Narrative of Shakespeare’s Sonnets’, in A Companion to 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets, ed. Michael Schoenfeldt (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007), pp. 45-56 (52-3). 
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‘ever-fixèd’ and ‘is never shaken’.5 But, as this chapter will make clear, the same cannot—
and indeed should not—be said of  those who experience it; to be ‘shaken’ is, I will 
suggest, an unavoidable risk for the subject who desires to cross the vibrative interim 
between self  and beloved. The following discussion will explore how love and desire take 
the subject outside of  themselves, offering momentary relief  from the inexorable passage 
of  time. While ‘Sonnet 116’ depicts love as unchanging, this chapter considers the ways 
that love affects temporal change in affectionate subjects.   
Indeed, while Love might not be Time’s fool, the foolish lover’s experience of  time 
is far from ‘fixèd’, with early modern literature repeatedly depicting the loving subject’s 
capacity to escape linear time and, accordingly, experience the rhythms and movements 
of  an alternative temporality; as Rosalind has it, ‘time travels in divers paces with divers 
persons’ (AYLI, III.ii.282-3). ‘Nothing is more changeable than time’, Franciscan author 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus would concur, whose encyclopaedic work frequently reveals a 
keen interest in the body, disease, and treatment, ‘and therefore nothing is more perilous 
to the body’.6 With this in mind, the following chapter considers the ecstatic experiences 
of  loving subjects in order to explore more fully Hamlet’s assertion that even the extremes 
of  ecstasy might still be felt and measured both temporally, and physiologically: 
 HAMLET      Extasie?  
   My pulse as yours doth temperately keep time,  
   And makes as healthful music.  
       (III.iv.142-3 [F1]) 
 
Evidencing his pulse in order to deny ecstasy, Hamlet here asserts his ‘healthful’ 
temperance: he is temperate (OED, ‘temper’, n. 3: to have ‘mental balance of  composure’) 
because his pulse ‘keep[s] time’ (OED, ‘temper’, v. 18: to regulate a clock).7 An ecstatic 
                                                             
5 For an alternative reading of this sonnet, see Helen Vendler, The Art of Shakespeare’s Sonnets 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 488-93. 
6 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De Propreitatibus Rerum, trans. Stephen Batman (London: by Thomas 
East, 1582), p. 142. 
7 Both of these references are consistent with early modern usage. 
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subject’s pulse, he tells us, is by contrast irregular, out of  time, dislocated from temporality. 
This is not the first time that Shakespeare suggests a link between ecstasy and pulse; in 
the Comedy of  Errors, Doctor Pinch examines Antipholus of  Ephesus as he ‘trembles in his 
ecstasy’ by taking his ‘hand’ and ‘feel[ing]’ his ‘pulse’ (IV.iv.53; 54). For scholars such as 
Susan Iyengar, this relationship between out-of-body experience and heart rate suggests 
that an ecstatic subject’s pulse ‘would beat quickly, like that of  a madman in a frenzy or 
delirium’.8 Ecstasy, in other words, is an experience that has the pulse racing.   
And yet elsewhere it seems to stop the heart altogether: ‘sometimes I am, in effect, 
without anie pulse at all, as my Sisters tell me … the Bodie remains apart, as if  it were 
utterly dead’, Saint Teresa observes in her discussion of  her own out of  body experience.9 
In his essay ‘On the Force of  the Imagination’, Montaigne similarly discusses ‘reports of  
a Priest, whose soule was ravished into such an extasie, that for a long time the body 
remained voide of  all respiration and sense’; ‘during this extasie’, he continues, ‘he 
seemed to have neither pulse nor breath’.10 The ecstatic experience can thus be 
understood as both a moment of  fleeting intensity, and conversely an experience that 
could last for a sustained period of  time. Where the previous chapter demonstrated how 
ecstasy might be read as a spatial experience, the following discussion considers the 
ecstatic experience in terms of  temporality and pacing: to experience the ecstasy of  love, 
I suggest, is to experience a telescoping of  temporality. As Teresa and Montaigne have 
highlighted, ecstasy was not and should not be understood solely in terms of  
acceleration—where time seems to go quicker, where the pulse beats faster—for it also 
                                                             
8 Iyengar, p. 115. 
9 Cit. Nicky Hallett, Senses in Religious Communities, 1600-1800: Early Modern ‘Convents of Pleasure’ 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), p. 102; see also Walter S. Melion on Theodoor Galle’s Life of 
Blessed Father Ignatius of Loyola (1610) in Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe, ed. Wieste de 
Boer and Christine Göttler (Leiden: Brill, 2013): ‘having fallen into a death-like state of ecstasy at 
compline, he is indeed taken for dead and mourned until his companions detect a weak pulse’, p. 
81, emphasis added. 
10 Montaigne, Essays, I.20.41. 
 
128 
holds a sense of  dilation, where time and pulse seem to stand still. Indeed, discussions of  
and by a range of  early modern religious figures similarly reveal ‘Extasies’ as leaving 
subjects with ‘no beating of  [their] pulses’, swoons where ‘the breath may be stopt [and] 
the pulse not beat sensibly’, trances where ‘pulses’ fall ‘dull and dead’.11 ‘In extasies and 
raptures’, writes Scottish clergyman Alexander Ross, ‘the body’ is ‘without sense and 
motions, and seems as it were dead’.12 To anticipate Chapter Four, medical discussions 
of  ‘Phrensie … Epilepsie, [and] Convulsion’ similarly find that these states are 
accompanied by ‘an irregular Pulse’, identifying cases of  syncope, epilepsy, and other 
trance states ‘where no pulse is perceptible … so that even Physicians themselves … have 
sometimes mistaken the Living for the Dead’.13 In moments such as these, where the 
subject trembles between life and ‘that undiscovered country’ (Ham., III.i.81), a ‘little 
death’ might not be understood simply as a sexual experience—though this sense will be 
explored in detail in due course—but as an experience of  ecstasy.  
Where the previous chapter considered ecstasy as offering a ‘time-out’ and escape, 
the following discussion considers the ecstatic experience as one able to both speed up 
and slow down the pulse of  existence. Furthermore, this chapter considers the ‘little 
death’ as a kind of  ecstatic experience, in order to demonstrate how these experiences 
bring subjects to the threshold between life and death, self  and other: ecstasy, I suggest, 
is an experience that is located at these boundaries. Focusing on period medical discourses 
of  sex, ecstasy, and notions of  orgasm as a ‘little death’, the first section of  this chapter 
                                                             
11 Christoph Kotter, Prophecies of Christoph Kotterus, Christiana Poniatovia, Nicholas Drabicus (London: 
for Robert Pawlet, 1664), p. 58; John Oldfield, The Generation of Seekers: Or, The Right Manner of the 
Saints Adddresses to the Throne of Grace in Two Treatises (London: s.n., 1671), p. 99; Thomas Miles, 
Out-port-Customers Accompt (London: W[illiam] Jaggard, 1627), sig. B2r. 
12 Alexander Ross, The Philosophical Touch-Stone (London: for James Young, 1645), p. 144. Ross 
here contrasts the state of the body to that of the soul which ‘remains unperished, or unextinguished’. 
13 Walter Charleton, Enquiries into Human Nature (London: by M. White, 1680), p. 425; Sir Robert 
Talbor, Pyretologia, A Rational Account of the Cause and Cure of Agues with their Signes Diagnostick and 
Prognostick (London: for R. Robinson, 1672), p. 61. 
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establishes the virtues and risks of  sexual expenditure. This chapter then moves to explore 
how moments of  ‘little death’ might be considered as moments of  ecstasy: where 
moments of  ecstasis and petite mort intersect to demonstrate more fully the implications of  
being beside oneself. From Venus’ death-like swoon (Ven., 484) to Juliet’s ‘thing like death’ 
(Rom., IV.i.74), what follows considers ecstasy as both an experience of  intense quickness, 
and one of  radical pause. Suggesting how ecstasy problematizes the subject’s capacity to 
‘keep time’, this chapter identifies ecstatic subjects trembling between ‘tempering 
extremities’ (Rom., 2.0.14) and distempering extremis. If  ‘the self  forms at the edge of  
desire’, as Anne Carson asserts in her study of  Eros, what follows explores ecstasy as an 

























                                                             
14 Anne Carson, Eros the Bittersweet: An Essay (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 39. 
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I.  ‘TH’EXPENSE OF SPIRIT’: SEXUAL ECSTASY AND ANXIOUS MINGLING 
 
 
Th’expense of  spirit in a waste of  shame 
Is lust in action, and till action, lust 
Is perjured, murd’rous, bloody, full of  blame, 
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust; 
Enjoyed no sooner but despisèd straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had, 
Past reason hated as a swallowed bait 
On purpose laid to make the taker mad: 
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so,  
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme; 
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe, 
Before, a joy proposed, behind, a dream. 
       All this the world well knows yet none knows well 
       To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.          
        (‘Sonnet 129’) 
 
 
‘In the acte of  Generation or Copulation’, writes early modern physician Helkiah 
Crooke, ‘the whole bodie is delighted and as it were stupified with an extasie of  pleasure, 
or if  you will, suffereth a pleasant Convulsion’.15 Borrowing from the Latin dēlectāre—to 
allure, attract, please—and dēlicĕre—to entice away—‘delight’ occurs at this moment of  
being carried away from oneself  with pleasure: the ‘extasie of  pleasure’ is ‘delightful’, the 
body is ‘delighted’, because it is enticed away. Transported by the pleasures of  sexual 
intercourse, trembling towards the moment of  orgasm, the ecstatic subject willingly 
relinquishes control. This pleasurable ecstasy could be experienced by male and female 
bodies alike: ‘in the ecstasy of  coitus’, as William Harvey notes, women experience a 
‘violent shaking and dissolution and spilling of  humours’, just as Aristotle had observed 
how ‘much delight accompanies the ejection of  seed, by breaking forth of  the swelling 
spirit, and the stiffness of  Nerves’.16 Once again, ‘delight’ involves a sense of  projection. 
It is in this way that the body responds to the delight that accompanies the moment of  
                                                             
15 Crooke, Microcosmographia, p. 279. 
16 William Harvey, Disputations Touching the Generation of Animals (1653), cit. Thomas Laqueur in 
Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1992), p. 67; Aristotle, Aristotle’s Masterpiece (1684), cit. Laqueur, p. 64. 
 
131 
ecstasy: the body trembles, muscles and nerves contract and release. As Crooke continues 
his medical account of  sexual experience, he admits that these violent delights harbour 
the threat of  a violent end: on the one hand, the subject trembles in pleasurable ecstasy; 
on the other, it convulses to such an extent that Crooke reveals that ‘coition is called parua 
Epilepsia, a light Fit or falling sicknesse’.17 As Thomas Laqueur notes, this notion of  
‘coition as a version of  epilepsy’ traces back to Democritus, who considered ‘coition’ as 
‘a slight attack of  apoplexy’, where ‘man gushes forth from man, and is separated by 
being torn apart with a kind of  blow’.18 As this chapter demonstrates, this is an ecstatic 
experience that threatens ‘swooning destruction’ (Tro., III.ii.21), an experience of  being 
‘for a time transported from ourselves’, in which both body and soul are co-partners. 
 To be ‘overtaken with an extasie’, then, is to be thrown beside oneself  with a 
blow.19 Accordingly, both the pleasures and risks of  ecstasy lie in the moment of  losing 
control, of  letting go, and Bataille reminds us that ‘pleasure is so close to ruinous waste 
that we refer to the moment of  climax as a “little death”’.20 In moments of  desire, as in 
death, the subject loses itself  as it transcends the limits that delineate it as a distinct being. 
For Bataille, sexual experience tests these limits of  self: ‘[i]t questions the discontinuity 
with which the feeling of  self  is necessarily bound up because that [discontinuity] 
furnishes its limits’.21 The subject, in other words, discovers itself  in response to the self-
willed but self-annihilating forces that threaten it. Both sex and death are, for Bataille, 
two such forces. Sexual experience simultaneously ‘put[s] forward the possibility of  
continuity’ and ‘continually threaten[s] a rent in the seamless garment of  the separate 
individuality’: it figures at once as both a promise and a threat. Accordingly, Bataille 
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19 Crooke, p. 200. 
20 Bataille, p. 170. 
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suggests, there is a necessary violence to the meeting of  two bodies: 
The violence of  the one goes out to meet the violence of  the other; on each side 
there is an inner compulsion to get out of  the limits of  individual discontinuity. 
There is a meeting between two beings being projected beyond their limits by the 
sexual  orgasm. … At the moment of  conjunction the animal couple is not made 
up of  two discontinuous beings drawing close together uniting in a current of  
momentary continuity: there is no real union; two individuals in the grip of  
violence brought together by the preordained reflexes of  sexual intercourse share 
in a state of  crisis in which both are beside themselves.22  
 
This is not to conflate anachronistically modern and Renaissance theories of  sexual 
experience, for while this sense of  coitus as a means of  transcending subjective limits is 
articulated by writers in both periods, the early modern subject evinces faith in the 
moment of  ‘real union’ that Bataille denies. As Adriana articulates in The Comedy of  Errors, 
asserting her husband as an indivisible, incorporate other: 
Thyself  I call it, being strange to me 
That undividable, incorporate, 
Am better than thy dear self ’s better part.  
Ah do not tear away thyself  from me; 
For know, my love, as easy mayst thou fall 
A drop of  water in the breaking gulf, 
And take unmingled thence that drop again 
Without addition or diminishing, 
As take from me thyself, and not me too. 
      (II.ii.112-20) 
 
If, in love, two are one, she asks, and if  therefore ‘man and wife is one flesh’ (Ham., 
IV.iii.52), then how is it possible for Antipholus to have become ‘estranged’ from the 
‘undividable, incorporate’ self  that they share? Informed by Aristophanes’ mythic 
androgyne in Plato’s Symposium, whereby humans are described as hermaphrodites split 
into two male and female selves destined to seek their other half, we here find that, in 
Plato’s terms, ‘love is simply the desire and pursuit of  the whole’.23 The highest aspiration 
these lovers have, Aristophanes explains, is to experience the ecstasy of  being dissolved 
                                                             
22 Bataille, p. 103.  
23 Plato, The Symposium, trans. Walter Hamilton (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 192D-E. See 
also Pablo Maurette, ‘Plato’s Hermaphrodite and a Vindication of the Sense of Touch in the 
Sixteenth Century’, RQ, 68 (2015), 872-98. 
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back into one. As I will demonstrate in what follows, to be ‘beside oneself ’ may be, for 
some, a ‘state of  crisis’, but such abjection is necessary for the subject who desires the 
pleasures of  ecstasy.   
 
i)  ‘O, HAPPY DEATH’: THE PLEASURES OF ECSTASY 
 
To understand sexual climax as a ‘little death’ (or petite mort) is, as Jennifer Pacenza notes, 
‘common knowledge among those well versed in early modern literature’. For Aristotle, 
and later for Galen, semen was understood ‘as reconstituted blood’, and thus ‘orgasm 
causes a release of  life-giving blood; too much blood loss was deadly’.24 ‘Stupefied with 
an extasie of  pleasure’ in an act that will generate new life, the subject thus risks 
diminishing their own. Returning to Crooke, we find an array of  theories as to what, in 
grossly material terms, semen or ‘seede’ is: 
The Nature of  Seede no man that I know hath yet essentially defined; Hippocrates 
in his Booke de Geniture calleth it, The best and strangest part of  that humour which is 
contained in the whole body. Pythagoras, The froth of  the best and most laudible blood. 
Plato, The defluxion of  the spinal marrow. Alcmaon, A small portion of  the Brayne. 
Zeno Criticus The spirit of  a man which he looseth with moisture, and the slough 
of  the Soule. Epicurus A fragment of  the Soule and the Body.25   
 
Common to these theories is the notion that part of  oneself  is evacuated in the moment 
of  orgasm, from a humour common to one’s whole body, to a part of  the brain or soul. 
But, for Crooke, none of  these models ‘do sufficiently expresse the nature of  Seede … 
and therefore we will not content with them’. Instead, Crooke finds seed to be a ‘double 
matter … compounded of  a permixtion of  the blood and spirits’.26 In ‘an Embleme of  
the holy mixtion of  seedes in matrimony’, the double matter of  blood and spirit are 
                                                             
24 Jennifer Pacenza, ‘“None Do Slaken, None Can Die”: Die puns and Embodied Time in Donne 
and Shakespeare’, in Shakespeare and Donne: Generic Hybrids and the Cultural Imagination, ed. Judith H. 
Anderson and Jennifer C. Vaught (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 61-84 (62). 
25 Crooke, p. 277. 
26 Crooke, p. 277; 282. 
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‘mingled’ and ‘permix[ed]’ (OED, n. 2: a thorough mingling) in the ‘labyrinths’ of  the 
veins and arteries. By this ‘new concoction’ (‘The Extasie’, 27) there ‘is made one 
seede…’, and so begins a process of  arithmetic-defying fusion, where ‘of  two’ comes 
‘one’: ‘of  two seeds the Male and Female one infant, and of  two parents the husband and 
wife one body’.27 As Shakespeare’s erotic computations have it, the loving couple has ‘the 
essence but in one’: ‘Two distincts, division none: | Number there in love was slain’ (PhT, 
27-8). To appropriate Donne’s phrase, through ‘a single … transplant’ comes an ‘abler 
soul, which thence doth flow’ (‘The Extasie’, 37; 43):  
 Love these mix’d souls doth mix again 
 And makes both one, each this and that.  
          (35-6) 
 
With seed released at the moment of  orgasm—and with ‘the spirit’ being understood as 
‘the first immediate instrument of  the soule, disposing it selfe in the bulke of  the seede’—
pleasure (and by extension conception) was therefore understood to depend on the 
mingling of  souls: ‘of  the effusion of  the seedes of  both sexes, the pleasure thereupon 
conceived, and the permixtion of  the seeds themselves’.28  
With soul and seed inextricably implicated, both are emitted towards their partner 
at the moment of  orgasm; ‘I cannot help asking,’ notes Christian writer Terullian, 
‘whether we do not, in that very heat of  extreme gratification when the generative fluid 
is ejected, feel that somewhat of  our soul has gone out from us?’29 The mingling of  souls 
that Donne imagines occurring in moments of  ecstasy elsewhere is thus literalized in 
medical texts that understood the moment of  orgasm as one of  soulful expulsion:  
The man therefore and the woman joined together in holy wedlock … in their 
mutual imbracements doe either of  them yield seede the mans leaping with the 
greater violence. The woman at the same instant doth not only ejaculate seede 
into herself, but also her womb snatcheth as it were and catcheth the seede of  the 
man. … These seeds thus cast and drawn into the bottom of  the womb are out 
                                                             
27 Crooke, p. 279. 
28 Crooke, p. 263; 296.  
29 Cit. Laquer, p. 47. 
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of  hand exquisitely mingled, otherwise sayeth Hippocrates in his Book de 
Naturapueri, they are neither nourished nor animated together. And if  any man, sayeth 
he in his first Booke de diata, do deny that the Soule is mixed with the Soule, let him be held 
for a dotard…30 
 
It is in this way that seeds are ‘exquisitely mingled’—that is, mingling here occurs because 
the womb is ‘exquisite’ (ex- out; quaerĕre, to search or seek): it seeks out and ‘snatcheth’ the 
male seed which is yielded to it with ‘great… violence’. Read this way, such ‘exquisite’ 
mingling also presents itself  as an experience to be sought after: indeed, from de Sales’s 
desire to be ‘entirely mingled’ with the divine in Chapter One, to the ‘mutual inhesion’ 
of  ecstatic union articulated by St. Teresa in the previous chapter, the subjects of  this 
study would agree. But, as Crooke articulates, this experience also involves some degree 
of  violence, a sense that is etymologically bound up with the moment of  orgasm (from 
the Latin orgasmus, a violent action in a bodily organ). As Crooke elsewhere reminds us: 
‘the seed itself  is hoven with aboundance of  spirits which maketh it to passe orgasmo, that 
is, with a kind of  impetuous violence’.31 ‘Haven’t you seen’, asks Lucretius in his De Rerum 
Natura, playing on this sense of  violent mingling, ‘those whom mutual pleasure binds 
together, | How they are tortured in the bondage of  their common tether?’32 The loving 
couple is unable to ‘tug apart’ once the ‘sturdy fetters of  Venus [has] b[ou]nd them tight 
… [and] ensnare[d] | Them fast’ (IV. 124-7). Having come together in ‘holy wedlock’, 
the couple now come together, come simultaneously, and yield to one another ‘in their 
mutual imbracements’; to borrow from John Weever’s Fanus and Melliflora, ‘he gives, she 
takes, and nothing is denied’.33 As Ovid puts it in his Ars Amatoria, this ‘is the fulnesse of  
all sweet content | When both at once strive, both at once are spent’.34 Erotic experience, 
                                                             
30 Crooke, p. 262. 
31 Crooke, p. 244. 
32 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. A. E. Stallings (London: Penguin, 2007), ll. 1201-2. 
33 John Weever, Faunus and Melliflora (London: by Valentine Simmes, 1600), Fr. There are also 
echoes here of Hero and Leander: ‘He askt, she gave, and nothing was denied’, sig. Dr. 
34 Ovid, Loves Schoole Publii Ovidii Nasonis de Arte Amandi; Or, The Art of Love, trans. Thomas Heywood 
(Amsterdam: by Nicolas Iansz. Visscher, 1625), p. 62. 
 
136 
as we have heard, involves this kind of  expenditure, this ‘expense of  spirit’. For these 
writers, sex is understood as an exquisite mingling and mixing of  two souls, where the act 
of  ‘leaping’ out of  oneself  with ‘great … violence’ is a requisite stage in the fashioning of  
‘this new soule … Of  what we are compos’d, and made’ (‘The Extasie’, 45-6).  
Looking to key scientific discourses in the period, there is little to be distinguished 
between the physiological act of  ‘making love’—which, as we have seen, ‘interanimates 
two soules’ into ‘[t]hat abler soule’—and philosophical discussions of  amorous 
experience and ‘mutual affection’. Common to both is the sense that the quest for union 
demands the subject risk ‘leaping’ out of  themselves; ‘the first effect of  love’, observes 
French theologian and poet Nicholas Coeffeteau, ‘is that it hath a uniting vertue, by 
means whereof  it causeth him that loveth to aspire to unite himself  to the thing beloved’. 
Echoing Platonic doctrine where the soul ‘aspire[s]’—not only ‘desires’ (OED, v. 3) but 
also ‘rises up’ (v. 5)—Etienne Pasquier’s philosophical discourse on love articulates how 
the emotion ‘so knittes and unites our minds’: 
That being the cause of  a perpetuall death, yet it revives us in an other, making 
us forget our proper condicion, to remember our selves eftsoones in an other, 
seconde our selves, and drawes us besides by a devine power, with such a strong 
and indissoluble bonde ... that he distils two spirites into one bodye, & by the same 
miracle brings to passe that two spirits be made one minde in two bodies.35 
 
To be thrown so radically beside oneself  is to become inseparably ‘knit’ and ‘unite[d]’ by 
an ‘indissoluble bonde’; to be in love is to die and be revived in another, to ‘forget’ and 
‘remember’, to simultaneously preserve and annihilate one’s identity. This ‘mutual 
affection’ is, for Plato, the happiest form of  ecstatic ‘mania’: 
A has himself, but in B; and B has himself, but in A. … After I have lost myself, I 
recover myself  through you. … There is only one death in mutual love, but there 
are two resurrections. … O, happy death, which is followed by two lives. O, 
wonderous exchange in which he who gives himself  up for the other, and has the 
other, and does not cease to have himself. O, inestimable gain, when two so 
                                                             




become one, that each of  the two, instead of  one alone, becomes two.36 
 
True to both physical and metaphysical experiences of  love, to both romantic and 
Platonic models of  loving experience, is the condition that the subject must be willing to 
give themselves ‘to the other in order to receive the other’: ‘O, happy death. … O, 
wonderous contract’. Negotiating this contract of  mutual loss and mutual gain, these 
metaphysical discourses of  love prepare the subject for this hazardous exchange, guiding 
lovers towards and mitigating the pain of  this transaction: recovery ‘through you’ can 
only occur after ‘I have lost myself ’. The terms of  this contract are that both parties be 
willing to undergo a transaction of  identity, a to-and-fro. For this is a transaction that 
‘making love’ demands: the mingling of  souls and seed can occur only once they have 
been released and given over to the other. No generation without the ‘little death’ of  
mutual pleasure; ‘double resurrection’ only through orgasmic ‘happy death’. It is in this 
way that the ecstatic subject is recompensed for taking a step beyond.  
 
 





As he anticipates a night with Cressida, Troilus articulates how this prospect of  mingling 
with and dying in another is both exciting and threatening:  
  I am giddy: expectation whirls me round.  
  Th’imaginary relish is so sweet 
  That it enchants my sense: what will it be 
  When that the wat’ry palate tastes indeed 
  Love’s thrice-reputed nectar? Death, I fear me,  
  Swooning destruction, or some joy too fine,  
  Too subtle-potent, tun’d too sharp in sweetness 
  For the capacity of  my ruder powers.  
  I fear it too much; and I do fear besides 
  That I shall lose distinction in my joys, 
  As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps 
                                                             
36 Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love, trans. Sears Reynolds Jayne (Dallas: Spring 
Publications, 1944), p. 145. 
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  The enemy flying.      
           (Tro., III.ii.16-27)  
 
Here, sexual experience is simultaneously dizzying, enchanting, deathly, and destructive: 
at once both ‘sharp’ and ‘sweet’. Above all else, it is for Troilus something to be feared: ‘I 
fear me … I fear it too much … I do fear’. For the ecstatic little death—a ‘joy’ at once 
‘too fine’, ‘too subtle-potent’, and ‘too sharp’—threatens ‘swooning destruction’, 
threatens ‘that I shall lose distinction in my joys’. Troilus fears that in the face of  such 
pleasures, his ‘joys’ will become indistinguishable from one another, that he will ‘lose the 
ability to distinguish one pleasure for another’, as David Bevington explains.37 But there 
is more at stake here, for Troilus also risks losing his distinguished reputation (OED, 
‘distinction’, n. 9) but, more severely, if  Shakespeare’s erotic arithmetic is anything to go 
by, also risks losing himself.  
This is, after all, a play which compulsively reminds us that ‘distinction’ is the key 
to identity, where ipseity is determined in relation to others. As Marianne Sanders Regan 
has it, translating Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic framework into a model of  the 
subject: ‘we learn our identities by difference and differentiation from the whole, by loss 
of  being. … Our experience of  the world is an experience of  not-ness’.38 Selfhood is 
determined and negotiated via difference: ‘Troilus is Troilus’, for instance, because ‘he is 
not Hector’ (I.ii.65; 73), because he has ‘three or four hairs on his chin’ (108) and a 
‘dimple’ (117) in his cheek. As Eric Langley observes, this impulse to ‘contrast a Troilus 
with a Paris, a Helen with a Cressida, a Trojan with a Greek, that is exhibited throughout 
this play of  sustained comparison, is shown to be neurotically compulsive’, and, as a 
result, any claim to individuality is, as Langley demonstrates, ‘utterly untenable’.39 To 
                                                             
37 David M. Bevington (ed.), Troilus and Cressida (London: Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 1998), 
p. 229, n. 
38 Marianne Sanders Regan, Love Words: The Self and the Text in Medieval and Renaissance Poetry 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 28. 
39 Langley, Shakespeare’s Contagious Sympathies, p. 75. 
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‘lose distinction’, in these circumstances, is to lose one’s sense of  self. For, as the subjects 
of  Troilus and Cressida variously discover, this system of  difference—one that from the 
play’s outset sees ‘on one and other side, Trojan and Greek’ (I.0.21)—offers no stable 
foundation upon which to assert self  as distinct from other. As Hector discovers, Greek 
cannot be so easily distinguished from Trojan:  
Thou art, great lord, my father’s sister’s son, 
A cousin-german to great Priam’s seed, 
The obligation of  our blood forbids 
A gory emulation ’twixt us twain. 
Were thy commixtion Greek and Trojan so  
That thou couldst say, ‘This hand is Grecian all, 
And this is Trojan; the sinews of  this leg 
All Greek, and this all Tyor; my mother’s blood 
Runs on the dexter cheek, and this sinister 
Bounds in my father’s’, by Jove multipotent, 
Thou shouldst not bear from me a Greekish member 
Wherein my sword had not impressure made 
Of  our rank feud. …  
Let me embrace thee, Ajax.  
(IV.v.121-36) 
 
‘Two distincts, division none’ (PhT, 27): Ajax’s body cannot be split into its component 
‘Greek’ and ‘Trojan’ parts, for they are here ‘commix[ed]’: what were once stable 
categories of  distinction now no longer apply. With ‘Priam’s seed’, to recall Crooke’s 
terms, so ‘exquisitely mingled’ in Ajax’s Greek blood, Hector recognises the futility of  
seeking out distinction, and instead embraces his ‘cousin-german’. Embracing this 
sameness, heroic distinction is lost.  
If  loss of  distinction is therefore not simply a concern but a reality for the subjects 
of  Troilus and Cressida, then it is with good reason that Troilus feels anxious about giving 
himself  over to the erotics of  ecstasy, to the experience of  being mingled with and dying 
in the beloved. As we have variously seen since the Bacchic rites of  Chapter One, in 
ecstasy identities mingle, distinction is lost. ‘I do fear besides | That I shall lose distinction 
in my joys, | As doth a battle, when they charge on heaps |The enemy flying’: in these 
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circumstances, it is not simply Troilus’ joys that lie amassed in an indistinguishable ‘heap’ 
on the battle-field. In this joyful encounter, Troilus will himself  be under charge, forced 
to ‘fly’ from himself  like an enemy breaking ranks.40 As we have seen, this is the kind of  
self-departure that ecstasy demands: ‘the lover’, as Anne Carson observes, ‘helplessly 
admits that it feels both good and bad to be mixed up, but is then driven back upon the 
question “Once I have been mixed up in this way, who am I?”’.41 These are the dynamics 
of  erotic experience that Cressida understands all too well, asserting herself  as having ‘a 
kind of  self  that resides with you, | But an unkind self  that itself  will leave’ (135-6). These 
are subjects who know that desire necessarily entails some degree of  self-loss, a departure 
from self, a ‘swooning destruction’ that, in Troilus’ case, hits almost immediately: 
Even as such a passion doth embrace my bosom. 
 My heart beats thicker than a feverous pulse,  
 And all my powers do their bestowing lose. 
(33-5)  
 
Pulse racing as he whirls in giddy expectation, Troilus feels himself  losing control.42 As 
the couple make their way to bed, the poetics of  desire are stripped back to reveal layers 
of  sexual anxiety: ‘Cupid’ is substituted by ‘monsters’, and the rhetoric of  soulful 
expulsion is swapped out for more clinical conceptions of  ‘discharging’ (84). Romantic 
idealism, in other words, here gives way to sexual frustration (or, more properly, to 
frustrations with sex) and is faced with the reality that erotic experience can fall short of  
‘expectation’. ‘They say all lovers swear more performance than they are able’, notes 
Cressida, ‘call[ing sexual] activity in [to] question’ against Pandarus’ caution: ‘and yet 
                                                             
40 This was, as Charles Edelman notes in Shakespeare’s Military Language: A Dictionary, the main 
objective of such ‘charge[s] on heaps’: ‘The amount of space taken up by each mount means that 
a cavalry charge would be unlikely to inflict heavy losses at the point of contact with defending 
massed infantry; the main objective was to get the defenders to break and run’ (London: 
Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2000), p. 84. 
41 Carson, p. 37. 
42 See Alison V. Scott, ‘Making a Virtue of Giddiness: Rethinking Troilus’ (E)Motion’, in 
Shakespeare and Emotions: Inheritances, Enactments, Legacies, ed. R.S. White, Mark Houlahan and 
Katrina O’ Loughlin (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 124-36. 
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reserve an ability that they never perform’ (55-6; 81-3). If  Troilus was fearfully anxious 
before, Cressida seemingly does little to put him at ease.   
 The ecstasy of  erotic experience is thus, for Troilus and Cressida, tinged with 
expectation, fear, and anxiety, and as Troilus metaphorically likens Cressida’s doorway to 
Stygian banks, Pandarus to ‘Charon’, and himself  to ‘a strange soul’ waiting for ‘waftage’ 
and ‘swift transportance’ (8-10), he hints at having another reason to ‘fear it much’. ‘By 
Charon doubtelesse death was understood’, explains Alexander Ross in his study of  
‘ancient Greek and Latine poets’. But, for Ross, being ‘admitted into Charons boat’ was 
not necessarily something to fear, but rather something to welcome: to be greeted by 
Charon was to ‘have a joyfull death’.43 Thomas Dekker, musing on the meanings of  a 
dream, similarly tells us that ‘Charon, by interpretation is Joy; for after we have ferried over 
the troublesome passage of  death, [we] land … on the shoares of  Blessednesse’.44 These 
are the terms in which Troilus grounds his metaphor: Pandarus’ function is to ferry 
Troilus over the passage of  death or, in this case, the orchard, to Cressida’s heavenly ‘lily-
bed’ (11). Troilus is willing to be transported, indeed wills ‘swift transportance’, towards 
Cressida. Prepared to risk troublesome passage, Troilus is willing to risk a ‘joyful’ little 
death.  
 However, by likening himself  to a ‘strange soul upon the Stygian banks’, by 
articulating thoughts of  ‘Love’ that so swiftly turn to thoughts of  ‘Death’, Troilus displays 
an awareness that there may be more at risk. Charon does, after all, ‘signify… [a] Sweete 
Perswasion to prepare for death’, and is ‘that grim ferryman’ that will in a dream elsewhere 
transport the Duke of  Clarence’s ‘stranger soul’ unto ‘the kingdom of  perpetual night’ 
(R2, I.iv.47).45 At stake here, very simply, is not just an ecstatic loss of  distinction, but loss 
                                                             
43 Alexander Ross, Mystagogus Poeticus (London: for Richard Whitaker, 1647), p. 61; 62. 
44 Thomas Dekker, Dekker his Dreame (London: by Nicholas Oakes, 1620), p. 17. 
45 Dekker, p. 17. 
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of  life. For in Pasquier’s notion of  ‘perpetual death’, in Troilus’ fears of  ‘Death’ and 
‘destruction’, lies not only the intense pleasure of  an orgasmic petite mort, but also an 
awareness that with each ‘little death’ the subject draws one step closer to actual death, 
for ‘each such an Act, they say, | Diminisheth the length of  life a day’ (Donne, ‘Farewell 
to Love’, 24-5). The agonising nature of  ecstasy, as understood thus far in this study, is 
that it can only ever function as a promissory note for wonders that are to come after 
death. And yet here, for the subject in the thralls of  sexual pleasure, ecstasy seemingly 
threatens to make good on that promise by drawing death closer: ‘we kill ourselves to 
propagate our kind’, laments Donne in ‘The First Anniversarie’ (110). ‘Th’expense of  
Spirit’, very simply, comes at a deathly cost. Where religious ecstasy offered the subject a 
glimpse of  future pleasures, sexual ecstasy tinges that glimpse with an immediate threat; 
this may be ‘a bliss in proof ’, as the speaker of  Shakespeare’s ‘Sonnet 129’ has it, but 
once ‘proved, [it is] a very woe’ (11). The stakes are higher, the pulse is faster, for the 
subject who is open to sexual ecstasy, and who feels more keenly the dangers of  losing 
control. This is not, in other words, a glimpse of  heavenly splendour: this is ‘the heaven 
that leads men to ... hell[ish]’ anguish (‘Sonnet 129’, 14). The lustful subject finds that 
they are losing time: the subject who makes love is time’s fool.46  
 And so there is, as ever, a negative flip-side to the experience of  being thrown 
beside oneself, for as the subject races towards ecstatic pleasure, it finds lurking there a 
tenor of  death. As Carson writes, articulating an anxiety shared by the subjects of  this 
chapter thus far: ‘when an individual appreciates that he alone is responsible for the 
content and coherence of  his person, an influx like eros becomes a concrete personal 
                                                             
46 See also Marcus Norlund, Shakespeare and the Nature of Love: Literature, Culture, Evolution (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007). Norlund here identifies a heightened sense of time in 
Troilus and Cressida, and considers the extent to which Cressida’s attempts to ‘buy time and prolong 
the courtship’ with Troilus are ‘eroded by the intensity of her own passion’, p. 144.  
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threat. … Union would be annihilating’.47 Erotic experience is at once ‘enjoyed’ and 
‘despisèd’, ‘hunted’ and ‘hated’. ‘Sonnet 129’ articulates sex as an extreme experience, 
one that holds in tension both erotic hell—‘not to trust’—and erotic heaven: ‘Before, a 
joy proposed, behind, a dream’. In Peter J. Smith’s terms, the sonnet ‘demonstrates the 
overwhelming and all-consuming nature of  sexual desire … desire which occupies every 
waking moment’.48 ‘Mad in pursuit’, the subject rushes to arrive at the moment of  
orgasm—‘had, having, and in quest to have, extreme’—but ‘no sooner had’ retreats into 
a state of  tormented anguish. But this is not simply a lament that death lies in the margins 
of  sexual experience, but also that the whole experience is fleeting: ‘enjoyed no sooner but 
despised straight’; ‘no sooner had | Past reason hated’ (5; 6-7, emphasis added). ‘No sooner 
had [and it is] past’: this ecstasy is over too quickly. As Ben Jonson’s translation of  
Petronius has it: ‘Doing, a filthy pleasure is, and short; | And done, we straight repent us 
of  the sport’.49 ‘This is’, Troilus notes, ‘the monstrosity of  love’: ‘that the will is infinite 
and the execution confined; that the desire is boundless and the act a slave to limit’ (Tro., 
III.ii.77-80).50 It is in these circumstances that we find subjects threatening to bid 
‘Farewell to Love’ altogether: 
   … man should despise 
 The sport, 
 Because that other curse of  being short,  
 And onely for a minute made to be  
 Eager, desires to raise posterity. 
                                                             
47 Carson, p. 45; 62. 
48 Peter J. Smith, ‘A “Consummation Devoutly to be Wished”: The Erotics of Narration in Venus 
and Adonis’, SS, 53 (2000), 25-38 (37). 
49 Ben Jonson, The Workes of Ben Jonson (London: by John Beale, James Dawson, Nernard Alsop, 
and Thomas Fawcet, 1641), p. 271. 
50 Montaigne would agree with Troilus’ term ‘monstrosity’ here: ‘What monster is it, that this 
teare or drop of seed, whereof we are ingendred brings with it…’ (II.27.427). For both Montaigne 
and Troilus, there is something unnatural and anxiety inducing at the heart of sexual experience. 
As Ian Frederick Moulton considers in light of Montaigne’s claim: ‘That this most “natural” of 
acts—sexual generation of offspring—could be seen as monstrous, and therefore “unnatural”, 
indicates the ambivalence at the heart of early modern understandings of both parenthood and 
of the sexual attraction that generates children’—‘Monstrous Teardrops: The Materiality of 
Early Modern Affection’, in Historical Affects and the Early Modern Theatre, ed. Ronda Arab, Michelle 




 Since so, my minde 
 Shall not desire what no man else can finde, 
 I’ll no more dote and runne 
 To persue things which had indammag’d me.51  
 
 
Unlike Donne’s poem ‘The Extasie’ which, as we have seen, offers a sustained glimpse of  
the orgasmic moment of  inter-animation, Donne here finds little reward for that kind of  
expenditure. Quite the opposite: this is an experience that, as Troilus’ ‘swooning 
destruction’ can attest, can ‘indammag[e]’. Accordingly, the speaker vows to close 
themselves off  to such experience: ‘I’ll no more dote and runne’. As Lucretius advises, 
‘it’s easier to avoid the toils of  love than extricate| Yourself  once you’re caught fast in the 
nets’.52 What we are presented with, then, are subjects who are unwilling to ‘expend 
themselves’ because the cost of  ‘persue[ing] things which had indammag’d me’ is too 
great. As was true of  the religious subjects in the previous chapter, the radical return to 
self  that follows ecstasy is painfully disappointing. ‘[W]hat the[se] lovers feel … is not 
some pure and simple bliss’, for ‘there are stings that lurk beneath it’.53 ‘They feel pleasure 
indeed’, Sibbes concurs, ‘but the sting comes after’.54 We know by now that there is always 
agony in ecstasy.   
 What this chapter identifies is that the erotic moment is as much about the 
experience of  being in projection as it is about ‘the consummation | Devoutly to be 
wished’ (Ham., III.i.63-4). The subject driven by desire finds that the ecstatic experience 
is not simply a celebration of  the moment of  arrival (and, subsequently, a lament of  
return), but also demonstrates there to be something wonderfully vibrative, something 
                                                             
51 Donne, ‘Farewell to Love’, in Complete Poems, pp. 121-3 (ll. 26-34). Gloucester similarly 
articulates sexual experience in terms of ‘sport’ in King Lear, remarking that ‘there was good sport 
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52 Lucretius, De Rerum, ll. 1146-7. 
53 De Rerum, ll. 1081-2.  
54 Sibbes, A Glance of Heaven (London: by E. G., 1638), 45-6. 
 
145 
equally rapturous, about the ‘quest to have, extreme’, of  the ‘swift transportance’ out of  
oneself  and towards the beloved. Trembling towards petite mort, trembling in ecstasy, 
trembling at the edge of  irrecoverable self-dissolution, it is here that the subject willingly 
puts themselves at risk, and here they glimpse the rewards of  that endeavour. It is the 
prospect of  ecstasy that draws subjects towards this border. To appropriate Derrida’s 
thinking regarding the sublime, and to echo the discussions of  Chapter One, ecstasy is 
‘the experience of  the border and of  overflowing, the trembling apprehension of  that 
which, touching on the border, at once goes overboard and remains at the border, holding 
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II.   ‘KILL ME ONCE AGAIN’: TREMBLING ECSTASY IN VENUS AND ADONIS 
 
  
  But now I lived, and life was death’s annoy; 
  But now I died, and death was lively joy.   




‘To kiss and be kissed’ is, according to Robert Burton, ‘a most forcible battery, as 
infectious ... as the poison of  a spider’.56 This ‘strong assault’, this ‘prologue to burning 
lust’, is powerful enough to move the soul, and, accordingly, woven into Burton’s chapter 
on ‘Love Melancholy’ is a series of  poetic accounts of  ‘they [that] kissed again and again, 
and as they joined their lips their souls also commingled’, those who claim to have 
‘transferred [their] souls to one another through [their] lips’.57 Recalling Dante’s Convivio, 
Italian writer Annibale Romei elsewhere tells his readers ‘that [through] kissing, the soule 
commeth into the lippes, from whence it flieth out, and is received’; ‘a kisse’, he considers, 
‘is rather a conjunction of  soule then body, for by means of  a kisse, a most pleasing 
passage ... the soules of  lovers remaine so bound togither by the undivided knot of  love, 
that of  two ther[e] is made one’.58 As Robert Greene has it, ‘by the breath the soule 
fleeteth, | And soule with soule in kissing meeteth’.59 With a kiss the soul melts on the 
lips; with a kiss the soul can be ‘suck[ed] forth’; with a kiss two souls can be bound 
together.60 Such ideas were articulated in Baldesar Castiglione’s vastly influential Book of  
                                                             
56 A Winter’s Tale dramatizes the dangerous potential of a (misread) kiss, which is similarly 
articulated in terms of having ‘drunk, and seen the spider’ (II.i.45).  
57 Burton, III.110-11. For a broader discussion of love melancholy and its side effects, see Lesel 
Dawson, Lovesickness and Gender in Early Modern English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
58 Annibale Romei, The Courtiers Academie, trans. John Keeper (London: by Valentine Sims, 1598), 
p. 40. 
59 Robert Greene, Philomela (London: by R. Bourne and E. Allde, 1592), sig. B4r. 
60 The notion of souls melting on lips is also seen in Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus; ‘Sweete 
Helen, make me immortall with a kisse: | Her lips suckes forth my soule, see where it flies: | 
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And all is drosse that is not Helena’ (London: by Valentine Simmes, 1604), sigs. E4v-Fr. 
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the Courtier, where he considers the dangers and virtues of  such amorous activity: 
For sin[ce] a kisse is a knitting together both of  body and soule, it is to be feared, 
least the sensuall lover will be more inclined to the part of  the bodye, then of  the 
soule. … That bonde is the openynge of  an entry to the soules, whiche drawen 
with a counting the one of  the other, power them selves by tourn, the one into the 
others bodye, and be so mingled together, that e[a]ch of  them hath two soules, 
and one alone so framed of  them both ruleth (in a maner) two bodyes. 
Wher[e]upon a kisse may be said to be rather a cooplinge together of  the soule, 
then the bodye, bicause it hath suche force in her, that it draweth her unto it, and 
(as it were) seperateth her from the bodye. For this do all chast[e] lovers covett a 
kisse, as a cooplinge of  soules together.61  
 
‘Openynge’ up an ‘entry’ into the self, the kiss, like the sexual activity of  the previous 
section, occasions a mingling, a knitting, a coupling of  those who partake: body to body, 
soul to soul. Both within and outside of  early modern poetry, therefore, we find a keen 
interest in the metaphysical potential of  the kiss. If  souls could be exchanged 
simultaneously with breath, then a kiss could bind lovers together both physically and 
spiritually; a kiss is not simply a joining of  two bodies, but is a site of  a connection, a 
mingling, a marriage of  minds.  
  Kisses are, therefore, a hyperbolic manifestation of  a familiar dynamic, where 
souls are passed to-and-fro between lover and beloved. This kind of  experience manifests 
what Selleck’s study defines as The Interpersonal Idiom, whereby the self  is figured ‘as a 
process of  interpersonal exchange’: where ‘the self  not only encounters and responds to 
the other, [but also] emerges through the conceptual framework of  the other’.62 If  ‘all 
chast[e] lovers covett a kiss, as a coopling of  soules together’, so too must they recognise 
that to exchange a kiss is, in some crucial sense, to transfer an exiled self. After all, in 
terms that are central to this chapter’s understanding of  ecstatic experience, the 
experience of  ‘lips on lips’ (Ven., 120) is a reminder of  boundaries: the kiss occurs at the 
threshold of  a precarious self. As Carla Mazzio explains, ‘skin is at once a boundary 
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between the self  and an organ of  sense perception through which the world can be let 
in’.63 The function of  the skin is to contain the subject: to keep it intact (contained, whole) 
but also the site of tact (of  touch, of  interaction): to demarcate the boundaries of  the 
subject from the world, while simultaneously providing an opportunity to share in it. It is 
this dual function that has prompted Michel Serres’ identification of  skin as ‘where the 
ego is decided’, a notion explored elsewhere by psychologist Didier Anzieu who, reading 
literally the surface of  Sigmund Freud’s body-ego, conceives of  a ‘skin ego’:  
The surface of  the body allows us to distinguish excitations of  external origins 
from those of  internal origin; just as one of  the capital functions of  the ego is to 
distinguish between what belongs to me myself  and what does not belong, 
between what comes from me and the desires, thoughts and affects of  others, 
between a physical (the world) or biological (the body) reality outside the mind; 
the ego is the projection in the psychic of  the surface of  the body, namely the skin, 
which makes up this sheet or interface.64 
 
In these models, identity is located at and across the skin’s surface. ‘It is only at the 
boundary’, as Claudia Benthien asserts, ‘that subjects can encounter each other’: identity, 
in other words, is negotiated at the body’s threshold.65 For Imogen Tyler, following Julia 
Kristeva, ‘human skin is always involved in abjection’: ‘it is the border zone upon which 
self  and not-self  is perpetually played out. It is the bodily site at which abjection occurs’.66 
The skin, therefore, is a site of  interaction, and the experience of  ‘Eros’, in Carson’s 
terms, ‘is an issue of  boundaries’: more specifically, ‘the boundary of  flesh and self  
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University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), p. 205. 
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between you and me’.67 Understanding the kiss as a site where soul and self  could be 
transacted, and informed by these discussions that assert the skin as an envelope, a border, 
a threshold of  the self, I here posit the extent to which this model can be contracted down 
to the lips. It is the lips, in this reading, ‘where the ego is decided’.  
 As a forerunner to erotic consummation, the kiss seemingly operates within the 
same dynamics as the act of  sex itself; echoing the discussions outlined in the previous 
section, souls are here understood as being fluid, sent out, and mingled. Like sex, a kiss is 
hyperbolically imagined as being a site of  both life and death: here impassioned subjects 
die in one another; here they are revived. These ideas are explored in the ‘kiss poetry’ or 
basia of  Dutch poet Johannes Secundas (first published posthumously in 1539), whose 
collection of  poems, as Pablo Maurette has argued, had profound influence on poets such 
as Christopher Marlowe, Sir Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, Ben Jonson, and 
Shakespeare.68 Influenced himself  by the amatory poetics of  Hellenistic and Greek 
writers, Secundas can be seen as ‘tak[ing] the kissing motif  to a new level by elevating it 
to the category of  a sub-genre, and “placing it at the same level of  odes, and elegies”’.69 
Here, in what Thomas Nashe refers to as the ‘booke of  the two hundred kinde of  leises’, 
providing another hint at the kiss as something that could cause harm (OED, ‘lese’, v. To 
cause loss, damage or harm), Secundas employs the common motif  of  the kiss as 
constituting a liminal space between life and death:   
To suck your trembling tongue with my plaintive lips,  
  And mix two souls in one mouth,  
  And then when our love languishes to the point of  resembling death,  
  To diffuse our bodies one into one another.70  
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One soul in two bodies; two souls in one mouth. Here, life is simultaneously sucked out 
of  and breathed into the subject, and therefore just as kisses mingle souls, life and death 
are similarly entangled. It is in these circumstances that poet William Drummond would 
come to express this chiasmus of  life and death as being intrinsic to ‘The qualitie of  a 
Kisse’ (1616), echoing the epigraph to this chapter as he vacillates between the polarities 
of  what Shakespeare’s Venus considers to be death’s ‘lively joy’: 
  The Kisse with so much Strife,  
  Which I late got (sweet Heart) 
  Was it a Singe of  Death, or was it Life? 
  Of  Life it could not bee,  
  For I by it did sigh my Soule in thee,  
  Nor was it Death, Death doth no Joy impart:  
  Thou silent stand’st, ah! What thou didst bequeath,  
  To mee a dying life was, living Death.71 
 
A kiss, exchanged in a period neurotically aware of  the cost of  contact, holds life and 
death in the balance, and brings the subject to this joyfully dangerous threshold.72  
Central to this study is this sense of  the ecstatic subject as one repeatedly drawn 
to the threshold. For the subjects of  the previous chapter, this threshold was one that 
offered a glimpse of  divine union. As we saw of  A Midsummer Night’s Dream, taking a literal 
step outside of  Athens’ walls, crossing the threshold into the forest, facilitated ecstatic 
union with the beloved. Ecstasy, very simply, is only attainable beyond the threshold: it is 
only there that we are offered a glimpse (for we know by now that ecstasy is only 
temporary) of  the union that lies beyond it. What this chapter has demonstrated thus far 
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is the extent to which this ecstatic threshold is not only spiritual or geographic, but also 
maps on to discourses of  the body, especially in moments of  amorous and erotic 
encounter. As we have seen since the first chapter, ecstasy could be an intensely double-
edged physical experience—that is, the ecstatic experience could be achieved through 
physical contact, but could also have deleterious effects on the body. Having 
demonstrated how ecstasy could be achieved through physical contact, this chapter will 
now explore how this ecstatic threshold is embodied, situated at the corporeal edges of  
the subject. Taking Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis as its central text, what follows argues 
that the kiss represents this threshold, and suggests how the poem’s obsession with 
kissing—indeed Shakespeare uses the word here more than in any other work—is 
symptomatic of  a text which locates desire at the limin, in suspended ecstasis. Observing 
how the poem, like Venus, ‘stands … in trembling ecstasy’ (Ven., 895), I attend to the 
dangerous complexities of  this liminal space where time, life, and death all hang in 
suspension. Exploring a poem where Shakespeare approaches, in Joe Moshenka’s terms, 
‘the question of  what it would mean for a human to touch a divine body in an entirely 
new way’, what follows considers how the ecstasy of  divine union could be embodied in 
the act of  a kiss.73 
 If  a kiss represents a threshold at which the bodies and souls of  lovers can come 
together, then it is towards this liminal moment that Venus aspires. For, as Castiglione had 
it, ‘all chast[e] lovers covett a kisse’, and Venus is love: ‘she’s love, she loves’ (Ven., 610). 
But this complex mythological figure embodies much more. As interpretations of  Venus 
proliferated throughout the Renaissance—indeed we have already heard about the 
goddess’ ‘sturdy fetters’ from Lucretius—the ‘queen of  love’ (251) ‘simmers with 
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alternative meanings and associations’.74 For the period inherited not one but an array 
of  Venuses from classical tradition. In Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Symposium, for 
instance, we are told that ‘Venus is two-fold’, while Cicero ‘discovered no less than four’, 
and ‘Giraldi no less than fifty’.75 Yet while in philosophical treatises we encounter Venus 
in various guises, Renaissance poets, as mythographer Julianus Aurelius Haurech notes, 
‘often fail to distinguish’ between these various Venuses, and instead ‘assume there is just 
one Venus’, a Venus that embodied a range of  associations, from Venus vulgaris (sensual 
love) to Venus mechanitis (verbal artifice) to Venus Genetrix (the mother).76 ‘And yet’, despite 
it all, Shakespeare’s Venus ‘is not loved’ (Ven., 610), and is at risk of  losing herself  in the 
excesses of  that solipsistic emotion. In Shakespeare’s narrative poem, first appearing in 
1593 as plague closed London’s theatres and turned playwrights to non-dramatic verse, 
the goddess of  love is herself  ‘love-sick’ (175): she is not desired, but is rather absorbed in 
a state of  desire. With Venus ‘unexpectedly appear[ing] as a desiring subject’, 
Shakespeare’s poem inverts both the traditional narratives that see her as the subject of  
desire, as well as the relationship between subject and divine.77 For here is a god made 
flesh—‘this love-sick queen began to sweat’ (195)—a god presented in the tactile terms 
yearned for by the subjects of  the previous chapter. While early moderns no longer 
believed in the existence or divinity of  classical deities, Venus remained ‘for many 
Renaissance readers … the allegorical figure of  elemental passion’.78 This is not a goddess 
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with whom subjects sought union, but who instead embodied the kind of  precarious 
mingling that we have thus far understood as being a fundamental part of  erotic and 
amorous experience. ‘I assure you’, asserts Plutarch, ‘Venus is the work-mistresse of  mutual 
concord, solace and benevolence between men and women, mingling and melting (as it 
were) together with the bodies their soules also, by means of  pleasure’.79  
 That kissing should be central to Shakespeare’s narrative, therefore, perhaps 
comes as no surprise, nor was it necessarily anything new. It is, after all, a kiss that causes 
the goddess to fall for Adonis in the Ovidian narrative, when her son Cupid accidentally 
wounds her with one of  his arrows as he kisses her: 
  For as the armed Cupid kist Dame Venus, unbeware 
  An arrow sticking out did raze hir brest uppon the bare. 
  The Goddesse being wounded, thrust away her sonne. The wound 
  Appeered not too be so deepe as afterward was found.80     
 
With this kiss comes accidental, and irrecoverable, damage; proximity to Cupid’s quiver 
leaves Venus trembling with desire: now ‘the beawty of  the lad | Inflaamd her’; now ‘shee 
lovd Adonis more | Than heaven’.81 Putting to one side the incestuous frame of  the 
Ovidian account—one that has been explored in detail by critics such as Philip Hardie, 
Barbara Pavlick, and Karen Newman—what the passage brings into focus is the 
dangerous potential of  desire, and the dangers of  getting too close.82 As Derrida observes 
in his examination of  touch, the tactile semantics of  sexual experience dissolve 
dissymmetric opposition between the caress and the blow, stroking and striking; the 
pleasure of  contact is not easily distinguishable from the destructive touch; akin to the 
                                                             
ed. Anna Riehl Bertolet (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 287-306 (293). 
79 Plutarch, The Morals, trans. Philemon Holland (London: by Arnold Hatfield, 1603), p. 337 
80 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Arthur Golding, X.606-9. 
81 Ibid., 610-5. 
82 For a detailed consideration of this moment, see esp. Philip Hardie, Ovid’s Poetics of Illusion, pp. 
187-8; Barbara Pavlick, The Image of the Poet in Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2009), p. 97; Karen Newman, ‘Myrra’s Revenge: Ovid and Shakespeare’s 




orgasmic ‘kind of  blow’ that Democritus articulated in the previous section, ‘a caress may 
be a blow and vice versa’.83 This tension between intense sexual passion and threat of  
physical harm is present from the outset of  Shakespeare’s poem, and throughout his 
characterization of  Venus. Indeed, when Venus first addresses Adonis, it is with a 
threateningly impassioned offer: ‘I’ll smother thee with kisses’ (Ven., 18). As Moshenska 
observes in Feeling Pleasures, ‘the verb that Shakespeare’s Venus associates with her 
kissing—“smother”—captures the force of  her feeling while also suggesting … a real 
physical threat’.84 Offering to ‘smother [Adonis] with kisses’, Venus balances violence and 
passion and thus brings the more sinister implications of  ‘d[ying] upon a kiss’ (Oth., 
V.ii.358) into the realm of  possibility. As we shall see, this is a character who, recalling 
Narcissus who ‘died to kiss his shadow’ (162) and who herself  ‘murder[s]’ Adonis’ words 
‘with a kiss’ (54), is well aware of  this deadly potential. In Venus and Adonis, kisses are 
imbued with violent energy from the outset.  
 That kisses should operate as both deathly threats and amorous offers should by 
now seem a familiar trope, for, as we have seen, notions of  the kiss as a liminal space 
between life and death were well established in poetry of  the period. But what 
Shakespeare offers is a text that seeks to situate itself  within that liminal space. As the 
poet ‘dispenses with the usual introductory niceties of  mythological literature and throws 
us right into the action in media res’, the text carves out an interim, bracketed by the 
action of  the hunt, that Venus will try to prolong for as long as possible.85 ‘Trembling in 
her passion’ (Ven., 27), Venus’ offer reveals her key motivations: to hold Adonis, and to 
hold on to him for as long as possible in order to postpone his departure.86 Accordingly, 
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she offers him ‘fresh variety’: 
  Ten kisses short as one, one as long as twenty. 
  A summer’s day will seem an hour but short, 
  Being wasted in such time-beguiling sport.  
                             (21-4) 
 
Offering kisses ‘long’ and ‘short’, biting kisses that turn lips simultaneously ‘red’ and ‘pale’ 
(20), kisses that gain ‘intr’est’ (209) and multiply, kisses as ‘debts[s]’ that can ‘double’ (521) 
and, pushing the ‘limit[s]’ (235) of  kiss-poetry, kisses that ‘stray lower’ (234), Venus makes 
good on her promise of  ‘fresh variety’. As she kisses Adonis all over—‘his brow, his cheek, 
his chin’—singular kisses are transformed into one that knows no end: ‘and where she 
ends she doth anew begin’ (59-60). For Venus, ‘ten kisses’ can merge into ‘one’, one into 
twenty: ‘quickly told and quickly gone’ (520). Like Serres’ Hegelian conception of  non-
linear time, a kiss ‘is not set, although it can become one, it goes in bursts’.87 A kiss, she 
tells Adonis, is able to stretch time, can propel its participants into a new temporal horizon 
where ‘hours are long, though seeming short’ (842). This ‘time-beguiling sport’ is 
therefore not simply an erotic pass-time, but a suspension of  time altogether; kissing will 
suspend time, and together in this locus amoenus they can enjoy the interim. As Antony has 
it elsewhere, entreating Cleopatra that they ‘not confound the time’ but rather make good 
use of  it: ‘for the love of  Love and her soft hours … There’s not a minute of  our lives 
should stretch | Without some pleasure now’ (Ant., I.i.45-8). For what a kiss offers, and 
what the first section of  this chapter understood sex to deny, is infinite elongation: a 
moment that can be extended for as long as the subject desires; a temporal protraction 
without climax that leaves the subject wanting more rather than wishing that they had 
never had it at all. While the moment of  sexual climax is, as it is in ‘Sonnet 129’, ‘despisèd 
straight’, a kiss offers a period of  sustained (and sustainable) ‘bliss’ that leaves the subject 
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wanting more, ‘mad in pursuit’, trembling in a ‘time-beguiling’ ecstasy that can last for 
as long as lips are met. ‘Th’expense of  spirit’ is not ‘wasted in such … sport’: ‘long may 
they kiss each other…’ (Ven., 505).  
 Thus Venus drives towards that moment of  amorous interaction; ‘trembling in 
her passion’, she operates at high speed. Like ‘an empty eagle’ she is ‘sharp but fast’ (55), 
‘duck[ing] quickly in’ (86) and seeking immediate reciprocal response from her beloved, 
eagerly waiting with ‘lips … ready’ for ‘lips on lips’ as ‘eyes in eyes’ (89; 120): ‘give me 
one kiss’, she begs, ‘I’ll give it thee again’ (209). But by comparison, Adonis—repeatedly 
described and describing himself  as ‘unripe’, ‘unfinished’ (128; 415), and therefore before 
his time—is characterized in contrast to Venus not in terms of  quick movement, but 
rather in those of  stillness: ‘lazy sprite … liveless picture … stone … idol, image dull and 
dead … statue’ (211-3). Thus Venus finds Adonis unwilling to match her pace—‘make 
use of  time’, she urges, ‘let not advantage slip’ (129)—but to no avail. For the more Venus 
craves interaction, the more Adonis seeks isolation; ‘let go, and let me go’, he entreats, ‘I 
pray you hence, and leave me here alone’ (379; 382). ‘I know not love, nor will I know it’, 
he announces, for having ‘heard it is a life in death’, Adonis is not willing to take that risk, 
‘unless it be a boar’ (409; 413; 410). Repulsed by her compulsiveness, Adonis remains 
closed off, ‘unyielding’, refusing to ‘ope the gate’ to Venus’ ‘seige’, ‘for where a heart is 
hard’ her advances ‘make no batt’ry’ (423-6). This ‘flint-hearted boy’ (95), she complains, 
will not yield even ‘one sweet kiss’ (84) to she who so desperately craves it: ‘’tis but a kiss 
I beg, why art thou coy?’ (96). As Venus laments in Samuel Holland’s masque of  the 
lovers: ‘When, when O when shall Venus find, | The flinty-soul’d Adonis kind [?]’.88  
 In Adonis, then, we are presented with the opposite of  Burton’s amorous subjects 
who ‘sometimes … lie open and are most tractable and coming, apt, yielding, and willing 
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to embrace’.89 In the previous chapter, Donne made clear the necessity of  ‘a good, 
tractable, and ductile disposition’ for those who wish to experience the ecstasy of  union 
with the divine.90 But face to face with the ‘queen of  love’ (251), Adonis has no such 
desire; if  Venus suffers from ‘intractable passion’, as Catherine Belsey has it, her passion 
is intensified by Adonis’ intractability.91 While we have heard elsewhere of  the divine 
capacity to make ‘the flintyest heart contrite and humble’, Venus seemingly has no such 
power:92  
  Art thou obdurate, flinty, hard as steel? 
   Nay, more than flint, for stone at rain relenteth; 
   Art thou a woman’s son, and canst not feel 
   What ’tis to love, how want of  love tormenteth?  
                                                                                         (199-202) 
 
Priding herself  as having been able to ‘oversway’ the ‘strong-tempered steel’ of  the 
‘direful god of  war’ (109-10; 98), Venus is unable to bend Adonis to her will: ‘he turns his 
lips another way’ (90); ‘he will not in her arms be bound’ (226); ‘from thence he struggles 
to be gone’ (228). ‘Hard as steel’, Adonis is not of  a ductile disposition, is not the 
attentively ‘tender boy’ (32) she would have him be and so, unlike the subject who will 
willingly make themselves tractable to the divine or beloved, cannot be the enjoyer ‘of  
such tendernesses, of  such Extasies of  … Love’.93 He is, in this, the antithesis of  an 
ecstatic subject, refusing to send himself  out because to ‘grow unto himself  was his desire’ 
(1180). In contrast to the ‘queen of  love’ (251)—so ecstatically tractable that she imagines 
simply the sight of  Adonis’ ‘outward parts’ could ‘move | Each part in [her] that were 
but sensible’ (435-6)—Adonis is characterized as being so ‘flint-hearted’, so ‘obdurate, 
flinty, [and] hard as steel’, that Venus has reason to fear that if  Adonis can steal her heart, 
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he just might be able to ‘steel’ it too: 
  ‘Give me my hand’, saith he. ‘Why dost thou feel it?’ 
  ‘Give me my heart’, saith she, ‘and thou shalt have it. 
  O give it me, lest thy hard heart do steel it, 
  And being steeled, soft sighs can never grave it. 
   Then love’s deep groans I never shall regard, 
   Because Adonis’ heart hath made mine hard’.  
                            (373-8) 
 
Craving his kiss, denied the ‘little death’ she desires, Venus takes alternative action; unable 
to persuade Adonis to meet ‘lips on lips’, the goddess instead tricks him into this mouth-
to-mouth contract. Falling into a swoon—an embodied ecstasy that the next chapter 
demonstrates as finding its crescendo in Othello’s trance—Venus forces the narrative to 
a standstill, interrupting Adonis’ speech not by ‘stop[ping] his lips’ (46), but by effectively 
forcing him to start using them. While Venus earlier ‘murders with a kiss’ (54), their 
second kiss will bring Venus back to life: ‘The silly boy, believing she is dead, | Claps her 
cheek, till clapping make it red … For on the grass she lies as she were slain, | Till his 
breath breatheth life in her again’ (467-8; 473-4). Seeking to rouse her from this death-
like swoon, Adonis ‘wrings’, ‘strikes’, ‘bends’ and ‘chafes’ Venus’ face and body, 
exhausting all options before, eventually, ‘he kisses her’ (475-9). We hear elsewhere of  
kisses that bring subjects back from this deathly threshold, as Venus will later assert her 
swoon to have been. In other epyllia texts such as Hero and Leander, for instance, Hero, 
‘viewing Leanders face, fell downe and fainted. | He kist her, and breath’d life into her 
lips’.94 Shakespeare’s Romeo, too, will dream of  such revival: 
  I dreamt my lady came and found me dead— 
  Strange dream, that gives a dead man leave to think!— 
  And breathed such life with kisses in my lips, 
  That I revived, and was an emperor.  
             (Rom., V.i.6-9) 
 
Things are, however, not so straightforward for Adonis, whose kiss is met with Venus’ 
                                                             




attempt to prolong her swoon, and so the kiss, for as long as possible: ‘He kisses her, and 
she by her good will | Will never rise, so he will kiss her still’ (Ven., 479-80). Once again, 
Venus betrays her desire to extend time, to reside at the threshold, and demonstrates the 
kiss as being the perfect way of  achieving that extension; the longer she can hold on to 
this kiss, the longer she can keep the action of  the narrative in pause, the longer she can 
keep Adonis safe in this interim. ‘Fall[ing] flatly down’ (463), Venus thus attempts to 
situate herself, and her body, at this threshold.95 As she comes to herself, Venus tries to 
hold on to this interim-state; ‘O where am I?’, she asks, ‘in earth or heaven?’: 
  Or in the ocean drenches, or in the fire? 
  What hour is this? Or morn, or weary eve? 
  Do I delight to die, or life desire? 
   But now I lived, and life was death’s annoy; 
   But now I died, and death was lively joy.  
                    (493-8) 
 
‘But now I lived … But now I died’: discovering ‘lively joy’ in ‘death’, Venus trembles at 
the edge of  these extremes. Having performed this little death, and having tricked Adonis 
into a temporary exchange of  breath, Venus finds herself  tantalisingly close to achieving 
what the narratives of  kissing and sexual union repeatedly promised: the ‘happy death’ 
of  dying in, and being revived by, the beloved. Adonis has at once ‘murd’red [Venus’] 
poor heart’ (502), and, with a kiss, brought her back from the brink, and now she seeks a 
repeat performance: ‘Thou didst kill me, kill me once again!’ (499). Able to both give life 
and take it away, kisses have maintained their dangerous potential.   
 Yet while Venus hopes for a kiss that will mingle their souls together, the ‘flint-
hearted’ Adonis considers a kiss as offering quite the opposite; where Venus asks for ‘ten 
thousand kisses’—‘is twenty thousand kisses such a trouble?’—Adonis reluctantly offers 
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to yield one: ‘Now let me say good night, and … if  you will say so, you shall have a kiss’ 
(517; 522; 535-6, emphasis added). For Adonis, a kiss is not a catalyst for inter-animation, 
but is rather an opportunity for disentanglement. In this, the poem finally moves towards 
the union that Venus has been driving towards but, as ever, this ecstasy cannot last. What 
was, in the previous chapter, a moment of  divine inspiration, is here embodied in the act 
of  a kiss, as the poem’s midway point gives way to a moment of  ecstatic union: 
‘incorporate they seem, face grows to face’ (540). ‘And now came I to have a sight of  those 
invisible things … But I was not able to fixe mine eye long upon them’: just as Augustine 
was anguished by his fleeting vision, just as St. Paul ‘did lose that sight again’, Venus 
begins to feel the agony of  ecstasy as the ‘breathless’ Adonis ‘disjoin[s]’ and draws 
backwards (541).96 Determined not to ‘lose that sight again’, Venus seeks to extend this 
moment with another kiss: 
 He with her plenty pressed, she faint with dearth,  
 Their lips together glued, fall to the earth.  
 
 Now quick desire hath caught the yielding prey,  
 And glutton-like she feeds, yet never filleth;  
 Her lips are conquerers, his lips obey, 
 Paying what ransom the insulter willeth,  
  Who vulture thought doth pitch the price so high 
  That she will draw his lips’ rich treasure dry.    
                      (545-52) 
 
But as we have seen time and again, total union is not available; ecstasy is only ever a 
promissory note that leaves the subject wanting more: ‘she feeds, yet never filleth’ and so 
‘begins to forage’ in ‘blindfold fury’ (553). ‘Mad in pursuit and in possession so, | Had, 
having, and in quest to have, extreme’: as the speaker of  ‘Sonnet 129’ had it, this is ‘lust 
in action’, and Venus loses herself  in that experience. But so too does Adonis. ‘Hot’ from 
Venus’ ‘hard embracing’ (339), Adonis is, for a moment, pliable to the goddess’s will, is 
of  a ductile disposition, as the ‘wax so frozen … dissolves with temp’ring, | And yields at 
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161 
last to every light impression’ (565-6). ‘At last’ this impressionable youth is impressed by 
Venus, and vice versa; with the goddess having expressed her willingness for Adonis to 
impress her—‘sweat seals in my soft lips imprinted’; ‘set thy seal manual on my wax-red 
lips’ (511; 516)—impassioned experience now brings about mutual impression, and the 
couple simultaneously figure as both wax and metal under the impress of  one another’s 
lips. With ‘their lips together glued’, we here glimpse a melding of  identities, ‘a bliss in 
proof  …’. 
 ‘… And proved, a very woe’ (‘Sonnet 129’, 11). Like the kiss that made it possible, 
this ecstatic interval cannot last. While the first half  of  the poem saw Venus race towards 
the moment of  union—with ‘quick desire’ not satisfied until it ‘hath caught the yielding 
prey’—Venus makes one final attempt to prolong it; her ‘yoking arms’ (Ven., 592) cause 
the pair to tumble together—‘he on her belly, she on her back’ (594)—but the moment is 
an empty climax, lacking sexual union: 
  Now is she in the very lists of  love,  
  Her champion mounted for the hot encounter. 
  All is imaginary she doth prove; 
  He will not manage her, although he mounted her: 
   That worse than Tantalus’ is her annoy, 
   To clip Elizium and to lack her joy.       
            (595-600) 
 
She has ‘clip[ped] Elizium’, embraced paradise; heaven is at once both tantalisingly close 
and kept at an agonising distance. Attempts to distract Adonis ‘with continual kissing’ are 
‘all in vain’ (606; 607), and Venus is no longer able to suspend the narrative by 
‘withhold[ing]’ (612) Adonis from the hunt. Within a few stanzas, Venus’ hopes of  ‘little 
death’ are quickly translated into fears of  her beloved’s demise; demands for Adonis to 
‘kill me once again’ now become pleas for him to ‘come not within … danger’ of  the boar 
‘bent to kill’ (639; 618). With this shift, the experience of  ecstasy is similarly translated; 
‘trembling ecstasy’ no longer signals Venus in a state of  passion, but rather paralysed with 
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fear: ‘when thou didst name the boar, not to dissemble, | I feared thy fortune and all my 
joints did tremble’ (641-2). ‘What is it makes you tremble?’: while the poem offers no 
single answer to Derrida’s question, it demonstrates trembling as the effect of  ecstatic 
extremis (ex-trem-is) on the body.97 As we have seen, for Venus, ecstasy is an intensely 
physical experience, one that can be achieved through physical actions such as kissing, 
and one that also manifests itself  physically; ‘ecstasy’, notes Serres, ‘builds up in the dark 
core of  the lower muscles, quivering and trembling before bursting forth’.98 Ecstasy, in its 
myriad forms, so often leaves its subjects trembling—and elsewhere Shakespeare 
encourages us to ‘mark how [Antipholus] trembles in his ecstasy’ (Err., IV.iv.53), how 
Othello ‘trembles’ before his trance (Oth., IV.i.37)—as the body, like the soul that has 
escaped it, is caught in a state of  radical suspension. Thus the ecstatic experience leaves 
Venus trembling—she ‘trembles at his tale’; ‘trembles at th’ imagination’; ‘quak[es]’, 
‘shake[s] and ‘shudder[s]’—and makes itself  visible through a series of  other physical 
markers: 
  Didst thou not mark my face? Was it not white? 
  Saw’st thou not signs of  fear lurk in mine eye?   
  Grew I not faint, and fell I not down right? 
  Within my bosom whereon thou dost lie 
   My boding heart pants, beats, and takes no rest,  
   But like an earthquake shakes thee on my breast.  
           (643-8, emphasis added) 
 
Venus has taken Adonis’ words to heart, and her body responds accordingly. Just as 
Shakespeare elsewhere associates ecstasy with pulse, Venus’ pulse is disordered by the 
experience of  being thrown beside herself. Like Leontes who suffers a tremor cordis (a 
trembling of  the heart) in The Winter’s Tale, Venus’ ‘heart dances, but not for joy, not joy’ 
(WT, I.ii.109-10). This ‘panting and trembling of  the heart’, notes physician Philip 
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Barrough, ‘is a corrupt motion of  the heart, or a stretching of  it against nature’.99 The 
heart that ‘pants, beats, and takes no rest’ is one that has stretched too far; willing to 
extend and send out her soul, Venus’ heart has followed suit. For the heart and the soul 
could be understood to expand and contract simultaneously; as some physicians believed, 
‘the shaking pulse’ was a result of  the soul causing the heart to ‘dilat[e]’ (or ‘stretch’ as 
we heard above) and contract as ‘the sides of  the heart fall … down under their owne 
waight’.100 The tremulous pulse is a result of  this movement, this stretching out and 
contracting back, this ebb and flow; as Adonis’ ‘uncouple[s]’ (674) from Venus, she 
experiences this painful contraction ‘as the snail, whose tender horns being hit, shrinks 
back in his shelly cave with pain’ (1033-4). ‘Before, a joy proposed; behind, a dream’ 
(‘Sonnet 129’, 12): ecstasy cannot last.  
 ‘In ecstasy I would dissolving lie’: like those subjects who ‘dissolve in to ecstasy’, 
Venus trembles towards the edge of  ‘dissol[ution]’, willing to ‘melt’ (114). For just as she 
repeatedly sought to dilate and extend her time with Adonis, so too had she prepared for 
the dilatation of  soul and self  that the poetry of  what Barbara Everett has described as 
the ‘“ecstasy” tradition’ repeatedly promises; as it is in Lord Herbert’s ‘Ode upon a 
Question Moved’, ‘two joined can themselves dilate’.101 The ecstatic subject willingly 
dilates and extends itself  in hope of  losing itself  in the beloved: 
  So can two persons propagate,   
  When singly either would decay.   
   
  So when from hence we shall be gone, 
    And be no more, nor you, nor I,   
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    As one anothers mystery,   
  Each shall be both, yet both but one.102  
 
This is the kind of  proximity and transcending of  boundaries yearned for by Venus; open 
throughout the poem to the kind of  exposure that ecstasy demands, we here find Venus 
‘trembling on the edge of  being’, to borrow Jean-Luc Nancy’s phrase. As Christopher 
Fynsk writes, echoing Nancy:  
The subject in love is a subject exposed—exposed (affected) by the other and 
opening to the other: opening further to its exposure, opening to further exposure. 
What it knows of  love is this exposure … [it is] always a singular self  coming to 
itself  in the presence of  the other, enjoying ‘itself ’ only as the exposure to an 
alterity and the transport of  this exposure.103  
 
Unlike Troilus in the previous section of  this chapter, Venus is willing to lose distinction 
in these joys. ‘We’ll speak our thoughts in kisses | In which wee’le melt our soules, and 
mixe them so, | that what is thine or mine, there’s none shall know’: this is the kind of  
‘lend and borrow’ (Ven., 961) of  identity that Venus longs for, her soul waiting at her lips 
to be released in a ‘kiss [that] shall be thine own as well as mine’ (117).104 But that this 
ecstatic mingling can only be realised by the proximity that kisses demand ultimately 
proves fatal in Adonis’ hunt and, in the poem’s final stages, metaphors of  the kiss as 
enacting a ‘little death’ are literalized as Venus imagines Adonis’ final moments: ‘If  [the 
boar] did see [Adonis’] face, why then I know | He thought to kiss him, and hath killed 
him so’ (1109-10). Adonis dies upon a kiss. This is the closest the poem gets to the kind 
of  sexualised union towards which so much of  its action drives. Describing the boar’s 
‘frothy mouth bepainted’ with ‘milk and blood … mingled together’ (901-2), Shakespeare 
casts this encounter between Adonis and the boar against the backdrop of  the discourses 
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explored in the previous section of  this chapter which understood male seed as ‘a 
permixtion of  the blood and spirits’.105 This ‘expense of  spirit’ has, as Donne warned, 
come at a deathly cost. This was not the consummation devoutly wished for, and Venus’ 
‘heavy anthem … concludes in woe’ (839).   
 Kisses proliferate throughout Shakespeare’s poem, from those that are kind to 
those that can kill, to those that can be extended and contracted and alter a subject’s 
perception of  time accordingly. As both a site of  physical incorporation and metaphysical 
interaction—drawing together bodies and souls alike—the kiss has the potential to enact 
ecstatic fulfilment. What Venus’ kisses reveal throughout the poem is the desire for an 
alternative temporality, one that can liberate these subjects from the restraints of  linear 
time; like the discussions of  pulse that opened this chapter, the kiss facilitates a state of  
distempering extremis, capable of  propelling subjects out-of-body and throwing them out 
of  time. But, as we have seen, hopes of  ecstatic petite mort are always tinged with the threat 
of  death; just as kisses offer a foretaste of  pleasures to come, ecstasy can only offer a 
glimpse at a moment of  union that, for now, cannot be sustained. And yet as Adonis 
‘melts’ (1164) into ‘the field’s chief  flower’ (1168), Venus makes one final attempt to keep 
him close: 
  Lo, in this hollow cradle take thy rest,  
  My throbbing heart shall rock thee day and night; 
   There shall not be one minute in an hour 
   Wherein I will not kiss my sweet love’s flower.   
           (1185-8) 
 
‘There shall not be one minute in an hour’ without a hopeful kiss. But as she takes up the 
‘crop[ped]’ (1175) flower ‘to wither in [her] breast’ (1182) in the poem’s climax, we are 
presented with a state of  ecstasy that even Venus must acknowledge cannot last, for death 
hovers in the margins. Like kisses, ecstasy occupies a liminal space, an in-between, a 
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threshold between life and death, a temporary, suspended state that, for Venus, is worth 
holding on to.   
 
167 
III.  ‘A THING LIKE DEATH’: SYNCOPATED STATES IN ROMEO AND JULIET 
 
  
 Sincopation is when the striking of  Time fals to be in the midst of  a Semibrief or Minum, 
 or as they are termed, Notes driven till the time falls even again.106 
 
Physical time never stops. That may be, but syncope seems to accomplish a 
miraculous suspension.107 
 
Let us return for a moment to Venus’ swoon. ‘Believing she is dead’, Adonis tries to revive 
the goddess, taking her wrist in his hand and ‘hold[ing] her pulse hard’.108 As Adonis 
continues his attempts to rouse Venus—though to kiss her, as we have seen, will be only 
his last resort—we are momentarily invited to question whether or not Adonis feels a 
pulse beneath his fingers. As he turns to the body with urgency, variously touching her 
cheeks, nose, wrist, and lips, Adonis looks for outward, corporeal signs of  Venus’ internal 
state. In this, Adonis shares the preoccupation of  the early modern physician who sought 
to understand the complexities of  the heart and pulse: how it worked; how it could be 
measured; how it could alter and be altered. As Crooke asserts, considering ‘the motions 
of  the Heart and the Arteries or Pulse’: ‘by what engines and pullies, what poyses and 
counter-poyses, what affluencies and refluencies this perpetuity [of  the heart beating 
continually] be accomplished, we imagine will neither be unprofitable nor unpleasant to 
understand’.109 Before William Harvey brought to light the workings of  the body’s 
circulatory system, Galen already had his finger on the pulse, and those informed by his 
work identified clear relationships between pulse and emotion.110 In this sense, what 
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Adonis feels beneath his fingers could tell him more than whether or not Venus is alive. 
But this all depends, of  course, on Adonis knowing what exactly he should be feeling for: 
the body’s internal rhythms could reveal a great deal, but measuring and interpreting 
them with accuracy was no straightforward endeavour. As Moshenska notes in his study 
of  touch, ‘Galen claimed that feeling the pulse involved not simply counting beats: his 
method was emphatically qualitative rather than quantitative, and, he explained, 
physicians would have to arduously and incrementally hone their ability to feel’.111 My 
intention here is not to read Adonis as a physician, but rather to highlight another 
moment where Shakespeare draws attention to the pulse of  the subject in the throes of  
extreme emotion, where attention to the pulse has the potential to reveal something about 
the internal states of  these characters. From Hamlet, to Antipholus, to Venus, this chapter 
has observed ecstasy as an experience that registers itself  on the body. More specifically, 
it has begun to unpack Shakespeare’s association between ecstasy and pulse rate. 
Continuing its exploration of  ecstasy as an experience that, as Hamlet had it, does not 
‘temperately keep time’, the remainder of  this chapter pays attention to these internal 
rhythms, be they regular or disrupted.  
 
i) MEASURING THE OFF-BEAT: DESIRE’S DISSONANT PULSE 
 
‘By the pulse it is possible to know a passionate lover’, observes Jacques Ferrand in his 
1623 treatise on love sickness, Erotomania: ‘if  you aske those that are in love, what part 
they are most affected in, they will all answer uno ore, their heart … the Heart is the true 
seat of  Passionate love’.112 It follows, Ferrand observes, that when we experience different 
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emotions, our heart responds accordingly; ‘during the time of  Feare, and Sadnesse’, he 
notes, ‘the Heart as it were contracts it selfe’, whereas ‘in Joy, & Hope, it seems to dilate 
and enlarge itself ’.113 As emotion causes the heart to contract and dilate, the pulse 
quickens and slows, races and relaxes: motion and emotion are in this sense inextricably 
linked. One way to observe these varying pulses and to diagnose a patient, Galen tells his 
readers in his Pulse for Beginners, is to measure the ‘intervals and impact’, for ‘it is in respect 
of  this interval that a pulse may be “frequent”, “sparse”, or “medium”—which is the 
normal state for a pulse’.114 Put simply, the ‘normal state’ of  the pulse accords to a 
‘normal state’ of  mind and health: a pulse that ‘temperately keep[s] time’ indicates a 
body that is well tempered, balanced, and regular. Citing Galen throughout, Ferrand 
refers his reader to the works of  highly influential Persian physician Avicen (or Avicenna, 
c. 980-1037 AD), who writes of  a ‘Passionate lover’ who, upon merely hearing the name 
of  his beloved, would suffer ‘a strange alteration in the Motion of  the Pulse’ which ‘will 
be very unequall, and often interrupted’.115 Observing for himself  ‘the foolish dotings of  
a young scholar in the City, who was desperately gone in Love’, Ferrand finds that this 
holds true: ‘For she coming in at the instant as I was feeling his pulse, I perceived it 
suddenly vary in motion, and beat very unequally; he presently grew pale, and Blushed 
againe in a moment, and could hardly speak’.116 The lover’s pulse is characterized by its 
irregularity, for ‘Love’, as Ferrand will later conclude, echoing Shakespeare’s Rosalind, ‘is 
little better then mere Madnesse’.117  
  On this matter Coeffeteau might agree, noting in his Table of  Humane Passions 
(1621) how the lover who ‘suffereth himselfe to bee so transported’ may well be subject 
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to ‘these extasies and ravishments’: 
For that his soule that loves intirely, is perpetually imployed in the contemplation 
of  the party beloved, and hath no other thoughts but of  his merit, the heate 
abandoning the parts, and retiring into the braine, leaves the whole body in great 
distemperature, which corrupting and consuming the whole bloud, makes the 
face grow pale & wanne, causeth the trembling of  the heart, breeds strange 
convulsions, and retires the spirits in such sort, as he seemes rather an image of  
death, then a living creature.118  
 
Observing how the heart trembles, how the face grows pale, how the body convulses, 
Coeffeteau’s observations again demonstrate how ‘extasies’ could have profound physical 
consequences. Spending too much time contemplating the beloved—loving ‘not too 
wisely but too well’ as Othello would have it (Oth., V.ii.342)—the subject is thrown into 
‘great distemperature’ as heat, like the soul in ecstatic rapture, ‘abandon[s]’ the body: 
lover pines after beloved, and the body suffers the consequences. As Galen tells us, in 
‘phrentis’—a state frequently conflated with the experience of  the lover as we have 
heard—‘the pulse … has a certain wavelike quality … and will sometimes manifest the 
slightest tremor, at other times [it] appear[s] to be cut short as in convulsion’.119 ‘Cut 
short’ in this way, the heart’s rhythm becomes syncopated (late Latin sunkopē—sún (with, 
together); kóptō (to strike, beat, cut off)—from the Greek συγκοπή), and with this sudden, 
temporary alteration, the subject is thrown into an uncertain period of  dissonance. 
‘Indeed’, Galen concludes, ‘the whole artery frequently appears to leace its proper place 
and move upward’.120 Just as the early modern physician understood the tremulous heart 
as being caused by the action of  stretching out and contracting back, Galen uses these 
terms to articulate the pulse’s tremor: ‘the motion is uneven, as the artery is moved up 
and down like a string … the artery appears to leap outwards then again to contract 
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inside’.121 If  ‘love is little better than mere Madnesse’, as Ferrand observed, it is the pulse 
that helps verify that likeness. In ‘these extasies and ravishments’, the subject’s body 
attempts to abandon, ‘retire’, or ‘lease’ itself, and those that ‘suffereth [them]selves to bee 
so transported’ experience ‘a thing like death’ (Rom., IV.i.74). What these considerations 
of  the pulse demonstrate is that the lover occupies a different time scheme, one that 
medical thinkers sought to regulate, and bring back to a healthy cadence. And yet, as we 
shall see, for Romeo and Juliet, there is value to be located in the off-beat. 
  As the speaker of  ‘Sonnet 147’ has it, ‘desire is death’: desire is deathly and death 
is something to be desired.122 That which Venus and poets such as William Drummond 
earlier described as the ‘lively joy’ of  ‘living death’ is, in these circumstances, dangerously 
literalized: desire leaves the subject seeming, in Coeffeteau’s terms, ‘rather an image of  
death, then a living creature’. ‘Desire is death’: once again death hovers in the margins 
of  loving and sexual experience. More than any of  his characters, it is of  course 
Shakespeare’s ‘death-marke’d love[rs]’ (Rom., 1.0.9) who feel this most keenly: ‘A pair of  
star-cross’d lovers [who] take their life … [and] with their death bury their parent’s strife’ 
(6; 8). Their ‘end’ (11) pronounced before the play has properly begun, Romeo and Juliet 
in some crucial sense embody this ‘living death’. As Jonathan Dollimore notes, ‘that 
[Romeo and Juliet] is a play about the paradoxical binding together of  desire and death is 
clear enough’, and we find throughout the text just how proximate those experiences can 
be; this is a play where lovers too often seem ‘rather an image of  death, then a living 
creature’.123 Besotted with Rosaline, for instance, Romeo laments that ‘she hath forsworn 
to love’, a vow that drives him to despair—‘do I live dead that live to tell it now’—and 
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throws him beside himself: ‘Tut, I have lost myself; I am not here; | This is not Romeo, 
he’s some other where’ (I.i.223-4; 197-8). ‘I live dead’: life without Rosaline is, for Romeo, 
a ‘living death’, and it is between those paradoxical extremes that Romeo has ‘lost 
[him]self ’. In a play that repeatedly situates its characters at these extremes, it follows that 
they announce themselves as being ‘born to die’, and find that ‘life, living, all is Death’s’ 
(III.iv.4; IV.iv.66). Furthermore, that the play understands desire as an experience that 
trembles between life and death is signalled by the tragedy’s leitmotiv of  death as Juliet’s 
bridegroom; ‘my grave is like to be my wedding bed’, announces Juliet after meeting 
Romeo for the first time, a mingling of  sex and death that she will later be driven to 
crave—‘Death, not Romeo, take my maidenhead’—and demand: ‘make the bridal bed 
| In that dim monument where Tybalt lies’ (I.iv.248; III.ii137; III.v.200-1). To revise 
slightly the claim of  ‘Sonnet 147’, then, ‘desire is [a living] death’ and, like the kisses in 
the previous section, the play brings its lovers to this dangerous threshold. 
 
ii) KEEPING TIME: VERONA’S ESTABLISHED RHTYHMS 
 
Enter Juliet, somewhat fast, and embraceth Romeo (II.vi.15 s.d.): this stage direction from Q1 is 
in many ways symptomatic of  the lovers’ tempo as they repeatedly rush towards the 
moment of  embrace.124 Meeting for the first time, the pair are quickly drawn into 
proximity as the lines of  their shared sonnet thread them closer and closer together like 
the twisting eye-beams of  Donne’s lovers. Coming together in a ‘tender kiss’ (I.iv.209) and 
drawn apart by the Nurse’s interruption (223), Romeo and Juliet are repeatedly driven to 
collapse the distance between them that society demands be maintained. For ‘fair Verona, 
where we lay our scene’ (I.0.2) is, after all, a single state divided by an ‘ancient grudge’ 
                                                             




(3), and the force dynamics that the lovers feel in these moments are at the heart of  the 
play’s central tension that sees the ‘rebellious subjects’ (I.i.77) of  the two houses repeatedly 
drawn into dangerous proximity: ‘three civil brawls … have thrice disturbed the quiet of  
[Verona’s] streets’ (85; 87), laments the Prince as he steps in to end the fight that erupts 
between Montagues and Capulets in the play’s opening scene. These tensions can be felt 
in the text from the outset, as the play’s poetic structure moves characters together and 
apart: 
 
Draw thy tool, here comes the house of  Montagues.  
… 
Draw if  you be men. … remember thy washing blow. 
 They fight. 
Part fools, put up your swords. 
              (I.i.30; 58; 60, emphasis added, speakers omitted) 
 
 
The swordplay in these moments establishes the force dynamics of  Romeo and Juliet, as 
characters are repeatedly drawn together—‘Draw … Draw’—and come to ‘blow[s]’, 
before ultimately being ‘part[ed]’. Indeed, this pattern is repeated moments later: 
Put up thy sword 
    … 
         Have at thee, coward. 
            They fight.  
           (64; 68, speakers omitted) 
 
  
There is, I am suggesting, a kind of  music to these carefully orchestrated encounters, a 
‘music in the blades’ to borrow J. Allen Suddeth’s assertion of  ‘the rhythmic patterns’ of  
fight sequences in Fight Directing for the Theatre. ‘Draw … Draw … fight … Part’: the play 
emphasises the strong beats; it accentuates these rhythms.125  
     And so where Juliet is drawn towards Romeo, her cousin, ‘the fiery Tybalt’ (105), 
feels the negative counter-force just as strongly; if  not already on stage with ‘his sword 
                                                             




prepared’ (105), the mere sound of  an enemy voice is enough to set his fingers twitching: 
‘This, by his voice, should be a Montague. | Fetch me my rapier, boy’ (I.iv.167-8). With 
Romeo and Juliet coming together as Tybalt is simultaneously driven away by Capulet—
‘go to! … Go to! … Go to, go to … you are a pincox, go’ (190; 191; 195; 199)—the play 
keeps the space between Montague and Capulet heavily charged, repeatedly bringing the 
two into close proximity only to rend them apart. It is in that interim that passion and 
violence are suspended and intensified, for, as the Friar famously warns, ‘these violent 
delights have violent ends, | And in their triumph die like fire and powder, | Which as 
the kiss consume’ (II.v.9-11). Like ‘gun-powder [or ‘touch powder’] which is presently set 
on fire by the lest touch of  a sparke that is put unto it’, we see how ‘a fire sparkling in 
lovers’ eyes’ (I.i.191) can prove just as dangerous as coming into contact with the ‘fiery 
Tybalt’: safe distance ought to be kept from both.126 From the ‘fire of  [the two houses’] 
pernicious rage’ (I.i.82) to Romeo’s ‘fire-eyed fury’ (III.i.125) that will bring about Tybalt’s 
demise—an encounter which the Friar will later similarly describe as being ‘like powder 
in a skitless soldier’s flask’ and ‘set afire by [Romeo’s] own ignorance’ (III.iii.131-2)—the 
play repeatedly articulates these explosive encounters through apt metaphors. Just like a 
kiss that draws lovers into the dangerous proximity of  ‘lips on lips’ (Ven., 120), the feuding 
houses are repeatedly drawn to hand-to-hand violence. Romeo and Juliet dramatizes the 
tension of  two parties being pulled towards the ‘incorporat[ion]’ of  two in one’ (Rom., 
II.vi.37), where being within touching distance is to feel the explosive potential.  
  Verona, therefore, is out of  sync, and in the midst of  it all Romeo and Juliet find 
themselves trying to locate harmony within dissonance. But achieving this is no 
straightforward endeavour. As Descartes explains in his Compendium of  Musick (1653): 
Diminuation is when against one Note of  one part, are set 2. or 4. or more in 
another; in which this order ought to be kept, that the First make a Consonance 
with a Note of  another part, but the Second, if  it be only one Degree distant from 
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the former, may make a Dissonance.127  
 
If  order is kept, the result is consonance: if  lost, then comes dissonance. In Verona, as we 
have seen, consonance and harmonious rhythm is only achievable through maintaining 
the correct distance: as the play’s opening brawl makes clear—‘strike, beat them down! | 
Down with the Capulets, down with the Montagues!’ (I.i.69-70)—and as the Friar 
warned, proximity is dangerous. Just as Galen stressed in his instructions for measuring 
the beats of  the pulse, the interval is significant—‘the space of  time between … 
impacts’—and the Prince demands it be maintained: ‘If  ever you disturb our streets 
again, | Your lives shall pay the forfeit of  the peace’ (92-3).128 Offering an example (figure 
2), Descartes demonstrates how dissonance is brought about when a note is ‘moved by 
degrees’, when notes fall out of  their correct place, and the ‘Syncopa’ that occurs as a 
consequence of  ‘one voice’ being heard at the same time as ‘the beginning of  one other 
Note of  an adverss [sic] part’.129  
 
Figure 2. A stave demonstrating an example of  musical syncopation—René Descartes, 
Compendium of  Musick (London, 1653) 
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What we hear, he explains, is simultaneously the consonance between certain notes, and 
dissonances caused by disrupted intervals: 
Yea, the Variety of  these doth cause, that the Consonances, among which they 
are set, are heard more distinctly, and also excite more constant attention. For, 
when the Dissonance B C is heard, the expectation of  the eare is encreased, and 
the judgement of  the Symphony somewhat suspended, until the Tune shall arrive 
at the Note D, in which it more satisfies the Hearing; and yet more perfectly in 
the Note E, with which, after the end of  the Note D, hath kept up the attention, 
the Note F, instantly supervenient doth make an exquisite Consonance. … And, 
indeed, therefore are these Consonances used in Cadences; because what hath 
been the longer expected, doth the more please when it comes: and therefore the 
sound, after a Dissonance heard, doth better acquiesce in a most perfect 
Consonance, or Unison.130  
 
Like the ‘exquisite mingl[ing]’ understood to take place during sexual encounter—where 
the womb ex-quisitely sought out male seed—the syncopated rhythm similarly seeks out 
‘exquisite consonance’. The result of  this interplay between consonance and dissonance, 
syncope, as Descartes describes it, is the product of  anticipation (a note that strikes early) 
and delay (a note that is held off) in order to ‘excite … constant attention’ and 
‘expectation’, keeping auditors ‘somewhat suspended’ until the arrival of  the note which 
can return everything to ‘perfect … unison’. The prologue to Romeo and Juliet makes a 
promise along similar lines, establishing the play’s central rhythm:  
From forth the fatal lions of  these two foes 
A pair of  star-crossed lovers take their life, 
Whose misadventured piteous overthrows 
Doth with their death bury their parents’ strife. 
The fearful passage of  their death-marked love,  
And the continuance of  their parents’ rage— 
Which but their children’s end naught could remove— 
Is now the two hours’ traffic of  our stage; 
The which if  you with patient ears attend,  
What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.  
         (I.0.5-14) 
 
Acknowledging Verona’s dissonant state and the long-established rhythm of  these ‘two 
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foes’, the Chorus entreats that what follows be ‘attend[ed]’ with ‘patient ears’, as discord 
moves through to concord: ‘a pair of  star-crossed lovers … with their death bury their 
parents’ strife’. As it stretches and contracts, extends ‘forth’ and ‘take[s]’ back, the 
prologue ebbs and flows from ‘life’ and ‘death’, ‘fearful passage’ to ‘death-marked love’, 
‘continuance’ to ‘end’. What governs this two-way flow is a compulsion to gesture ahead 
to the ‘end’, while also attending to the ‘now’ and ‘here’: to open up the ‘two hour’ pocket 
of  time between present moment and deathly end. In Descartes’ terms, as we enter into 
a ‘Symphony somewhat suspended’, we are reassured that the lovers’ deaths will provide 
the final, unifying beat, and that ‘the Tune shall arrive at … perfect Consonance, or 
Unison’. To appropriate Catherine Clément’s analysis of  syncope—which shares this 
study’s interest in moments of  self-absentation, and which will run throughout what 
follows—‘it is essential for the beat to change register, and it is syncope’, or, in the 
following reading, Shakespeare’s syncopated subjects, ‘that does the work’.131 
Consonance, in both Descartes’ example and Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, is only 
achievable after the fact, ‘supervenient[ly]’ (to come [venīre] on top of  [super]); unison 
between the two households, in other words, is only achievable after a period of  ecstatic 
dissonance, a disruption of  order. The harmonics of  true love and of  Verona are 
achievable only once the dissonant rhythms of  Petrarchan love and civil war have been 
played out. What we get in Romeo and Juliet, I will demonstrate, is an attempt to achieve 
harmonics. In anticipation of  this end, it is syncope that governs the interim. ‘From delay 
to anticipation’, notes Clément, ‘that is the very movement of  musical syncope’.132 On 
the one hand syncope ‘creates delay and accentuates it by prolonging time’: on the other, 
it seems to ‘make things go quickly, it accelerates’. To be ‘somewhat suspended’ in syncope 
is, as we shall see, to be caught in this dissonant interim. 
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iii)  INHABITING THE OFF-BEAT 
 
‘Love, the most perfect of  syncopes, starts with love at first sight. A shared syncope’.133 
From their first meeting, Romeo and Juliet find themselves in a relationship that operates 
at high speed, thrown into a whirlwind where every action risks being ‘too rash … too 
sudden’ (II.i.161); ‘wisely and slow’, the Friar feels impelled to caution, ‘they stumble that 
run fast’ (II.ii.94). But with Juliet ‘quickly won’ (II.i.138) and Rosaline ‘so soon forsaken’ 
(II.ii.67), Romeo finds himself  ‘stand[ing] on sudden haste’ (93) and overtaken with an 
intensity of  emotion that not only displaces Rosaline—‘I have forgot that name and that 
name’s woe’ (II.ii.46)—but will also lead him to throw off  and reform his identity: ‘I’ll be 
new baptized: | Henceforth I never will be Romeo’ (II.i.93-4). If  love for Rosaline 
brought out Romeo’s Petrarchan tendencies, Juliet divorces him from those conventions:  
ROMEO Thus from my lips, by thine, my sin is purg’d. 
JULIET Then have my lips the sin that they have took. 
ROMEO Sin from my lips? O trespass sweetly urged! 
   Give me my sin again.  
                 He kisses her. 
JULIET           You kiss by th’ book.  
                (I.iv.220-3)  
 
Having just shared a sonnet, Juliet now disrupts the rhythm of  their musical call-and-
response, rejecting structural artifice and inherited language, and instead turning the line 
back towards Romeo. ‘You kiss by th’ book’: what Juliet desires is authentic experience. 
As she guides him away from the artificial and establishes a different tonal key, this is 
Romeo’s first indication that the music will be different with Juliet. ‘What a change is 
here!’, marvels the Friar: ‘art thou changed?’ (II.ii.65; 79). This change, Romeo admits, 
is one that occurred suddenly; ‘I have been feasting with mine enemy’, he tells the Friar, 
‘where on the sudden one hath wounded me | That’s by me wounded’ (49-50). Such 
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sudden changeability is, as French physician André Du Laurens observes, typical of  the 
loving subject: ‘his heart doth alwaies quake, and his pulse keepeth not true course, it is 
little, unequall, and beating thicke, changing it selfe upon the sudden’.134 Desire for Juliet 
takes hold of  Romeo forcefully, and ‘on the sudden’. This suddenness often accompanies 
the ecstatic experience: seeming to position itself  outside of  time, leaving those who 
experience it collecting themselves from the sensation of  being thrown, the sudden marks 
a moment of  radical departure. That these lovers’ are ecstatically dislocated from the 
play’s time scheme by their ‘sudden’ romance is something the pair seem acutely aware 
of  throughout the play, from Romeo’s awareness of  how the present hangs over the 
future—‘this day’s black fate on more days doth depend; | This but begins the woe others 
must end’ (III.i.119-20)—to Juliet’s sudden vision of  Romeo in his grave:  
 JULIET O God, I have an ill-divining soul! 
    Methinks I see thee now, thou art so low,  
    As one dead in the bottom of  a tomb.  
    Either my eyesight fails, or thou look’st pale.  
                              (III.v.54-7) 
 
With this sudden vision, Juliet’s ‘ill-divining soul’ anticipates the ‘future in the instant’ 
(Mac., I.v.55), and puts her momentarily out of  sync with both present and future; 
experiencing a kind of  contretemps or ‘counter-time’ as Jacques Derrida would have it, 
Juliet finds herself  ‘out of  time’ like a musical note that pulses ahead of  the sequence of  
beats.135 Ecstasy has thus far been understood as a foretaste of  death, and Juliet’s vision, 
offering a glimpse of  Romeo’s fate, a moment of  little death, is no different. Like the song 
of  the lark that interrupts and cuts short the lovers’ time together—‘she divideth us’ (Rom., 
III.v.30), laments Juliet—this vision is ‘out of  tune, | Straining hard discords and 
unpleasing sharps’ (27-8). After all, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau later confirms in A Complete 
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Dictionary of  Music (1779), ‘every syncopated note is in countertime, and every collection 
of  syncopated notes is a movement in counter time’.136 Getting ahead of  herself, Juliet 
temporarily throws the narrative into dissonance. As Clément observes: ‘That is the 
function of  a short syncope: a sudden flight into nonexistent time’.137  
  This sense of  feeling out of  sync with the diegetic time of  the play is not isolated. 
Indeed, that the pair experience time differently to those around them is clear in moments 
where their ‘sudden haste’ is met with intense delay. As the couple seek to collapse the 
distance between them—‘he … leap’d this orchard wall’; ‘leap to these arms’; ‘Give me 
my Romeo’ (II.i.5; III.ii.7, 21)—they lament the expanses of  time that seem determined 
to keep them apart: ‘Be fickle, fortune, | For then I hope thou wilt not keep him long, | 
But send him back’ (III.v.62-4). Claims that ‘love’s heralds should be thoughts, | Which 
ten times faster glides than the sun’s beams’ (II.v.4-5), or fantasies of  immediate 
communication via ‘nimble-pinioned doves’, ‘wind-swift Cupid wings’, or ‘youthful’ 
nurses as ‘swift in motion as a ball’ (7; 9; 12-3), are met with experiences of  delay, and 
what should take ‘half  an hour’ (2) is stretched to ‘three long hours’ (11) as Juliet eagerly 
awaits to receive word from Romeo. It is in this way that the drama keeps the lovers 
suspended in states of  anticipation and delay, where things not only take longer than they 
should, but where the couple experience passages of  time that feel longer: 
JULIET   What o’clock tomorrow  
  Shall I send to thee? 
ROMEO        By the hour of  nine.  
JULIET I will not fail; ’tis twenty year till then.    
               (II.i.213-5) 
 
In these hours there are ‘twenty year[s]’ and, as Juliet later laments, ‘in a minute there 
are many days’ (III.v.45). It is in this way that the play carries through Romeo’s early 
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sense of  time as elastic, which, like the lover’s tremulous pulse, is able to both stretch and 
contract:  
 
BENVOLIO Good morrow, cousin. 
ROMEO     Is the day so young? 
BENVOLIO But new strook nine. 
ROMEO             Ay me, sad hours seem long. … 
BENVOLIO … What sadness lengthens Romeo’s hours? 
ROMEO  Not having that which, having, makes them short.  
                           (I.i.156-60) 
 
‘Sadness lengthens Romeo’s hours’, happiness shortens them. Accordingly, the couple 
find that time seems to go quickly when they are together, and slowly when they apart. 
For David Houston Wood, Romeo here articulates ‘a subjective truism’: ‘as individuals 
boasting our own respective agencies … [we] are inherently familiar with our own 
subjective impressions of  time and temporal experience across a range of  our daily 
activities and affective states’.138 As Carson observes: ‘the experience of  eros is a study in 
the ambiguities of  time … temporally, the world stands to you in a somewhat perverse 
relation, permanent and transient at once as it is’.139 Indeed, Romeo and Juliet are not 
unique: for Hero and Leander, time similarly seems to expand and contract as ‘each 
minute [spent apart] seems … a tedious day’ and ‘time stands still’, compared to the ‘kind 
melting hours’ in the arms of  the beloved; or, as it is in Venus and Adonis, ‘lover’s hours are 
long, though seeming short’ (842).140 And yet there does seem to be something distinctive 
about Romeo and Juliet’s response to time, and their acute sense that their experiences 
contradict time’s natural progress; ‘there are in the play’, argues Joseph S. M. J. Chang, 
‘two schemes of  time, that of  the real world … and that measured by the lovers’.141 This 
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is not to suggest that the lovers throw off  altogether ‘chronological time, the pulse of  the 
public world’, to borrow David Lucking’s phrase, but rather that they are attentive to the 
extent to which their experience of  time is slightly out of  sync: that they reside, as it were, 
on the off-beat.142 This ecstasy of  love, this shared syncope as Clément would have it, has 
made irregular the pulse of  their existence, and the lovers flatly refuse the early modern 
physician’s advice that they regulate it. 
The lovers therefore occupy an interim between their feuding houses: a 
syncopated off-beat that goes against Verona’s established rhythm. But, as Romeo 
discovers just hours after the Friar has ‘incorporate[d] two in one’ (II.v.37) and made 
official his union with Juliet, this interim is dangerous, and cannot be maintained. For as 
the two houses are once again drawn into proximity in Act Three, Scene One, the space 
between them is once again charged with dangerous tension: ‘Tybalt, Mercutio’, Romeo 
warns, ‘the Prince expressly hath | Forbid this bandying in Verona streets’ (86-87). 
Having ‘doff[ed] his name’ (II.ii.49) and shrugged off  his identity as a ‘Montague’ in 
order to marry a Capulet, Romeo finds himself  uncomfortably positioned between the 
two houses both figuratively—‘good Capulet, which name I tender | as dearly as my own, 
be satisfied’ (III.i.70-1)—and literally: ‘why the devil came you between us?’, laments 
Mercutio, ‘I was hurt under your arm’ (102-3). In both senses, Romeo is ‘’twixt’ (167) 
Tybalt and Mercutio, and so embodies the interim, figuring a disrupted interval that poses 
a threat to Verona’s long-established order. But the tune of  this ‘ancient grudge’ (I.0.3) 
cannot be thrown off  so easily, and the rhythms of  the play are carried over, audible on 
the striking of  a single strong beat: Tybalt stabs Mercutio under Romeo’s arm (88 s.d.).143 Thus 
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Tybalt strikes through the off-beat, and Mercutio’s ‘untimely death’ (118) comes at the 
hands of  a character who notoriously ‘keeps time’ (II.iii.20): as Mercutio observed earlier, 
Tybalt ‘rests his minim rests, one, two, and the third in your bosom’ (20-2). Going against 
those who keep time in Verona can have fatal consequences, Mercutio learns, and it is in 
revenging his death and killing Tybalt that Romeo discovers the same: ‘let Romeo hence 
in haste, | Else, when he is found, that hour is his last’ (194-5). Forced to depart Verona 
in haste, Romeo is once again thrown out of  sync: to keep time in Verona now would be 
deadly.144  
And so, just as Kiernan Ryan understands ‘words’ to be ‘the chains that bind the 
lovers to the sexual norms and social imperatives of  Verona’—a language system which 
the lovers ‘struggle to free themselves from’—time similarly places its own constraints on 
the couple; like Ryan’s description of  ‘the weight of  words’, there is a temporal ‘gravity 
that pins individuals to involuntary lives’.145 The play is driven by the fantasy of  an 
alternative temporality, one where ‘passion lends [these lovers] power, time means, to 
meet | Tempering extremities with extreme sweet’ (II.0.13-4), and where the ecstasy of  
love can cut Romeo and Juliet loose from the rhythm and ‘pulse of  the public world’. 
This is what syncope etymologically offers: a chance to cut oneself  off. But that chance 
seems unavailable in a world so conscious of  time that Juliet’s Nurse ‘can tell her age unto 
the hour’ (I.ii.12), and where, for Juliet, there is seemingly little time to break free of  those 
chains: 
CAPULET  But soft—what day is this? 
PARIS   Monday, my lord.  
CAPULET  Monday! Ha ha! Well, Wednesday is too soon.  
    A Thursday let it be, a’Thursday, tell her,  
    She shall be married to this noble earl. 
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    Will you be ready? Do you like this haste? 
           (III.iv.18-22) 
 
‘Insisting on the peremptory rhythms of  chronological and calendric time’, Lucking 
observes, Capulet here asserts the time that must be obeyed, must be kept.146 And so with 
Capulet having ‘sorted out a sudden day of  joy’ (III.v.109), ‘the time [becomes] … very 
short’ (IV.i.1), and the narrative is hastily thrown into quick-time. Thus Juliet is left to 
‘wonder at this haste’ (118), the Friar learns ‘the reason of  this haste’ (15), and Capulet 
busily ‘hastes [the] marriage’ (11): ‘Make haste, make haste … Hie, make haste, make 
haste … Make haste I say!’ (IV.ii.15; 25-6). But the time scheme that once circumscribed 
the lovers can no longer contain them; unwilling to keep her father’s pace, Juliet, like 
Romeo, looks to deviate from the narrative’s accelerated tempo by throwing herself  into 
a syncopated interval.  
 
iv)   JULIET’S LITTLE DEATH 
 
This chapter has thus far understood the ecstatic ‘little death’ as a means to facilitate 
union with the beloved, where departure from self  is understood as a requisite step 
towards achieving union with the other, and where the loving subject longs to die in, and 
be revived by, the other. It is this reciprocal death that Juliet anticipates as she muses on 
the explosive potential of  the ‘amorous rites’ she has ‘not yet enjoyed’: 
Come night, come Romeo, come thou day in night; 
For thou wilt lie upon the wings of  night 
Whither than new snow upon a raven’s back. 
Come gentle night, come loving black-browed night, 
Give me my Romeo; and when I shall die,  
Take him and cut him out in little stars, 
And he will make the face of  heaven so fine, 
That all the world will be in love with night,  
And pay no worship to the garish sun. 
           (III.ii.8; 28; 17-25) 
                                                             




‘When I shall die…’: this starry, orgasmic little death is the kind of  ecstasy Juliet wanted, 
the kind of  authentic experience that could never be achieved by doing things ‘by the 
book’. ‘There are few words to describe’ this experience, asserts Clément, and they are 
‘always the same ones: ‘explosion, eruption, earthquake, ascent, rending, bursting, 
vertigo, and the stars’.147 For Juliet, this is what it means to be ‘blasted with ecstasy’ (Ham., 
III.i.160); conflating death with starry petite mort, anticipating a death both little and literal, 
Juliet understands sexual ecstasy as an experience that touches death in an exciting way. 
The bedroom in Romeo and Juliet becomes a syncopated space, one that makes available 
the positive experiences of  loving ecstasy as this chapter has understood it thus far: here 
lovers are united by a mutual, loving death; here time temporarily stands still. Like 
Donne’s lovers in ‘The Sunne Rising’, Romeo and Juliet chide the ‘unruly Sunne’ that 
calls ‘through windowes, and through curtaines’ and seek to escape the ‘rags of  time’ (1; 
3; 10). As they are pulled towards morning—as clouds ‘sever’ and day ‘stands on tiptoes’ 
(8; 10)—the lovers ‘will’ (24) this syncopated moment to last: ‘it is not yet near day’, Juliet 
professes, ‘It was the nightingale, and not the lark, | That pierced the fearful hollow of  
thine ear … Yon light is not daylight’ (Rom., III.v.1-3;12). Holding on to these final few 
moments together, all is suspended, and Romeo’s fate hangs in the balance: ‘I must be 
gone and live, or stay and die’. The syncope—lasting for as long as the bird call remains 
undecided, until light creeps in through the window—dilates the comma between these 
opposing destinies, but ultimately slips away as day finally draws in. Romeo and Juliet 
may have experienced an authentic ecstasy, but by nature that experience can only ever 
be temporary.   
In a play where loving paradox has the potential to become violent conflict—
where ‘palm to palm’ (I.v.99) so readily becomes, as we have seen, hand-to-hand 
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violence—these little deaths have the potential to be actualized. ‘I long to die’ (66) asserts 
Juliet in distress—‘past hope, past care, past help’ (45)—as she laments the prospect of  
marrying Paris ‘on Thursday next’ (49). As she runs through a series of  preferred 
alternatives, from ‘leap[ing] … off  the battlements of  any tower’ to being ‘chain[ed] … 
with roaring bears’ (77-80), it seems Juliet really would ‘rather [die] than marry Paris’ 
(77). Death is, it seems, for Juliet the only means of  escape. It is in these circumstances 
that Friar Lawrence offers an alternative: 
  If  rather than to marry County Paris 
 Thou hast the strength of  will to slay thyself, 
 Then it is likely thou wilt undertake 
 A thing like death to chide away this shame, 
 That cop’st with death himself  to scape from it 
 And if  thou darest, I’ll give thee remedy.    
          (Rom., IV.i.71-5) 
 
Proposing ‘a thing like death’, the Friar offers a thing that comes into contact with ‘death 
himself ’ (OED, ‘cope’, v. 2—to strike, to encounter), in order to ‘[e]scape from it’. This 
syncope is, in other words, a little death that copes (encounters) death. Indeed, just as the 
musical syncope interrupts a rhythm, the early modern period understood syncope as a 
state which interrupts the natural progress of  the body: ‘to fall into the Syncope’, considers 
French author and Catholic minister Jean Guillemard, ‘is to fall into death; for as death 
is a cessation from all action, and motion, so the Syncope interrupts all motion, and all the 
functions both of  sense and life’.148 If  the loving subject has thus far been described as 
made in ‘the image of  death’, the ‘Syncopes and Extasies which sometimes happen to 
Lovers’ once again situate these subjects at the dangerous threshold between life and 
death.149 Syncope, to borrow the Friar’s words, is ‘a thing like death’ but allows ‘escape’, 
and as such it offers to place the subject in a unique position: out of  time, out of  body, 
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out of  sync, and in the between. As Clément has it:  
Syncope deceives death. In all ways. By delaying the weak beat, excessively 
prolonging time, and by making it disappear subjectively, it pretends to delay 
progress toward the biological conclusion. By crossing the limits of consciousness, 
it anticipates immortality. I leave the world, then I return to it. I die, but I do not 
die. I am placed between the two, between life and death, exactly in the between-
the-two, refusing one and the other.150  
 
If  attention to the play’s internal rhythms reveal Juliet and Romeo as syncopated subjects 
that establish themselves in the off-beat, against the rhythms of  society, it is apt that Juliet 
should turn to syncope and embody the interval in order to—recalling Descartes’ 
terms—throw the symphony into suspension. What syncope offers is an escape from the 
rigours of  time.  
‘Take thou this vial, being then in bed, | And this distilling liquor drink thou off ’ 
(Rom., IV.i.93-4): at odds with the narratives of  amorous experience we have encountered 
thus far which saw ‘two soules Distilled into kisses, [which] through our lips | Doe make 
one spirit of  love’, the ‘distilling liquor’ that will pass through Juliet’s lips promises not to 
dissolve her spirit into another, but rather to dissolve her prospective union to Paris.151 
This is not an experience of  symbiotic union or of  loving exchange; this is a ‘dismal scene’ 
that Juliet ‘must act alone’ (IV.iii.19). Furthermore, this is an experience that disturbs the 
fine line that keeps the ecstatic subject from losing themselves irrecoverably in death. This 
is something that ecstasy shares with syncope—a state which is, in Clément’s terms, ‘an 
absence of  the self  … a “cerebral eclipse”, so similar to death that it is also called 
“apparent death”; it resembles its model so closely that there is a risk of  never recovering 
from it’.152 Indeed, we are repeatedly encouraged to see Juliet’s experience as one that 
resides at these deathly limits, as Shakespeare dramatically literalizes the ‘living death’ 
that has echoed throughout this chapter. As the Friar assures her, this is not death, just a 
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thing like it: 
   Tomorrow night look that thou lie alone; 
   Let not the Nurse lie with thee in thy chamber. 
   Take thou this vial, being then in bed,  
   And this distilling liquor drink thou off; 
   And presently through all thy veins shall run 
   A cold and drowsy humour, for no pulse 
   Shall keep his native progress, but surcease.   
   No warmth, no breath shall testify thou livest; 
   The roses in thy lips and cheeks shall fade 
   To wany ashes, thy eyes’ windows fall 
   Like death when he shuts up the day of  life. 
   Each part, deprived of  supple government,  
   Shall stiff  and stark and cold appear like death; 
   And in this borrowed likeness of  shrunk death 
   Thou shall continue two-and-forty hours 
   And then awake as from a pleasant sleep.       
                                                                    (91-106, emphasis added) 
 
‘Like death … like death … like … death’. Describing how Juliet’s pulse will ‘surcease’ 
(from the french surseoir, to delay or suspend), the Friar explains that ‘this distilling liquor’ 
will allow Juliet to slip into suspension, a mimicked version of  death; as her pulse slows to 
a pause, she too will enter into a state of  intermission (OED, ‘surcease’, n. a) lasting, or at 
least meant to last, ‘two-and-forty hours’. With its capacity to ‘stiff ’ Juliet’s body as it runs 
through her veins, the Friar’s ‘distilling liquor’ bears a likeness to the ‘leperous distilment’ 
that ‘courses through | The natural gates and alleys’ of  King Hamlet’s body (Ham., I.v.64; 
66-7). In both instances, Shakespeare takes us inside the body and gradually draws our 
focus outward: first, we understand how liquid makes its way into the body—‘this 
distilling liquor drink thou off ’ (Rom., IV.i.94); ‘in the porches of  my ears [he did] pour 
the leperous distilment’ (Ham., I.v.64)—and then we follow its progress ‘through all th[e] 
veins’ (Rom., IV.i.95) and ‘alleys of  the body’ (Ham., I.v.67), moving gradually outward in 
order to witness its external effects. In Hamlet, this movement demonstrates the parity 
between ‘leprous distilment’ and resultant ‘lazar-like’ skin (to be ‘lazar-like’ is to be like 
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the leprous Lazarus in the Gospel of  Luke).153 In the above passage from Romeo and Juliet, 
our attention is similarly redirected from the inside to the outside of  the body, but with a 
more localized focus as we move out through the mouth where there is now ‘no breath’, 
before slowly settling our gaze on the face, panning outward from ‘lips’ to ‘cheeks’ to 
‘eyes’. While Juliet will only undergo a ‘thing like death’, the likeness between these 
speeches and the comparable effects of  these distillations on the body demonstrates just 
how incredibly like death this is; as Tanya Pollard notes, ‘the likeness [to death] is so 
persuasive that the distinction becomes uncomfortably blurred’.154 
Shakespeare inherits this uncomfortable blurring from his sources. Situating 
Juliet’s body at this threshold between life and death, Shakespeare echoes Arthur Brooke’s 
terms of  this temporary departure from self  in The Tragicall Historye of  Romeus and Juliet 
(1562): 
  Receve this vyoll small and kepe it as thine eye; 
  And on the marriage day, before the sunne doe cleare the skye, 
  Fill it with water full up to the very brim,  
  Then drink it of, and thou shalt feele throughout eche vayne and lym 
  A pleasant slumber slyde, and quite dispred at length 
  On all thy partes, from every part reve all thy kindly strength; 
  Withouten moving thus thy ydle partes shall rest,  
  No pulse shall goe, ne hart once beate within thy hollow brest, 
  But thou shalt lye as she that dyeth in a traunce …155 
 
‘No pulse shall goe, ne hart once beate’. In both texts, the potion has the same effect on 
the body: once drunk, the liquid will run through Juliet’s veins, stopping heart and pulse. 
In short, Juliet throws herself  into what Clément would term a ‘miraculous suspension’, 
and these terms are similarly obeyed in William Painter’s Palace of  Pleasure (1567): 
Beholde héere I give you a viole which you shal kéepe as your owne propre heart, 
and the night before your mariage, or in the morning before day, you shall fil the 
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same up with water, & drink so much as is contained therein. And then you shall 
féele a certain kinde of  pleasant sléepe, which incroching by litle & litle all the 
parts of  your body, wil constrain thee in such wise, as unmovavble they shall 
remaine: and by not doing their accustomed dueties, shall loose their natural 
féelings, and you abide in such extasie the space of  xl. houres at least without any 
beating of  poulse or other perceptible motion, which shall so astone them [tha]t 
come to sée you, as they will judge you to be dead.156 
 
To read Shakespeare’s Juliet alongside her source-text counterparts is to understand the 
suspended moment: what is for Shakespeare ‘a thing like death’, for Brooke ‘a traunce’, 
and for Painter an ‘extasie’, is a radical suspension of  body and soul engineered to last 
for a set period of  time. In her false death, Juliet, in other words, mimics the ecstatic 
threshold. As Hamlet led us to expect, ‘in such extasie’ Juliet’s pulse does not ‘temperately 
keep time’, nor does it play ‘healthful music’. Instead, as her pulse slows to an artificial 
pause, set to remain that way for ‘the space of  [forty] houres at least’, Juliet gives herself  
over to a ‘time out’: an induced ecstatic little death that is more ‘like death’ than anything 
we have encountered thus far. In this moment, Shakespeare follows his sources in order 
to locate value in the experience of  standing outside: of  time, of  self, of  society. Unlike 
death, this ecstasy does not offer a complete break: what it provides is temporary distance. 
The subject who is willing to risk breaking ranks is aware of  the risk—‘what if  the mixture 
do not work at all?’; ‘what if  it be a poison … to have me dead’; ‘How if  … I wake before 
the time … ? That’s a fearful point (20; 23-4; 29-31)—but hopes they will be rewarded 
with the prospect of  a world outside of  Verona’s patriarchal structures, outside of  
Capulet’s seemingly inflexible time scheme: of  a ‘world outside Verona walls’, after all 
(Rom., III.iii.17).  
Suspended in this death-like state, Juliet exhibits both the allures of, and anxieties 
about, being in projection, of  being thrown into the unknowable. But it is not only Juliet’s 
anxieties that Shakespeare dramatizes, for beneath this plot device lie broader concerns 
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surrounding bodies that reside at this threshold between life and death. Indeed, in Pericles, 
we see characters driven to the threshold between life and death, and pulled back again. 
While Pericles repeatedly escapes death—despite claims that ‘instantly this prince must 
die’ (I.i.149) and narrowly avoiding a ‘watery grave’ (II.i.10)—his wife, Thaisa, is not so 
lucky as she ‘fall[s] into travail’ (III.0.52) and dies in labour at sea. Caught in a storm that 
‘will not lie ’til the ship be cleared of  the dead’ (III.i.48-9), Pericles is spurred into hasty 
action, aware that time is against him:  
    Th’unfriendly elements 
 Forgot thee utterly, nor have I time  
 To give thee hallowed to thy grave, but straight 
 Must cast thee, scarcely coffined, in the ooze …  
           (56-9) 
 
And so it is that this ‘most wretched queen … must overboard straight’ (54; 53). But as 
‘Lord Cerimon’ will discover—famed ‘through Ephesus’ (43) by those whom he has 
‘restored’ (45) to health—‘they were too rough | That threw her in the sea’ (3.2.78-9). 
For as the ‘caulked and bitumed’ (57) chest is discovered ashore and its contents 
examined, Cerimon offers onlookers a glimmer of  hope:  
  Death may usurp on nature many hours 
  And yet the fire of  life kindle again 
  The o’erpressed spirits. I heard of  an Egyptian 
  That had nine hours lain dead, who was 
  By good appliance recovered.   
           (81-5) 
 
For Susanne Gosset, the passage here picks up ‘the play’s central concern with women 
who die and are revived’: women, in other words, who recover from a little death. To 
situate Thaisa, along with Juliet, against the backdrop of  early modern medical treatises, 
we find that Cerimon’s tale is not simply a convenient plot device, but also reflects larger 
period anxieties concerning the legibility of  bodies in these interim, trance states. As 
Crooke warns: 
It is impossible almost to perceive whether such women do yet live or no, and 
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doubtlesse many are buried in such fits (for they will last sometimes 24. houres or 
more, and the bodies growe colde and rigid like dead carkasses) who would 
recover if  space were given.157 
 
The danger with these little deaths—at once the point and the tragedy in Juliet’s case—
was that they could be taken for the real thing. What makes syncope dangerous for the 
Shakespearean subject is that it all too often opens up a space of  uncertainty: an off-beat 
into which letters can fall and go undelivered; a moment of  doubt into which an Iago can 
insert himself; an illegible body that is too quickly mis-read for dead. ‘In extasies and 
raptures,’ writes Alexander Ross in The Philosophical Touch-Stone, ‘the body be without sense 
and motion, and seemes as it were dead’.158 Thaisa’s ‘fit’ here also seems to comply with 
Jean-Louis Guez Balzac’s philosophical considerations in The Prince of  a ‘kind … of  
Separation … by which the Soul is divided from the Body’, ‘consist[ing] in an entire 
benumbednesse of  the spirits, and by a failing of  the heart and breath, whereby people 
fall in a swoon’ akin to ‘those Extasies of  Socrates, who remain’d sometimes from Sun-
rising to Sunset, without moving at all’.159 Upon the soul’s departure, the body is thrown 
into pause: no pulse, no breath, no motion. Anglican scholar Meric Casaubon makes 
clear just how problematic these states could be, recalling Tertullian’s ‘story of  a Woman 
that stirred her arms when she was carried to be buried … but [because] it was looked 
upon a thing merely supernatural and miraculous’, the woman ‘was buried nevertheless’; 
‘perchance’, Casaubon muses, if  she had been ‘then taken up and well-tended, [she] 
might have recovered to perfect life, without a miracle’.160 According to Casaubon, a 
number of  physicians ‘agree’ that these curious little deaths could be ‘ground[ed] … upon 
certain experience’: ‘that a man in ecstasi melancholia, or a woman in hysterica passione, may 
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be gone three dayes, and come to themselves again’.161 Elsewhere, Edward Jordan offers 
a similar account of  syncope as a state that could leave ‘all the faculties of  the body 
fayling, it self  lying like a dead corpse three or foure houres togither, and sometimes two 
or three whole dayes without sense, motion, breath, heate, or any signe of  life at all’.162 
Or, as the Friar had it: ‘No warmth, no breath shall testify thou livest’. For an early 
modern audience, then, it would have been entirely plausible—although perhaps no less 
‘strange’ or ‘most rare’ (105)—that the ‘entranced’ (93) Thaisa, like Juliet, could be 
mistaken for dead, and ‘by good appliance [be] recovered’: 
  Gentlemen, this queen will live. Nature awakes; 
  A warmth breathes out of  her! She hath not been  
  Entranced above five hours. See how she ’gins 
  To blow new life again.   
           (91-4) 
 
Variously dramatizing an experience able to last from five to forty-two hours, Shakespeare 
demonstrates just how ‘like death’ ecstasy can be. But, unlike death, ecstasy cannot last 
indefinitely: it can suspend time, but cannot hold it off  forever. Indeed, we have heard 
throughout this study that ecstasy offers a foretaste of  things to come, and to understand 
Juliet’s ‘thing like death’ in these terms is tragically apt. In this ‘pleasant sleep’, 
Shakespeare suspends Juliet in a state which Thomas Browne considers ‘a middle and 
moderating point betweene life and death’.163 To observe Juliet ecstatically asleep in her 
grave is to anticipate the truth in Browne’s assertion that ‘we tearme sleep a death, and 
yet it is the waking that kills us’.164  
But Browne would not approve of  ‘this borrowed likeness of  shrunk death’: 
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‘oblivion’, he asserts, ‘is not to be hired’.165 Romeo and Juliet, I would suggest, ultimately 
demands the same of  ecstasy: this is an experience that should not be artificially 
replicated. To place Shakespeare’s Juliet alongside both her source-text counterparts and 
those who suffer ecstatic little deaths elsewhere in Shakespeare’s works and early modern 
culture more broadly, is to reveal that what Juliet experiences is not a state ‘like death’, 
but is more properly a state that mimics those death-like states: this is merely something 
like a ‘thing like death’. ‘Nature awakes’ in Thaisa, because this was a natural experience; 
she is ‘recovered’, brought back from the brink of  death, and thus knows what it means 
to truly suffer ecstasy. What Juliet experiences is by contrast merely a ‘borrowed 
likeness’—a state that has not only been mediated through Shakespeare’s source-texts, 
but one that is also achieved artificially; it is the Friar’s ‘chemical intervention’, to borrow 
Pollard’s terms, that renders Juliet’s ecstatic experience inauthentic, unnatural, 
induced.166 For Thaisa, there is no guarantee that this state will only last ‘two-and-forty 
hours’, no guarantee of  safe-return: this is a true habitation of  the off-beat that Romeo 
and Juliet have elsewhere sought to achieve. What the Friar concocts, by contrast, is not 
ecstasy, merely ‘a thing like’ it. Where Thaisa’s natural ecstasy sees her inhabiting a 
syncopated state that will carry the play through to a comic resolution, the Friar’s version 
similarly envisages a state that will suspend Romeo and Juliet’s narrative ‘till … a time’ 
can be found to ‘blaze [their] marriage’ and bring about ‘reconcil[iation]’ (III.iii.149-50). 
That the Friar should turn to a medicinal ‘remedy’ for peace is apt given his unwitting 
pharmaceutical reading of  Verona’s central tensions: 
Within the infant rind of  this weak flower 
Poison hath residence, and medicine power: 
For this, being smelt, with that part cheers each part; 
Being tasted, stays all senses with the heart. 
Two such opposed kings encamp them still 
In man as well as herbs: grace and rude will; 
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And where the worser is predominant 
Full soon the canker death eats up that plant. 
        (II.iii.19-26) 
 
Highlighting the tension between ‘[t]wo such opposed kings’—one which reminds us of  
the play’s ‘two houses’—the Friar suggests the potential of  the ‘infant rind’ to either 
‘poison’ or ‘cheer’ the ‘weak flower’: if  administered correctly, it will medicate; if  too 
much is consumed, ‘death eats up that plant’. The issue here, as Pollard observes, is ‘one 
of  degree’: indeed, as this chapter has emphasised, channelling Galen and Descartes, 
such intervals are significant.167 As Romeo and Juliet repeatedly reminds us, departure from 
the prescribed melody, the healthy pulse, the healthy dose, is risky. But there is curative 
potential in those dangerous spaces. If  the Friar’s model of  desire is ‘at odds with the 
portrait offered by the play itself ’, as Pollard asserts, it is because desire in this play occurs 
in the off-beat, in the moment of  delay, in the experience of  syncope, at the intersection 
between life and death.168 Put simply, while the Friar might acknowledge the potential for 
the ecstatic experience to bring these families together, he fails to recognise that such an 
ecstasy cannot be artificially administered. What the Friar offers is merely an ecstatic 
experience that is ‘by the book’, and in a play that repeatedly locates value in the natural 
over the artificial, that denounces Petrarchan models and patriarchal limits in search of  
authentic experience, it should come as no surprise that ‘a thing like death’ will never be 
able to achieve the ecstasy of  the real thing.  
Like the syncopated off-beat that pricks the ear in expectation, Juliet’s artificial 
ecstasy anticipates agony. As Lucretius, Shakespeare, and Donne variously warned at the 
outset of  this chapter, that is the cost (or, rather, ‘th’expence’) of  ecstatic projection, real 
or medicinally administered: the snap-back follows hard on its heels. For Juliet, this return 
to self  comes simultaneously early and too late, for while Shakespeare’s Friar extends the 
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length of  the forty hour ‘extasie’ in Painter’s version by two hours, her ‘unnatural sleep’ 
(V.iii.152) lasts just twenty-four hours; as René Weis observes, ‘the Friar calculates that 
Juliet will be in a coma for forty-two hours from Wednesday night’, but with the wedding 
hastily moved forward, Juliet ‘swallows the draught on Tuesday night instead’, and wakes 
the following evening.169 True to the model it replicates, this syncope is cut short, and in 
this ‘unkind hour’ (145) the lovers are tragically out of  sync, as Romeo discovers Juliet 
just moments before she wakes. Believing Juliet to be dead, Romeo spends his final 
moments trying to achieve the only remaining opportunity for intersubjective union: 
 Arms, take your last embrace. And lips, O you 
 The doors of  breath, seal with a righteous kiss  
 A dateless bargain to engrossing death. 
           (113-5) 
 
‘Thus with a kiss’ (120) Romeo couples his body and soul with Juliet’s, and his soul departs 
his body for a world without limits; as Brooke has it, Romeo’s ‘long imprisoned soule, | 
hath freedome wonne at last’.170 ‘Thus with a kiss’, with a ‘last embrace’, Romeo seeks 
something akin to the Platonic ‘happy death’, the ‘wondrous contract’ of  intersubjective 
union. ‘Thus with a kiss’ Romeo is thrown beside himself. Waking to find Romeo dead, 
Juliet responds in kind—‘I will kiss thy lips’—before willing ‘happy death’ with ‘happy 
dagger’ (169). Brooke articulates the faith that lies behind Juliet’s action:  
O welcome death (quoth she) end of  unhappines,  
That also art beginning of  assured happines:  
Feare not to darte me nowe, thy stripe no longer stay,  
Prolong no longer now my lyfe, I hate this long delaye.  
For straight my parting sprite, out of  this carkas fled,  
At ease shall finde my Romeus sprite, emong so many ded.171  
 
If  Juliet’s dagger is ‘happy’, it is because it simultaneously promises the ‘end of  
unhappines’, and the ‘beginning of  assured happines’; Brooke’s Juliet imagines death as 
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a way of  finally throwing off  the ‘long delaye’ that has kept her apart from Romeo, and 
as a way of  achieving the immediacy of  contact that, in Shakespeare’s text, characterizes 
their love from the outset. Furthermore, Juliet understands that it is only in ‘[de]parting’ 
herself  that she can ‘finde’ Romeo, and that such departure from self  will ultimately 
deliver them over to an ecstasy that can last: ‘That so our parted sprites, from light that 
we see here, | In place of  endlesse light and blisse, may euer live yfere [together]’.172 To 
die in the beloved and live together in loving mutuality is something that ecstasy has both 
promised and held out of  reach: now, having enjoyed the ecstasy of  petite mort and endured 
an ecstatic little death, Juliet throws herself  beside herself  for the final time: ‘She grones 
she stretcheth out her simmes, she shuttes her eyes, | And from her corps the sprite doth 
fiye. What should I say: she dyes’.173 Up until this point, ecstasy has been ‘a thing like 




[(Juliet) stabs herself  and falls]: with this final act of  dissonance, this final beat, Shakespeare’s 
syncopated subject yields the disrupted interval, and so negotiates the transition from 
discord to harmony. For syncope has two functions: ‘to save the dissonance which 
precedes, and to prepare that which follows’.174 Syncope cuts itself  off, suspends itself  in 
the between, in order to bring dissonance through to harmonious consonance; there is, 
in other words, harmonious potential in syncope’s productive discord. It is this potential 
that has repeatedly driven the subjects of  this chapter towards the ecstatic moment, to 
contemplate the harmony beyond the syncopated interim. For some, the ecstatic 
                                                             
172 Brooke, p. 78. 
173 Brooke, p. 78. 
174 Rousseau, p. 391. 
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experience is something to guard oneself  against: for others, it is worth the risk. In this, 
the subjects of  this chapter aptly articulate the dangers and rewards of  ‘suffering ecstasy’: 
there is no guarantee of  safe return, but that is the terrific nature of  this terrifying 
experience. For Brooke’s Romeo and Juliet, this leap of  faith allows them to achieve 
something akin to Donne’s ecstatic model: the inter-animation of  ‘parted sprites’ into an 
‘abler soule’ (‘The Extasie’, 43). Indeed, in the final stages of  Shakespeare’s play, we see 
this unifying potential of  this ecstasy: 
 CAPULET   O brother Montague, give me thy hand.  
      This is my daughter’s jointure, for no more 
      Can I demand. 
 MONTAGUE    But I can give thee more; 
      For I will ray her statue in pure gold, 
      That while Verona by that name is known, 
      There shall no figure of  such rate be set 
      As that of  true and faithful Juliet. 
 CAPULET   As rich shall Romeo’s by his lady’s lie,  
      Poor sacrifice of  our enmity.  
           (Rom., V.iii.296-304) 
 
‘Reason in itself  confounded, | Saw division grow together’ (PhT, 41-2): the play’s final 
ecstasy is not that of  the lovers, but of  Verona’s divided state. Freeing themselves from 
the interim ‘’twixt two equall Armies’ (‘The Extasie’, 13), the lovers’ final ecstasy provides 
a catalyst for ‘division [to] grow together’, as they ‘with their death bury their parents’ 
strife’ (Rom., I.0.8). And so, to recall John Playford’s musical definition at the outset of  this 
section, Shakespeare’s ‘star-crossed lovers’ act as syncopated ‘notes driven till the time 
falls even again’, and it is in their suicides that they provide the final unifying beat, one 
that the play’s Prologue promised, and one that Descartes assured us would ‘acquiesce in 
a most perfect Consonance, or Unison’. Strong enough to ‘incorporate two in one’ (Rom., 
II.v.37), we find that, in Clément’s terms, ‘the last beat is the saving one’.175 Like Donne’s 
ecstatic couple—mirrored in the ‘sepulchral statues’ of  Romeo and Juliet in the Capulet 
                                                             
175 Clément, p. 5. 
 
199 
monument, and prefiguring those which will be erected in ‘pure gold’—Capulet takes 
Montague’s hand and unites these ‘two households both alike in dignity’. If  being hand-
to-hand was earlier in the play encoded with violence, it is here a gesture of  a mutual 
incorporation: ‘So to’entergraft our hands, as yet | Was all the means to make us one’ 
(‘The Extasie’, 9-10). As Clément has it, ‘syncope always provokes this sense of  
reunion’.176 Like ‘lips on lips’ (Ven., 120) or ‘palm to palm’ (Rom., I.v.99), hand-in-hand 
here dissolves Verona’s divided state into a ‘concordant one’ (PhT, 46). After all, as we 
have seen throughout this chapter, to experience ecstasy is to have a change of  heart.   
 
                                                             









 COURTEZAN  How say you now? Is not your husband mad? 
 ADRIANA   His incivility confirms no less.  
     Good Doctor Pinch, you are a conjurer; 
     Establish him to his true sense again, 
     And I will please you what you will demand. 
 LUCIANA   Alas, how fiery and sharp he looks! 
 COURTEZAN  Mark how he trembles in his ecstasy! 
 DOCTOR   Give me your hand, and let me feel your pulse.  
           (Err., IV.iii.39-46)  
 
 
Falling into an angered ‘frenzy’ (75) in a play that continually places characters quite 
literally beside themselves as they unknowingly traverse the same geographic space as 
their biological other halves, Antipholus of  Ephesus is taken by all in his company for a 
madman. Indeed, his frenzied behaviour ‘confirms no less’, with his body displaying 
visible signs—we are encouraged to ‘mark how he trembles’, to observe ‘how fiery and 
sharp he looks’, to acknowledge his irregular ‘pulse’—understood to evidence ‘his 
ecstasy’. But to recognize Antipholus as ‘suffering ecstasy’ here, to borrow once again 
from the speaker of  Shakespeare’s ‘A Lover’s Complaint’ (69), is to recognize this 
‘outrageous fit of  madness’ (V.i.139) as a physical response to, indeed reflection of, the 
sustained fracturing that his identity endures during the course of  the play: an ecstasy 
which at once leaves his mind and body trembling on the verge of  collapse. ‘Mistress, 
both man and master is possessed; | I know it by their pale and deadly looks’ (IV.iv.86-7): 
rather than denoting a fit or possession, as conjurer and schoolmaster Doctor Pinch 
confidently asserts, Antipholus’ ecstatic tremulousness here in fact denotes quite the 
opposite: a fit brought about by a lack of  (self-) possession. As I have been suggesting 
throughout this thesis, Shakespearean ‘ecstasy’, while acknowledging the state to be 
 
201 
rooted in and associated with ‘madness’, resists being neatly reduced to those terms, and 
often engages with the wider issues of  subjectivity at play in the text. Considering this 
moment in those terms, Antipholus’ ‘ecstasy’ is not just the experience of  a frenzied 
madman: it is a state that obeys ecstasy’s etymological sense of  displacement (from the 
Greek ek and histanai—to stand or place outside). That Antipholus is ecstatic comes as a 
result of  his brother’s resolution to ‘go lose [him]self ’ (I.ii.29) in a city where being a 
‘stranger’ (60) will ultimately cause his twin to become ‘estranged from [him]self ’ 
(II.i.111) and those around him. Antipholus’ ecstasy, in short, is more than ‘frenzy’: it is a 
symptom of  the displaced self.  
 This notion of  the ecstatic experience as a symptom of  displacement is central to 
the discussion that follows. Returning ecstasy to its etymological sense of  being placed 
outside, the first section of  this chapter continues the above diagnosis of  the displaced, 
tranced subject in The Comedy of  Errors. Establishing that, in this play, a subject’s identity 
is often bound up with their literal geographic placement, this section argues that Errors 
dramatizes a model of  ecstatic subjectivity: where self-fracture is literalized by the 
movement of  two identical subjects. Having asserted the centrality of  place to the 
subject’s sense of  self, the remainder of  this chapter provides an extended reading of  
these issues in Othello, exploring the play’s fractured models of  subjectivity through the 









I.   TRANCED SUBJECTS: SPACE, PLACE, AND SELF IN THE COMEDY OF ERRORS 
 
In a play like The Comedy of  Errors, we find the extent to which identity is established via 
position (be it geographic or social), only for those positions to be turned into chaos: where 
spatial representations of  subjectivity make clear the extent to which self  is constituted in 
relation to the place and displacement of  others. In fact, we learn, as the play invariably 
favours the fortunes of  the Syracusean over his local counterpart, Antipholus S. is able to 
find himself—‘There’s not a man I meet with but doth salute me | As if  I were their well-
acquainted friend, | And every one doth call me by name’ (IV.iii.1-3)—only at the cost 
of  displacing his twin: 
 ANTIPHOLUS E.  … upon me the guilty doors were shut, 
    And I denied to enter my own house … 
 ADRIANA  O, husband, God doth know you dined at home 
    … 
 ANTIPHOLUS E. Say, wherefore didst thou lock me forth today … ? 
 ADRIANA  I did not, gentle husband, lock thee forth.  
          (IV.iv.57-91) 
 
This is, as Wesley Kort observes, the inherent contradiction of  ‘languages of  place’, for 
while ‘they secure our location and environment’, they also ‘open us up to the 
vulnerability of  our places and locations’; ‘the languages of  place serve to give … both 
an identity or coherence and a chronic instability’.1 And Shakespeare’s addition of  
another set of  ‘twins both alike’ (I.i.55) (thus departing from his primary source, Plautus’s 
Menaechmi, and fashioning over fifty misrecognitions out of  an original seventeen) serves 
to double his drama of  displacement:2 
 DROMIO S.   [Within] … Go, get thee from the door. 
 DROMIO E.   What patch is made our porter? My master stays in the  
                                                             
1 Wesley Kort, ‘“Religion and Literature” in Postmodern Contexts’, Journal of the American Academy 
of Religion, 58 (1990), 581-2 (584). 
2 ‘It is appropriate’, writes Neely, ‘that this play became immediately synonymous with errors 
since it systematically multiplies those in Plautus by adding to his twin Menaechmi a second set 
of servant twins, a sister-in-law for the local twin, incidents taken from Plautinus’s Amphitruo, and 





 DROMIO S.   [Within] Let him walk from whence he came, lest he catch  
cold on’s feet. 
 ANTIPHOLUS E.  Who talks within, there? Ho, open the door.  
 DROMIO S.  [Within] Right, sir, I’ll tell you when and you’ll tell me 
    wherefore. 
 ANTIPHOLUS E. Wherefore? For my dinner. I have not dined today. 
 DROMIO S.   [Within] Nor today here you must not. Come again when  
you may. 
 ANTIPHOLUS E.  What are thou that keep’st me from the house I owe? 
 DROMIO S.   [Within] The porter for this time, sir, and my name is  
Dromio.  
 DROMIO E.   O, villain, thou hast stolen both mine office and my name.  
(III.i.35-44) 
 
Stood beside himself, ‘Dromio’ is at once within and without, with Dromio E. seeking 
access to that which Dromio S. denies from [within]. Thus is Dromio E. ‘for this time’ 
displaced, both in the sense that an imposter has ‘stolen both [his] office and [his] name’, 
but also because, despite his jest that ‘if  thou hadst been Dromio today in my place, | 
Thou wouldst have changed thy face for a name, | Or thy name for an ass’ (46-8), Dromio 
S. has of  course spent the day just so, now occupying his place and so forcing his local 
counterpart to stand outside, where accordingly, his ‘master [must also] stay … in the 
street’, ‘ke[pt] from the house [he] owe[s]’. While Dromio/Antipholus S. is welcomed 
and interpolated, therefore, Dromio/Antipholus E. is as a consequence driven out (of  
both ‘house’ and any stable sense of, or claim to self). Just as the lovers in A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream located desire beyond the city walls, or like Romeo and Juliet who situated 
themselves in seemingly impossible threshold spaces, moments of  ecstatic thrownness in 
Errors simultaneously serve to undermine and constitute notions of  self. To stand outside 
provides a new perspective on one’s self  and place.  
 What comes into focus, therefore, is a relationship between domestic (and 
theatrical) architecture, and the architecture of  the self, a relationship that critics such as 
Timothy Preiss have identified in their suggestion of  a correlation between the births of  
subjective and architectural interiority. ‘Interiority’, Preiss suggests, ‘begins not as a 
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psychic property, but as a spatial one, as a property of  the playing space itself—as the 
literal sensation of  feeling both inside and outside something at once’.3 Indeed, the notion 
of  interiority as a spatial property is the locus of  the problem that the Dromios face as 
they endlessly, unknowingly find themselves displaced by or in the place of  one another; 
‘I am in adversity’ (IV.iv.19) notes Dromio E. as he finds himself  living in a state that is 
contrary or opposite (OED, ‘adversity’, n. 2) to his sense of  self  before this ‘one day’s error’ 
(V.i.397), while his counterpart desperately seeks self-clarification: ‘Am I Dromio? … Am 
I myself ?’ (III.ii.72-3). Mary Thomas Crane similarly understands ‘inwardness’ as ‘a 
historical concept that was only just beginning to be developed’, noting The Comedy of  
Errors as being written at a moment ‘when interiority, involving linked concepts of  
individual inner life and domestic privacy, was taking on a new cultural significance’.4 
This was a period when theatres began to take on a new architectural identity—now self-
contained with walls which could simultaneously permit and exclude audiences—and 
when homes were similarly becoming increasingly private.5 In short, theatrical and 
domestic architecture was changing, and the architecture and spatiality of  the self  along 
with it. It is in having his ‘doors … shut against his entrance’ (IV.iv.81) that Antipholus E. 
is entranced, and we mark how he trembles. 
 To lose one’s place, therefore, might be to lose oneself. And this applied to those off  
stage just as much as it did to those on it, much to the anxiety of  the nonconformist, 
                                                             
3 Timothy Preiss, ‘Interiority’, in Early Modern Theatricality, ed. Henry S. Turner (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 47-70 (62). Preiss here pinpoints the construction of the Theatre in 
Shoreditch, the first self-contained theatre since classical times, as the moment that interiority 
(both subjective and architectural) came into being. 
4 Mary Thomas Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), p. 30; 39. 
5 ‘Between 1570 and 1640’, notes Crane, ‘the structure of English houses at all levels of society 
changed dramatically’, with peasant dwellings—‘which had housed people and animals under 
one roof and human inhabitants in a single open room’—now becoming ‘a separate house and 
barn’ with ‘a loft for storage and sleeping’, p. 43. These were changes that provided both a higher 
standard of living, and more individual privacy. See also Lena Cowen Orlin, Elizabethan 
Households: An Anthology (Washington, D.C.: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1995). 
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Puritanical preacher John Northbrooke in his Treatise wherein Dicing, Dauncing, Vaine Playes 
or Enterluds … are Reproved (1577): 
Nourish not among you these ydle loitering persons, but compell them with very 
hunger to labour … Truly you may see dayly what multitudes are gathered togither 
at those Playes, of  all sortes, to the greate displeasure of  almightie God, and 
daunger of  their soules. … He despiseth the Temple of  God, that he maye runne 
to the Theatre: the Church is alwaye emptie and voyde, the playing place is 
replenished and full: we leaue Christ alone at the aultar, and seede our eyes with 
vaine and vnhonest sights, and with filthie and uncleane playes.6 
 
In one of  the earlier attacks on early modern play going, Northbrooke’s concerns about 
‘masterless persons’ and wandering vagrants in his diatribe against idleness are centred 
around the extent to which place is constitutive of  identity; as Jean E. Howard notes in 
her discussion of  Northbrooke’s frustrations with ‘these ydle loitering persons’, ‘people at 
the theatre are not where they should be’ and, by consequence, ‘they are not who they 
should be and are not performing a useful social function’.7 These were bodies that 
needed to be returned to their proper place—back to their parishes, back to work, or into 
the church—if  order was to be restored. For both audience and actor alike, therefore, the 
theatre was considered a place of  destabilising self-transformation, a place where one’s 
place—and accordingly one’s identity—was unfixed, fluid, and volatile. In going to the 
theatre, laments Northbrooke’s contemporary antitheatricalist Stephen Gosson, we are 
ever ‘passing our boundes, going beyonde our limites, never keeping ourselves within 
compasse’.8 In the theatre, quite literally, the subject is never at home, but always beside 
themselves.  
 If, in Errors, Shakespeare plays out a drama of  ecstatic disseverance between two 
distinct characters, what a broader examination of  his tranced subjects reveals is a similar 
                                                             
6 John Northbrooke, A Treatise Wherein Dicing, Dauncing, Vaine Playes or Enterlduds with Other Idle 
Pastimes … are Reproved (London: by Henry Bynneman, 1577), p. 32; 62; 64. 
7 Jean E. Howard, ‘The Stage and the Struggle for Social Place’, in Place and Displacement in the 
Renaissance, ed. Alvin Vos (New York: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State 
University of New York, 1995), pp. 1-24 (6). 
8 Stephen Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse (London: for Thomas Woodcocke, 1579), sig. D2r. 
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dynamic whereby those subjects, divided from themselves, come to occupy distinct spaces. 
Simultaneously thrown into a trance and out of  themselves, out of  consciousness and into 
ecstasy, the tranced subject occupies a liminal space that pushes them to the limit of  their 
bodily and subjective borders. The word itself, derived from the French transe and Latin 
transīre (trans across, īre, to go), denotes a passage or passing over, a transition between 
states, most commonly between life and death or between sleeping and waking, but also 
carries a spatial sense, as we have seen here, of  moving between locations, or passing 
between buildings: ‘they stand at the door’ (III.i.68). ‘With delight I was entranced and 
carried so far from myself ’: both ‘entranced’—that is, entering in to a trance—and 
‘carried’ away, Eudox in Spenser’s A View of  the State of  Ireland (1596) articulates a state 
befitting of  a word that itself  operates in opposite directions.9 While architecturally an 
‘entrance’ designates an entering in, it occupies a liminal space that is at once both (and 
neither) in and out: it is an exit just as much as an entrance. To be en-tranced, therefore, 
is to occupy this intermediary space, allowing for movement in both directions. ‘Intrance 
thy selfe in thy sweet extasie’: ecstasy, I have been suggesting, operates in much the same 
way, encompassing both directions of  subjective experience. For the ecstatic subject is not 
only sent out, but also, as Philip King will later articulate, ‘drawn into [them]self  with 
extasies … and struck into a transport’.10 Indeed, we see these dynamics literally enacted 
throughout Errors as one Antipholus twin is ‘carried away’ (and his accompanying 
Dromio tirelessly ‘struck into a transport’ with violent blows) while the other is ‘drawn 
in’.11 This is model that is obeyed even to the play’s final stages, with Antipholus E. 
                                                             
9 Edmund Spenser, A View of the State of Ireland, in Two Histories of Ireland (London: by Thomas 
Harper, 1633), pp. 1-119 (42).  
10 Philip King, The Surfeit to A B C (London: for Edward Dod, 1656), p. 73.   
11 These spatial representations of subjectivity in The Comedy of Errors extend further still, in that 
the twins are quite literally defined by adjectives of placement; borrowing from his Plautine 
source, Shakespeare calls one brother ‘Antipholus Serreptus’—or ‘snatched away’—and the 
other ‘Antipholus Errans’: to wander. The names, as Lynn Enterline has suggested, therefore 
‘define each twin not by virtue of some original place, but by virtue of being located elsewhere’, 
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forcibly ‘carried away’ to receive treatment by Doctor Pinch in the play’s penultimate act 
while Antipholus S. retreats into an abbey to take refuge: ‘This is some priory. In, or we 
are spoiled’ (V.i.37). Words like ecstasy and trance, it seems, not only denote tranced 
states, but are themselves tranced denotations.  
These dramatizations of  displacement also offer geographic reflections of  the 
Antipholus’s internal states, where emotional disposition (one’s physical temperament or 
humour) is articulated through spatial dis-position (finding oneself  out of  place).12 As 
Carol Thomas Neely has suggested, if  we are to follow the diagnoses offered by the play 
and deem both these characters to be ‘mad’, we ought more properly to observe them as 
being mad in quite different measure; while Antipholus E. is presented as ‘the more 
“choleric” and misogynist of  the twins, … represented as beating his servant, raging at 
his wife, … [and] attribut[ing] madness to all those who misrecognize him, never for a 
moment doubting his own … sanity’, Antipholus S. instead ‘becomes the more 
sympathetic of  the two brothers … represented as habitually “melancholy” … yearning, 
and dissatisfied, not settled and self-satisfied like his twin … fear[ing] for his own 
stability’.13 Indeed, the Syracusean’s moment of  self-scrutinizing introspection—‘Am I in 
earth, in heaven, or in hell? | Sleeping or waking? mad or well advised? | Known unto 
these, and to myself  disguised?’ (II.ii.203-6)—is absent from his local counterpart who, 
as his wife can attest having unknowingly taken twin for husband, is of  an opposite 
temperament: 
This week he hath been heavy, sour, sad,  
And much different from the man he was.  
                                                             
of being out of place—Tears of Narcissus: Melancholia and Masculinity in Early Modern Writing 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 210. 
12 Carla Mazzio explores models of selfhood in these terms in her compelling analysis of the 
geometry of disorientation in Blame Not Our Author (c. 1613): ‘The Three Dimensional Self: 
Geometry, Melancholy, Drama’, in Arts of Calculation: Quantifying Thought in Early Modern Europe, 
ed. David Glimp and Michelle R. Warren (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 39-65 
(46). 
13 Neely, p. 141-2. 
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But till this afternoon his passion  
Ne’er brake into extremity of  rage.  
                  (V.i.45-8) 
 
One ‘drawn into himself  with exstasies’, the other ‘carried so far from [him]self ’, the 
twins therefore represent opposing models of  ecstasy in the terms of  divided selfhood as 
we have understood it thus far.  
 From Lady Macbeth’s sleepwalking to Titus’ grief, Shakespeare invests 
considerable dramatic attention in those suffering mental affliction: to ‘distracted 
subjects’ as Neely has identified them, a term which in the early modern period 
‘emphasized that sufferers of  mental distress were viewed as divided, diverted, 
disassembled—as beside themselves—temporarily’.14 In this, notes Neely, ‘distract’ serves 
as an adjective ‘denoting not permanent attributes, but temporary behaviors,’ and so 
finds company among ‘many other overlapping adjectives that label disordered states—
“lovesick,” “troubled-in-mind,” “idle-headed,” “melancholic,” “lunatic,” “frenzied,” 
“mad”’.15 To this wide semantic field, this chapter adds one more: ecstatic. In so doing it 
also contributes a subject who, though absent from Neely’s study, endures a number of  
the above afflictions, and accordingly determines ecstasy’s place within this (increasingly 
medicalized) lexicon of  disorientation.  
Moving from Antipholus’ trembling ecstasy to Othello’s convulsive seizure, this 
chapter explores how the ecstasies suffered by these subjects lie at the heart of  what I 
consider to be dramas of  displacement. In The Comedy of  Errors, any sense of  the self  as 
an autonomous, unified entity is threatened by the presence of  another, identical self: 
‘twinness confuses autonomous identity’, as Kent Cartwight asserts in his introduction to 
the play.16 The model of  the self  that Errors presents is fractured, plural, divided: one that 
                                                             
14 Neely, p. 3. 
15 Neely, p. 3. 




is dramatized through the literal movement of  one self  in two bodies. In this, the play 
presents a model of  ecstasy akin to that which was both craved for and experienced by 
the divine and loving subjects of  the previous chapters, where ecstasy was understood as 
an experience of  being in dialogue with another, and where the subject is constituted 
through that encounter. Having established the ecstatic dynamic of  one self  in two bodies, 
the remainder of  this final chapter will invert that model to consider the subject that 
embodies two selves in Othello. Where ecstasy has been thus far explored as an experience 
towards union, it is here, by contrast, a journey through fracture. Taking the divided-self  
as its subject, therefore, this chapter considers the role of  self-loss in the constitution of  




I. ‘I AM NOT WHAT I AM’: RENAISSANCE SELF-FRACTURING 
   
 
If  wee bee our selves, to our selves, and in peace among our selves, and that our 
God be with us; neither the world nor the Devill can hurt us: But if  there be a 
breach in a banke, the Sea breaks in, & ouerflowes the Land … if  there be a 
breach in a Fort, the enemie will enter and sacke the Towne … & if  ther be a 
breach of  love in the hearts of  a people, the enemie will take aduantage for the 
invasion of  the kingdome. See then, and consider how dangerous a thing is 
division, and how safe an assurance is unitie.17  
 
 
For the early modern subject, poet and novelist Nicholas Breton’s message would have 
been a familiar one: unity over division. Published in 1607, Breton’s pamphlet, A 
Murmurer, found itself  on London bookstalls in the company of  other debates surrounding 
the Union of  England and Scotland; ‘the Tower of  Babell could not be builded’, writes 
Breton, ‘when the languages were divided’, just as ‘England was disturbed, when Scotland 
was divided’:   
but now the Landes all bearing one name, the Subjects all one, under one King, 
the laws all tending to one ende; why should not the Nations bee all one people?18  
 
Unsurprising given his support for James I’s drive for a more united kingdom, Breton’s 
stance on this is clear: to be unified is to be stable and safe; division is dangerous. Othello, 
written just a few years previously (c.1604), is similarly plagued by these anxieties. What 
I am suggesting is not that Shakespeare here engages in the Union debate (as James 
Shapiro has suggested we see more explicitly in a text like Lear, for instance), but rather 
that Othello is similarly concerned with what it means to be united or divided. This is a 
play that invites us to consider ‘how dangerous a thing is division, and how safe an 
assurance is unitie’.19  
The pamphlet’s eponymous figure, the Murmurer, functions as a political 
                                                             
17 Nicholas Breton, A Murmurer (London: by Robert Ravvorth, 1607), sig. F4v-F5r. 
18 Breton, sig. F3v. 
19 See James Shapiro, ‘The Division of the Kingdoms’ in 1606: William Shakespeare and the Year of 
Lear (London: Faber & Faber, 2015), pp. 39-54. 
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metaphor, marking out any ‘breach[es] in [the] Fort’ of  the polis as sites of  danger through 
which ‘the enemie will enter and sacke the Towne’. This contagious force, with his eyes 
‘ever bent downewardes as if  he were looking into Hell’, his ‘browes ever wrinkled with 
frownes, to shew the distemper of  his unquiet Braine’, his ‘tongue, like the sting of  a 
serpent, which uttereth nothing but poison’ and his breast ‘that is ready to burst with 
corruption’, poses a significant threat to the health and stability of  the body politic.20 ‘If  
wee bee our selves, to our selves, and in peace among our selves,’ Breton tells us, then 
‘neither the world nor the Devill can hurt us’. But to not ‘bee our selues’ is to be 
vulnerable to ‘that demi-devil’ who threatens to ‘ensnare’ both ‘soul and body’ (Oth., 
V.ii.294-5). As Pierre le Loyer warns:  
So mischievous is the divell, that he creepeth throughout all the passages of  the 
senses. Hee adhereth vnto soundes, … and hee filleth all the passages of  the 
intelligence with certayne mistes and clowdes. And by the same reason it 
happeneth also, That the divell dooth cast himselfe also into the inward and 
interiour senses, and into the fantasie of  men, and mooveth them in the same 
sorte as hee dooth the externall: and by a certayne extasie and alienation of  their 
spirites which hee causeth; hee maketh diverse formes, specters, and phantosmes 
to appeare in their imaginations.21 
 
The devil, as described by le Loyer, works in much the same way as Iago; with equally 
disruptive potential, as I will demonstrate, this external figure can put the subject into ‘a 
certayne extasie and alienation of  their spirities’. Like Breton’s Murmerer, Iago’s threat 
lies in his capacity to infiltrate unstable structures and unguarded boundaries. As 
anthropologist Mary Douglas tells us, ‘all margins are dangerous’, for to interact with the 
energy that lies there ‘is to have been in contact with danger, to have been at a source of  
power’, and one runs the risk of  altering the internal state (social or bodily) as a result.22 
                                                             
20 Breton, sigs. D3v-D4r; for a fuller discussion of the significance of the Murmurer in relation to 
the ‘pathological body politic’, see Jonathan Gil Harris, Foreign Bodies and the Body Politic: Discourses 
of Social Pathology in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 44-
7. 
21 Pierre le Loyer, A Treatise of Spectres or Straunge Sights, Visions and Apparitions Appearing Sensibly Vnto 
Men (London: by Valentine Simmes, 1605), p. 123. 
22 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 150; 120. 
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Boundaries are safe: venturing beyond them is not.  
 
i)   OTHELLO’S CONTENT: IAGO AND THE FANTASY OF DISPLACEMENT 
 
We saw in the previous chapter the loving subject’s desire to be united with and become 
indivisible from the beloved, a desire which Othello shares and through which the play 
‘induces deep uncertainty about human separation’.23 As we heard above, and will see 
below, unity is safe: division is dangerous. Early in the play we see Desdemona assert 
herself  as unable to endure the ‘heavy interim’ of  the Moor’s absence should ‘he go to 
the war’ without her (256; 254), shortly followed by the ‘wrack and sufferance’ that ensues 
as their ships are ‘parted | With foul and violent tempest’ (II.i.33-4) leaving those on shore 
to pray for their safe reunion: ‘Great Jove, Othello guard | And swell his sail with thine 
own powerful breath | That he may … Make love’s quick pants in Desdemona’s arms’ 
(77-80). Indeed, it is in his greeting of  Desdemona that Othello’s uncertainties about their 
separation are first made clear: 
It gives me wonder as great as my content 
 To see you here before me. O my soul’s joy, 
 If  after every tempest come such calms,  
 May the winds blow till they have wakened death  
 … If  I were now to die, 
 ’Twere now to be most happy; for I fear   
 My soul hath her content so absolute 
 That not another comfort like to this 
 Succeeds in unknown fate.   
(178-8) 
 
If  Donne is correct that ‘you and I are nothing … when on a divers shore’ (‘A Valediction 
of  Weeping’, 9), then Othello’s joy here lies in their having ‘triumph[ed] over distancing’, 
to borrow Derrida’s phrase, and he ‘cannot speak enough of  this content’:24 
                                                             
23 James Kuzner, Shakespeare as a Way of Life: Skeptical Practice and the Politics of Weakness (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2016), p. 51. 
24 John Donne, ‘A Valediction of Weeping’, in Poems (1633), p. 228; Derrida, The Post Card, p. 43. 
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 It stops me here; it is too much of  joy. 
 And this, and this, the greatest discords be 
  They kiss 
 That e’er our hearts shall make!  
          (191-4) 
 
As he speaks of  his ‘content’—a word he uses three times in fewer than fifteen lines—
Othello presents himself  as complete, ‘absolute’, and bounded by his desires. His ‘soul 
hath … content so absolute’ because of  his union with Desdemona: because she makes 
him content (OED, n. 2: satisfaction, pleasure) but also because she provides him with 
content (OED, n. 1: that which is contained). If  this is, as Arthur Kirsch has it, ‘the most 
ecstatic moment in the play’, then it is here that we witness most fully the force with which 
love moves Othello: how powerfully he feels it, the extent to which he is informed by it.25  
Othello is not oblivious to the implications of  his affections, and ‘fear[s]’ the ‘unknown 
fate’ (185; 188) that may not offer a match to this present delight: ‘it is too much of  joy’. 
To hear an echo of  Portia in these lines—‘allay thy ecstasy, in measure rein thy joy, scant 
the excess … make it less for fear I surfeit’ (MV, III.ii.111-4)—is to hear a warning against 
the ‘shudd’ring fear and green eyed jealousy’ (110) that Othello’s ‘surfeit’ will enable Iago 
to inflict: this is loving not wisely, but too well. Othello’s ‘content so absolute’ is, therefore, 
at once ‘permeated … with a sense … of  dangers barely escaped’, as Valerie Traub 
observes, and of  dangers yet to come; ‘at the same time that Othello celebrates his peak 
of  joy so markedly’, writes Susan Snyder, ‘his invocations of  death, fear, and unknown 
fate make us apprehensive about the post-comic future’.26 Absolute contentment comes 
with the threat of  disruption; ‘that which is contained’ can be emptied out, and Iago 
knows it: ‘O, you are well tuned now! | But I’ll set down the pegs that make this music’ 
                                                             
25 Arthur Kirsch, Shakespeare and the Experience of Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), p. 26. 
26 Valerie Traub, Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 38; Susan Snyder, Shakespeare: A Wayward Journey (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2002), p. 33. 
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(194-5). In the previous chapter, Romeo and Juliet’s Friar sought to appropriate ecstasy in 
order to achieve harmonious consonance between the warring houses: here, Iago 
manipulates the dynamics of  ecstasy with an eye to throwing all into discord.   
In Othello’s wondrous contentment, therefore, we are reminded of  the loving 
subject’s desire to end separation from the beloved by collapsing the ‘unkind breach’ 
between them, as Derrida articulates in his ‘post card apocalypse’:  
When we will separate from each other, when I will separate myself, I will 
see you. I will turn back toward you. But I have never known how to 
separate myself. I will learn, and then I will take you into me and there 
will no longer be any distance between us. I already feel in my body … 
strange mimetisms.27 
 
Comprised of  a series of  loving exchanges between himself  and his (pseudo-fictional) 
beloved, Derrida’s ‘postal principle’ provides a familiar narrative of  self-division and self-
location via another: ‘setting you astray from yourself  in order to set you on your way 
toward me’.28 In this, we might understand the ecstatic dynamic through the terms of  
correspondence, as Donne (similarly conflating ‘letters’ with ‘ourselves’) would agree: 
‘th[e] writing of  letters is a kind of  extasie, and a departure … of  the soul, which doth 
then communicate itself  to two bodies … I oftentimes deliver myself  over in writing’.29 
In absentia, therefore, the letter functions as a surrogate self  through which the loving 
subject seeks to overcome the frustrations of  separation. Division from the beloved is a 
painful torment for the subject that desires, above all, the absolute content of  union. To 
this, Othello is no exception. ‘Nothing’, according to Stanley Cavell, ‘could be more 
certain to Othello than that Desdemona exists; is flesh and blood; is separate from him; 
other. This is precisely the possibility that tortures him’.30 And this is, therefore, precisely 
the possibility that Iago uses to torture him:  
                                                             
27 Derrida, The Post Card, p. 13; 43. 
28 The Post Card, p. 69. 
29 Donne, Letters to Severall Persons, p. 240; 11. 
30 Stanley Cavell, Disowning Knowledge, cit. Kuzner, Shakespeare as a Way of Life, p. 50. 
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 IAGO  Did Michael Cassio, when you wooed my lady, 
   Know of  your love? 
 OTHELLO He did, from first to last— 
   Why dost thou ask? 
 IAGO  But for a satisfaction of  my thought, 
   No further harm. 
 OTHELLO       Why of  thy thought, Iago? 
 IAGO  I did not think he had been acquainted with her. 
 OTHELLO O yes, and went between us very oft. 
 IAGO                 Indeed? 
 OTHELLO Indeed? Ay indeed. Discern’st thou aught in that?  
   Is he not honest?      
       (III.iii.96-104)  
 
Iago begins to disrupt the network of  loving correspondence between Desdemona and 
Othello, not by simply interleaving Cassio into it, but by reminding Othello that Cassio 
was there all along, ‘from first to last’.31 And so Othello must consider whether in 
delivering himself  over to Desdemona (in letters sent via Cassio), he has as a consequence 
inadvertently delivered Cassio to Desdemona, and vice versa. While Othello must ‘walk 
the works’ and ‘inspect the fortifications’ in Act III, Scene iii, taking the necessary 
precautions against invading enemies, Iago has already found a breach in the fort, in 
Breton’s terms, and has begun to insinuate himself  into the cracks. 
Shakespeare plays out these anxieties of  delivery and destination throughout the 
canon.32 The delivery of  Proteus’s love letter to Julia which opens The Two Gentlemen of  
Verona is, for instance, particularly problematic; we see it delivered through a number of  
hands—from ‘Valentine’s Page’ to Lucetta who, ‘being in the way’ (I.i.39-40), receives the 
letter on Julia’s behalf—before being dropped, picked up, and finally torn up by its 
                                                             
31 Harry Berger Jr. examines the implications of Desdemona’s reminder to Othello that ‘Cassio 
came awooing with you’ (III.iii.71), a statement which he compellingly demonstrates ‘has an edge 
to it’ in A Fury in the Words: Love and Embarrassment in Shakespeare’s Venice (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), p. 97. 
32 Derrida, writing on the back of a post-card, shares this anxiety that his messenger (or the Courrier, 
the Facteur, the Postman as they are variously termed throughout his correspondences) cannot be 
trusted. ‘[I w]ould like to address myself, in a straight line,’ he writes, ‘directly, without courrier, 
only to you, but I do not arrive, and that is the worst of it. A tragedy, my love, of destination’ (The 
Post Card, p. 12). 
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addressee. The letter, therefore, does not always arrive at its destination, the full tragic 
potential of  which Shakespeare dramatizes in the Friar’s undelivered letter in Romeo and 
Juliet: ‘I writ to Romeo | That he should hither come this dire night … but he which bore 
my letter … was stay’d by accident, and yesternight | Return’d my letter back’ (V.iii.246-
52). Elsewhere, in Twelfth Night, Orsino’s loving correspondence with Olivia is 
undermined by his messenger who, delivering their own words rather than Orsino’s—
‘you are now out of  your text’ (I.v.214) as Olivia remarks—unwittingly wins her affections 
and displaces Orsino. Othello’s anxieties about the implications of  having sent Cassio 
‘between and between’ (Tro., I.i.69) him and Desdemona are, by these accounts, well 
founded. ‘[He] went between us very oft’: what were once considered letters of  loving 
exchange, connecting lover and beloved via an ecstatic ‘double string’ (Donne, ‘The 
Extasie’, 8), are, for Othello, now plagued with doubt: ‘is he not honest?’ Exploiting 
Othello’s anxieties about Desdemona being separate from him, Iago supplants Cassio 
into the gap between them in order to keep her that way, expanding the interim between 
lover and beloved, and situating himself  into the space between the two. Othello may 
well ‘fail … to tolerate the paradox of  being one but two’, as James Kuzner observes, but 
Iago brings him into a world where he can no longer ignore it.33  
Iago, this chapter suggests, exploits this paradox, and while Othello may fail to 
tolerate it, Othello (as directed by Iago) invests itself  in the exploration of  what is at stake 
in a world where one can become two and vice versa. As Iago turns Desdemona’s virtue 
to pitch, Othello’s identity changes with it; if  we allow ourselves to exist in and be defined 
by our relationships, then Othello’s marriage accordingly determines his identity: it is 
Desdemona’s supposed infidelity that renders him ‘cuckold’ (IV.i.193).34 As Kuzner 
writes, and as the subjects of  the previous chapter may well agree, ‘in her, not him, is he 
                                                             
33 Kuzner, Shakespeare as a Way of Life, p. 75. 
34 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 19. 
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thus or thus’.35 And this cuts both ways. For having been stamped with a false address by 
Iago—‘I took you for that cunning whore of  Venice’—Desdemona is unsure both of  her 
destination—‘My lord? … My lord?’—and how to address herself: ‘am I that name, 
Iago?’ (IV.ii.87; IV.i.220; 230; IV.ii.118). Disrupting the dynamics of  loving 
correspondence and displacing Desdemona from Othello’s affections, Iago’s 
transmutations ultimately exhibit that to live in the receipt of  others is an opportunity to 
find oneself  within and through another, but accordingly is also to live in dangerous 
ecstasy.  
Such fantasies of  displacement are central to Iago’s machinations from the outset. 
What motivates this desire to surplant others—to ‘put the Moor … into a jealousy so 
strong’ (II.i.299), to ‘put Cassio in some action | That may offend the isle’ (II.iii57-8)—is 
the fact that Iago was first displaced by them. ‘I am worth no worse a place’, laments Iago 
as he reveals how Othello turned down his ‘personal suit to make me his lieutenant’, 
having instead given that position to ‘One Michael Cassio’ (I.i.8-10; 19). In the play’s 
opening stages, Iago announces that he has been denied the place of  the placeholder (lieu 
place, tenant holding). Furthermore, Othello has not only denied this placement, but has 
displaced him from his loving interlocutor; ‘it is thought abroad that ’twixt my sheets | 
He’s done my office’, Iago announces: ‘I do suspect the lusty Moor | Hath leaped into 
my seat’ (I.iii.386-7; II.i.293-4). If  Iago seems put out, then, it is because Othello has not 
only put someone else in the place he felt he deserved, but has furthermore replaced him 
in his marital bed. In these circumstances, an announcement such as ‘I am not what I 
am’ (I.i.64) is not simply an announcement of  false duplicity, of  being two-faced, but of  
actually being in some crucial sense duplicate, fractured, dislocated from self.  
 
                                                             
35 Kuzner, Shakespeare as a Way of Life, p. 56. 
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ii)   ‘I AND I’: THE DISPLACED INTERLOCUTOR  
 
Describing the death of  his friend Étienne de la Boetie in his essay ‘Of  Friendship’, 
Montaigne articulates his particular grief  as entailing the irrecoverable loss of  a second 
self. Emphasising how such relationships enable man to ‘double himself ’, Montaigne 
highlights that the implications of  being so ‘glued together’ is that being ‘sundred’ enacts 
an intensely painful experience which ‘pull[s] away some piece of  our owne’.36 As 
Adriana articulates in The Comedy of  Errors, entreating Antipholus ‘not [to] tear thyself  
from me’ (II.ii.115), loss of  one’s other half  cannot occur ‘without … diminishing’ oneself  
(120). Just as Montaigne’s response to this painful experience is to replace this lost 
interlocutor by fashioning a second self  in the Essays—‘I was so accustomed to be ever 
two, and so enured to be never single, that me thinks I am but halfe my selfe’—I suggest 
that Iago responds in comparable fashion. Lovers, in Derrida’s postal formulations, ‘send 
back each other’: to lose one’s other half  is to lose this kind of  reflection.37 If  Othello has 
‘leaped into [Iago’s] seat’ and dislocated his bonds to Emilia, occupying his position as 
alter-idem—‘the thought whereof  | Doth like a poisonous mineral gnaw my inwards’ 
(II.i.294-5)—Iago responds by replacing his lost second self  with a perverse other. ‘I am 
not what I am’: with this claim, Iago shows how the dynamics of  loving ecstasy can be 
converted into a kind of  violent self-fracture.  
‘I am not what I am’ is, in many ways, the calling card of  the ecstatically fractured 
subject: never ‘at home’ but always beside or outside of  itself. An inversion of  divine 
agency—‘I AM THAT I AM’ (Exodus, 3:15)—in Iago’s keynote line of  self-gemination 
we hear echoes of  a number of  other self-divided Shakespearean characters, from Viola 
                                                             
36 Montaigne, I.27.94; I.38.121. See also Will Tosh’s exploration of such models alongside less 
familiar forms of friendship in Male Friendship and Testimonies of Love in Shakespeare’s England (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
37 Montaigne, I.27.95; Derrida, The Post Card, p. 83. 
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(who made an identical claim two years earlier in Twelfth Night) to King Lear’s Edgar and 
his enigmatically nihilistic assertion ‘I nothing am’, to Richard III as he trembles himself  
into fracture on the eve of  battle:  
 What do I fear? Myself ? There’s none else by. 
 Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I. 
 Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am.  
 Then fly. What, from myself ? Great reason why? 
 Lest I revenge. What, myself  upon myself ? 
 Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good 
That I myself  have done unto myself ? 
 Oh, no. Alas, I rather hate myself   
 For hateful deeds committed by myself. 
 I am a villain. Yet I lie; I am not. 
 Fool, of  thyself  speak well. Fool, do not flatter. 
 My conscience hath a thousand several tongues … 
 I shall despair. There is no creature loves me, 
 And if  I die, no soul will pity me.  
 Nay, wherefore should they, since that I myself 
 Find in myself  no pity to myself ?   
      (V.iii.180-201)38  
 
Richard’s self-shattering, to apply Cynthia Marshall’s term, is disorienting and painful. 
Even his claim to selfhood ‘I am I’—an assertion that seeks to unite and take possession 
of  his warring, disparate selves—is problematized by the Quarto version of  the text which 
undermines the repair offered by his narcissistic self-embrace—‘Richard loves 
Richard’—by severing the two into distinct identities: here, ‘I am I’ is ‘I and I’.39 Unable 
to balance these two selves, self-identification becomes self-annihilation for Richard: ‘I 
am … I am not’. Torn from himself, Richard cannot recover himself; ‘both voices’, notes 
Joel B. Altman, ‘speak of  the self  as ‘‘I’’ or ‘‘myself ’’, but gradually the first begins to 
cower before the unremitting, cumulative depositions of  the second’.40  
                                                             
38 I here follow the 1623 First Folio, where The Norton Shakespeare follows Q1. 
39 ‘[I]t is surely worth noting,’ comments Thomas Cartelli, ‘that Q’s “I and I” was changed to F’s 
“I am I” as early as Q2’s publication date of 1598 and in every Quarto thereafter. These changes 
suggest that the First Quarto’s “I and I” was either a printer’s mistake or was found considerably 
less instructive that “I am I” by later Quarto compositors or printers’.  
<http://digital.wwnorton.com/shakespeare3> [accessed 25/07/2017]. 
40 Joel B. Altman, The Improbability of Othello: Rhetorical Anthropology and Shakespearean Selfhood 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 270. 
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 In Shakespeare’s comedies, we see how this model works to present the restorative 
and self-constitutive potential of  the ecstatic experience, where ‘division of  yourself ’ is 
facilitated by an environment that enables ‘division [to] grow together’ (PhT, 42), where 
divided subjects are not ‘dissolved and loosed’ (Tro., V.ii.,163) but rather ‘cohere and 
jump’ (TN, V.i.246), ‘embrace’ and exit ‘hand in hand’ (Err., V.i.413; 424). ‘This general 
movement from threatening self-loss to self-recovery is’, as Rolf  Soellner notes, ‘common 
to all of  Shakespeare’s comedies and tragi-comedies’.41 Considered in this way, Viola’s 
assertion in Twelfth Night that ‘I am not what I am’ is, like Iago’s, more than a claim of  a 
duplicitously disguised self. She too has suffered violent fracture, has lost her ‘other half ’, 
her twin interlocutor, and as a result she fashions a second self  in his image. Viola is, to 
borrow Derrida’s postal metaphors once again, ‘between two “addresses”’—not merely 
the lodgings of  Orsino and Olivia that she shuttles between, but also a mutual occupancy 
of  ‘I’ and ‘I’: her dual residences of  Viola and Cesario.42 The very name ‘Cesario’ evokes 
this sense of  being parted, of  being ‘untimely ripped’ (Mac., V.vii.46) from another by 
Caesarean section, as in birth when one becomes two. Read this way, Cesario is not 
simply a disguise to enhance employment prospects, but is Viola’s ecstasy: a time outside 
of  herself.  
And, in identical fashion, her identical twin similarly fashions a second self. While 
James Stone has read Sebastian as being ‘self-sufficient because he does not need Viola 
as she needs him’, Sebastian is similarly ‘undone’ by the loss of  his twin.43 Indeed, the 
complexity of  our introduction to Sebastian in Act II, Scene i—a structural mirror of  the 
introduction to Viola in Act I, Scene ii—is often overlooked. ‘You must know of  me then, 
                                                             
41 Rolf Soellner, Shakespeare’s Patterns of Self-Knowledge (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 
1972), p. 63 
42 Derrida, The Post Card, p. 28. 
43 James Stone, ‘The Transvestic Glove-Text of Twelfth Night’, in Crossing Gender in Shakespeare: 
Feminist Psychoanalysis and the Difference Within (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 24-43 (29). 
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Antonio, my name is Sebastian, which I called Roderigo’ (II.i.13-4): while Sebastian 
might not ‘cross dress to recuperate a lost sibling’, as Stone observes, his action of  
adopting a separate identity echoes Viola: Roderigo is to Sebastian what Cesario is to 
Viola.44 Or, in an Aristotelian format:  
 Roderigo: Sebastian :: Cesario: Viola.  
These are Shakespeare’s subjective equations: his ipseic calculus. Being thrown from 
oneself  in this comic environment offers these subjects space to journey through self-
fracture and come back together again, from division to (re-)union, therefore creating an 
ecstatic moment of  ‘extricating frenzy’ (V.i.275) in the play’s conclusion that sees subjects 
returned harmoniously to themselves and the lost other.  
Shakespeare’s tragedies, however, tend to instead explore and exhibit the dangers 
of  ecstasy. A figure such as Lear, exiled from his daughter’s house and onto the stormy 
heath that lies between him and Dover, sent into, rather than ‘withdraw[ing]’ from, the 
‘contentious’, ‘pitiless storm’ that threatens to ‘turn … all to fools and madmen’ (Lr., 
II.ii.476; III.iv.6; 29; 77), experiences these dangers all too keenly. For it is in this 
geographic interim that Shakespeare will display the vulnerability of  the subject who 
stands outside of  both society and self  by creating and widening a subjective fissure—
‘who is it that can tell me who I am’ (I.iv.221, emphasis added)—to the point of  subjective 
and linguistic dissolution: ‘howl, howl, howl, howl, howl’ (IV.iv.255). This is an interim of  
self-loss—where Lear’s ‘me’ is divided from his ‘I’—that held as much tragic potential for 
Shakespeare as it did comic. ‘The King grows mad’ (III.iv.149), we learn, for this is a play 
where to go beyond is to lose control, and where self-control is always problematized by 
the extent to which identity is constituted not internally, but by others. Just as Gloucester 
must entrust himself  to Poor Tom—himself  only able to assert ‘I nothing am’, to negate 
                                                             
44 Stone, p. 29. 
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the self  and fashion it anew, once he has fled from society—Lear similarly depends on 
others to ‘tell me who I am’, to ‘keep me in temper’ (II.iii.21; I.v.38). The desire to assert 
‘I am’ and establish self-control or self-ownership is, therefore, always plagued by ‘the 
social conditions of  our very formation’: by the question, as posed by Judith Butler in 
Precarious Life, ‘Who “am” I, without you?’45 For ‘each of  us’, she continues:  
is constituted … by virtue of  the social vulnerability of  our bodies—as a site of  
desire and physical vulnerability … at once assertive and exposed … attached to 
others, at risk of  losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of  violence by 
virtue of  that exposure. … We are not only constituted by our relations but also 
dispossessed by them as well. … Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if  
we’re not, we’re missing something. … One does not always stay intact.46 
 
It is the dangerous potentialities of  Butler’s celebration of  being outside oneself  that the 
ensuing discussion explores, where taking a step beside oneself  is to risk or experience 
fracture that in Shakespeare’s tragedies all too often comes without cure. The comic 
desire, as C. L. Barber puts it, to journey ‘through release to clarification’ is unattainable 
in a tragic environment that can facilitate only projected liminality (whereby the subject 
exists in a state of  indefinite suspension, detached from itself  in a world that yields no 
promise of  a safe return) or violent fracture (where such suspension cannot hold and the 
departure from self  is permanent and irreversible). Or, more simply, release without 
clarification.47 Throughout this thesis, ecstasy has always resided at this fine line: it has 
always had the potential to cut both ways.  
Yet while Richard, Viola and Edgar are estranged from themselves by forces largely 
beyond their control, Iago conversely wills and facilitates his own self-fracturing; by 
actively throwing himself  beside himself, Iago paradoxically constitutes his self precisely 
through self-negation: ‘I am not what I am’. This is precisely what is at once so dangerous 
                                                             
45 Butler, Precarious Life, pp. 23; 22. 
46 Precarious Life, p. 20; 24; 23. 
47 C. L. Barber, Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy: A Study of Dramatic Form and its Relation to Social Custom 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959; 2012), pp. 5-10. See also Naomi Conn Liebler, 
Shakespeare’s Festive Tragedy: The Ritual Foundations of Genre (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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and so attractive about Iago’s claim. If  we find in a characteristically enigmatic claim 
such as ‘were I the Moor I would not be Iago’ (I.i.55) an assertion of  what Greenblatt 
terms ‘hypothetical self-cancellation’, then what we observe in Iago’s subsequent keynote 
claim is a subject who has not only endured self-cancellation, but has been constituted by 
it.48 In ‘I am not what I am’, the second ‘I’ is brought into existence precisely through 
having not been, and through continuing not to be, the first. Neither is false in so much 
as neither is true, but Iago inhabits both subject positions nonetheless. Iago has, indeed, 
‘gone beyond social feigning’ and has, in doing so, come into being.49 What we hear in 
Iago’s ecstatic claim is perhaps less ‘an I that will not look beyond itself ’, but rather an I 
that is always looking beyond, a model of  subjectivity that resides in projection and 
fashions itself  precisely through the act of  being thrown out: Self-Fashioning, in 
Greenblatt’s terms, through self-fracturing.50 
 Where Richard struggled for self-possession, Iago possesses himself. Iago is, as 
Eric Langley suggests, ‘the exponent of  self-perpetuating ipseity before such a thing is 
deemed philosophically or morally legitimate’.51 Acknowledging himself  as being thrown 
out of  and beside himself, Iago demonstrates a model of  divided, diffuse identity, capable 
of  projection and introspection in a way that would later become the hallmark claim of  
modern cynically-inflected subjectivity—‘I think therefore I am’—and that could already 
be heard in Montaigne’s Essays: ‘Every man lookes before himselfe, I looke within my 
selfe; I have no businesse but with my selfe … I roule me into my selfe’.52 What these 
claims acknowledge is that distance from oneself  is required in order to reflect on oneself, 
that the dislocation of  self  from self  allows one I to understand its existence in relation to 
                                                             
48 Greenblatt, p. 235. 
49 Greenblatt, p. 236. 
50 Eric Langley, Narcissism and Suicide in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 273. 
51 Narcissism and Suicide, p. 274. 
52 Montaigne, II.17.381. 
 
224 
another that reflects it back: to know itself  ‘but by reflection’ (JC., III.iii.99), as 
Shakespeare’s Ulysses would have it. The departure from self  that was encouraged by 
loving ecstasy is therefore translated into a ‘dialogue of  one’ (Donne, ‘The Extasie’, 74), 
whereby the subject still understands itself  by relation, but now does so crucially in 
relation to itself. ‘We are never ourselves wholly untill we have wholly put ourselves off ’:53 
this is the dialogic model through which, as this study has suggested, ecstatic subjectivity 
is articulated: the kind of  chronic self-reflexivity that, for George Goodwin’s 
hermaphroditic figure, discloses the ontological nothingness at the heart of  being: 
 My Selfe at-once I both displease and please:  
Without my Selfe my Selfe I faine would sease:  
For, my too-much of  Mee, mee much annoyes;  
And my Selfe’s Plentie my poore Selfe destroyes.  
Who seeks mee in Mee, in mee shall not finde  
Mee as my Selfe: Hermaphrodite, in minde 
I am at-once Male, Female, Neuter: yet 
What e’er I am, I am not Mine (I weet): 
I am not with my Selfe (as I conceive)  
Wretch that I am; my Selfe my Selfe deceive:  
Unto my Selfe, my Selfe my Selfe betray: 
I from my Selfe banish my Selfe away: 
My Selfe agree not with my Selfe a jot: 
Know not my Selfe; I have my Selfe forgot: …  
My Selfe I follow, and my Selfe I flie 
Besides my Selfe, and in my Selfe am I.54  
 
‘Besides my Selfe, and in my Selfe am I’: this final claim to simultaneous possession and 
negation of  self  holds an individualising power, one that encapsulates this chapter’s 
thinking. ‘Who seeks mee in Mee, in mee shall not finde | Mee as my selfe’: obsessively 
self-absorbed and self-defacing, Goodwin’s subject is not, in Iago’s terms, what they are—
‘at-once’ both ‘mee’ and ‘Mee’ but ‘not Mine’, never truly ‘with my Selfe’ by virtue of  
being beside that self. In this, both Goodwin’s speaker and Iago might be considered, as 
Jean-Paul Sartre would have it, to be selves who exist ‘in the perpetual mode of  
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detachment from what is’, whereby the self  finds itself  to be an ultimate nothingness and, 
in that realisation, feels most like themselves.55 What Iago exhibits is a ‘reflexive’ model 
of  selfhood—one which Charles Taylor might identify as being fashioned in response to 
‘a reflexive turn … which intensifies our sense of  inwardness and depth’—which 
establishes itself  by negating the ipseic fixity that the claim ‘I am’ designates. ‘I am not 
what I am’, therefore, because ‘I am not’ an ‘I am’, at all.56 This is a subject that resists 
such subjective stability and singularity. For Iago, as for Goodwin, ‘I am’ cannot contain 
both ‘mee’ and ‘Mee’. If  in ‘I am not what I am’ Iago ‘provides a succinct description of  
tragic subjectivity’, as Garrett A. Sullivan Jr. suggests, so too does he provide a succinct 
description of  the proto-modern, ecstatic subject: knowingly beside himself  and enjoying 
his model of  coalesced detachment.57  
‘I am not what I am’: Iago has mastered the art of  losing control, of  constituting 
himself  via displacement, and spends the play encouraging others into his rhetorical 
structure. Having gestured towards the significance of  Iago’s ecstatic claim, this 
discussion now turns to observe its echoes that reverberate throughout the text as Iago 
ventures to induct other characters into ecstatically distracted plurality. Informed by 
critics such as Michael Neill who suggest that Othello suffers ‘a violent induction into this 
new discourse of  interiority’, and Janet Adelman, who has observed the ‘extent to which 
[Iago] works to replicate his own self-division in Othello’, I shall consider how the 
representations of  ecstatic experience in this play are at a remove from those we have 
seen thus far in this study. Here, in the hands of  Iago, ecstasy is less a means of  achieving 
interpersonal experience whereby two become one, than it is a demonstration of  how 
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such relationships can fracture the single subject into two.58 Furthermore, I consider how 
the play represents these dynamics of  fracture in medical terms: first by considering how 
Cassio’s ‘unhappy brains’ contribute to his self-fracture, before moving to explore 
Othello’s ecstasy in the epileptic terms with which the play conflates it. Ecstasy, a state 
that has elsewhere in this study been attained via the divine or the beloved, will now be 
considered as a state that could be artificially inflicted onto others, and which could have 
profound physical and physiological consequences. Informed by Michael Schoenfeldt’s 
assertion that ‘temper’ belongs to ‘the earlier lexicon of  the self ’, the remaining discussion 
observes the distempered subject that, displaced from this lexicon, is estranged from 
itself.59  
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III.      ‘UNHAPPY BRAINS’: DRINKING TOWARDS DUALITY 
 
 
 Some wine, ho! 
 And let me the cannikin clink, clink,  
 And let me the cannikin clink 
 A soldier’s a man; 
 O man’s life’s but a span— 
 Why then let a soldier drink.  
 Some wine, boys!   
    (Oth., II.iii.63-8) 
 
If  the mind is to attain height, writes Montaigne in his essay ‘Of  Drunkenness’, it ‘must 
quit-it[self] and raise hir-selfe a loft, and taking the bridle in hir teeth, carrie and 
transporte hir man so farre, that afterward he wonder at himselfe, and rest amazed at his 
actions’.60 Montaigne here articulates alcohol’s ability to facilitate the act of  self-
departure, and considers the extent to which wine allows and encourages the subject to 
take an intoxicated step beyond itself. But while he may be intrigued by associations 
between drunken excess and the experience of  spiritual ecstasy—both of  which this study 
has understood to enable the subject to stand outside themselves—Montaigne is no 
advocate of  drunken experience: ‘drunkennesse … appeareth to mee a grose and brutish 
vice’:  
Other vices but alter and distract the understanding, whereas this utterly 
subverteth the same, and astonieth the body. … The worst estate of  man, is where 
he looseth the knowledge and governemen of  himselfe. And amongst other 
things, it is said, that as must wine boyling and working in a vessell, workes and 
sends upward what ever it containeth in the bottome, so doth wine cause those 
that drinke excessively of  it, [to] worke up, and breake out their most concealed 
secrets.61  
 
Drinking, in these terms, causes us to lose knowledge and control of  ourselves. While 
borrowing the central dynamics of  ecstasy—‘send[ing] upward’, ‘work[ing] up’, and 
enabling that which is contained to ‘breake out’—this experience is at a remove from the 
spiritual experiences considered earlier in this study. We saw in the Bacchic revelry of  
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Chapter One, for instance, how alcohol provided both an opportunity for unity, but could 
also occasion violent loss of  self; wine is a ‘galvanic substance’, as Roland Barthes terms 
it, which could be at once both profoundly inspirational and informative, as well as 
violently destructive.62 Throughout this thesis, ecstasy has demonstrated itself  as a 
double-edged experience, and alcohol has shown its capacity to readily transport the 
subject in either direction: alcohol, very simply, is a catalyst for the ecstatic experience, 
for better or for worse. ‘Beware of  drink’, warns divine Samuel Speed, because ‘where 
drunkenness reigns, reason is an exile’.63 ‘That quaffing and drinking will undo you’, 
Maria cautions Sir Toby in Twelfth Night (I.iii.13). While ‘we may maintain drunkennesse 
to bee profitable’, then, so too must we be aware that this ‘distempering draught’ (Oth., 
I.i.100) has the potential to ‘undo’ and ‘distemper’ its consumers.  
The fine line between ecstatic connectivity and ecstatic self-abjection, between an 
experience that is blissfully social and one that is painfully individual, is central to the 
presentation of  drinking in Act Two, Scene Three of  Othello. Obeying the entreat of  the 
Herald in the previous scene—‘it is Othello’s pleasure … that … every man put himself  
into triumph’ in celebration of  both the ‘perdition of  the Turkish fleet’ and Othello’s 
‘nuptial[s]’ (II.ii.1-7)—Iago encourages Cassio to raise a glass and join the friendly ‘night 
of  revels’ (40) enjoyed by their fellow comrades: ‘happiness to their sheets! … to the health 
of  black Othello’ (28-9). ‘This custom of  health drinking’, writes Rebecca Lemon, who 
considers the treatment of  drinking in this scene in light of  what she identifies as the 
play’s broader representation of  issues of  addiction, ‘was a prevalent one, associated with 
male communities bound in political-military unity’.64 At the outset of  the scene, then, 
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drinking is presented as a means to achieving social unity and celebration. But when 
Cassio articulates alcohol’s adverse effects—‘I have very poor and unhappy brains for 
drinking’ (30-1)—Iago’s insistence upon these rituals is no longer about achieving social 
harmony, but instead becomes an attempt to capitalise on the violent ecstasy that such 
drinking can produce. In philosopher and Protestant divine William Ames’ terms, Iago 
knows that ‘drunkennesse doe consist in the loss of  the use of  reason by drinking’, and it 
is with this notion that he translates his seemingly kind offer—‘come, lieutenant, I have a 
stoup of  wine’ (26-7)—into unkind motivation:65 
If  I can fasten but one cup upon him,   
 With that which he hath drunk tonight already,  
 He’ll be as full of  quarrel and offence … 
 Now ‘mongst this flock of  drunkards 
 Am I to put our Cassio in some action 
 That may offend the isle.   
       (44-56) 
 
Venturing to manipulate Cassio’s ‘infirmity’ to satisfy his own ends, Iago ventures to 
‘fluster’ Cassio ‘with flowing cups’ and cause him to lose himself  ‘’mongst [a] flock of  
drunkards’ (II.iii.2; 35; 37-8).  
Cassio has ‘unhappy brains for drinking’, not simply because he is ‘unfortunate 
in the infirmity’, but because drinking makes the brain unhappy. As a number of  early 
modern writers confirm, ‘excessive drinking of  wyne’ can ‘troble & distemper the brain 
& judgement of  the drinker’, for wine gives ‘the braine a blow’ and ‘spoyles the brain’.66 
In his Methode of  Phisick, Philip Barrough goes as far as to draw parallels between drinking 
and conditions such as apoplexy:  
The Apoplexie is caused of  a flegmaticke humour, that is cold, grosse and tough, 
which doth at one time aboundantly fill the principall ventricles of  the braine, 
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which humour ouermuch crudities, and chiefly dronkennes doth engender. Also 
it is caused by a fall or a blow which shaketh & bruiseth the braine, and causeth 
humours to flowe thither.67 
 
Drinking violently affects, disturbs, and distempers the brain. Observing how ‘the vapour 
of  wine mount[ed] up into the brain’, Italian writer Tomaso Garzoni discusses in a 
chapter ‘Of  Drunken Fooles’ how wine could ‘overwhelm’ the subject, ‘taking from a 
man sight, knowledge, and judgement … in an instant’.68 Pierre de la Primaudaye asserts 
the stakes as being even higher:  
Wine is hurtful for the braine, for the marrow of  the back bone, and the sinewes 
that grow out of  it. Whereby it falleth out, that this principall part beeing hurt, 
there succeede in time, great and dangerous maladies thereup, to wit, the 
apoplexie, the falling evil, the palsie, shakings, numbness of  members, 
convulsions, giddines of  the head, shrinking of  ioints, the incubus, the catalepsia, 
lethargie, frensie, rheumes, deafenes, blindenes, and shrinking of  mouth and 
lips.69 
 
Perhaps influenced by theories of  ‘Galen’ that ‘by drunkennesse commeth astonishment 
of  the brayne, the Falling sicknesse, or some maybe either to Sense or Motion’, these 
writers establish the extent to which drinking could damage the subject.70 To situate the 
representation of  drinking in this scene alongside this medical framework, therefore, is to 
observe that wine is no longer the inspiring, divine substance that was depicted in Chapter 
One. As the effects of  wine are diagnosed in terms of  ‘dangerous maladie’, examined in 
relation to their effect on the brain, these discourses bring into focus how the experience 
of  being beside oneself  was depicted in medical terms. Acknowledging the capacity of  
the ‘distempering draught’ to alter his temper, that he has ‘unhappy brains’ for this 
substance that was itself  understood to make the brain unhappy, Cassio articulates the 
ecstasy of  intoxication not as an opportunity for happy union or social bonding, but 
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rather as an intensely physical and physiological experience.  
Drinking, very simply, makes Cassio unhappy, and it is this unhappiness that 
causes him to lose himself. For if, as Sara Ahmed asserts in her consideration of  happiness 
as an affective state, ‘happiness ... puts us into intimate contact with things’, then Cassio’s 
unhappy disposition—disposed towards unhappiness—signals a move in the opposite 
direction: not towards cohesion, but towards fracture.71 The lexicon of  ‘hap’, as well 
denoting moments of  chance and fortune (as, for instance in ‘happenstance’, or ‘haply’), 
is often also involved in issues of  contact and proximity: ‘haptic’ involves touch, to ‘hap’ 
or ‘happen’ can be to ‘to take possession’ or to seize something (OED, v. 3). ‘To be “hap-
py”’, Langley observes, ‘is to be coincident—hap—in unmediated contact’.72 In this 
sense, ecstasy has been, throughout this study, an experience that drives the subject 
towards such ‘hap-py’ moments: of  union with the divine or beloved, or a moment where 
subjects feel might more ‘in touch’ with the world around them. For Cassio, however, we 
see the inverse: the ecstasy of  intoxication makes him ‘un-hap-py’: he does not happily 
coincide with himself, nor does he find himself  in ‘intimate contact with things’, but 
rather comes to violent blows with Montano: 
MONTANO  What’s the matter, lieutenant? 
CASSIO A knave teach me my duty? I’ll beat the knave into a 
twiggen bottle! 
RODERIGO  Beat me? 
CASSIO  Dost thou prate, rogue? 
MONTANO  Nay, good lieutenant! I pray, sir, hold your hand. 
CASSIO  Let me go, sir, or I’ll knock you o’er the mazzard.  
MONTANO  Come, come, you’re drunk. 
CASSIO  Drunk?  [They Fight] 
        (142-52) 
   
While Viola is ‘happy’ at the end of  Twelfth Night because ‘place, time, fortune, do cohere 
and jump’ (V.i.251-2), Cassio’s unhappiness renders him in-coherently ‘drunk’ and 
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‘speak[ing] parrot’ (275). Cassio’s ‘unhappy brains’ lead him to these un-hap-py actions, 
as drinking brings him to blows with others: actions that will in turn only intensify his 
unhappiness. Like the ‘unhappy’ Antipholus at the outset of  The Comedy of  Errors, Cassio’s 
incoherent unhappiness will similarly cause him to ‘lose [him]self ’ (Err., I.i.40). 
As Cassio attempts to assert his authority over Iago—reminding him that ‘the 
lieutenant | Is to be saved before the ensign’—while also maintaining control of  
himself—‘I am not drunk now  … you must not think, then, that I am drunk’ [Oth., 101-
2; 106; 109-10])—Iago exploits Cassio’s ‘unhappy’ disposition. Craving Cassio’s 
lieutenancy, Iago seeks to dis-place Cassio in order to take the place that he considers to 
be rightfully his. Cassio’s claims that ‘I am not drunk’ are therefore met with Iago’s 
counter that ‘he’ll watch the horologe a double set | If  drink rock not his cradle’ (121-2), 
a claim that seeks to sever Cassio from his ‘reputation’ and cause it to be ‘lost without 
deserving’ (260-1). Exploiting the fact that Cassio is ‘unfortunate in the infirmity’ (38), 
Iago inducts Cassio into his model of  self-fracture by eroding ‘the immortal part of  
[him]self ’, employing the ‘invisible spirit of  wine’ to ‘steal[s] away his brains’ (131; 254; 
271; 279-80). Where Cassio laments ‘that men should put an enemy in their mouths’ and 
thus ‘transform ourselves into beasts’ (265-6; 267-8), an alehouse critic like Richard 
Young—anatomising the problem of  drunkards and the evils of  drink in his jeremiad The 
Drunkard’s Character (1638)—would argue that ‘drunkards are worse then beasts, in that 
beasts remaine the same they were created; whereas Drunkards … suffer themselves to 
be transformed by drinke into swine’.73 ‘I have lost the immortal part of  myself—and 
what remains is bestial’ (259-60): pouring drink down Cassio’s throat, Iago supplants his 
own unhappiness onto this ‘unfortunate’ subject, and demonstrates just how easily his 
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own experience of  self-fracture can be inflicted on to others.  
With drinking, as with the ecstasies explored elsewhere in this study, comes the 
potential for transformation. ‘I am not drunk now: I can | Stand well enough’ (106-7): 
‘swagger[ing]’ (270) in his drunken state Cassio is unable to balance ‘I’ and ‘I’, signifiers 
that lack stability because their dizzied referent cannot stand still. It is in this way that this 
‘voluable’ (II.i.236), changeable, subject is translated from ‘a sensible man, by and by’ to 
‘a fool, and presently a beast—O strange!’ (281). The ‘sinne which cracks mens credits’ 
is, therefore, felt particularly strongly by Cassio, as cracks start to show in his ipseic 
foundations; as Young would put it, ‘hee looseth his credit and good name, for drunkennes defames 
a man, and takes away his reputation’.74 As Cassio laments accordingly: ‘Reputation, 
reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my reputation’ (258-9). By a drink that ‘dislikes’ 
him, Cassio is estranged from himself—‘how comes it, Michael, you are thus forgot?’ 
(197)—to the point where he is no longer like himself, and no longer likes himself: ‘one 
unperfectness shows me another to make me frankly despise myself ’ (285-6). Having 
successfully dis-placed Cassio—‘never more be officer of  mine’ (240), asserts Othello, 
woken by the drunken revelry—Iago works towards making that place his own: ‘now thou 
art my lieutenant’ (III.iii.478), Othello will later assert. Alcohol has, as Speed warned 
above, exiled Cassio from himself, and like the loving subjects of  the previous chapter he 
grieves the distance, desperately trying to get back to and recover himself: ‘I will ask him 
[Othello] for my place again’ (291). If  it was loss of  place that brought about Iago’s self-
fracture, it is apt, an unhappy co-incidence, that Cassio’s self-fracture now causes him to 
lose his place. 
While Iago might be able to balance a protean model of  ecstatic plurality (‘I am 
not what I am’), Cassio’s unhappy self-estrangement forces him not into Iago’s reflexive 
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model, but rather into a violent state of  self-loss. Compared to the plastic Iago, able to 
maintain and constitute himself  through the experience of  fracture, Cassio is friable and 
brittle. Cassio might not know the subjective flex that drunkenness facilitates, but Iago 
does: ‘good wine is a good familiar creature | If  used well’ (296-7). Under the influence 
of  both alcohol and Iago, Cassio’s sense of  self  is shattered. Like wine, to appropriate 
from Barthes, Iago is a converting substance, having ‘at [his] disposal apparently plastic 
powers’ that can drive the play’s subjects into ecstatic fracture.75 Iago demonstrates how 
easily the dynamics of  ecstasy can be thrown into discord, how easily self-knowledge can 
be corrupted, and how easily the subject can be distempered.  
 Having considered how Cassio’s ‘unhappy brains’ make him vulnerable to a 
negative, physiological ecstasis, an experience of  self-loss rather than self-location, this 
discussion moves to consider the fracture that Iago inflicts upon Othello in similarly 
medical terms. If, as R. R. Simpson suggests, ‘the use of  a medical situation to enhance 
dramatic effect is an absorbing theme worth more detailed study’, then what follows reads 
Othello’s ‘ecstasy’ (IV.i.80) alongside medical treatises of  epilepsy in order to suggest the 
extent to which Shakespeare’s conflation of  these states creates a moment that reflects 
the play’s larger concerns about subjectivity and integrity.   
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IV.   ‘FALLS IN A TRAUNCE’: OTHELLO’S EPILEPTIC ECSTASY 
 
Earthquakes and falling sickness have the same causes. Falling sickness is not a 
disease coming from nature in its regular course, or from ill health in the organism 
of  destruction of  the humors, but solely from the same causes as earthquakes, for 
the motion of  the earth is also the motion of  man and is experienced by all which 
grows on the earth. … If  the living spirit boils due to faults in its properties, it 
produces vapors which make the whole body tremble.76  
 
CASSIUS  When the fit was on him, I did mark | how he did shake…  
             (JC., I.ii.121) 
 
Lost in a corporeal storm, as Paracelsus has it, the epileptic subject is disrupted by internal 
eruptions; vulnerable to its environmental surround, it trembles, loses control and, as is 
described above, suffers internal fracture as the storm rages. Behind this metaphor lies 
the notion that the body operates as a microcosm of  the world; ‘earthquakes and falling 
sickness have the same causes’ for, as John Donne has it, ‘every Man is a little world’.77 
Indeed, believed to have been composed of  the same chemical principles—mercury, 
sulphur and salt—storm and body were seen to operate in much the same way; both exist 
in a state of  flux, at risk to external influence:78  
For a while the body of  a thunderstorm is surrounded by a shell or skin, and as 
long as the body remains whole, the effect of  mercury, sulphur and salt remains 
enclosed in it. But when the time comes, thunder disrupts its shell and breaks 
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The subject must therefore remain closed off, contained and hermetic, if  the storm is to 
be constrained. For while sulphur lies dormant in the body, it may be ignited by an outside 
force and produce vapours which, ‘communicated to the brain’, stupefy the senses and 
throw the subject into ‘Epilepsie, and trembling’:  
Paracelsus … doth oft-times define a Feaver to be an Earth-quake of  the 
Microcosm; which trembling of  the earth, he sometimes defines, to be our Falling-
sickness. … He defineth a Feaver to be a Disease of  Sulphur and Nitre; boasting, 
that the Cause, and also the Remedy, are in that his essential definition.80 
 
Writing of  his Select Observations on English Bodies (1657), Shakespeare’s son-in-law John 
Hall notes three cases of  patients ‘troubled with the Falling Sickness’.81 In the case of  
‘MR. Fortiscue aged 20’, Hall prescribes his patient a course of  opiates on June 5th, 1623, 
before drawing an ounce of  blood the following day, by which means ‘he was in a short 
time cured’.82 In this, as Stephanie Moss has noted, Hall prescribes ‘the cure suggested 
by Paracelsus to calm the traumatic corporeal storm’.83 Similarly obeying Paracelsus—
noting that ‘the Galenists’, by contrast, ‘flatter and palliate the diseases, but they do not 
cure them, which the experience of  the cure of  the Falling-sickness doth testifie’—an 
anonymous physician informs his readers of  a cure for the Falling Sickness (‘the remedies 
[being] fourfold’) to be found in ‘the seed extracted of  Piony & Poppy’.84   
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 There is, however, little hope of  a cure for Shakespeare’s epileptic sufferer. For 
Iago’s ‘dangerous conceits’, which ‘with a little act upon the blood, | Burn like the mines 
of  sulphur’ (327-31), work in much the same way as the ‘acrid’ vapours that cause ‘a 
perturbation of  the brain’.85 As Crooke confirms: ‘Epilepsy is caused when the blood is 
disquited and defiled in the veines’.86 Slowly eroding Othello’s sense and reason with 
decentring words that push him ‘to [his] compass’ (Ham., III.iii.357), to his limits, Iago’s 
poisonous words muddle and destabilise the Moor as he collapses into dizzying prose: 
Lie with her? Lie on her? We say lie on her when they belie her! Lie with her, 
zounds, that’s fulsome!—Handkerchief ! confessions! handkerchief !—To confess, 
and be hanged for his labour! First to be hanged and then to confess: I tremble at it 
… It is not words that shakes me thus …  
        [He] falls in a trance.87  
           (IV.i.35-42, emphasis added) 
 
I tremble at it… his body vibrating, his substance unsettled, Othello is no longer ‘the noble 
Moor, whom passion could not shake’ (IV.i.258). For as Iago’s ‘medicine’ sets in, ‘bloody 
passion’ begins to ‘shake … [Othello’s] very frame’ (V.ii.45), pushing him to his bodily 
limits as he simultaneously suffers the external force of  the words that Iago crams into his 
ears, and the internal pressure of  ‘the lethargy [which] must have his quiet course’. ‘If  
not’, asserts Iago, adopting a diagnostic role in a play that lacks doctors or medics, ‘he 
foams at mouth’ (49-50).  
Othello’s fit is, to my knowledge, one of  only three to occur on the early modern 
stage. Elsewhere, in Ben Jonson’s The Devil is an Ass (first performed 1616) and Volpone 
(1606), characters depict this altered state. In both instances, these fits are feigned and 
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used to comic effect. In Volpone, Voltore feigns being possessed by a demonic parasite, and 
in Act V, Scene xii, the eponymous Volpone (disguised) orchestrates the fit’s manifestation 
in front of  an audience: 
VOLPONE  They said, you were possessed; fall down, and seem so: 
   I’ll help to make it good. [Voltore falls.]—God bless the man! 
   [aside] Stop your wind hard, and swell.—See, see, see, see! 
   He vomits crooked pins! His eyes are set,  
   Like a dead hares, hung in a poulter’s shop! 
   His mouth’s running away! Do you see, signior? 
   Now ’tis in his belly.88    
 
Voltore falls when he is told, comes too when he is told—‘Look! he comes to himself !’ 
(33)—and articulates his return to self  in familiar terms: ‘Where am I?’ (34). As Volpone 
highlights various symptoms and other characters ‘reinforce the effect, the audience is’, 
as Alan C. Dessen considers, ‘treated to one of  the funniest scenes in the play’.89 In The 
Devil Is An Ass, by contrast, Fitzdottrel is the author of  his own feigned seizure:  
         [Fitzdottrel] begins his fit. 
 FITZDOTTRELL Gi’me some garlic, garlic, garlic, garlic.      
 MERECROFT  Hark, the poor Gentlemen, how he is tormented! 
 FITZDOTTRELL My Wife is a Whore, I’ll kiss her no more: and why? 
     May’st not thou be a Cuckold, as well as I? 
     Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, &c. 
 SIR POL   That is the Devil that speaks, and laughs in him.90  
               
In this lengthy ‘fit’, his observers—many of  whom are in on the trick—note ‘how he 
changes’, ‘how he foams!’ and ‘swells!’, and ‘give him more Soap to foam with’ (69). Using 
‘a little castle-soap’ (V.iii.3), Fitzdorrel mimics both the physic effects of  seizure, as well as 
other commonplace traits such as inarticulate stammers—‘buzz, buzz, buzz, buzz’; ‘O, O’; 
‘Hum!’; ‘Yellow, yellow, yellow, yellow, &c.’ (46; 48; 72; 74)—and speaking in foreign tongues 
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(a feature of  some prophetic trances known as ‘glossolalia’).91 Both plays, therefore, employ 
commonplace markers of  these fits, feigning demonic possession in order to achieve 
comic effect.92  
 Othello’s genuine seizure, by contrast, intensifies the tragedy. The play’s interest 
and investment in this altered state, and the desire to diagnose it, is evidenced by the 
significant alterations to this speech between its appearance in the 1622 Quarto (Q1), and 
its reproduction in the First Folio (F1) the following year.   
   Q1: 
Lie with her, lie on her? We say lie on her, when they bely her; lye with her, Zouns, 
that’s fulsome, handkerchers, Confession, hankerchers. 




Lye with her? lye on her? We say lye on her, when they be-lye-her. Lye with her: 
that’s fullsome: Handkerchiefe: Confessions: Handkerchiefe. To confesse, and be 
hang’d for his labour. First, to be hang’d, and then to confesse: I tremble at it. 
Nature would not invest her selfe in such shadowing passion, without some 
Instruction. It is not words that shakes me thus, (pish) Noses, Eares, and Lippes: 
is’t possible. Confesse? Handkerchiefe? O divell. 
    Falls in a Traunce.94 
 
In F1, the speech is expanded to include references to Othello’s physical state, including 
references to trembling and shaking, and furthermore the additional clarification that 
when ‘he fals downe’ (Q1), it is ‘in a Traunce’ (F1).95 In this, it is almost as though Ralph 
Crane, the scribe who is generally taken to have prepared Othello for publication in the 
Folio, felt compelled to diagnose Othello’s fall, rescripting a fall into a moment of  tranced 
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altered consciousness. The critical compulsion to diagnose this condition, as we will see 
below, is one shared by the text itself, creating a moment that, as the above versions of  
the scene demonstrate, straddles the medical and the non-medical. Unlike the feigned 
trances in Jonson’s plays, Shakespeare uses this trance moment in order to mark a 
moment of  irrecoverable subjective fracture, such that will ultimately be expressed in 
Othello’s assertion that ‘that’s he that was Othello; here I am’ (V.ii.282); as Kiernan Ryan 
notes, ‘the entire tragedy is contained in the gulf  that divides those two pronouns’.96 What 
the remainder of  this chapter considers, therefore, are the intersections between identity 
and this altered state of  consciousness. For Othello’s epileptic body, as Iago diagnoses it—
which will receive further treatment in due course—is, in both Q1 and F1, also curiously 
ecstatic: ‘I … laid good ’scuse upon your ecstasy’ (IV.i.74-5), Iago tells Othello when he 
returns to himself.  
In Chapter One, critical works by Gail Kern Paster and Tanya Pollard contributed 
to a sense of  ecstasy as a state that was more commonly experienced by the open, 
vulnerable and, consequently, female subject. In this sense, the language of  ecstasy could 
be gendered, as seen here in Iago’s claim that Othello has exhibited in his trance ‘a 
passion most unsuiting of  a man’ (78). Elsewhere, in Julius Caesar, epilepsy is used as a 
metaphor for political weakness, as Cassius reports Caesar to have suffered a fit in Spain 
and details how ‘this god did shake … as a sick girl … I did mark | How he did shake’ 
(I.ii.122-31).97 In these circumstances, to use epilepsy as an ‘’scuse’ for ecstasy has the 
deliberate effect of  undermining Othello’s strength, as both a man and as a military 
leader, to Cassio. What interests me in what follows, however, is the affinity between these 
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two states, and what might prompt, and allow, Iago to conflate these altered states of  
consciousness. If  ecstasy was, in the previous chapter, observed in the trembling pleasures 
of  erotic rapture, it is here translated into the convulsive tremors of  medical seizure. 
‘When the time comes, thunder disrupts its shell and breaks forth’: Othello is our bursting 
shell, and like so many of  the ecstatic subjects seen throughout this study, we mark how 
he breaks forth.  
 That Iago describes Othello’s ‘trance’ as both ‘epilepsy’ and ‘ecstasy’, the only 
instance of  these states being conflated on the early modern stage, has received little 
critical attention. For the most part, this is owing to the lack of  evidence for the former 
diagnosis, unless, as Sujata Iyengar notes in her exploration of  Shakespeare’s medical 
language, ‘we take [Othello’s] headache as a migrainous aura preceding the attack’ rather 
than a symbolic implication of  his supposed cuckoldom.98 Furthermore, she writes, ‘Iago 
appears to be bolstering outdated associations among epilepsy, madness, and hysteria, 
confirmed by his anticipation of  Othello’s “savage madness” if  disturbed before the fit 
outlives its course’.99 Hoeniger’s conclusion concerning Othello’s fit similarly discredits 
the episode as an epileptic one, asserting that ‘Othello’s fit is merely a short-lived trance 
caused by his overwrought emotional state’, supporting his diagnosis with the claim that 
‘Shakespeare knew the symptoms of  epilepsy, and that they do not suddenly appear 
because a man is overcome with passion’.100 And yet, as Stephanie Moss argues, ‘epilepsy 
does appear precisely because the individual is overcome with emotion’, thus suggesting 
the trance to be an embodiment of  emotional excess which would support Iago’s later 
assertion that the Moor, ‘o’erwhelmed with … passion’ (IV.i.72-3), suffered ecstasy.101 In 
Moss’ medical reading, Othello’s epilepsy, ‘whether or not Iago’s diagnosis is correct’, is 
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representative of  ‘the pinnacle of  [Iago’s] manipulations’, a state that marks Othello’s 
shift ‘from a subject to an object, from an assimilated black man to an outsider’.102 
Understood in these terms, epilepsy figures as an experience of  radical alienation and 
expulsion, not only from self, but also from society. Where diagnostic readings of  the play 
have previously focused on and taken issue with Iago’s claim that ‘my lord is in an 
epilepsy’, the following is more interested in placing this assertion alongside Iago’s 
subsequent claim that this was simply a cover, an ‘excuse [laid] upon [Othello’s] ecstasy’. 
In so doing, I will suggest how the conflation of  these two states reflects the play’s central 
issues concerning identity and selfhood. To view these states in tandem provides a lens 
through which we might better understand the significance of  Othello’s moment of  
violent physic fracture.  
 
i) DIAGNOSING TRANCES IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 
 
 
In one of  the few studies that has considered the affinity between ecstasy and epilepsy, 
Jesús López-Peláez Casellas touches on Othello’s epilepsy as ecstatic, but does so more as 
a means to reject the former diagnosis than to develop it; ‘Othello experiences an 
uncontrollable sexual arousal’, he writes, that ‘leads not necessarily to an epileptic fit … 
but to an episode that resembles an orgasm’.103 The term ‘ecstasy’ here is sexually rather 
than medically charged. But, as Helkiah Crooke hinted in the previous chapter, epileptic 
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fit and sexual orgasm need not be treated as distinct categories. In fact, it is the ecstasy of  
‘natural pleasure in generation’ that binds them together:   
For were it not that the God of  Nature hath placed heerein so incredible a sting or 
rage of  pleasure, as whereby wee are transported for a time as it were out of  our 
selves … and wee overtaken with an extasie, which Hippocrates calleth a little 
Epilepsie or falling sicknesse.104 
 
Ecstasy and epilepsy are here one and the same, and Crooke is not alone in his 
identification of  a similarity between the two. Variously described as a state which is 
‘divine, demonic, pathological, and geohumoral’, one which ‘philosophers and physicians 
alike have struggled to determine [the] nature and significance [of]’, discussions of  
epilepsy suggest the state to be just as enigmatic as ecstasy.105 But the relationship between 
these two states extends further, for not only are they similarly problematic when it comes 
to classification, but they are similar in their very nature; just as ‘sense to ecstasy were 
ne’er so thralled’ for Hamlet (III.iv.74), epilepsy similarly takes both sense and the senses 
into thraldom, ‘the whole bodye [being] depriued of  sense and motion’.106 Both ‘import 
a distraction of  the senses, a violent alienation of  the mind’; both throw the subject beside 
itself.107 There is, it seems, little to be distinguished between a subject ‘falling into Trances 
and Ecstasies’ and those who ‘lye in Trances like men having the falling sickness’: those 
who in ‘wild extasies’ suffer the ‘swelling of  their bodies and foaming at the mouth’ and 
‘they that are in a swoune [and] foaming under a Epilepsie’.108  
It is not surprising, therefore, that these tranced states were, for a number of  early 
modern writers, inextricably linked and often prone to conflation: ‘I pray what is the 
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difference between a Trance, & a fainting or swooning’, asks Meric Casaubon, from whom 
we shall hear more presently, explaining that ‘there is so much affinity, that the words may 
probably be confounded sometimes’.109 For Casaubon, as for a number of  others of  both 
medical and theological disciplines, this was precisely the problem. As Allison P. Hobgood 
notes in her consideration of  Julius Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’, ‘with increased conversion 
of  the populace to Christianity, epilepsy’s connections to divine prophecy … and ecstatic 
possession became more pronounced’, with medieval Christianity ‘recasting … epileptic 
fits as divine ecstasy’.110 In much the same way, with increased medical examination and 
interest concerning the cause and nature of  epilepsy, ecstasy began to take on a medical 
identity, and would later earn its place under an index of  ‘distempers of  the brain’, in a 
chapter on ‘Inward Diseases, and Distempers of  the Body’ in alderman Randle Holme’s 
encyclopaedic endeavour, The Academie of  Armorie (1688).111 In short, the lines between 
natural and numinous ecstasy were blurred: lines which Casaubon—asserting ‘every true, 
natural, and perfect ecstasie, to be a degree or species of  epilepsie’—would seek to clarify 
by re-situating conceptions of  the ecstatic experience among discussions of  disease.112 In 
these circumstances, the textual changes to Othello outlined above are reflective of  a 
broader compulsion to diagnose these altered states: states which, as the ‘little deaths’ in 
the previous chapter demonstrated, simultaneously captured and evaded the early 
modern medical imagination.   
 Casaubon makes his endeavour explicitly clear: ‘of  Religious Enthusiasme, truly 
and really religious’, he tells his reader, ‘nothing will be found here’.113 As its full title 
would suggest, Casaubon’s Treatise concerning Enthusiasm as It is an Effect of  Nature: but is 
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mistaken by many for either Divine Inspiration, or Diabolicall Possession departs from religious 
discussions of  enthusiasm. Instead, it seeks to establish the extent to which his readers 
might more properly understand what has been mistaken for divinely inspired enthusiasm 
(and the ecstatic condition with which he closely aligns it) as ‘proceed[ing] from naturall 
causes’.114 As we saw in Chapter One, the relationship between enthusiasm and ecstasy 
extends back to notions of  frenzy in Phaedrus, where such states of  extremis were taken as 
divine gifts to be clearly distinguished from madness brought about by disease. But, for 
Casaubon, these distinctions are less clear-cut: ‘for what if  all these pretend enthuiasticall 
Divinations,’ he asks, ‘by Oracles, or other ways, were but mere Gulleries and Impostures 
to get money … and to amaze credulous and superstitious people?’115 What if  moments 
of  enthusiasm and ecstasy could simply be feigned for financial gain? Could these states 
be brought about by other (natural) means and mistaken for true divine inspiration? 
Could ecstasy be voluntary? Though he does not deny that states like enthusiasm and 
ecstasy exist, Casaubon’s Treatise displays a scepticism as to the veracity of  claims of  divine 
possession, in particular those found in The Life of  Sister Katherine of  Jesus (1628). This text, 
notes Paul J. Korshin, ‘is little more than an attempt, obviously fostered by the Jesuit party 
in France, to persuade potential converts by the inspired quality of  the Catholic 
faithful’.116 Suspicious of  its supernatural claims and, as an Anglican scholar, to some 
extent biased against its French Catholic author, Casaubon expresses his philosophical 
doubts of  the source, doubts which would govern his tone of  enquiry in his Treatise:  
I found the book to be a long contexture of  severall strange raptures and 
enthusiasms, that had hapned unto a melancholick, or if  you will, a devout Maid. 
In this I saw no great matter of  wonder: Neither could I observe much in the 
relation of  the particulars, but what as I conceived, rationally, probable; so I might 
believe, charitably, true. I could observe, as I thought, a perpetuall coherence of  
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naturall causes, in every particular; which gave me good satisfaction.117  
 
In coming to write his Treatise, Casaubon engages in a number of  discussions that sought 
to highlight and examine the widening gap between medical and religious perceptions of  
claimed possessions. The Doctor’s claims in Macbeth that the Queen’s ‘disease is beyond 
my practice’, and that ‘more needs she the divine than the physician’ (V.i.52; 67) in many 
ways reflect the uncertainty among early modern physicians and theologians alike when 
diagnosing cases of  possession.  
These anxieties about diagnosis were more pronounced with regards to the 
medical theory surrounding female pathologies, with possessed and hysterical subjects 
demonstrating similar ‘symptoms’. In early modern England, such concerns manifested 
themselves in cases such as that of  Mary Glover: a fourteen-year-old suffering from a 
seemingly incurable disease. As Michael MacDonald notes in his study of  Glover’s 
affliction and the intersections between discourses of  witchcraft and hysteria: 
As the doctors were trying and failing to diagnose and cure Mary Glover, her fits 
became more regular, more spectacular and more frightening. … Glover also fell 
into trance-like states and suffered contortions every time she ate. Her 
extraordinary fits occurred whenever she was in the company of  Elizabeth 
Jackson … [and] became a kind of  show. … The house was jammed with people 
… [it] had become a kind of  theatre.118  
 
Whether Glover was suffering from organic illness or demonic possession was ultimately 
decided in court, with Edward Jorden, a member of  the College of  Physicians, unable to 
suggest a cure for her disease: ‘it is not naturall’, ruled Sir Edmund Anderson, the 
presiding judge of  the case.119 But when Jorden came to write his Briefe Discourse on the 
Suffocation of  the Mother in 1603—less than a year after the Glover trial—he would note 
the cases of  a number of  women ‘in the fit of  the Mother, that was besides her selfe’ and 
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conclude that ‘the peturbations of  the minde are often to blame for this and many other 
diseases’:  
For seeing we are not maisters of  our owne affections, wee are like battered Citties 
without walles, or shippes tossed in the Sea, exposed to all maner of  assaults and 
daungers, even to overthrow our owne bodies …We haue infinite examples … of  
such as haue dyed uppon … such like perturbations of  the mind: and of  others 
that upon the same causes haue fallen into grievous diseases: as … the Falling 
sickenesse, Apoplexies, Madnesse, Swounding, Palsies, and diverse such like 
infirmities upon the like causes.120  
 
Once again we are reminded of  the importance of  boundaries: of  ‘bodies’ that can be 
‘overthrow[n]’ by dangerous assaults of  invading enemies. Nicholas Breton’s political 
message at the outset of  this chapter—which emphasized unity over division through 
metaphors of  a city that could be endangered by the slightest breach—here accrues 
medical resonance. Likening the sick body to a ‘battered cit[y] without walls’, Jorden 
maps Breton’s obscure geographies onto the medicalised body; an ‘unkind breach’ (Oth., 
IV.i.213) in the body or mind could, by these accounts, render the body susceptible to 
sickness, to ‘peturbations of  the mind’, to ‘falling sickness’ and ‘diverse such like 
infirmities’. In this way, we see clearly the dangers of  allowing the self  to be breached, of  
opening the self  up to others, in the terms that the loving subjects of  the previous chapter 
demanded. Unity is safe, and from Cassio’s ‘infirmities’ to Othello’s ‘Falling sicknesse’, 
Shakespeare demonstrates in medical terms how dangerous division can be.  
Finding himself  at a strange intersection between the natural and the numinous, 
between real and performed trances, Jorden is pushed to the limits of  his medical 
knowledge, driven by the compulsion to locate a diagnosis for what was considered as 
being beyond the interpretive capacity of  physicians and theologians alike. This was the 
substantial interpretive crux that occupied Casaubon and, like Jorden, he sought to 
dislocate these tranced states—including Melancholici, maniaci, ecstatics, phrenetici, epileptic 
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within his catalogue—from their religious roots; instead he moves to explore them as 
diseases brought about by a ‘concurrence of  Naturall Causes’, something that he assures 
his readers ‘is granted by all Physicians and Naturalists … Nobody doubts that’.121 
‘Endeavour[ing] to reduce divers ecstaties to naturall causes’, Casaubon quickly 
establishes the state as being ‘sometimes taken for a bodily disease’, proceeding from 
natural causes and curable by natural remedy.122 The thrust of  Casaubon’s Treatise is his 
belief  that Enthusiasme and (false) claims to divine inspiration could be explained ‘upon 
some grounds of  nature’, and that what were taken by some for revelations and 
manifestations of  the Holy Spirit were in fact symptoms of  Melancholy.123 ‘In this 
respect’, notes Michael Heyd, Casaubon ‘continued to develop a traditional line in 
Anglican thought which went back to the turn of  the century’, one which ‘was clearly 
expressed … in Burton’s Anatomy of  Melancholy’.124 Like Burton, ‘possibly under his 
influence’, Casaubon calls upon an array of  traditional medical sources in making his 
point.125 In his chapter, ‘On Contemplative and Philosophicall Enthusiasme’, we are 
introduced to a number of  ‘particular examples’ of  ecstatic and epileptic sufferers, the 
first being a woman, in a case mentioned by Terullian (c.160-220 AD) who ‘in ecstasies of  
the spirit happen unto her at Church’ claimed ‘(in her fits) [to] converse with Angels: sometimes with 
the Lord himselfe’.126 Yet ‘[s]uch an ecstaticall woman’, he concludes, was less divinely 
inspired than she ‘was much troubled with melancholy’.127 Similar revelations follow for 
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his subsequent subjects: ‘so many we take into the number of  ecstaticall men’.128 Whether 
or not ecstasies were authentic was therefore difficult to gauge; in this climate a false 
prophet such as Joan of  Arc may be taken for the real thing—‘the spirit of  deep prophecy 
she hath | Exceeding the nine Sibyls of  old Rome’ (1Henry4, I.ii.29-30)—while the 
‘raptures’ and accurate foresight of  sibylline figures such as Cassandra will be diagnosed 
as ‘mad’ and ‘brain-sick’ (II.ii.122).129  
Moving to consider more recent cases, Casaubon’s next study is of  a baker’s son 
in Oldenburgh in 1581 who, beaten with ‘fists’, subsequently suffered ‘diverse terrible fits’ 
of  ‘Epilepsie’ from which, rather than recovering from, he later ‘fell into ecstasies … 
without either sense or motion’.130 Another contemporary case, this time of  a Maid in 
Fribourg in 1560, brings him to the similar conclusion that their ‘ecstasies were 
epilepticall fits’.131 All these examples, ancient and contemporary, served to demonstrate 
that these mystical experiences, trances and ecstasies were pathological symptoms: 
Truly I do not see any cause to believe that in any of  these many Visions or 
Ecstasies, there was anything at all supernaturall, either divine or diabolicall, more 
then is in every common disease.132  
 
And subscribing to this naturalistic understanding of  ecstasy, Casaubon would briefly 
consider how it might function as any other disease:   
I will not make question of  it … but I desire only to propose it, that learned 
Naturalists and Physicians may (if  they please) consider it; whether it be probable 
or possible, that naturall Ecstasies and Enthusiasms … should be contagious: 
though not contagious in the same manner as the Plague, or the Pox is; yet 
contagious in their kind.133  
 
This is precisely the proposition that would come to occupy the next generation of  critics 
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of  enthusiasm, which was understood as being what Daniel Lindmark terms ‘the 
preaching disease’ in his discussion of  contagious ecstasy in eighteenth-century 
Sweden.134 Here he quotes Olof  Celsius, president of  the Stockholm Consistory, writing 
of  what was by 1776 not merely a proposition, but an established diagnosis:  
The consequences of  this enthusiasm may be less dangerous as long as the 
infection is restricted to certain individuals. But since it has really proved to be 
contagious, just like certain diseases, it is believed that entire crowds of  people 
may be easily infected in the meanwhile, damaging the country and agitating the 
congregation.135  
 
A century on from Casaubon’s proposition, conceptions of  ecstatic phenomena continue 
to situate themselves between medical and theological thought. Here we find answers to 
Casaubon’s question as to whether ecstasy might be in some sense contagious, most 
notably in works such as French physician Philippe Hecquet’s pamphlet on those suffering 
les maladies de l’epidemie convulsionnaire (1733), a work which considers convulsions as not 
brought about by divine or demonic intervention, but rather understands them as 
psychological phenomenon born of  an agitated imagination: ‘an actual soul fever’, to 
borrow a phrase from German Philosopher Christoph Martin Wieland.136 What was for 
Casaubon merely a passing thought, therefore, would be explored in full a century later 
as debates surrounding the ecstatic condition continued. 
These debates also, however, as I have been suggesting, precede Casaubon’s study: 
just as these lines of  enquiry were carried forward, these questions about the nature of  
these altered states were ones which he inherited from an array of  early modern writers. 
Indeed, Casaubon’s consideration that ecstasies could be ‘contagious in their kind’ would 
by no means have been alien to an early modern audience. We saw in Chapter One how 
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early modern writers, informed by Longinus’ theories about the sublime impact of  words 
upon the body, considered the potential for one ecstasy to beget another. In his treatise 
on poetry, for instance, Henry Dethick (1547/8 - c.1613) celebrates poets who could 
experience ‘a burning ardour of  mind, as if  in a kind of  violent impulse’, and could bring 
about a similar experience for their listeners.137 In An Apology of  Poetry, Philip Sidney 
likewise observes the intense ‘heart-ravishing’ potential of  poetry which could ‘strike, 
pierce’ and ‘possess’ the soul.138 Poetry could carry hearers away from themselves: the 
ecstasy of  a poet could bring about ecstasies in its audience members. Elsewhere, in 
Hamlet—a play that repeatedly identifies the ear as a location of  danger, as a vulnerable 
entry way into the body and mind—Ophelia’s ‘speech’ is reported as having the potential 
to ‘move | The hearers to collection’ (IV.v.8-9), and Hamlet’s ‘words’ strike Gertrude ‘like 
daggers’. In these models, subject and soul could all too easily be moved by words that 
entered the ear.  
We might, therefore, situate Casaubon’s suggestion alongside the early modern 
medical discussions heard above, where epilepsy was understood as emanating from 
harmful vapours. This is precisely what underpins Casca’s fears that that which brought 
about Caesar’s fit might also pose a threat to him: 
And still as [Caesar] refused it the rabblement hooted, and clapped their chopped 
hands, and threw up their sweaty nightcaps, and uttered such a deal of  stinking 
breath because Caesar refused the crown that it had almost choked Caesar, for he 
swooned and fell down at it. And for mine own part, I durst not laugh, for fear of  
opening my lips and receiving bad air.  
      (JC., I.ii. 242-8)  
 
Fearing the ‘infection of  air’ as capable of  bringing about ‘most contagious diseases, as 
the falling sicknesse’, Casca reflects an anxiety in the early modern period concerning the 
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contagious nature of  epilepsy.139 Pinpointing ‘stinking breath’ as the cause of  Caesar’s 
falling sickness, Casca insists upon the ‘geohumoral quality’ of  this altered state, aligning 
it with ‘filthy utterances’, as Hobgood observes.140 What, in early modern medical 
treatises, are considered ‘noxious vapours’ are here represented as ‘bad air[s]’; airs which 
to receive have the same violent effect on the body:141 
CASSIUS But soft, I pray you; what, did Caesar swoon? 
CASCA He fell down in the market-place, and foamed at mouth,  
and was speechless. 
BRUTUS ’Tis very like; he hath the falling sickness.   
        (249-52) 
 
Falling back on scientific discourse to explain Caesar’s epilepsy, Casca emphasizes this 
state as pathological rather than divine: as a transmissible medical condition. As Hobgood 
writes: ‘If  Caesar can be moved to swoon and foam, so might he’.142  
 
ii)   ‘THAT’S HE THAT WAS OTHELLO’: OTHELLO’S DISPLACED SELF 
 
Shakespeare dramatizes the full potential of  Casca’s fears when coming to write Othello, 
where the bad airs that circulate are equally dangerous. Given the outbreaks of  plague 
that London was enduring over these years (namely the major outbreak in 1603 from 
which it was still recovering), contagious breath was of  course less a metaphor and more 
a threatening reality for the early modern theatregoer; ‘what will not kill a man if  vapours 
will?’, asks Donne, articulating a contemporary anxiety surrounding man’s relationship 
to his environment.143 By focusing on the infectious nature of  Iago’s speech, we can 
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observe the dramatic potential of  Casaubon’s claim. As Longaville tells us from across 
the canon, ‘vows are but breath, and breath a vapour is’, thus implicating the dangers of  
Othello and Iago’s ‘vapour-vow[s]’ (LLL, IV.iii.63; 65): 
 OTHELLO Now, by yon marble heaven,  
   In the due reverence of  a sacred vow,  
   I here engage my words. 
 IAGO        Do not rise yet.  
    Iago kneels 
   Witness, you ever-burning lights above, 
   You elements that clip us round about, 
   Witness that Iago doth give up 
   The execution of  his wit, hands, and heart,  
   To wronged Othello’s service. Let him command,  
   And to obey shall be in me remorse, 
   What bloody business ever.   
       (III.iii.454-64) 
 
In a play that makes the power of  words all too clear—where ‘hearts are piercèd through 
the ear’ (I.iii.204) and the art of  telling stories is deemed no less powerful than witchcraft 
(I.iii.129-70)—we cannot fail to recognise the dangerous potential that lies within these 
exchanges. Binding themselves together in what a number of  critics have identified as per 
verba presenti vows, this engagement of  words follows a scene that brings into focus the 
material consequences of  the imagination.144 ‘I have a pain upon my forehead here’ (282): 
though Othello’s pain here is principally taken to signify his cuckoldom as horns push 
through his skull, we can all too easily comprehend that Othello here experiences 
something akin to Gonzalo’s pain in The Tempest, as Stephano and Trinculo ‘cram … 
words [into] his ears against | The stomach of  [his] sense’ (II.i.107-8).  
The hearing process, as explained by Helkiah Crooke, is one of  violent invasion, 
whereby ‘sound sealeth or stampeth in the ayre the species or forme of  the sound, and 
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… driueth it on vnto the instrument of  hearing which … receiue[s] those species, and 
must like-wise be mooued’.145 ‘My Lord, I see you’re moved’ (Oth., III.iii.228): taking the 
early modern anatomist’s conception of  the mouth and ear as connected in a circulatory 
system, whereby ‘inward air’ is continually replaced and refreshed, Iago’s interruptions 
throughout Act III, Scene iii can be understood as preventing Othello from expelling the 
poisoned aire which, ‘implanted in the instrument of  hearing’, is trapped inside his 
body.146 A common feature of  early modern plague literature, the process of  purgation 
is delayed in Othello: 
 
 IAGO  I know not that; but such a handkerchief— 
   I am sure it was your wife’s—did I today 
   See Cassio wipe his beard with. 
 OTHELLO                  If  it be that— 
 IAGO  If  it be that, or any, it was hers.  
   It speaks against her with the other proofs.   
         (437-42) 
 
These are, to appropriate from Joesph du Chesne’s Practise of  Chymicall and Hermeticall 
Physicke (1605), but ‘fumes and smoakie evaporations procéeding from burnt or scorched 
blood’, ‘fuming matter’ that is ‘lifted up and carried into the braine, and therin set an fire, 
stir[ing] up Meteors, long madnesses, burning phrenzies … paines of  head, [and] falling 
sicknesses’.147 If, as Allison K. Deutermann observes, ‘it is by stopping the mouth of  this 
dazzling storyteller and, at the same time, stuffing his ears with poison that Iago works 
upon him’, then Moss’s earlier suggestion that Othello’s fit represents ‘the pinnacle of  
Iago’s manipulations, the “medicine” that contaminates both the body and the spirit of  
the Moor’, finds medical support in Thomas Blount’s Glossographia (1656):   
Epilepsie (epilepsia) the Falling-sickness … is caused by some humor or vapour; 
suddenly stopping the passage of  spirits in the brain, which the brain striving to 
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expel, causeth [t]he Patient to fall down, and commonly foam at the mouth.148  
 
Understood this way, Othello’s ecstatic epilepsy is brought about, in Francis Bacon’s 
terms, by the ‘Grossenesse of  [Iago’s] Vapours, which rise and enter [through the ear and] 
into the Cells of  [his] Braine’.149 Indeed, Casaubon himself  notes that to be enthusiastic is 
to be ‘replenished with wind’, to be under the influence (or inflowance) of  the airs and 
spirits that surround us.150 Othello thus exhibits the dramatic potential of  Casaubon’s 
proposition that ecstasy, like enthusiasm and epilepsy, might be in some sense 
transmissible. In considering the ‘extent to which [Iago] works to replicate his own self-
division in Othello’, this chapter has demonstrated how such self-fracture could be read 
in the light of  period medical discourses surrounding the ecstatic experience. If  ecstasy 
could be transmissible, I have suggested—if  ‘a burning ardour in the mind’ of  the poet 
could have ‘a kind of  violent impulse’ on audience members, if  words could violently 
‘move’ their hearers—this medical reading demonstrates how Iago’s ‘dangerous conceits’, 
which ‘burn like mines of  sulphur’, bring about Othello’s ‘violent induction into this new 
discourse of  interiority’.151 
Shakespeare employs this trance state to enhance the dramatization of  a violent 
moment of  self-fracture, an intensely physiological instance of  the radical fracturing 
experienced by the subjects who suffer ecstasy in Othello. Where Iago is able to inhabit an 
ecstatic model of  being—‘I am not what I am’—and control the extent to which he is 
received by others as ‘brave Iago, honest and just’ (V.i.31), Othello is unable to recuperate 
from being thrown beside himself, and consequently loses all sense of  self-address. In 
bidding ‘farewell [to] content’, as we heard above, Othello is given over to ecstasy, but 
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unlike Iago he cannot master the art of  losing control. Instead, from the moment of  
Othello’s physical collapse, we see a subject not successfully negotiating a state of  
sustained dislocation, but a subject that is fractured beyond repair: he ‘whom our full 
Senante [can no longer] call all in all sufficient’ (IV.i.256-7), he that was Othello. Once 
sent out to his beloved, Othello now finds himself  without destination, without a loving 
interlocutor, and it ‘shakes [him] thus’. ‘Farewell the tranquil mind, farewell content’ 
(III.iii.350): Othello here displays an awareness of  his self-fracturing, and finds himself  







Thrown beside himself, Othello’s moment of  ecstatic and epileptic rupture is at a far 
remove from the ecstasies enjoyed by the subjects elsewhere in this study, and indeed the 
ecstasy of  romantic union of  Act II, Scene i, as discussed by Kirsch. But neither moment 
constitutes, in Kirsch’s terms, the ‘most ecstatic moment in the play’. Indeed, a challenge 
to this kind of  claim—and the implication that ecstasy has a singular, stable meaning, 
designating a particular emotion, measurable in a specific way—has run, implicitly, 
throughout this examination of  ecstasy. The play is, as this chapter has suggested, deeply 
wrought with subjects who exhibit the self-shattering potential of  what Butler famously 
terms ‘precarious life’: subjects who know what it means to suffer ecstasy. Iago’s victims 
function as dangerous exemplars of  what it means to live interpersonally, to take a step 
outside and beyond oneself, but it is not until the play’s closing stages that we see this 
exhibited most forcefully. For, while an examination of  the dangers of  ecstasy has 
repeatedly drawn us to moments of  violent self-fracture, we find its apotheosis not in a 
literal moment of  ecstasy, but in Othello’s final speech:  
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 Soft you, a word or two before you go. 
 I have done the state some service, and they know’t; 
 No more of  that. I pray you in your letters,  
 When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,  
 Speak of  me as I am. Nothing extenuate, 
 Nor set down aught in malice: then must you speak 
 Of  one that loved not wisely, but too well; 
 Of  one not easily jealous, but being wrought, 
 Perplexed in the extreme; of  one whose hand,  
 Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away 
 Richer than all his tribe; of  one whose subdued eyes,  
 Albeit unused to the melting mood, 
 Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees 
 Their medicinable gum. Set you down this; 
 And say besides that in Aleppo once, 
 Where a malignant and a turbaned Turk 
 Beat a Venetian and traduced the state,  
 I took by th’ throat the circumsised dog 
 And smote him - thus. 
    He stabs himself.    
      (V.ii.336-54) 
 
‘Speak of  me as I am; nothing extenuate’: drawn into Iago’s world of  plural and diffuse 
identity, Othello now acknowledges himself  as both instrument of  and servant to the 
Venetian state, and as the Turk, ‘the circumsisèd dog’, despised and feared throughout 
Venice. Succinctly, he here acknowledges the paradox of  one being two. The ‘heavy 
interim’ between ‘him - thus’—where punctuation punctuates gesture—is one that draws 
together both language and action, but also self  and self. Such an interim has been crucial 
to this study’s consideration of  ecstasy, from ecstatic subjects who sought to collapse the 
distance between themselves and the divine through prayer and meditation, to the 
merging of  bodies in the lover’s kiss or sexual encounter. Indeed, Othello’s suicide here 
neatly echoes Juliet’s identical gesture in the previous chapter: one that would bring about 
a final ecstasy with Romeo. ‘Thus’ Othello similarly brings his fractured selves into violent 
contact and, in so doing, allows one half  to recuperate for the failings of  the other: a 
‘single violet transplant’ (Donne, ‘The Extasie’, 37) of  redemptive union. This is the 
tragedy of  divided identity that Robert N. Watson observes as being implicit in both 
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Othello’s name—‘decipherable as ‘Ottoman’ with an Italian suffix’—and at the 
overarching level of  the play’s title which presents both Othello and the Moore of  Venice.152 
In this self-suicidal gesture, Othello collapses the gap between the turbaned Turk and the 
Venetian and, as Janet Adelman writes, ‘returns via suicide to a purely martial mode’.153 
Here Othello (or rather ‘he that was’) seeks to fix the ruptured verb ‘to be’ and distil 
himself  back to singularity, back to distinction: ‘speak of  me as I am’. For this is an ‘I am’ 
that cannot be inverted or displaced by Iago, who now retreats into silence and ‘never 
will speak word’ (302). To re-appropriate Adelman, then, Othello here returns via suicide 
to a mode of  purity and singularity, to a coherence of  subjectivity, to ‘grace in all 
simplicity’ (PhT, 54). Only in throwing himself  beside himself  can the Moor recover and 
restore himself: self-control only through self-loss. To recall Michel Serres’ claim, heard 
in the early stages of  this thesis, ‘no one who has not experienced ecstasy can know what 
being together means’.154  
Trembling on the verge of  subjective fracture, the subjects of  this chapter know 
what it means to suffer ecstasy. For the subject in sufferance is, as Jean-Luc Nancy would 
have it, always to some extent ecstatically beside itself: ‘“I am suffering”’, Nancy writes, 
‘implies that there are two “I”s, each one foreign to the other (yet touching) … in “I am 
suffering”, one “I” rejects the other “I”’.155 As we have seen, identity and sense of  self  
can be located precisely at this point of  painful rejection and self-fracture. In ‘“I am in 
ecstasy”’, Nancy continues, ‘one I exceeds the other’, goes beyond, is thrown beside itself, 
and in so doing is forced not to see itself  as equal to itself, but rather to locate itself  via 
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displacement.156 Othello, I have suggested, is a play that similarly establishes a model of  
identity that resides elsewhere. The first step in Iago’s induction to contemporary 
consciousness is to bring subjects to the realisation that they are not themselves, that the 
self  is not a stable, fixed entity. As Nancy articulates: 
The soul differs from itself  with a trembling—nothing more than a shuddering 
and a pulsation, which makes it swoon and offers its identity in the collapse. 
Trembling differentiates, defers, identity: that is how identity is given.157  
 
Identity, this chapter has suggested, resides not in the ‘simple adequation (I=I)’, nor in 
the statement ‘I am’. Instead, identity is formed by a sense of  self  that resides beyond the 
self. The experience of  being inducted into this plural, flexible model, as Nancy implies, 
necessarily brings about a trembling, perhaps a temporary swoon or a moment of  
collapse. Indeed, the ecstatic tremble that has punctuated accounts of  ecstasy throughout 
this study often occurs at the moment when ecstasy brings the subject into a threshold 
space between disparate selves. The challenge of  a realisation such as ‘I am not what I 
am’, an experience of  self-abjection which the ecstatic subjects of  this study variously 
share, is that it requires the subject to recognise that identity is constituted somewhere in-
the-between: be it the space between pronouns, or the interim between subject and divine 
or beloved in which relation occurs. While the fracture of  ecstasy might, in Serres’ terms, 
help the subject realise what it means to be together, it also highlights the extent to which 
such togetherness is not permanent. As Judith Butler had it: ‘we’re undone by each other. 
And if  we’re not, we’re missing something. … One does not always stay intact’. With 
autonomy comes abjection, and vice versa. The ecstatic tremble denotes a subject that 
will be thrown from itself  again. And necessarily so, for, as Nancy identifies, ‘that is how 
identity is given’. Ecstasy may only be a temporary experience or a fleeting encounter, 
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but to observe a model of  a self  that can fracture and be fractured, depart and return, 
that can recognise that its relationships and experiences render it simultaneously ‘simple’ 
and ‘compounded’ (PhT, 46), might just suggest the extent to which Renaissance selfhood 





‘We are never in ourselves, but beyond’ 
 
In his essay ‘On practice’, Montaigne describes an encounter with death. Having 
‘fortuned one day, for recreation-sake, to goe forth and take the ayre’, he had an accident 
on the journey home that would leave him on the brink of  death:  
The nagge lay along astonied in one place, and I in a trance groveling on the 
ground ten or twelfe paces wide of  him; my face all torne and brused, my sword 
which I had in my hand a good way from me, my girdle broken, with no more 
motion or sense in me then a stocke. It is the onely swowning that ever I felt yet. 
Those that were with me, after thy had assayed all possible meanes to bring me 
to my selfe againe, supposing me dead, tooke me in their armes, and with much 
adoe were carying me home to my-house, which was about halfe a french league 
thence.1 
 
Thrown from his horse, Montaigne suffers a little death: a ‘trance’—‘the onely swowning’ 
he had ‘ever … felt yet’—from which, seemingly, he could not be revived. ‘After I had for 
two houres space, by all, bin supposed dead and past all recoverie’, Montaigne continues, 
‘I began to stir and breathe’.2 As he slowly comes to, ‘little by little’ Montaigne becomes 
aware of  the accident’s effect on his body—he gets to his feet and vomits the ‘great 
aboundance of  blood [that] was falne into my stomacke’—but even more so, he begins 
to appreciate the encounter’s effect on his soul: 
Me thought, my selfe had no other hold of  me, but of  my lippes-ends. I closed 
mine eyes, to helpe (as me seemed) to send it forth, and tooke a kind of  pleasure 
to linger and languishingly to let my selfe goe from my selfe. It was an imagination 
swimming superficially in my minde, as weake and as tender as all the rest: but in 
truth, not onely exempted from displeasure, but rather commixt with that 
pleasant sweetenesse, which they feele that suffer themselves to fall into a soft-
slumbring and sense-entrancing sleepe.3  
 
Montaigne’s self, Montaigne’s life, here resides on the tip of  his lips: at the threshold of  
                                                             
1 Montaigne, Essays, II.6.205 
2 Ibid. 
3 Montaigne, II.6.206-7. 
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the body, suspended on the brink of  departure. Lingering and languishing there, 
Montaigne willingly sends himself  ‘forth’, and finds ‘a kind of  pleasure’, a ‘pleasant 
sweetnesse’ in the experience of  letting ‘my selfe go from my selfe’. Thrown from himself, 
Montaigne enjoys the ecstasy of  this temporary departure. 
I turn to Montaigne here, in part, because his experience seems to me a 
celebration of  what could otherwise be thought of  as a particularly painful moment of  
ecstasy, but also because his articulation of  being beside himself  resonates with the 
experiences of  many subjects as seen throughout this study. As with discussions of  sublime 
ecstasy in Chapter One, Montaigne recalls how this experience was like ‘a flashing or 
lightening, that smote my soule with shaking, and that I came from another world’.4 Like 
Hamlet, he feels himself  ‘yeelding up the ghost’, and like Erasmus, Demetrius, and 
Bottom, he articulates the experience of  his soul ‘as in a cloud …’: 
They came not from my self. All which notwithstanding, I knew neither whence 
I came, nor whither I went, nor could I understand or consider what was spoken 
unto me. … Whatsoever the soule did assist … was but a dream, being lightly 
touched, and often sprinkled by the soft impressions of  the senses.5  
 
Like Venus, Montaigne asserts his life and self  as hanging by the tip of  his lips; like Juliet, 
he finds how deathly ecstasy can be. ‘To say truth’, he asserts, ‘it had beene a very happy 
death’. Montaigne—whose Essays elsewhere reveal his attempts at self-control, his desire 
to keep himself  in the saddle—here concedes that being beside oneself, while having the 
potential to be a dangerous and painful experience, could also be pleasurable. 
Furthermore, as the remainder of  his essay goes on to suggest, such temporary loss of  
self  catalyses a desire for further discovery and knowledge of  self. As Felicity Green has 
observed, this ecstatic experience begins Montaigne’s ‘study of  the soul’, and it is in 
recalling this moment that Montaigne is prompted to digress into the study of  himself: 
                                                             
4 Montaigne, Essays, II.6.209. 
5 Ibid., II.6.208. 
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‘Many yeares are past since I have no other aime, whereto my thoughts bend, but my 
selfe, and that I controule and study nothing but my selfe’.6 Montaigne, who, as Ann 
Hartle has considered, ‘always comes upon himself  by accident’, here reveals the 
experience of  being thrown from himself, of  temporarily losing himself, to have 
motivated him to find himself, and to understand more fully what the self  is.7   
By bringing together discussions of  ecstasy by theologians, philosophers, 
physicians, dramatists, and poets, this thesis has brought to light the extent to which this 
altered state held a curious fascination for a range of  early modern writers. A key aim of 
this thesis has been to reveal the complex, multivalent nature of ‘ecstasy’; each chapter 
in turn has shown how the word denoted a range of different experiences—from drunken 
revelry, to religious rapture, sexual encounter, or medical seizure—and how this state 
could be experienced in a variety of ways: spatially, temporally, physically, and 
psychologically. I have also shown through a number of close readings how experiences 
and representations of ecstasy are often symptomatic of broader issues at play: from the 
force dynamics in dramas such as Hamlet and A Midsummer Night’s Dream, to the pacing of 
desire in Venus and Adonis and Romeo and Juliet, to experiences of fracture and displacement 
in Othello. Although I have focused on these texts, I have also, where appropriate, drawn 
on passages from other works in order to demonstrate how Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries present a sense of interiority which renounces any essentialist claim to 
coherence, and instead come to an appreciation of the productively flexible and 
precarious nature of selfhood.   
As shown in Chapter One, early modern conceptions of ecstasy as both a painful 
and pleasurable experience were informed by classical thought, which understood 
                                                             
6 Felicity Green, ‘Montaigne’s Soul’, in Passions and Subjectivity in Early Modern Culture, ed. Brian 
Cummings (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), pp. 95-112 (95). 
7 Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 86. 
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ecstasis as both an opportunity for interaction and union with the divine or beloved, while 
also holding the potential for violent subjective fracture. This chapter provided context 
as to why ‘ecstasy’ might often be glossed as ‘madness’ or ‘frenzy’, as well as introducing 
a range of other words and states that belong to the ‘ecstatic’ lexicon, such as abjection, 
distraction, enthusiasm, inspiration, transformation, trance, and rapture. The second 
chapter of this study moved from classical texts to the early modern period, and explored 
in detail the dominant narratives of religious ecstasy inherited by Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries. In so doing, it demonstrated how the ecstatic experience was frequently 
articulated in terms of movement, ascension, and journeying, and demonstrated how 
ecstasy could be read as a spatial experience. Furthermore, it explored the ways in which 
commonplace narratives of religious ecstasy—which emphasize the experience of 
journeying out of oneself in order to return home to and unite with a divine other—
provided writers such as Shakespeare and Donne with a metaphorical framework 
through which to explore the experience of being ‘beside oneself’ as a literal journey, a 
moment of temporary transformation, or an experience of intersubjective union. While 
Shakespeare might not engage directly with theologically inflected narratives of  ecstasy, 
this chapter posited that his works provide secular versions of  these ecstatic models.    
Having established Shakespeare’s interest in the ecstatic experience to be at one 
remove from these divine contexts, Chapters Three and Four explored other kinds of 
ecstatic experiences in Shakespeare’s works. In addition to the spiritual and geographic 
readings of ecstasy offered in the preceding chapters, Chapter Three demonstrated the 
extent to which ecstasy maps on to discourses of the body, especially in moments of 
amorous and erotic encounter. In light of Hamlet’s critically overlooked connection 
between ecstasy, time, and pulse-rate, this chapter brought to light the intersections 
between ecstasy and (little) death in period medical, philosophical, dramatic, and poetic 
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texts. In so doing, it explored the ecstatic experience as a moment of radical temporal 
suspension. Returning to the etymological sense of ‘ecstasy’ as the action of standing or 
being placed outside, Chapter Four explored the ecstatic experience as one of 
displacement and dislocation. Identifying that ‘trance’ carries senses of both emotional 
disposition and spatial dis-position—of suffering mental affliction and of finding oneself 
out of place—this chapter considered the experience of ‘suffering ecstasy’ as a 
consequence of such radical dislocation: of tranced subjects who experience the fracture 
of displacement. Having established in previous chapters the ecstatic dynamic of one self 
in two bodies, this final chapter inverted that model in order to consider how the 
experience of ecstatic displacement—a loss of place that manifested itself in a series of 
tranced moments, from Iago’s distracted plurality, to Cassio’s drunken fracture, to 
Othello’s violent medical seizure—could fashion a subject that embodies fractured, 
multiple selves. 
A further aim of this thesis has been to identify a lens through which to explore 
Renaissance conceptions of selfhood, and to offer a conception of ecstatic subjectivity. 
From the outset, this thesis established itself not as a study of the self-avowedly 
autonomous individual, but rather as a study of the dividual, and the experience of 
divisibility. At the very beginning of  this thesis, Cressida announced herself  as having 
both ‘a kind of  self  that resides with [Troilus]’ and ‘an unkind self  that itself  will leave | 
To be another’s fool’. This claim, one of  self-departure, self-fracture, and self-alienation, 
has echoed throughout this study, having been heard variously in claims such as ‘I have 
lost myself; I am not here’ (Rom., I.i.197) or ‘I will go lose myself ’ (Err., I.ii.29); from ‘am 
I not Hermia?’ (MND, III.ii.273) to ‘I am not what I am’ (TN, III.i.132; Oth., I.i.65). Each 
chapter has considered the dangers of  ecstatic existence, but so too has it shown the 
rewards. To consider moments of  ecstasis as this study has done, is to recognise that the 
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ecstatic subject enjoys a ‘kind of  self ’ that is constituted not by the moment of  arrival, 
but by the experience of  projection: a self  that is not fixed but is still coming into being, 
and which readily anticipates of  the next act of  departure. As Walter Pater writes 
emotively in the final stages of  The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry:  
Not the fruit of  experience, but experience itself, is the end. … To burn always 
with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. … While 
all melts under our feet, we may as well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any 
contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a 
moment.8 
 
To be ecstatic, Pater suggests in his characteristically celebratory mode, is to be ‘renewed 
from moment to moment’, and to enjoy the ‘strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving 
of  ourselves’.9  
 ‘I have a kind of  self  that resides with you, and an unkind self, that itself  will 
leave’: if, as Linda Charnes has described, this is Cressida’s ‘notorious identity’—an 
assertion that is characteristic of  a subject caught in a pre-established narrative—I have 
emphasized that this is also her ecstatic identity, her dividuality.10 While there is anguish 
and anxiety in this recognition of  divided selfhood—such that will later bring about 
similar distress in Troilus’ realisation that ‘this is and is not Cressid’ (V.ii.53)—this thesis 
has suggested the virtues of  such ecstatic existence. What Cressida highlights, 
acknowledging that she is in part constituted by her capacity to reside beyond, outside, 
away from home, is a notion that many of  the subjects herein have discovered: that 
selfhood is not neatly defined or established by a quest for autonomy or the experience 
of  abjection, but by the recognition that the self  is constituted by both, and that ipseity 
resides somewhere in the in-between. In so much as ecstasy enables the subject to make 
                                                             
8 Walter Pater, The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893), p. 
154. 
9 Ibid., p. 153; 154. 
10 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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the claim that ‘I have a kind of  self  that resides with you’—to acknowledge, in other 
words, that the self  might be formed in the interim between and the mingling of  self  and 
other—it discourages the subject from considering that model of  selfhood as the final 
destination. To experience ecstasy is not simply to be thrown beside oneself, but is to find 
that the self  was to some degree beside itself  already, and that subjectivity will always 
reside both at and within this threshold. 
 
We are [as Montaigne has it] never in ourselves, but beyond.11  
                                                             















In an article published in the New Scientist in 2014, Anil Anathaswamy considers the 
overlap between epilepsy and ecstasy from a modern medical perspective. Asking ‘Why 
do bliss and ecstasy sometimes accompany ecstatic seizures?’, Anathaswamy explores 
the ‘feelings of  bliss’ experienced by epileptic sufferers, and furthermore if  and how 
such ‘ecstatic epilepsy’ could ‘open a window on self-awareness more generally’.1 
Elsewhere, in her study of  ‘Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures’, Fabienne Picard, a neurologist 
at the University Hospital in Geneva, Switzerland, posits that the reason patients may 
not talk about their experiences may be ‘because the emotions are so strong and strange, 
maybe they feel embarrassed to speak about them; maybe they think the doctor will 
find them mad’.2 Ecstasy, even now, retains these associations with madness. But by 
encouraging her patients to speak about their ecstatic seizures, Picard observed that 
their sensations ‘could be characterized by three broad categories of  feelings’: 
heightened self-awareness, a sense of  physical wellbeing, and finally, intense positive 
emotions. The questions I have asked here regarding the interrelation between these 
altered states of  consciousness, and their impact on a subject’s sense of  self, are therefore 
questions that continue to be explored in modern medical study.  
Informed by the intersections between these issues, I proposed that the ‘Oxford-
Globe forum’ (December 2017)—a bi-annual event that brings together researchers and 
practitioners in medicine, theatre, and academia to explore a designated topic—take as 
its theme ‘Altered States’. Papers were invited on (but not limited to) a wide range of  
                                                             
1 Anil Anathanaswamy, ‘Fits of Rapture’, New Scientist, 25 January 2014, 45-7. 
2 Fabienne Picard, ‘Ecstatic Epileptic Seizures: A Potential Window on the Neural Basis for 
Human Self-Awareness’, Epilepsy and Behaviour, 16 (2009), 539-46.   
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topics—consciousness and unconsciousness, hallucinations, possession, sleep and 
dreaming, melancholy and anxiety, madness, anger, passion and passions, trances, 
voices, echoes, the senses, obsession, contagion, grief  and mourning—with an aim to 
enabling a discussion among different interests and disciplines. As well as academics 
from a number of  (primarily UK based) universities, speakers included members of  the 
NHS, and from the World Health Organisation. Of  particular relevance here is a paper 
by Christopher Bailey (of  the World Health Organisation), which spoke in many ways 
to Anathaswamy’s article, and to Picard’s study.3 Discussing his own experiences of  
epilepsy, Bailey articulated how this altered state of  consciousness, for him, had also 
altered his sense of  self: he described how, in moments of  seizure, he felt divided from 
himself, and felt his sense of  self  transforming. Recent research into the neurology of  
seizures, he suggested, located the effects of  epilepsy on the brain, and identified that 
the location that was affected was also the site that was associated with one’s sense of  
self. As Picard observes in her study, the neurological origin of  ‘ecstatic epilepsy’ pointed 
her towards the insula—a region of  the cortex that is of  growing interest to scientists 
studying consciousness. As Anathanaswamy observes: 
The portion of  the insula closest to the back of  the head deals with objective 
properties, such as body temperature, and the front portion, or anterior insula, 
produces subjective feelings of  body states and emotions, both good and bad. In 
other words, the anterior insula is responsible for how we feel about our body 
and ourselves, helping to create a conscious feeling of  ‘being’.4  
 
The suggestion in Chapter Four of  this study of  a link between ecstasy, epilepsy, and 
sense of  self, therefore, has a resonance with these modern experiences of  ‘ecstatic 
epilepsy’.  
 The aim of  the forum was to consider how these modern experiences and 
                                                             
3 Christopher Bailey, ‘The Neurology of Catharsis: Healing and Learning in Theatre’, Oxford-
Globe Forum conference paper (Oxford, 2017). 
4 Anathanaswamy, p. 46.  
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conceptions of  ‘altered states’ might not be at a remove from those considered in this 
thesis and in early modern studies more broadly, but could be placed in productive 
dialogue with them. Situated in between these papers, therefore, was a workshop 
session, co-ordinated by me and James Wallace, which staged a number of  the ‘altered 
states’ discussed in this thesis: Thaisa’s ‘entrancement’ and Pericles’ trance as he is 
reunited with Marina; the report of  Caesar’s ‘falling sickness’; Othello’s seizure; and the 
feigned seizures in Volpone and The Devil is an Ass. We prefaced each scene with early 
modern medical accounts of  these states, in particular the ‘falling sickness’ and accounts 
of  prolonged trances, including extracts from Shakespeare’s son-in-law John Hall and 
his Select Observations (published posthumously in 1657), Edward Jorden’s Brief  Discourse 
of  the Suffocation of  the Mother (1603), Helkiah Crooke’s Microcosmographia (1615), Pierre 
Charron on the ‘falling sickness’ (1608), and Meric Casaubon’s later consideration of  
an affinity between epilepsy and ecstasy (1654). 
The response to the workshop highlighted key differences in the reception to the 
feigned seizures in Jonson’s Volpone and The Devil is an Ass (see Chapter Four), and 
Othello’s seizure. The former, as expected, were performed, and received, comically: 
the audience laughed at the extent to which the characters adopted common traits of  
these altered states to serve their own ends. For Othello’s fit, which was staged at the 
end of  the session, we played the scene two ways: the first with a short trance, akin to a 
fainting spell; the second a more violent seizure or petite mal. Audience members noted 
that they felt more ‘moved’ by the second, and felt uncomfortable not only watching 
someone in a seizure and not assisting them, but furthermore watching someone watch 
someone else in a seizure, and not assisting them. In response to these issues, we again 
played the scene two ways, this time with a focus not only on Othello’s trance, but on 
Iago’s response to this seizure. The first time with Iago watching Othello for the 
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duration of  the trance; the second time with Iago turning his back, and delivering his 
‘work on, my medicine’ speech to the audience. These scenes provoked a number of  
comments and discussions, but one comment in particular stands out: an assertion from 
one of  the doctors in attendance that the appropriate response when a patient has an 
epileptic seizure is not to interfere: to stand back and not touch them. Medical 
practitioners also observed that the dramatizations of  the early modern states resonated 
with those they had seen in practice, where patients might not be able to remember how 
long they had been unconscious, or remember what they said or did in these altered 
states. 
I discuss this forum here because, to me, it suggests that there is still much to be 
gained from a consideration of  the intersections between various altered states of  
consciousness, and furthermore the intersection between the work of  early modern 
scholars, and modern medical practitioners. Having taken ecstasy as its primary focus, 
this study hopes to open up further avenues of  study surrounding altered states more 
broadly, and to invite further consideration about what they might tell us about our 
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